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ABSTRACT
Overexploitation of many fish stocks underlines the need for more effort
directed towards stock management so that the sustainability of resources is assured. To
avert the tragic consequences of overfishing in coastal waters, a growing body of
theOretical and empirical research provides evidence in support of cooperation among
resource users to manage their commons. This study aimed to investigate the factors
that contribute to the emergence and evolution of collective action in fishermen's
communities to manage their coastal fish resources in South Al-Batinah, Sultanate of
Oman. The study emphasises the importance of a collective action approach to fish
resource management with examples from three fishing towns.
In order to understand why fishermen choose to participate (or not to participate)
in local collective action to manage fish resources, the researcher focuses on six main
sets of issues that influence fishermen's decisions: economic factors; awareness of
resource exploitation problems; institutional rules in use; social identity, group size and
heterogeneity among resource users. Social and demographic factors as well as vessel
configuration were also considered.
Data collection for the study was carried out using three methods: questionnaire,
semi-structured interview and observations of fishermen's activities. Statistical reports
and other research papers carried out in Oman were also reviewed.
The study found that there is a management institution that governs the fishing
activities of the fishermen in the study area. Fishermen in the area inherited an
indigenous management institution, which was established hundreds of years ago. It
was also found that fishermen were very aware of the resource exploitation problems.
High awareness of the resource exploitation problems coupled with high
interdependence among users might induce them to work collectively to mitigate harm
to their long-term welfare.
The results of testing a number of hypotheses indicated that among the reasons
which may influence collective action, are high economic dependence on the fishery,
individuals' social identity as fishermen, awareness of the resources exploitation
problems, risk aversion and heterogeneity (differences in objectives and interests).
The study findings indicated that individuals using common resources are faced
by various "assurance" and "chicken" problems. In both the PD game and the Assurance
game, the preferred outcome is mutual cooperation. Whereas the predicted outcome of
the former is defection, the latter suggests the possibility that the preferred outcome
(i.e., cooperation) will occur, because individuals' decisions in the commons are
influenced by a complex set of factors, rather than strictly materialistic self-interest. The
analysis presented in this study examined several of those factors for their influence on
individual behaviour.
The findings of this study strongly suggest that the presence of local
management institutions to coordinate the fishermen's activities in the study area is the
key factor in avoiding the worst outcome (universal defection). The game structure has
been changed from a Prisoner's dilemma to a Privileged game or a game of Chicken
where the benefits from cooperation are maximized. It is the role of the institutions to
determine how the cost of providing the public goods might be shared among
participants.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Fish resources can be appropriately utilised and managed in common, but at the
same time they are susceptible to destruction by the users themselves in what has been
called the "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968). The literature abounds with
examples of overfished fisheries around the world. Fisheries management has often
failed in Europe and America and threatens to fail in developing countries too (Baland
and Platteau, 1996). The following quotation highlights this fact: "it is in the light of the
perverse logic of open access that the following distressing facts must be understood
Almost all the world's 200 fisheries monitored by the FAO are today fully exploited
One in three is depleted or heavily overexploited, almost all in developed countries"
(Baland and Platteau, 1996; p. 28).
Overexploitation of many fish stocks underlines the need for more effort
directed towards stock management so that sustainability of resources is ensured. To
avert the tragedy, a growing body of theoretical and empirical research developed
during the last twenty years provides evidence in support of cooperation among
resource users to manage their commons as an alternative to the expensive and often
inappropriate state management. There are many researchers who have focused on
factors that appear to influence individuals' decision-making in the commons. All these
experimental and empirical researches have contributed toward the development of
theory pertaining to the use of common property resources. These advances will help to
apply the theory and its applications in policy formulation and implementation in a field
setting.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
The inshore fish resources of Al-Batinah can be regarded as common pool
resources; they can be used jointly, because of the high cost of excluding fishermen in
the community, and their consumption is subtractive in the sense that fish caught by one
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fisherman are not simultaneously available for another fisherman (Wade, 1987; P. 96).
So, when fish are scarce, congestion is likely, causing conflicts and yield reduction in
the catch of individual fishermen. The coastal fisheries form vital parts of the
livelihoods of large sections of the population in the county, and the issue of how to
prevent their over-exploitation as population grows is of great importance for
development policy in Oman.
The inshore fisheries resources of the Sultanate of Oman have witnessed the
symptoms of overfishing especially the high value commercial species such as the
kingfish, lobster, shrimp, abalone, sardine and many other demersal species (Siddeek,
1995; Sultan, 1996; Moore and Dorr, 1994; Hooker and Parsons, 1995). A steep decline
in annual landings and in catch per unit of effort of many high value commercial
species is a testimony to the current situation.
Jentoft and Kristoffersen (1989) argued that management of fisheries resources
is commonly regarded as synonymous with management by the state as predicted by the
Hardin (1968) model and its sweeping pessimism about collective action. Resource
management of developing countries, as well as of many developed countries, is
concerned with regulating fishermen's activities to comply with the legislation.
The case of the Omani fishery is similar to the one stated above where the
Government provides measures to regulate fishermen's activities. However, failures of
state control to solve the problem of the commons are well documented in the literature
all around the world (Baland and Plateau, 1996; Runge, 1986; Berkes, 1989 and
Ostrom, 1990). But, in contrast, there are numerous instances of indigenous local
groups who, with or without governmeet support, have succeed in conserving and
managing their common property resources (see: Berkes, 1989; Baland and Platteau,
1996; Jentoft and Kristoffersen, 1989; Jentoft and McCay, 1995; Ostrom, 1990; Runge,
1986 and Scott, 1993). However, there are few examples in the literature where states,
on their own initiative, have successfully maintained common property resources for an
extended period of time. The existing situation points to the need for a management
strategy that will solve the common problems through cooperation between resource
users and the state.
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The fishery of Oman is managed by a Directorate-General within the Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries. A system of licensing small fishing vessels and fishermen is
in place, but remains unenforced. This is generally attributed to the fact that fishermen
in Oman are spread throughout the country in numerous villages, both small and large,
scattered along the 1,700 kilometres coastline. Lack of financial resources can be
added, as the Ministry has to spend a substantial amount of money to enforce its
licensing programme.
Looking at fish landings during the past few years, it can be seen that landing of
major groups of fish has been on the decline, despite the increase in the number of
fishermen and fishing boats, but within the group of commercially important species,
they have been affected severely (Siddeek, 1995). The population of kingfish
(Scomberomorus commerson), for example, has witnessed a steep decline during the
last nine years. The annual catch of kingfish declined from 25,000 metric tonnes
between 1987 and 1990 to 3,000 metric tonnes between 1991 and 1994 (Hooker and
Parsons, 1995). Based on late 1980 data, Don (1991) observed that sardine was caught
close to the optimum. Recent landing indicated a decline in the catch of many demersal
species of high market value, supporting the concern that overfishing has taken place.
The government in Oman is facing a challenge of balancing resource
exploitation and conservation. Fish resources in Oman are facing the tragedy of the
commons as individual fishermen invest in new fishing gear and increase their fishing
effort to raise their catch. The remedy to this situation is collective action by resource
users to limit fishing effort (Ostrom, 1990 and Runge 1986).
The approach taken in this thesis is that a social institution is needed to evolve
rules which fishermen understand, agree upon and are willing to monitor and comply
with. Mearns (1996) argued that the management of common-pool natural resources, in
particular, may be approached theoretically as a collective action problem, which arises
as a result of their subtractibility (rivalry) in use, and the difficulty of excluding
unauthorised users (nonexcludability). One good reason to use collective action in
resource management is because it is much cheaper in term of state resources than state
control or private ownership regimes. State control and private ownership are expensive
to implement, especially over a stretched coastline like the Omani coast.
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Overexploitation of fish resources in Oman and particularly in South Al-Batinah
result from a number of reasons. One reason is the rapid change in the institutional
setting in Oman. The traditional fisheries laws (Senat Al-Bahar or the local fisheries
management institution) which were governed by Islamic rules as well as customary
rules (established practices) have been changed. As argued by Dybro (1995), "In
relation to the development of agriculture in Oman, adhering to Islamic law (sharia)
was not only exercising a strict will to order, of "going by the book (Quran)", but also
flexibility and cooperation". Historically, the laws of Senat Al-Bahar were used to
govern the fish resources in the country. The objective is always to define
responsibilities, conserve the fishery and limiting personal and communal disputes.
With modern fisheries management the government has declared all fish resources to be
a national resource and as such empowers the relevant governmental agencies to
develop and protect these resources according to laws declared by Royal Decree. The
result of the new fisheries management institutions has been a need for more
coordination of policies between the various governmental agencies involved with
fisheries management. Each agency currently designs and implements policies aimed at
achieving each agency's objectives. Differences of interest and some duplication of
effort have occurred.
Overexploitation of fish resources resulted from the changes mentioned in the
above subsection. These have led to an increase in the number of fishermen and fishing
effort. Access to large urban markets (and markets in neighbouring Arabian Gulf
countries) increased the price of fish in the local markets. The rise in fish prices led to
an increase in the average revenue of the fishermen, and investment in fishing activities
became more lucrative which attracted more people to enter the fishery. This was
coupled with a government subsidised scheme to attract more Omani nationals to the
fishing occupation without due knowledge of the availability of sufficient fish
resources. Fishermen increase the numbers of units of gill nets or the number of traps
every year as the fish gets scarce, in their effort to achieve a higher economic gain. Fish
stocks have been exploited beyond their maximum sustainable yield and thus to rent
dissipation following intense competition between users for the resource.
Violence erupting over the fishing ground is common, causing boat and gear
damage. The local authority, in its effort to resolve the problem, passes new regulations
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to allocate fishing grounds, though few have been obeyed by fishermen. Allocation of
resources among fishermen must be carried out in a fairly and efficient manner
(Ostrom, 1990). If fishermen feel that the allocation of the fish resource is unfair and
not efficient, they have no motivation to contribute to the provision of the collective
goods. Gardner and Ostrom (1991) point out that unless the fishermen themselves
accept legislation as effective rules, they continue to play the fishing game as if the
legislation did not exist.
All this leads us to conclude that the inshore fish resources in Oman are
overexploited and there is a need for a new approach toward the management of fish
resources.
1.3 Theoretical and Conceptual Background
Several theories of collective action are commonly used to model common-pool
resources. These theories are: Garrett Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons; the Prisoners'
Dilemma Model of Strategic Choice; and Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action.
The public good theory (a sub-theory of collective action) can answer our question here,
as to the conditions under which fishermen commonly using fish resources may agree
on a set of rules to reduce fishing effort without external enforcers of the agreement.
The starting point for any analysis of common-pool resources is Garrett Hardin's
(1968) "tragedy of the commons" which has become the standard frame for so much of
the common-pool resources management (Blair, 1996). Hardin (1968) assumes that
common property resources users are individualistic and are unable to co-operate in
their collective interest. However, much empirical evidence challenges the use of
Hardin's model and its sweeping pessimism about collective action in general or some
kinds of common-pool resources management in particular. Co-operative means to
manage common pool resources have achieved successful results in many parts of the
world (see: McCay and Acheson, 1987; Ostrom, 1990; Berkes, 1987; Baland and
Platteau, 1996 and Salim, 1996).
Mancur Olson (1965) in his book, "The Logic of Collective Action", states that
provision of the public good depends largely on group size. He divides groups into
"small", "intermediate" and "large". As the size of the group increases, free riding
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becomes a dominant strategy according to Olson. Olson argues that the likelihood of
voluntary collective action (without selective punishments or inducements) is high for
small groups, low for large ones, and indeterminate for intermediate ones.
Sandler (1992) provides a more rigorous analysis of collective action. His
analysis shows that important exceptions exist to the themes proposed by Olson. For
example, the extent of suboptimality may be independent of group size. Large,
homogenous groups may be privileged, and their provision levels may increase with
group expansion (Sandler, 1992; p. 19). The provision of public good depends largely
on the notion of privilege. A privileged group will form when at least one individual
derives sufficient net benefits from the collective action to go it alone. The conditions
for a privileged group may depends on the technology of publicness and its relationship
to the underlying game structure (Sandler, 1992).
Ostrom (1990) argues that control of overexploitation of common property
resources can be achieved through institutional arrangement. Contracting is one
possibility to solve this problem. However, Johnson and Libecap (1982; pp. 19 - 20)
have shown that contracts are difficult to formulate when the group is not homogenous.
They reasoned this from the fact that agreement on effort restrictions is more costly for
heterogeneous groups (see also Libecap, 1994; pp. 589 - 590).
The aim of this study is to examine situational and individual factors that affect
individual co-operation and collective action to resolve problems in the commons.
Chapter Three provides a general literature review of the theoretical and empirical
background for the study.
1.4 Purpose and Objectives of the Study
The goal of this exploratory study is a contribution to ongoing theoretical
development in the field of collective action by examining individual and institutional
factors that affect individual participation in collective action to resolve the commons
problem. The study examines the factors that motivate individual fishermen to co-
ordinate their collective decisions to improve their collective well-being. The collective
action studied includes voluntary fishermen contributions to restrain resource
overexploitation. Reduction in fishing effort will establish a balance between
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overexploitation and resource conservation for sustainable production. The research
focuses on those factors which foster collective action.
The capture fishery is a frequently cited example of collective failures in which
exploiters' pursuit of profits lead to the attainment of their private interest and not the
group interest. A static analysis of the fishery will be demonstrated by this study based
on the work of Comes and Sandler (1996), and Sandler (1992).
The collective choice of fishermen will be analysed by a game theory approach.
There are a number of games of relevance for the collective action problems: the
Privileged game, the Assurance game (also called the game of trust); the game of
Chicken; and the Battle of the Sexes. This approach will be used to find the type of
game used by the fishermen in the study area.
The study undertaken by this thesis will investigate the factors that enhance
fishermen's co-operation in the study area to solve their common problem of reducing
fishing effort which threaten their common survival as the fish resource they depends
on is overexploited. To address the research questions the following objectives were
developed:
1. to provide a general picture of the structure, standard of living and other
activities of fishermen in the study area, and to explain the effects of these
socio-demographical factors on fishermen's ability to participate on collective
action;
2. to investigate the influence of institutional characteristics on fishermen's effort
to participate in collective action to co-ordinate resource use;
3. to investigate the influence of group size and group heterogeneity on
individual fishermen's collective decisions to manage their fishery;
4. to determine the factors which are influential on individual fishermen's
decisions to co-operate.
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1.5 Scope of the Study
The study of collective decisions of fishermen in South Al-Batinah, Sultanate of
Oman, focused on three towns: Barka, Al-Masn'a and Suwaiq. These three coastal
towns were selected to represent three groups of different fishermen population, to
enable examinations of the differences in individuals' attributes among the three towns
and their relationship to fishermen's decision to co-operate in the commons.
For the purpose of this study, the questionnaire methodology was complemented
by a semi-structured interview and observation technique to enhance the accuracy of the
findings. This study seeks to provide further evidence about the factors that enhance
collective action and the appropriateness of the collective action approach to fisheries
management to solve the commons problem.
1.6 Thesis Organisation
The thesis covers the factors that appear to be responsible to enhance or hinder
the emergence of collective action and the appropriateness of collective action to be
used as an alternative to state management or private ownership of common property
resources. It comprises ten chapters, including this introductory chapter. This chapter
(Chapter One) has stated the problem and the importance of the study, as well as
highlighting the theoretical background for the study of collective action. The
remaining chapters are organised as follows: Chapter Two provides a review of the
Sultanate of Oman Fishing sector with special reference to the traditional fisheries. It
discuses the importance of the fisheries sector to the Omani economy, trends in fish
landings and fishing efforts and the current fisheries management approach as well as
the problem of overfishing in coastal areas. Chapter Three presents a literature review
for the study of collective action in the commons. It explores the theoretical and
empirical development in the field of collective action and focuses on the different
factors that might be selected to test hypotheses designed for this study. Chapter Four
investigates the influence of institutional characteristics on fishermen's effort to
participate in collective action to co-ordinate resource use. It explores the changes in
the underlying game structure with different institutional arrangements.
8
Chapter Five presents the conceptual framework for the study. Chapter Six
outlines the research methodology selected and then explains in detail the application of
that methodology to the South Al-Batinah fishery. Then Chapter Seven presents a
detailed statistical analysis of the study population covering its economic, social and
demographic profile. Chapter Eight discusses the characteristics of the fishery studied
and gives the background to common dilemmas that confront the fishermen and the way
they are solved. It also highlights the local indigenous management institution that has
been used to manage the fisheries for several generations. Chapter Nine identifies and
quantifies factors or attributes that are influential in fishermen's decision to participate
in collective action to manage the coastal fishery in South Al-Batinah. Chapter Ten
presents the findings about the collective action problems facing fishermen in their use
of the fishery. Then in Chapter Eleven, the researcher presents a conclusion and
recommendations, as well as suggestions for further research.
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CHAPTER TWO
AN OVERVIEW OF THE FISHERIES SECTOR IN THE
SULTANATE OF OMAN
2.1 Introduction
The main aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the fisheries sector, in
both its traditional and commercial dimensions. More emphasis is devoted to the
activities of the traditional sector as this is the main concern of this study. In this chapter
the importance of the fishery among other sectors, its economic significance, and the
potential of fish resources in the Omani waters are discussed. The chapter will also
describe the technological changes that have taken place during the last two decades and
the effect of these on landings of the traditional fishermen. The last section is concerned
with the management of the fisheries in Oman and the problem of overfishing in coastal
waters.
2.2 Country Profile
The Sultanate of Oman forms the south-eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula.
Oman, with its 309,500 square kilometres of very varied, striking terrain and its two
million inhabitants is the second largest state (after Saudia Arabia) in the Arabian
Peninsula. Its geographical location on the map lies between latitudes 16° 40' and 26°
20' North and longitudes 51 0 50' and 59° 40' East. The country is bounded to the south
by the Republic of Yemen; to the west by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates;
to the north by the Strait of Hormuz; and to the east by the Arabian Sea. The coast
stretches a distance of 1,700 kilometres, from Ras Musandam, on the southern side of
the Strait of Hormuz in the north, to the Batinah plain that inclines south-east towards
Muscat through the A'Sharquiyah region to the near-tropical Salalah region in the south
near the Republic of Yemen.
With its subtropical location, Oman's rainfall is relatively low and irregular with
the exception of the southern region, where heavy rains occur during the Monsoon
season (June - September). The climate varies across the regions. In the coastal areas it
is hot and humid in summer (May - September), but pleasant in winter (October -
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April). In the interior, it is hot and dry during summer, although it is temperate all year
around in some higher locations such as the Jabal al-alchdar plateau which is 3,075
metres above sea level.
Geographically, the country is divided into five administrative divisions called
regions (Al-Batinah, A'Daldiliya, A'Sharquiyah, ADahira, Al-Wusta) and three other
divisions called governorates (Muscat, Dhofar, Musandam). Each of these regions and
governorates is divided into smaller administrative divisions called Walayat. There are
59 Walayats (towns), each administered by Government representative called a Wali
(Governor) (Ministry of Development, 1993; p. 28).
According to Donaldson, (1980; p. 480) 'fishing communities along the coast of
Oman have existed certainly for many centuries and probably for several millennia, and
most travellers in the area over the years have testified to the large quantities offish
caught". The sea has contributed much to the character of the coastal Omani settlers.
The Omani maritime trade flourished between the seventh to the fifteenth centuries,
during which period a major trading empire was formed in the region. Omani ships
regularly called at ports in Persia, India and South East Asia (Ministry of Information,
1995; p. 27). They also reached Canton in China as early as the eighth century. In 1507,
the famous Omani navigator Ahmed bin Majid guided the Portuguese sailor Vasco da
Gama round the Cape of Good Hope, discovering an important sea route to India (ibid.).
Since the first export shipment of oil from the country in late 1960s Oman has
had an oil-based economy (70 % of the national income), affected by the fluctuation in
world oil prices. The major violent slump in oil prices witnessed in 1986 resulted in a
11.3 percent devaluation of the Omani Rial. Although world oil prices have made
considerable recovery since then, during the last quarter of 1998 the Omani crude was
sold at $9 a barrel, well below the $18 which would be a comfortable price for the
Omani economy and resulting in 50 percent reduction on oil revenue compared to
previous years.
Due to the uncertainty of world oil prices the Government has been exerting
efforts to diversify the economy away from its dependency on oil revenue, and a
considerable degree of success has been achieved. The major non-oil resources are
agriculture, fisheries and minerals. To these can be added tourism, trade and light to
medium industries, which have developed rapidly during the last 15 years, and
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contribute to the national income. These non-oil sectors have the potential to make
substantial contributions to the national economy and their share of the GDP is steadily
increasing. For example, the manufacturing sector, which contributed less than one
percent to GDP at current prices in 1980, has grown remarkably since then, its
contribution rising to six percent by 1994 (Pinto, 1995).
2.3 An Overview of the Fisheries Sector
Fishing and agriculture have been traditional Omani occupations and major
sources of food and employment for the people in Oman. For example, before the
discovery of oil in the country, agriculture and fisheries dominated the Omani economy,
with around 80 percent of the population depending on these two sectors. Although the
structure of the Omani economy has changed since the discovery of oil in the late
1960s, which caused agriculture to lose its position as the main contributor, agriculture
and fisheries at present are among the major contributors to the national economy. It is
estimated that at present around 50 percent of the population in Oman still depend on
these sectors (Oman Daily Newspaper, 10 November 1997 and Ministry of Information,
1997; p. 134). The development of these sectors has the potential to increase the
national GDP under the government strategy to diversify the national economy. Besides
their contribution to the GDP, the development of these sectors has secured a
continuous supply of food and will eventually reduce the dependency on food-
producing nations.
The importance of the agriculture and fisheries sectors has attracted the attention
of the government, whose investment in these sectors has steadily increased.
Government investment in both sectors showed an average growth rate of 13.5 percent
per year during the period 1971 - 1995, although this rate was reduced during the Fourth
Five-year Plan (1991 - 1995) to an average of 1.5 percent per year (Oman Daily
Newspaper, 10 November 1997). Government investment in these sectors has
contributed to a noticeable growth in both of them; the average growth rate achieved
during the period 1971 - 1995 was 9.9 percent per year, around three times the rate of
population growth in Oman, which means that a higher percentage of self sufficiency in
food has been achieved.
The agriculture sector's share of the gross national product was 3 percent in
1995, and is expected to rise to 3.1 percent by 2020 (Ministry of Development, 1996; p.
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240). Similarly, future Government planning for the Omani economy places major
emphasis on the fisheries sector. The sector is expected to grow at an annual average
rate of 5.6 percent by the year 2020. The fisheries sector is expected to contribute
around 2 percent to the gross national product in 2020 compared to its level of 1.1
percent recorded in 1995 (Ministry of Development, 1996; p. 242).
Oman is one of the most important countries engaged in fishing in the Middle
East. The 1,700 km coastline, with a commercial fishing area of 350,000 km 2, has rich
fishing grounds, the potential of which has yet to be fully evaluated. A 200 nautical mile
exclusive economic zone, extending out toward the sea from the baseline from which
the territorial waters are determined, was declared. The climatic conditions induced by
the prevailing south-easterly and north-easterly winds contributed to the phenomenon of
upwelling which is responsible for the annual recycling of nutrients. The presence of
upwelling along the coastline brings to the surface nutrient rich deep-water from the
ocean, which is an essential component for the productivity of the phytoplankton, which
constitute the start of the marine food chain. The Arabian sea (on the eastern coast of
Oman), for, example, is characterised by better circulation to the open ocean and high
availability of the nutrient rich deep water which makes it among the most biologically
productive seas in the world. There are 930 fish species available in the Omani waters,
including 52 inshore species, of which four required new generic names (Randolph,
1995; cited in Sultan, 1996).
Given the high abundance of fish in Omani waters and its importance to the
livelihood of thousands of people, the fisheries sector is a significant sector in the
Omani economy. There is a strong fishing tradition in Oman, and a large number of
small villages scattered along the coast, from which around 26,000 small-scale
fishermen operated in 1997.
With the advent of a petroleum-based economy, Oman underwent rapid social
and economic changes causing a drift away from fishing communities by young men to
the cities where they could earn better wages, leading to a shortage in manpower skills
from the traditional occupations. The Government has recognised the effects of its
development programmes on traditional occupations and urgent steps have been taken
to stem this drift by initiating programmes to develop the traditional fishing sector and
help the people to continue with their fishing occupation. With such encouragement,
there has been a substantial increase in the number of fishermen, indicating the strong
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interest of people in fishing as an occupation. The situation has now stabilised with
26,096 fishermen directly employed in the fisheries sector in 1997 compared to only
11,750 recorded in 1985 (Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Annual statistics report
for 1997). The sharp increase in the number of fishermen is attributed mainly to the
introduction in 1978 of the Fishermen's Encouragement Fund, which encouraged coastal
inhabitants to keep to their traditional occupation. The Fund provides financial
assistance for the purchase of fibreglass fishing boats, engines and fishing gear. The
Agriculture and Fisheries Bank administered the Government's subsidy programme to
upgrade the fishermen's socio-economic conditions and make the fisheries profession
attractive. For example, during the Second Five-year Fisheries Development Plan (1980
- 1985), the bank processed subsidised loans to small-scale fishermen with a total value
of RO 4.073 million ($ 10.61 million) at a two percent interest rate.
The fisheries of Oman are divided into traditional and commercial fisheries,
though the traditional sector continues to be the corner stone of the fisheries sector in
the country. For example, in 1994 the traditional fishery contributed around 84 percent
of the total national landings, the balance being produced by the commercial sector,
which is composed of foreign-owned demersal trawlers and longliners. The traditional
fishing fleet has been enhanced by increasing the number of units (11,746 in 1997), and
replacing the old and inefficient units. By 1993, almost all the traditional fishing vessels
had been mechanised by means of the Fishermen's Encouragement Fund. The total
Government expenditure during the period 1978 - 1992 to subsidise the traditional
fishermen reached RO 6 million, used to help around 16,162 fishermen. During the
same period, around 8,462 fibreglass fishing skiffs and 14,106 engines were subsidised.
2.4 The Economic Significance of the Fisheries Sector
The significance of the fisheries sector to the national economy stems from its
contributions to: (a) the national GDP; (b) national exports, and hence, foreign
exchanger; (c) sources of animal protein and (d) provision of employment opportunities.
(a) Contribution to the national GDP: The fisheries sector's contribution to the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in market prices has enjoyed modest growth in the
period 1980 - 1994, with a sharp increase in 1987 in which the GDP was 68 percent
above the 1980 level (Table 2.1). Following 1987, the sector witnessed modest growth
1 A rate of RO 0.384 to US $ 1 has been used as a rate of exchange in this study.
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again until it peaked again in 1995. The year of 1995 witnessed a significant growth,
which saw the sector's 1995 GDP 69 percent above that recorded in the previous year,
and 209 percent above the 1980 level (Ministry of Development, 1997; pp. 341 - 348).
Although the sector's GDP was on the increase, there have been some sharp
reversals. For example, the GDP in 1988 was 10.6 percent below the 1987 level and
another sharp decline was recorded again in 1991 when the sector's GDP was 21 percent
below the 1990 level. In 1996, the sector's GDP was RO 46.2 million, 11 percent below
the 1995 level (Table 2.1). During the period 1980 to 1995, the relative contribution of
the fisheries sector to the non-oil GDP at current prices ranged from 0.85 percent to
1.92 percent, averaging of 1.32 percent. As a proportion of the total GDP, the sector's
GDP during the same period accounted for between 0.5 percent to 1.0 percent at an
average of 0.72 percent. The fisheries sector is expected to contribute around 2 percent
to the gross national product in 2020 compared to its level of 0.8 percent recorded in
1996 (Ministry of Development, 1996; p. 240).
Table 2.1 Key Indicators of the Fisheries Sector (1980 - 1996)
Year Sector GDP
(million)2
Annual
growth (%)
GDP share (%) Share of non-
oil GDP (%)
1980 16.9 0.8 1.92
1981 19.7 16.57 0.7 1.76
1982 21 6.60 0.8 1.62
1983 24.8 18.10 0.8 1.68
1984 24.1 -2.82 0.7 1.42
1985 22.1 -8.30 0.6 1.21
1986 21.6 -2.26 0.7 1.12
1987 28.3 31.02 0.9 1.54
1988 25.3 -10.60 0.8 1.26
1989 27.3 7.91 0.8 1.30
1990 28.1 2.93 0.6 1.17
1991 22.1 -21.35 0.5 0.85
1992 26.7 20.81 0.6 0.93
1993 26.9 0.75 0.6 0.88
1994 30.9 14.87 0.6 0.96
1995 52.2 68.93 1 1.55
1996 46.2 -11.1 0.8 1.3
Average 27.3 8.30 0.72 1.32
Source: Ministry of Development (1997); pp. 341 - 348.
2 Current prices
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(b) Contribution to Foreign Exchange Earning: In terms of foreign exchange
earning, fish exports increased steadily between 1981 and 1988, then fluctuated around
RU 19 million between 1989 and 1994 (Figure 2.1). The year 1995 witnessed a
significant increase in the value of fish exports, reaching RU 41.2 million, which was
117 percent above the 1994 level. Fish exports declined in 1996 to 10.4 percent below
the 1995 level. As shown in Figure 2.1 a further 27 percent reduction in the value of fish
exports was recorded in 1997. The value of fish exports in 1997 was 34 percent below
the 1995 level. Similarly, the quantity of fish exported increased steadily and peaked in
1995 when 59.2 thousand tonnes were exported, which was 33 percent above the 1994
level. After 1995, the quantity of fish exported was on the decline. In 1996 it was 34.9
percent below the 1995 level and a further 5.4 percent reduction was observed in 1997.
The 1997 exports were therefore 40.3 percent down on the 1995 level (Figure 2.1).
The reduction in the quantity and value of fish exports was to be expected due to
the declining trends of the landings of the traditional sector during the same period.
Restrictions imposed by the European Union on fish imports that do not comply with
the Union standard are another factor which contributed to reduce the quantity and
value of fish exported from the country. At present only one factory (belonging to the
Oman Fisheries Company) meets the standards for exporting fish to Europe.
Fish exports are considered to be a significant earner of foreign exchange to the
national economy, ranking second after oil exports and first among the non-oil exports.
• Exports El Value
co	 t()	 co	 Lc)
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Years
Figure 2.1 Fish Exports in Metric Tonnes and Value in (RO 000s), 1981 - 1997
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(c) Contribution to food security: Fish has been an important staple food for
the Omani coastal inhabitants for countless centuries, providing a large portion of their
protein requirements. Even the interior populations have long depended on fish landed
along the coasts of the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman, which were transported by
camel and donkeys to the interior in dried or salted forms. At present fish is transported
chilled with ice or in refrigerated trucks to the interior over an excellent network of
national highways. As stated by Jenkinson (1987) 'fish consumption per capita in Oman
is high when compared with other nations in the Arab region". According to the 1983
FAO Yearbook of Fisheries statistics, per capita fish consumption in Oman was 20.3 kg
(ibid.). However, by employing a flesh yield coefficient of 70 percent, the actual per
capita consumption of fish was closer to 14.2 kg / year. Table 2.2 provides a rough
estimate of the per capita fish consumption in Oman during 1997. As shown in Table
2.2, the per capita fish consumption was 20.3 kg per year. The figure represents the
quantity of fish available to each person in Oman during the 1997 after fish exports and
losses due to poor handling were deducted and by employing a generic flesh yield
coefficient of 70 percent.
Table 2.2 Apparent Consumption of Fish in Oman during 1997.
Total fish landings 119,000 metric tonnes
Exports - 36,000 metric tonnes
Balance 83,000 metric tonnes
Losses due to poor handling g 30 %
_
- 24,900 metric tonnes
Amount available to be consumed by the 2
millions total population
58,100 metric tonnes
Yield coefficient @ 70 % of the 58,100
metric tonnes available in the country
40,670 metric tonnes
Fish consumption per capita 20.3 kilos/ year
The average total fish landings in Oman between 1985 and 1997 were 121, 000
metric tonnes, of which between 70 to 80 percent was consumed locally and the balance
exported. This indicates that the country has achieved self-sufficiency in an important
source of animal protein. However, current landings must be sustained or more efforts
should be directed to the exploitation of the off-shore fishery in order to increase fish
landings to off-set the increased demand inside the country as the result of the high
population growth rate, which was estimated at 3.5 percent in 1993 (Ministry of
Development, 1993).
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(d) Contribution to employment opportunities: The other significant role of
the fisheries sector is its contribution to employment for the Omani people. The
fisheries sector provides thousands of employment opportunities for Omani nationals,
especially those inhabiting the coastal villages. The sector provided direct employment
for 26,000 traditional fishermen in 1997. Another 4,000 people are engaged in fisheries-
related activities, such as fish handling, selling, processing and distribution as well as
ancillary industries like workshop mechanics and selling of fishing gears and spare
parts. Therefore, the fisheries sector provides direct employment for around 30,000
Omani nationals, or 1.5 percent of the total population. More employment opportunities
are to be created in the fisheries-based industry that is planned to be established around
the fishing ports currently under construction. There would also be around 3,500
employment opportunities for the Omani people if the commercial fleet were to be fully
Omanized. The fisheries sector is expected to employ around 50,000 fishermen in 2020
compared to its level of 26,000 fishermen recorded in 1997 (an interview with Dr.
Mohamed Ridha, Director General of the DGFR, Oman Daily Newspaper, 4 July 1998).
2.5 Fish Landings
Although the traditional fishery is still predominantly small-scale, it constitutes
the most important sub-sector, accounting for about 86 percent of the total fish landings
in 1985. There do not appear to be any statistics available relating to fish landings in the
early 70s but Table 2.3 shows the annual fish landing between 1985 and 1997. Two
distinct peaks can be noticed from Table 2.3. The total quantity of fish landed rose
sharply through the 1980s, peaking first in 1988 when landings rose from 94,900 metric
tonnes in 1985 to 166,100 metric tonnes in 1988. This sharp increase in fish landings
was attributed to technological development as a result of the fisheries development
programme initiated by the Government to upgrade the sector. For several years
following that peak, catches decreased (Figure 2.2). Total landings hit a low of 112,300
metric tonnes in 1992 but then generally increased. This was considered as the first sign
of overfishing which was caused by excessive pressure on the coastal fisheries resulting
from the development programme during the 1980s (Siddeek, 1995; Sultan, 1996).
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Table 2.3 Total Fish Landings (000's tonnes) and Value (RO million) between 1985
and 1997
Year / Sector Traditional Commercial Total
Landing Value Landing Value Landing Value
1985 81.5 22.34 13.4 2.7 94.9 25.04
1986 82.8 21.83 13.6 2.73 96.4 24.56
1987 124.1 30.52 10.9 2.46 135.0 32.98
1988 148.2 27.25 17.9 6.7 166.1 33.95
1989 105.2 27.73 12.3 5.7 117.5 33.43
1990 99.8 27.11 18.8 7.5 118,6 34.61
1991 103.5 22.26 14.2 6.09 117.7 28.35
1992 97.0 26.01 15.3 6.61 112.3 32.62
1993 92.4 24.39 24.0 9.91 116.4 34.3
1994 97.5 28.67 21.0 9.70 118.5 38.4
1995 108.6 47.25 31.3 13.62 139.9 60.87
1996 89.0 39.9 33.0 14.0 122.0 53.90
1997 84.0 45.2 34.50 14.2 119.0 59.40
(Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Annual Statistics Report for
1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997)
However, total fish landings started to increase gradually after 1992 reaching
second peak in 1995, at about 139,900 tonnes, but declined again since then (Figure
2.2). The total fish landings in 1996 were 122,000 metric tonnes, 13 percent lower than
those recorded in 1995. The following year (1997) another 2.5 percent reduction in fish
landings was recorded (Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Annual Statistics Report
for 1997). The average fish landing during the period 1985 to 1997 amounted to
121,000 metric tonnes.
In 1997, the total fish landings in Oman were 119,000 metric tonnes,
representing a small decline of 3,000 tonnes compared to the landings of 1996 which
amounted to 122,000 tonnes (ibid.). Out of the total fish landings, the traditional
fishermen produced 84,000 tonnes of fish, representing 71 percent of the total fish
landings, which was 4,100 tonnes short of that landed in 1996. Despite the decline in
fish landings, the value of the landed fish continued to increase, reaching RO 59.4
million in 1997 compared to RO 53.9 million in 1996 (Table 2.3).
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Figure 2.2 Landings Trends in the Sultanate of Oman, 1985 - 1997
It is reasonable to relate the increasing trend in total landings during the 1980s to
the progressive expansion of the number and type of fishing vessels. The initial impetus
for the expansion of the traditional fishing fleet occurred in 1978 when the government
launched the Fishermen's Encouragement Fund. The fund provides financial assistance
for the acquisition of fibreglass fishing vessels and engines to replace the native wooden
fishing vessels. Statistical figures available for 1985 onwards suggested that the number
of fishing vessels (the vast majority of which were motorised fibreglass skiffs)
increased by 31 percent from about 9,000 vessels in 1985 to 11,750 vessels in 1997.
Regarding the number of fishermen, this has increased in an exponential
manner, from 11,750 in 1985 to 26,095 in 1997, an increase of 121 percent. The sharp
increase in the number of fishermen can be attributed to the government programme to
encourage local people to stick to their occupation and to the shortage of alternative
employment opportunities facing the country since the early 1990s with the advent of
low oil prices.
Despite the declining trend of the total fish landings, as well as the traditional
ones, figures for the value of landed fish follow an increasing trend as shown in Figure
2.3. As can be observed from Figure 2.3, from 1993 onward, the values of the landed
fish continued to increase, but at a higher rate. The value of the landed fish in 1987 was
RO 30 million, and had jumped to RO 60 million by 1997; in other words, it doubled
during a period of 10 years. This increase in the value of the total landings is ascribed
mainly to the increase in the value of the landings produced by the traditional
fishermen, which reached its highest level during the last five years as shown in Figure
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2.3. The value of the catch landed by traditional fishermen follows a similar trend to the
total; it witnessed a sharp increase after 1993, despite the declining trend in the quantity
landed. The value of landings produced by the traditional fishermen represented 76
percent of the total value landed in 1997.
Figure 2.3 Value of the Fish Landings in RO Million Between 1985 - 1997.
Although fish landings declined for several years, this improvement in the value
of the landed catch can be related to the improvement in the quality of the landings and
reduction of waste due to bad handling and storage. This can be ascribed to the newly
built landing facilities and cold storage constructed by the Government. During the
Fourth Five-year Plan (1991 - 1995), the government planned to build eight large
fishing ports and 16 smaller ones along the coast to provide landing facilities in order to
improve fish handling and to create fishing based industry around these facilities. In
1994, the government allocated RO 40 million ($104 million) to build 12 fishing ports,
five of which are currently in operation (Oman Daily Newspaper, 15 January 1994).
The value of the landings produced by the commercial sector, in comparison,
although it has increased for the last six years, has done so at a slower rate (Figure 2.3).
In 1997, the value of the catch landed by the commercial sector reached RO 14.2
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million, making a small increase of RO 200,000 compared to the corresponding figure
for 1996. During the last ten years, the value of the landings of the commercial sector
has increased from about RO 2.7 million in 1985 and 1986 to RO 14.2 million in 1997,
making an increase of 426 percent. The percentage contribution of the commercial
sector to the total value of the landings was 24 percent in 1997, as compared to 10.7
percent in 1985. The increase in the value and landings of the commercial sector can be
related to the rapid expansion of the commercial fishing fleet in the Omani waters,
especially during the 1990s.
As indicated above, the total fish landings in Oman are made up of landings
from the traditional and the commercial sectors. The traditional fishery plays a
significant role in the Omani fishery. However, as indicated in Figure 2.2, the landings
of the traditional fishery have shown a declining trend for several years since the late
1980s. For example, during the period of 1985 to 1992, the average percentage
contribution of the traditional fishery to the total landings was about 88 percent.
However, for several years following 1992, this share was on the decrease; the average
percentage contribution declined to 77 percent during the period 1993 to 1997 (Figure
2.4).
The contribution of the traditional fishery to the total landings was 71 percent in
1997. It is reasonable to expect that the declining trend in the landings of the traditional
fishermen during the last eight years would be correlated with the progressive
expansion in the number of fishing vessels and fishermen. It is interesting to see that
fishing effort has been on the increase during the same period. Therefore, this gradual
decline in the catch of the traditional fishermen can be largely attributed to overfishing
in inshore waters.
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Figure 2.4 Percentage Share of the Traditional and the Commercial Catch of the
Total Landings
In contrast to the traditional sector, the landings of the commercial sector have
been on the increase, especially during the 1990s as indicated in Figure 2.4. The average
percentage contribution of the commercial sector to the total landings has risen from
less than 10 percent before 1987 to around 30 percent in 1997 (Figure 2.4). The
commercial sector refers to large fishing vessels that either operate trawl nets targeting
demersal species or long-lines to catch large pelagics on the high seas. The involvement
of foreign fleet in the Omani fishery was first started in 1976 when the Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries entered into a contract with a Japanese fishing company and
later on with a Korean company in 1978, allowing these companies to operate in the
Omani waters against a percentage of the catch.
In 1989, the Government decided to give five private Omani companies a
production quota. The Oman Fisheries Company is a leading commercial company
which was established in 1989. Twenty-four percent of its equity is owned by the
Government and the rest is held by thousands of shareholders. Oman Fisheries
Company, like other local fishing companies, does not fish on its own account but has
been contracting demersal fishing rights to Korean and lately to Chinese trawl operators
and large pelagic fishing rights to the Taiwanese. The number of foreign vessels
licensed by Omani private companies since 1989 has varied, as has the sharing system
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employed in exchange for fishing authorisation. The percentage of the catch retained by
local companies, for example, has varied from 39 percent in 1988 to its current level of
20 percent. Foreign fleet operators consider such long-term fishing businesses to be
profitable, as evidenced by the long period of the contract.
The number of foreign fishing vessels has also varied between 1989 and 1997.
There were 9 trawlers operating in Omani waters during 1990 to 1992. The number
increased gradually to 25 in 1994 and then dropped to 19 in 1995. The number of
trawlers fishing in Omani waters in 1997 was 21. Similarly, the number of longliners
varies according the availability of the large pelagics; there were 135 in 1994, 74 in
1995 and 96 in 1997 (Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Annual Statistics Report
for 1997).
To protect the traditional fishermen's fishing grounds, foreign fishing vessels are
required to operate at about 10 nautical miles from the coastline or 50 metres depth,
whichever is farther, in relation to the trawlers and about 20 nautical miles in the case of
the longliners. Despite the Ministry's effort to monitor the activities of the foreign
fishing fleets, a lot of criticism is directed towards their activities in Omani waters. As
stated by Sultan (1996) "there is a gross under-reporting of the catch to the authorities
and the possibility of off-loading on the high seas is often mentioned". Intrusion into the
rich fishing grounds of the traditional fishermen can be added to the above criticisms, as
confirmed by regular conflicts with traditional fishermen and court suits for various
controversies which reached 541 between 1990 and 1995 (Sultan, 1996).
2.6 The Traditional Fishing Fleet
Although the vast majority of fishing vessels are motorized, the traditional
fisheries are still predominantly small-scale fisheries. As shown in Figure 2.5, the
traditional fishing fleet is composed of five types of fishing vessels. However, fibreglass
vessels (5 to 10 metres long, powered by outboard petrol engines) dominate the fishing
fleet. As shown in Figure 2.5, such vessels represent around 79 percent of the traditional
fishing fleet. Fishermen also operate Houris (traditional wooden vessels, 8 metres long
with an outboard engine), 14 - 16 metre Dhows (traditional wooden vessels with an
inboard diesel engine) and Shashas (traditional vessels made of a shell of stripped date
palm fronds tied with palm fibre cord and filled with palm frond butts to give
buoyancy). The Houris used to be found along the coast in all regions, and dominated
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the fishing fleet up until late 1970s. The larger wooden vessels (Dhows) are currently
operated in big numbers in A'Sharquiyah region, and to a lesser extent in Musandam
region, according to the availability of harbours. The Shashas, on the other hand, can
only be found on the low, sandy Al-Batinah coast of Northern Oman. Although there
are around 965 vessels of the Shasha type in Al-Batinah, these fishing vessels rarely
make any landings at the markets of the three towns surveyed by the researcher. This
was also confirmed by many studies conducted in the area (Hooker and Parsons, 1995).
It is believed that the catch made by these vessels is primarily for subsistence use.
Fishing vessel tenure includes family-owned vessels with family operators and
non-family labour, and individually-owned and operated vessels with hired labour
(Omezzine, Zaibet and Al-Oufi, 1996). Returns from the family owned vessels are
distributed among the family members according to their contribution to the operation
of the boat and ownership.
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Figure 2.5 The Traditional Fishing Vessels per Type, 1997
Over the last 28 years, there has been a rapid increase in the number of small
fibreglass vessels as a result of Government subsidies, accompanied by a rapid decline
in the number of wooden Houris. The number of wooden Houris declined from 1684 in
1987 to 794 in 1997 (Hochtief, 1987; Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Annual
Statistics Report for 1997). Shashas have also been on the decline during the same
period. The number of Shashas declined from 2,866 in 1987 to its lowest level of 965 in
1997. During the same period, the number of fibreglass fishing vessels increased from
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2,601 (Hochtief, 1987) to 9262, an increase of 256 percent (Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries, Annual Statistics Report for 1997).
Fishermen prefer these small fibreglass fishing vessels because they are light,
and so much more easily beached than the wooden vessels, which is especially useful in
places which lack proper berthing facilities, as do many places along the coast at
present. The tendency of these vessels to dominate the traditional fleet poses a number
of problems. Because of their small size, these vessels are vulnerable to sea conditions.
As a consequence, their fishing operation is restricted to the inshore areas, which results
in intensified pressure on coastal stocks. Moreover, the small size of these vessels
prevents fishermen from taking ice on their fishing voyages to preserve the quality of
the catch, thus restricting their sea time capability significantly.
Very low entry costs (vessels are cheap and available secondhand), have
contributed to raising the number of individually-owned and operated fibreglass vessels.
Crew (boatless workers with fishing skills) aboard the larger wooden Dhows find it
more profitable to operate their own fishing vessels instead of working as crew. As the
number of owner-operators of these small fibreglass boats increased, the situation
created a shortage of hired fishing labour in coastal communities to work as crew
aboard the larger fishing boats. As a consequence, the number of the larger wooden
Dhows has declined gradually. The Dhows are regarded as more productive, can
undertake longer voyages, and have more space for storage, than the fibreglass vessels;
thus, they are more able to fish in the off-shore waters.
2.7 Resource Surveys by Research Vessels
Estimation of the annual yield is based on researches and observations
conducted by various consultant teams during the past 20 years. In general it is
recognised that the Omani water contains abundant resources which are not exploited by
the Omani fishermen. Three research surveys have been undertaken in the Omani
exclusive economic zone, (EEZ), over the recent years, by using trawl nets and acoustic
integration techniques, to evaluate the availability of demersal and pelagic resources.
The FAO survey (1990), the first extensive and major survey, provides the first
adequate information base to develop an appropriate and scientific management of the
fish resources. A total of 156 demersal species belonging to more than 30 families were
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documented during this survey. Of these, only 99 species from 15 families were
considered of commercial interest (Al-Abdissalam, 1991).
On the basis of the results of the survey conducted aboard the vessel
Rastrelliger, in 1990, the total biomass of small pelagic species amounted to 252,000
metric tonnes and the potential yield of this resource was estimated at around 59,000
metric tonnes. This was less 80 per cent than the previous estimates by the vessel
Fridtjof Nansen in 1983. The report indicated a 36 per cent increase in the biomass of
the demersal resource.
The estimated total biomass of demersal resources was 564,000 metric tonnes
(Al-Abdissalam, 1991). The total potential annual yield of demersal species is estimated
at 126,000 metric tonnes, of which 67,000 metric tonnes is the potential yield for
commercial fish species. The total landing of demersal species during the period 1987 -
1992 averaged only 25,000 metric tonnes, and an additional 7,200 metric tonnes
annually is discarded by the commercial trawl fleet. Thus, there is scope for expansion
of the demersal fishery, considering that only 32,000 metric tonnes is harvested out of a
possible 67,000 metric tonnes per year. However, the bulk of the demersal fish stocks is
distributed along the eastern coast of the country. The survey carried out in 1990
indicated that in areas with major traditional fishing grounds, especially in Muscat,
Dhofar and Al-Batinah, the demersal fish stocks were limited (Al-Abdissalam, 1991).
Given this fact, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries should consider limiting
further expansions of the traditional demersal fishery, especially in Al-Batinah, to avoid
overfishing.
The results of the survey indicate that the biomass was highest on the East Coast
of the country (the Arabian Sea). The total biomass found in the area was 314,820
metric tonnes, constituting 76 percent of the overall biomass (Al-Abdissalam, 1991). By
comparison, the Salalah region, Halanyat bay and Al-Batinah coast with 1.4 percent, 5.7
percent and 6.4 percent of biomass respectively were the least productive (Al-
Abdissalam, 1991). The highest catch rates were recorded in areas along the Arabian
sea (Muscat to Sauciarah bay) and the lowest catch rates were found in Salalah region
and Al-Batinah region.
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2.8 Fisheries Management in Oman
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the development of both the traditional
and the commercial sectors of the Omani fisheries has exerted excessive pressure on
fish stocks. Unfortunately, most of the development efforts have been and still are
directed toward the accumulation of fishing efforts in coastal waters. Consequently, for
reasons that appear to be complex but clearly point to the problem of overfishing, the
landings of the traditional fishermen have now been on the decline for several years (see
section 2.5). Stocks of many high value species of fish and shelfish in the Omani waters
are seriously depleted, and their fisheries appear to be heading towards collapse (Moore
and Dorr, 1994). In particular, kingfish, tuna, sardine, abalone, shrimp and lobster are
among the species that have been considerably affected. There is much apprehension
that the viability of the fishermen's future is in jeopardy and that their livelihoods are
being threatened.
The fishery of Oman is managed by a Directorate-General within the Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries. A system of licensing small fishing vessels and fishermen is
in place, but remains unenforced. This is generally attributed to the fact that fishermen
in Oman are spread throughout the country in numerous villages, both small and large,
scattered along the 1,700 kilometres coastline. Lack of financial resources can be added,
as the Ministry has to spend a substantial amount of money to enforce its licensing
programme. The costs associated with the use of a licensing programme include not
only hiring of staff, but also the purchase of monitoring equipment, development of an
effective monitoring infrastructure, the ability to sanction rule violators and many
others. This considerable expenditure cannot be met by the Ministry in Oman, as is the
case in many developing countries. The licensing programme in its current form is,
therefore, only used for statistical purposes and in fact it does little to regulate the
activities of the fishermen. Furthermore, regulations of this type are imposed from
outside the village (external) and do not recognize the informal rules crafted by the
users themselves, the very fact that limits the effectiveness of state run resource
management institutions (Alessi, 1998; p. 30; Ostrom 1990; p. 23 and Baland and
Platteau, 1996; p. 281).
Obtaining a licence was not a problem for those who wanted to enter the fishery,
until 1992 when the Ministry discontinued issuing new licences after it concluded that
the number of fishermen was too high compared to the capacity of the resources to
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support them. However, after three years the Ministry discovered that there were 4,500
fishing vessels and 7,000 fishermen fishing without a licence. In April 1997, the
Ministry changed its original policy to restrict the number of fishermen when it decided
to register those unauthorized fishermen, an action which officials claimed to be in
consistence with the Ministry's policy to increase the number of fishermen to 50
thousands in the year 2020 according to the recommendations of the Vision for the
Oman Economy 2020 (an interview with Dr. Mohamed Ridha, Director General of the
DGFR, Oman Daily Newspaper, 22 August 1998).
2.9 Overfishing in Coastal Waters
The economic theory of an open access or common property fishery was
developed by Gordon (1954). However, as argued by many scholars, there is confusion
over the use of the term open access to denote common property fisheries and vice
versa. For example, Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, (1975) argued that the notion of
property implies the exclusion of non-owners. The same authors argued that open
access (res nullius) is free for all, while common property (res communes) represents a
well defined set of institutional arrangements to determine who should utilize the
resource and the rules governing the activities of the users. Historically, common
property has been regarded as "nobody's property"; the economic rent from the resource
is to be gained by the first corner (Gerritsen, 1987). In the Omani fishery this attitude
was reflected in uncontrolled access of thousands of fishermen to the fishery. The
results were, first, that resources, especially the high commercial value species, were
depleted at an inefficiently high cost, and secondly, that the landing levels declined
below what could be produced if less effort had been applied to the fishery. The results
of the development programme are quite impressive, since the number of fibreglass
fishing vessels has increased from 2,601 in 1987 (Hochtief, 1987) to 9,262 in 1997, an
increase of 256 percent (Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Annual Statistics Report
for 1997). Nevertheless, for reasons which appear to be rather complex but clearly point
to problems of overfishing, total landings (in metric tonnes) did not really increase
between 1987 and 1997, but on the contrary, declined. It can argued here that the
Government has actually subsidised over-fishing by providing grants for procuring
better boats and fishing gears.
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It has been widely accepted that when common property fishery resource is open
access, fishermen will not exploit the fishery in a rational manner where the long-term
sustainability of the resource is considered (Hardin, 1968). For reasons which appear to
be rather complex but clearly point to the fact that there exists no restraint on
fishermen's activities, nor can they see the negative consequences they create for others
and for the future productivity of the fishery, depletion is the ultimate result. In this
case, rent from the fishery is said to be completely dissipated. Based on these grounds
and in order to rectify the uncontrolled use of the fishery, government intervention was
seen as justifiable. In 1975, the Directorate General of Fisheries within the Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries claimed sole responsibility for the development and
management of the countries' fish resources, undermining the laws and social norms of
the informal local institutions (Senat Al-Bahar) that were used to coordinate the use of
the fishery by constraining the behaviour of individuals.
The fishery of Oman is therefore more likely to be an open access model than a
common property model, with a few exceptions which are found in three shellfish
fisheries, namely: the shrimp fishery in Mahut Island, the Abalone fishery in Salalah
and the Lobster fishery in the Al-Wusta region. The three fisheries represent the highest
valued species in the country. Since they are fished by fishermen inhabiting remote
communities exclusion of outsiders is possible. In these three fisheries, the users
themselves exclude outsiders and a system of closed seasons was implemented for the
three fisheries after they almost collapsed. Some success has been achieved in this
regard; although the stocks have not fully recovered to their level before 1990, at least
landings levels have for several years been stable, except the for lobster fishery, which
continues to decline.
To summarize how rent from fishing will eventually be completely dissipated
under open access, let us consider a simple graphical representation of an open access
model as shown in Figure 2.6. This model provides a rough illustration of why
decisions were made by individuals which seemed rational from the individual point of
view but proved to be irrational collectively. There are two models resource managers
can choose from when formulating a management plan. The regulatory practices may be
dominated by restrictions designed to preserve the biomass supply in the long run; an
approach which relies on the use of the biological concept of Maximum Sustainable
Yield (MSY). MSY is defined as the maximum quantity, which may be taken from the
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stock without adversely affecting future reproduction and recruitment (King, 1995; p.
198). However, Gordan (1954) argues that fisheries managers should aim to maximize
the economic yield (MEY) from the fishery. MEY is defined as the maximum
difference between the value of the catch and the cost incurred in catching it This point
on the yield curve is achieved by equating the marginal revenue to the marginal cost of
fishing.
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Figure 2.6 The Open Access Fishery
As fishing begins at point "o", the profit, represented here by the space above•
OC and below OB, accelerates sharply initially (Figure 2.6). The high profit gained by
those who are actually in the fishery as fishing starts attracts new fishermen. As fishing
efforts are added into the fishery, the MEY (Maximum Economic Yield) will soon be
reached. Economists consider the MEY as the point where the maximum return from
the fishery is obtained with the lowest possible effort (F 1). However, maintaining an
optimal level of effort is extremely difficult. The high profits will attract more
fishermen into the fishery and the effort level will tend to gravitate towards F2,
especially in fisheries which are not controlled or are under-controlled. Soon the
maximum sustainable yield (MSY) will be reached at an effort level of F2. At the MSY,
although the catch is at its highest level, the marginal cost of fishing (for the fishery as a
whole) is higher than the marginal revenue. Thus, the fishery is said to be economically
overfished. As there is no information about the size of the stocks, new entrants are not
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discouraged because of their expectations of high profits, despite the declining profits at
the MSY. The situation will eventually reach the equilibrium point OAE, which
represents the open access equilibrium. At this point the cost of fishing equals the value
of the catch. The same catch produced at the OAE point can be efficiently produced at a
considerably lower level of effort. However, even when the open access equilibrium is
reached, new fishermen may still enter the fishery because profitability varies
depending on individual skill and technology endowments (Gerritsen, 1987; p. 393).
Therefore, eventually, the OAE point will be surpassed and the fishermen will start to
make negative returns. The situation leads in many cases to the collapse of fish stocks.
The kingfish fishery of Oman, which is reported to be in a state of collapse, is an
example (Hooker and Parsons, 1995 and Marine Science and Fisheries Center, 1995).
However, if the level of fishing effort exerted on a fish stock produces a catch in
access of the maximum sustainable yield a fishery can sustain, the ultimate result will
be overfishing. Biological overfishing can take two forms: first, growth overfishing
which results when the young recruits entering the fishery are caught before they grow
to a marketable size; second, recruitment overfishing which results when the adult stock
is reduced to the extent that insufficient offspring are produced to maintain the
population (Pauly, 1984; p. 39 and King, 1995; p. 198).
It is believed that the coastal fisheries of Oman are exploited beyond the MSY
level or at the OAE level. This is indicated by an escalation of fishing effort in the
coastal fisheries during the last 20 years and the fact that landings of many commercial
species have been on the decline during the same period. There is no indication of entry
into the fishery being restricted by the Ministry, nor are there policies to encourage
fishermen to exploit the off-shore fisheries. In fact, the traditional management system
for the common fishery (including usage pattern, enforcement, sanctions and
conservation issues) has practically disappeared. This is a side effect of the development
projects initiated by the Government since the 1970s, where CPRs have been converted
into an open access resource and the tragedy of the commons of fish resources in coastal
areas is the result. Furthermore, as was observed by Platteau, most developing countries
have given preference to the industrial development of fisheries while to a large extent
letting the small-scale sector fend for itself (Platteau, 1989a; p. 589). Fisheries
development, in the official view, should be ensured through radical modernization
which implies the importation of industrial techniques from developed countries rather
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than through gradual upgrading of the traditional sector. For example, an American
consultancy consortium which was commissioned to assess the potential development
of fisheries sector in Oman in the early 1970s advised the government to ignore the
traditional small-scale fishery and to replace it with modern, high technology fishing
and fish marketing (Donaldson, 1980; p. 491)
Traditional conventions and informal social sanctions relating to the use of fish
resources have been replaced by unenforceable legal and administrative measures. This
has marginalized the fishermen's initiatives to coordinate their usage pattern and to
exclude outsiders from entering their communities.
2.10 Fishing Activities in Al-Batinah Region
The Batinah coast runs for a distance of some 270 kilometres from the frontier
with the United Arab Emirates to the town of Sib, 40 kilometres from Muscat. The
entire length of this coast is characterised by a medium width continental shelf
extending up to 30 nautical miles toward the sea (Mundt, 1980). The substrate is
generally sandy. The coast itself is marked by a thin strip, seldom wider than three
kilometres, of dense vegetation composed primarily of date palm trees (Ministry of
Information, 1995; p. 30).
Al-Batinah, with its 12,500 square kilomtres area representing 4 percent of the
total area of Oman and its 623,708 inhabitants (representing more than one third of the
total Omani population in 1997), is one of the most populous areas in Oman where there
are around 50 people per square kilometre. The main towns are Barka, Masn'a, Suwaiq,
Khaboura, Saham, Sohar, Liwa and Shinas.
Traditional fishermen are distributed continuously along the Batinah coast in
numerous villages, both small and large, scattered along the 270 kilometres coastline. In
1997 there were 9,027 fishermen representing 35 percent of the total fishermen in the
country operating 4,158 fishing vessels which constitute 35 percent of the total
traditional fishing fleet (Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Annual Statistics Report
for 1997). The fishing fleet in Al-Batinah is composed of different types of fishing
vessels, but dominated mainly by fibreglass fishing vessels, accounting for around 3000
vessels (1997) which represent 70 percent of the total fishing fleet in the region. The
numbers of fishermen and fishing vessels have been on the increase since the 1980s. In
1987 there were 4,060 fishermen operating 1,203 fibreglass fishing skiffs along the
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Batinah coast. Therefore, the number of fibreglass fishing vessels has grown by 150
percent between 1987 and 1997.
Fishermen along the Al-Batinah coast use a variety of gear types including drift
gill nets, fixed gill nets, fish traps, cast nets, beach seine, handlines, longlines, and
encircling nets. Given the high population, number of fishermen and fishing vessels,
intense fishing activity has been observed along this coast compared to other regions in
the country.
In 1997 the total fish landings in Al-Batinah was 23,000 metric tonnes
representing 28 percent of the total traditional fishermen landings in Oman, making a
decline of 10 percent below the 1996 level. The value of the catch for the same year was
RO 12.5 million compared to RO 13 million recorded in 1996. The decline in the catch
was largely attributed to the decline of tuna and sardine.
Figure 2.7 shows the annual fish landings and number of fishermen in Al-
Batinah between 1985 and 1997. A distinct peak in the quantity landed can be noticed
from Figure 2.7. The total quantity of fish landed increased steadily between 1985 and
1990 but rose sharply to peak in 1991 when landings rose from 32,000 metric tonnes in
1990 to 41,900 metric tonnes in 1991.
Figure 2.7 Total Fish Landings (Metric Tonnes) and Number of Fishermen in Al-
Batinah between 1985 to 1997
For several years following that peak, catches have been on the decline, despite
a slight increase in landings recorded in 1994 and 1995 (Figure 2.7). Total landings hit a
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low of 23,392 metric tonnes in 1997, which was 44 percent below the 1991 level. In
comparison, the number of fishermen has been increasing steadily between 1985 and
1991. After 1991, the number of fishermen increased sharply and since then it has been
on the increase. The number of fishermen is therefore has grown by 122 percent
between 1985 and 1997. On the other hand, the number of fibreglass fishing vessels has
grown by 150 percent during the same period.
The declining trends of the fish landings was considered as the first sign of
overfishing which was caused by excessive pressure on the narrow continental shelf of
the Al-Batinah coast as the result of the development programme during the 1980s
which increased the number of fishermen by 122 percent and the number of vessels by
150 percent between 1987 and 1997 (Siddeek, 1995; Sultan, 1996).
2.11 Conclusion
In this chapter, an overview of the fisheries sector was presented. The fisheries
sector, particularly the traditional sector, is a significant sector in the Omani economy.
As indicated in the chapter, the sector is important for the livelihood of thousands of
people in the country. It provides substantial employment opportunities for coastal
inhabitance besides its contribution to the national GDP, foreign exchange and the
provision of an important source of animal protein.
Although the traditional fishery is still predominantly small-scale, it constitute
the most important sub-sector, accounting for around 80 percent of the total fish
landings during the last twenty years. However, as indicated in the present chapter, the
landings of the traditional fishery showed declining trends for several years since 1980s.
The decline in the landings of this sub-sector was largely attributed to overfishing in
inshore waters.
The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries manages the traditional fishery. Many
fisheries management plans have been implemented to address the problem of
overfishing in coastal waters, but remain unenforced due to the lack of financial
resource. Furthermore, these management plans do not recognize the informal rules
crafted by the fishermen themselves, which limit the effectiveness of the regulations
designed by the Ministry.
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Given the failures of the current state management institution to address the
problem of overfishing and to protect the livelihood of thousands of fishermen, it is
important to search for an alternative solution. Cooperation among resource users to
manage their resources has been regarded as an alternative to the expensive and often
inappropriate state management. Therefore, it is essential at this stage to examine the
factors that influence fishermen's decisions to participate in collective action. Chapter
Three provides an overview of the collective action approach to fisheries management.
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CHAPTER THREE
LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE EMERGENCE OF
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY OVER LOCAL COMMONS
3.1 Introduction
This study focuses on the possibility of collective responsibility among resource
users to resolve dilemmas facing them in their use of the resource. Previous studies
(experimental and field research) have explored the topic, but each with a distinct
focus. This study, however, will use the combined findings of previous research as the
bases for exploring the use of coastal fish resources among the fishermen in South Al-
Batinah, Oman.
The purpose of this chapter is to present a literature review of the theoretical and
empirical background of the study. The review uses concepts from collective action,
common property resources, public goods and game theory, as they pertain to the study
of small-scale traditional fishermen, to create the rationale for this study. In this chapter
common property resources are defined and distinguished from open access. The
chapter will also compare common property resources to public goods, to demonstrate
their susceptibility to the problem of free riding and other problems usually associated
with public goods. The use of game theory to explore fishermen's behaviour in social
dilemmas is also discussed. The final section of this chapter presents how state
regulation of local commons my not guarantee efficient exploitation of the resource.
Fish resources are considered as renewable natural resources, which are
regenerative but at the same are in danger of exhaustion from excessive use (Dasgupta
and Maler, 1994; p. 320). In developed countries the problem of the commons is often
related to global warming, acid rain and depletion of ozone layer, whilst in developing
countries the daily livelihood of the poor depends more substantially and directly on the
local commons: irrigation, forestry, grazing, coastal fisheries and so on (Bardhan,
1993b; p. 87). The importance of common property resources for human well-being has
been stressed by Dasgupta (1996). The extent of common property resources as a
proportion of total assets in a community varies considerably across ecological zones. In
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India, for example, they appear to be most prominent in and regions, mountain regions
and unirrigated area and are less prominent in humid regions and river valleys.
(Dasgupta, 1996; p. 404). For example, Jodha used data from eighty villages in six dry
tropical states in India to estimate that, among poor families, the proportion of income
based directly on local commons is in the range 15 to 25 percent (Jodha, 1986).
3.2 Common Property Resources
Of fundamental relevance to the study of collective action is the distinction
between Common Property Resources (CPRs) and Open Access Resources (OARs). A
CPR is distinguished from an OAR by the fact that the former is governed by a property
regime while the later is not (Shanmugaratnam, 1996; p. 165). CPRs are defined as a
natural or man made resources in which (a) exclusion is nontrivial (but not necessary
impossible) and (b) yield subtractive (Hackett et al., 1994; p. 99). Similarly Berkes et
al. (1989; cited in Feeny eta!., 1996; p. 187) defines CPRs as a class of resources for
which exclusion is difficult and joint use involves subtractability. OAR resources are
defined as those resources, which belongs to no one and where no rules of exclusion
operate (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975; p. 714; Feeny eta!., 1996; p. 187). In the
words of Tietenberg, property rights on CPRs are a bundle of entitlements defining the
owner's rights, privileges and limitations for use of the resource (Tietenberg, 1992; p.
45).
Therefore, in the context of coastal fisheries, CPRs are those resources which
have clear physical boundaries and the rights to use the resource are assigned to an
identified group of individuals by virtue of their membership of the group in accordance
with its rules and norms of appropriation and management and where non-members are
denied access to derive benefits from the resource. Most coastal fisheries appropriated
as CPRs fit this definition. This type of property rights regime was common among
traditional artisanal fishing communities and is often in a number of contemporary
coastal fisheries throughout the world (Feeny eta!., 1996; p. 188). The property rights
governing the use of the resource affect how users behave and relate to one another. By
examining the entitlements of the users and the way these entitlements affect human
behaviour, we will have a better understanding of how resource problems arise. OARs
and unregulated CPRs are likely to be exploited in an inefficient way. As expressed by
Baland and Platteau, "the core problem is that open access and unregulated CPRs .
 do
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not give individuals the proper incentives to act in a socially efficient way" (Baland and
Platteau, 1996; P. 36). As Runge (1986) noted, natural resources such as fish stocks are
more used in common rather than used in private; thus, without exclusive rights,
individual users would exploit the resource until profit is zero.
As illustrated by the above definitions, OAR is not governed by an enforceable
regime; thus, there is no restriction on entry of appropriators nor are there any
restrictions on their use of it. As the matter of the fact, in developing countries, more
often than not, state property resources have become de facto private or open access
resources due to the state's failure to enforce property rights because of high transaction
costs, corruption of enforcement agencies, and / or political reasons (Shanmugaratnam,
1996; p. 166). There are many examples of CPRs, which became OARs when their
management institutions broke down and disintegrated due to the effects of factors like
nationalisation, partial privatisation and social and demographical changes. The fact
that coastal marine resources have often been under a regime of free access has
contributed to fleet overcapacity, resulting in too many fishermen and vessels racing
after too few fish. The use of inappropriate economic assistance measures, which can
provide the incentives for increased participation in the fisheries sector, has aggravated
the problem (OECD, 1997; p. 9). Such situations lead to uncertainty caused by lack of
assurance mechanisms which in turn hamper the capacity or motivation of resource
users to participate in collective action'.
To look at Hardin's example of a pasture open to all, one of the problems
associated with inefficiency is lack of property rights. The pasture is an open access
resource to which herdsman can bring any number of cattle to graze. After some time,
the amount of food available will be reduced as more cattle are added into the pasture,
thus reducing the benefits herdsmen receive. Inefficiency results because there are no
limits placed on the rights to graze, which leads each herdsman to take only his own
benefits and costs into account and ignore the effect his actions have on others.
Therefore, if property rights are well defined concerning the use of the pasture,
sustainability can be maintained. If the villagers are dependent on healthy animals from
1 1nI  this thesis the term collective action refers to the process and consequences of individual decisions to
voluntarily coordinate behaviour (White and Rung, 1995). The term collective action regime refers to the
set of institutional arrangements governing a collectively managed activity or resources (White, 1997, p.
68).
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the pasture land for their survival (economic dependence), they are likely to ensure that
grazing rights are limited and enforced through some form of collective decisionmaking
body to form rules and monitor use (Hanna et al., 1995; P. 16). Therefore, property
rights regimes are a necessary but not sufficient condition for the efficient use of
environmental resources (ibid., p. 24). For property rights to be efficient, sufficient
property rules must be enforced.
Another issue of fundamental relevance to the study of collective action is the
distinction between the attributes of CPRs and pure public goods. It is important to note
that the common property that concern us here (coastal fisheries) are renewable
common-pool resources which are distinguished from pure public goods by their
property of subtractability (Ostrom, 1990). Unlike the consumption patterns of pure
public goods, in the case of a fishery each user reduces its total availability to others by
the quantity harvested by him, less the amount that is replenished through biological
regeneration at a given time. If one fisherman catches more fish less remains for the
others. In this context, when the rate of harvest exceeds the rate of replenishment, the
fishery can be exhausted. To distinguish it from CPRs, pure public goods can be defined
as those goods which exhibit consumption indivisibility and, in additionally, are fully
accessible to all (Tietenberg, 1994; p. 39). Indivisibility in consumption refers to the
pattern of consumption when one person's consumption of a good does not diminish, in
the slightest, the amount available for others (Tietenberg, 1994 and Comes and Sandler,
1996). Fish stocks often share the nonexcludability attribute of public goods in their
use. Exclusion occurs when it is possible to exclude potential users from deriving
benefits from the goods unless they meet certain criteria. Because fish stocks (marine
fisheries) require a large territory it is difficult (if not impossible) to exclude potential
users.
Many common environmental resources are regarded as public goods, such as
clean air, clean water and biological diversity. Other examples of public goods include
fireworks displays, strategic weapons, and pollution-control devices. Public goods, such
as pollution-control devices for example, are similar to reductions in fishing effort in
that it is difficult to exclude potential users from deriving the benefits of the good once
it is provided. Therefore, fish stocks are a common-pool resources, they can be used
jointly, because of the high cost of excluding potential fishermen within a community;
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and their consumption are subtractive when a particular fish is caught by one fisherman
is not anymore available to the others.
As illustrated above, fish stocks are usually characterised by three features:
nonexcludability, subtractability and replenshability. The nonexcludability and
subtractability of fish stocks pose a major challenge for organising assurance
mechanisms that ensure a fair distribution of the resource without impairing its
sustainability. In the context of a coastal fishery, the challenge facing its users (or
owners) is how to organize for the provision of institution or rules (the public good) to
coordinate their activities.
The attributes of public goods give an individual user an opportunity to derive
benefits from the resource without paying the full cost. This can be clearly seen in an
OARs and unregulated CPRs which are likely to be exploited in an inefficient way.
These inefficiencies result as an individual user exploiting these resources becomes a
free rider on the contribution of others. This action tends to diminish incentives to
contribute toward a sustainable exploitation of the fish stocks. The cumulative effect of
this action by multiple users can create harms (negative externalities) on the stocks and
the users that will eventually affect the well-being of both. In the case of the fishery,
these externalities include stock depletion, gear destruction and congestion. Negative
externalities imposed on the stocks and their users and the subsequent loss of benefits
are regarded as the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968).
Individuals jointly using a CPR are assumed to face a social dilemma often
caused by factors which appears to be complex but point to the protracted absence of an
institutional environinent or failure of existing ones to provide the interested individuals
the opportunity to negotiate courses of actions. In such a situation, individual rational
actions ignore the external harm they impose on each other, leading to outcomes that
are not rational from the perspective of the whole.
Cooperation in the case of an overexploited fishery is required to restrain
resource use and to provide institutions for coordinating individual action. In such a
situation, fishermen have many options to coordinate their use. They can choose one or
more of the following: limits on their boat size and power; limits on the number and
size of nets; limits on their fishing time; limits on individual total catches and minimum
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landing sizes. However, collective action may take place in cases where the balance
between the gains from cooperative effort reduction and the transaction costs involved
in initiating it is positive. In Lipton's view, the positive balance is the "temptation of
goodness": the incentive for each individual in the common dilemma to make a social
optimum choice and the negative balance is the "temptation for badness" (Lipton, 1985;
cited in Morton, 1996; p. 66).
It seems unlikely that individuals will initiate collective action if their patterns
of usage of the resource are not organized through an institution 2. Institutions for
managing the fishery can be regarded as a public good where they are provided jointly
by the users (or the state), and produce nonexcludable benefits for all participants (e.g.,
stock enhancement, restrained fishing, reduction of gear damage and conflicts
resolution mechanisms), but the benefits obtained are not indivisible, which makes
them similar to private goods. To illustrate this, let us take a small fishing village in
which stocks are overfished and fishermen finally agreed to establish an institution to
restrain their take from the fishery. For simplicity, assume that there is full compliance
with rules and the fishery recovers after a period of time. In this context, the institution
is jointly provided by all participants, the benefits are nonexcludable to any member of
the village and further, the benefits are rivalrous in the sense that one fisherman's catch
is another's loss.
A major problem in relation to the supply public good is "free riding". In an
overexploited fishery, rent dissipation occurs because each fisherman becomes a free
rider3 on the others' contribution to restrain the take from the fishery. Because of the
nonexcludability property of fish stocks, free rider fishermen receive the benefits of any
reduction of fishing effort contributed by other fishermen. Those who free ride on the
common pool fishery obtain benefits (without paying the cost) from the adherence of
other fishermen to the rules of such institutions.
2 According to North: "Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in
human exchange, whether political, social, or economic. Institutional change shapes the way societies
evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding historical change" (North, 1990; cited in Hanna
and Munasinghe, 1995).
3
A free rider is someone who derives benefits from a commodity without contributing to its supply
(Tietenberg, 1994; P. 41).
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The losses resulting from an overexploited fishery may provide incentives for
fishermen to engage in collective action to set restrictions on entry and on the amount
of fish harvested. These losses are perceived by an individual as equivalent to the
potential gain from collective action. Capturing a portion of aggregate resource rent that
is saved motivates individuals to bargain for institutional change (Libecap, 1994; p.
566). The private expected gain from institutional change as compared to the status quo
will determine the strength of the bargain over benefits distribution by interested
parties. Libecap (1994) argues that the intensity of debate over distribution and
likelihood of collective action are influenced by: (1) the size and the aggregate expected
gains; (2) the number and heterogeneity of the bargaining parties; and (3) information
availability. The larger the potential benefits over the cost incurred in initiating the
collective action, the more likely the emergence of collective institutions to coordinate
resource use (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Comes and Sandler, 1996; Gardner and
Ostrom, 1991; Libecap, 1994; Sandler, 1992; Wade, 1988 and White and Runge, 1995).
Large potential benefits will make individuals better off as compared to the status quo.
It can be expected, therefore, that influential individuals will aim to provide
institutional change to coordinate resource uses.
The size and heterogeneity of resource users are commonly reported by scholars
as potential problems facing the emergence of collective action. Olson (1965), for
example, argues that provision of public goods depends on the size of the group: a small
"privileged" group4
 will provide itself with public goods, whereas in large and
intermediate groups the public goods will not be provided. Olson (1965) has also
attributed failure in the provision of the public goods to group heterogeneity. Baland
and Platteau (1996; p. 302) provide three sources of heterogeneity which hamper the
capacity or motivation of resource users to participate in collective action. First,
heterogeneity may result from ethnic, race, or other kinds of cultural divisions. Second,
it may arise from differences in the nature of interests various individuals may have in a
particular collective action. Third, it may originate in inter-individual variations in some
critical endowments, that are reflected in varying intensities of interest. Baland and
4 A privileged group, as defined by Sandler, contains at least one individual or coalition whose benefits
from collective action exceed the associated costs, even if these costs are solely borne by the individual or
coalition (Sandler, 1992; P. 9).
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Platteau (1996; P. 302) further assert that while the first two are considered as causing a
strong obstruction to collective action, the same cannot be said of the third case.
Regarding the first source of heterogeneity, ethnic, social and other cultural
differences may have a negative impact on the ability of resource users to form
collective action. This happens as these differences leave room for different
interpretations of the rules of the game being played, for different views about who
should enforce them, and for different perceptions of social conventions and norms
supporting cooperation (Baland and Platteau, 1996; p. 302). However, this should not
be generalized to assert every collective failure to these differences. For example, Salim
(1996) in his study of the coastal trawl fishery of Malaysia found that Chinese, Muslims
and Malay fishermen have organized collective action to reduce overfishing in their
fishery. Thus, their ethnic differences were no impediment to collective action.
The second source of heterogeneity (heterogeneity of interests or objectives) is a
strong impediment to collective action as argued by Baland and Platteau (1996). In the
context of coastal fisheries, for example, collective action is threatened when some
fishermen have alternative income-earning opportunities. Resources management is
undermined by the existence of different interests, most notably between full-time and
part-time fishermen and, more seriously still, between small-scale traditional fishermen
and industrial fishing. In the case of fishing status, part-time fishermen, having secured
another source of income, may feel much less concerned about conservation of fish
resources, than full time fishermen for whom subsistence crucially depends upon the
state of these resources owing to lack of alternative income opportunities. The same can
be said about industrial fishing owning many exit possibilities, because they can move
their fleets to other fishing grounds (Platteau, 1989b; p. 645). Many cases of this type
are found in developing countries, where industrial fishing have been given concessions
to exploit fish resources (see Lim et al. (1995) for an example from San Miguel Bay,
Philippine). In the Sultanate of Oman, for example, it was observed that the Korean
fleet operating off the east coast of the country is causing severe damage to the
demersal fish stock through violation of the rules by entering the coastal zones
previously allocated to the traditional fishermen and by discarding substantial quantities
of valuable fish species which do not fit the local markets in Korea (Hare, 1989).
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In the context of the third cause of heterogeneity (differences in skills, assets,
income and access to credit markets), changes in property institutions involve the risk
of being made worse off for some group members, especially those who are usually
profited under the status quo (Libecap, 1994). This is because different sharing rules
may produce different distributions of earnings for resource users. In his well-known
book, The Logic of Collective Action, Olson (1965) has argued that agents with high
stakes in a public good are more willing to bear large share of the costs of its production
(see also Guttman, 1978; p. 254). Some evidence from CPRs supported Olson's
argument where the costs of regulation are often born by the economic elite (Wade,
1988; p. 190 and Ostrom and Gardner, 1993; p. 105). In an example provided by Baland
and Platteau, (1997a; p. 461), it was found also that rural cooperatives in the
Netherlands were often created by better-off farmers who took the initiative to start the
cooperatives and contribute the bulk of initial share capital.
Another successful example was the case of Saudi Arabia which for many years
produced less than its quota of oil to subsidize OPEC in its effort to reduce excess
production by other members (Heckathorn, 1993, cited in Baland and Platteau, 1997b;
p. 3). This pattern conforms well to the exploitation hypothesis advanced by Olson
(1965) that the large is exploited by the small.
However, as argued by Baland and Platteau, (1997a; p. 461 and 1997b, p. 3), the
above consideration should not be taken to mean that if the distribution of wealth is
more equal, individual contributions will fall. It just happens that the wealth of Saudi
Arabia has been overwhelmingly more than other members in OPEC and it attaches a
higher value to any improvement in oil prices, which make it rich enough to bear a
greater share of the reduction of excess production. Further, Comes and Sandler (1985;
p. 113) argue that the optimal provision of public goods in a community of a given size
is independent of income distribution (see also Comes, 1993; p. 265). In communities
where wealth is made more equal, the cost of initiating regulatory tasks is shared more
equally among agents, whereas greater inequality makes some agents big enough to
bear a greater share of the costs on a voluntary basis, while others are too small or
attach too little value to their resource endowments (Baland and Platteau, 1997b; p. 3).
In many instances, wealth is associated with better availability of outside
economic opportunities. Thus large elites, even though they attach greater value to their
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resource endowment, may still choose to sacrifice conservation effort in order to derive
quick gains in the present. In the context of coastal fisheries, for example, conservation
effort may be seriously undermined by the presence of more endowed members. As
their assets increase, they start to acquire bigger vessels and stronger engines, which
allow them to exploit new fishing grounds away from their base village. Owing to this
exit opportunity, they feel less concerned about conservation of local fish resources. It
has been suggested that heterogeneity of preferences amounts to transaction costs, and
thereby impedes cooperation as cooperation requires shared values (Dasgupta, 1996; p.
403). Therefore, more inequality does not necessary lead to more efficient use of
natural resources (Baland and Platteau, 1996; chap.12; 1997a; p. 461 and 1997b; p. 3).
Thus Olson's (1965) conjecture (the equilibrium in public-goods game often has small
members free-riding more than large members) might not hold true in the case of CPRs.
Information problems can also delay the emergence of collective action. The
function of institutions that make available to the fishermen the opportunity to negotiate
mutually advantageous collective choices is hampered by the lack of information.
According to Dasgupta, "the functioning of institutions is linked closely to the structure
of property rights (that is, who controls what and who owns what) and also the
structure of information that people possess and have access to" (Dasgupta, 1996; p.
393). Similarly, Baland and Platteau, (1996) argued that information asymmetries make
the bargaining process inefficient. This is because parties often have an incentive to
give false information so as to manipulate the outcome of the new arrangement.
Further, it can be difficult to evaluate individual wealth under the status quo and
proposed changes, in the presence of serious information asymmetries (Libecap, 1994).
It is difficult for fishermen using a common fishery to achieve agreement if they lack
information regarding the value of the individual's share of the resources under current
use and of potential losses resulting from institutional change. Limited information on
the impact of the new arrangement rules on fish stock and individuals' returns makes
collective action less preferred by fishermen.
As pointed out in the previous section, lack of information tends to diminish
contributions toward the initiation of collective action. However, Teoh (1997; p. 401)
argues that a policy of nondisclosure or nongeneration of information (good or bad) can
sometime benefit teams. For example, when a cooperative is in a state of collapse,
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generating information about its status would make members more reluctant to
contribute to the cooperative. The same can be said about resources management
institutions (formal or informal), where rosy forecasts are likely to motivate greater
contributions.
3.3 Externalities and Common Property Resources
Externalities are responsible for many general problems in a capture fishery. An
externality occurs whenever an action taken by some economic unit has a direct impact
on the welfare or productivity of some other economic unit (Dorfman, 1974; p. 5). It
occurs when someone is not held accountable for his actions. The obvious case of
negative externality is producer to producer, when one fisherman's behaviour can affect
the welfare and productivity of other fishermen in a particular fishery. An externality
can be either positive (if the effect is favourable) or negative (if the effect is
unfavourable). A negative externality exists when a fisherman uses fishing traps to
harvest demersal species, but catches other non-targeted species in the process (for
example, killing female lobster during breading season). There is no feedback to the
trap fisherman in terms of fines to curtail the non-target mortality. There may be a
longer term effect on the lobster fishery if catching female lobster reduces its stocks.
Therefore, activities of misuse of CPRs are an instance of negative externality. A
positive externality exists when a trap fisherman decides to change his fishing gear
(change to handline, for example) to minimize the bycatch of lobster during the closed
season. This action does not benefit the trap fisherman, but does benefit a lobster
fisherman. There is no feedback that enables the trap fisherman to capture the benefits
of protecting lobster during the closed season other than the personal satisfaction of
avoiding non-target mortality.
There are two types of externality, pecuniary and technological (Tietenberg,
1992). Pecuniary externality affects the input and output prices of firms but does not
directly enter into the production decisions (Sarch, 1996; p. 306). Therefore, overfishing
is not a pecuniary externality because the effect is not transmitted through prices. The
other class of externality is technological externality, which occurs when the negative
effect produced by an economic unit directly enters in the production function of
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another economic Imit5. If we think of common fishing grounds, the yield on any day
displays diminishing returns to the total fishing effort. In this case the activity of an
individual fisherman depletes the flow of services available for other fishermen thereby
imposing a negative externality. Fishermen have to fish longer and incur higher fishing
costs. Consequently, there are short and long term effects on the fishery since excessive
fishing on any day raises the cost of the catch on subsequent days, and excessive effort
in one season may impair the productivity of the fishery in the future. The mode of
damage to common property resources is the removal of something of value from it
(Dorfman, 1974). It is obvious that depletability is not the only mode of damage to
CPRs, because in congested fishing spots (in the case of the beach seine fishery for
example) fishermen do also reduce its accessibility to other beach seiners.
Stock externalities occur as the cumulative effect of catching fish from the
standing stock at a rate which exceeds the rate of replenishment, leading to a
diminished quality and quantity of fish (MacDonald, 1993). Congestion, on the other
hand, is a class of technological externalities, which occurs when fishing gears become
entangled or when the setting of a fisherman's gear affects the catchability of another
fisherman's gear. The assignment problem is the outcome of the situation where there
are more fishermen competing for a limited number of good fishing spots or when
industrial fleets enter inshore fishing grounds previously allocated to traditional
fishermen. All these will ultimately result in conflict among fishermen, resulting in
many cases in gear being stolen or cut loose, and boats damaged. There have even been
cases of gunfire exchange resulting in injuries and death (see: Gardner and Ostrom,
1991; Ostrom, 1990; McGoodwin, 1994 and Begossi, 1998). As shown above, negative
externalities in a fishery may take different forms: stock externality, technological
externality, congestion, and assignment problems. All these lead to a rise in fishing
costs and diminish returns from the fishery, hence increasing rent dissipation.
3.4 Public Goods and Collective Action
A good is nonrival or indivisible when a unit of the good can be consumed by
one individual without detracting, in the slightest, from the consumption opportunities
still available to others from the same unit (Comes and Sandler, 1996; p. 8). Examples
5 Johnston termed this type of externality a real externality (Johnston, 1992; cited in Sarch, 1996).
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of indivisible goods are pollution-control devices, lighthouses and street lighting. If
lighthouse services are provided, the use of this service by one boat does not reduce its
availability for the others, therefore, its benefits are nonrival. At the other extreme,
private goods (such as food) are regarded as rival. Consumption of one unit of the
private good eliminates consumption opportunities available for other consumers.
Therefore, the benefits of private good are fully rivalrous and excludable, whereas the
benefits of pure public goods are nonrival and nonexcludable (Comes and Sandler,
1996). Another attribute of public goods is non-excludability. If the benefits of a good
are available to all, once it is provided, then the benefits are said to be non-excludable
(Sandler, 1992). The benefits of a lighthouse are non-excludable since once the service
is provided, all boats can use the service regardless of whether they contributed to the
cost or not. Pollution removal is another example. Where pollution is removed it will be
impossible to exclude any one from enjoying a clean air, even those who do not
contribute to the cost of removal. In the case of private goods (such as food, cloth) the
benefits can be withheld costlessly by the owner, therefore they are excludable (Table
3.1).
However, unlike the consumption of public goods, consumption of common
property resources is rivalrous in the sense that it is possible for an individual to
increase his consumption at the expense of others (Dasgupta, 1996; p. 399). Therefore,
the reduction of fishing effort as a collective good is public-like, by its nonexcludability
and jointness of provision and resembles private goods as the benefits are subtractive
(rivalrous) in nature. In the context of an overexploited fishery, if all fishermen agree to
restrain their take to ensure sustainability they will all benefit. If few fishermen choose
not to reduce their catch, they will continue to harvest at the previous rate allowing
others to bear the cost of restraint, thus they are free riding on the groups' effort.
However, motivation for free riding is often affected by cultural norms, ideology and
value systems (Feeny et al., 1996; p. 190 and Dasgupta, 1996; p. 422).
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Table 3.1 Goods Types and their Attributes
Type of goods example Excludability Rivalrousness
•	 pure	 public
goods
•	 Pollution-control
devices
Difficult Absent
•	 impure	 public
goods
•	 Club	 goods
(swimming pool)
•	 private goods •	 Foods and cloths Easy High
Sugden, (1984) argues that public goods can be produced through three
mechanisms: (i) Charging consumers (those who consume must pay); (ii) Raising taxes
(equal taxes are paid by those who consume and those who do not consume); (iii)
Voluntary contribution (consumers decided for themselves whether to contribute or
not). As stated above, the problem with the voluntarily contribution of public goods is
characterized by nonexcludability; once the goods are provided, their benefits are
allocated among consumers. It will be costly and difficult (if not impossible) to exclude
those who do not contribute time and money toward the provision of the public goods
(Comes and Sandler, 1996). Comes and Sandler (1996) claim that the nonexcludability
attributes of public goods are the crucial factor determining the level of provision. As it
is costly to exclude non-contributors, this gives individuals incentives to take a free ride
on the provision of others.
Free rider problems result from the incentive that individuals have to defect
from the rules of institutions they belong to. This defection behaviour (Olson, 1965)
seems to be logical from the point of view of narrow self-interest. This behaviour leads
to an outcome in which the group as a whole is made worse off (Runge, 1986). The
tragedy of stock over-exploitation results from the individual fisherman's incentive to
free ride regardless of the expected actions of the others. Even when fishermen agree to
refrain from further fishing, the dominance of the free riding strategy makes such a
contract unstable, which will result in an inferior Nash 6 equilibrium.
6 Nash equilibrium results when an agent chooses his or her best or optimizing choice for one (or more)
variables, given that the other players have chosen their optimizing or best responses for this (or these)
variables. However, it should be noted here that when the public good is impure (exclusion is possible for
example as in club goods), Nash behaviour need not imply sub-optimality (Sandler, 1992; p. 16).
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The reduction of fishing effort and solving conflicts in the fishery can be
conceived of as public goods characterised by jointness of supply and consumed by a
well-defined group. The nonexcludable nature of the benefits derived from effort
reduction creates incentives for individuals to undersupply it. Runge (1984; p. 156)
states that these consumption decisions are troubling both in theory and practice
because they create incentives to free ride at the group expence. How can a reduction in
fishing effort be achieved when fishermen can benefit by catching more fish and
passing the cost of overfished stocks to the whole society? The answer to this question
was advanced in a pessimistic conclusion by Olson (1965; p. 2): "rational self interested
individuals will not achieve their common or group interest". However, there are many
counterexamples. For example in many real world situations there are substantial
voluntary contributions to the provision of public goods without outside enforcement.
In the context of coastal fisheries, many fishermen in different regions are able
to organize allowing scope for viable collective action to avoid the tragedy. The case of
the fishermen of Alanya-Turkey (Ostrom, 1990 and Berkes, 1986) is an example; the
informal lobster territories in Maine (Acheson, 1989) is another example; many
successful cases are also presented by Baland and Platteau, (1996). Furthermore, from
their experimental research, Marwell and Ames (1981) provide little support for Olson's
perspective. They found individuals contribute to public goods at an average rate
between 40 and 60 percent. They question the validity of the dominant free riding
hypothesis, however, they observed the existence of some "weak" free riding', but they
found that individuals often contribute resources voluntarily to public goods. Their
investigation does not support the "strong" free riding hypothesis, which concludes that
those who contribute to provision of public good voluntarily are simply irrational. Feeny
et al. (1996; p. 190) reached the same conclusion: "complete five riding appears to be
uncommon; on the other hand the complete absence offree riding is as well". In the
same vein Hirshleifer (1983; p. 384) argues that: "in normal times people behave in a
conventionally cooperative way because individually they find it profitable to do so:
7
The "Weak" free rider hypothesis suggests that individuals often contribute resources to public goods
voluntarily, whereas, the "strong" free rider hypothesis concludes that there will be no contributions made
by individuals. Weak free riding leads to some form of provision (sub-optimal provision) of the public
goods, whereas strong free riding is demonstrated by contribution close to zero. (Runge, 1984; p.156;
Marwell and Ames, 1981).
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while there is some slippage around the edges, on the whole the social control
mechanisms deter evildoing".
3.5 The Tragedy of the Commons
In an overexploited fishery, collective action is required to maintain the
sustainable exploitation of fish resources. If resource users succeed in solving their
collective problems, the outcome will be collective goods in the form of healthy stocks
and mechanisms for solving conflicts between users. To achieve this outcome,
voluntarily provisions by all fishermen are necessary, as state control and private
ownership schemes to manage fish resources, as discussed in the following sections, do
not produce optimal social outcomes (Ostrom, 1990; Baland and Platteau, 1996;
Dasgupta and Maler, 1994 and Dasgupta, 1996).
The starting point for any analysis of common-pool resources is Garrett Hardin's
'tragedy of the commons' which has become the standard frame for so much of the
common-pool resources management (Blair, 1996). Hardin (1968) assumes that
resource users are individualistic and unable to co-operate in their collective interest.
He concludes that to prevent the tragedy of the commons, resources must be either
privatized or controlled by the state, in other words, by an authority external to those
directly effected by the commons. This idea has been adopted by many third world
countries which have failed to stop over-exploitation and in many cases may have
contributed to even more rapid degradation of resources and increased inequality where
the distribution of wealth is already unequal (Runge, 1986). However, there is much
empirical evidence challenging the use of Hardin's model and its sweeping pessimism
about collective action in general or some kinds of common-pool resources
management in particular. Co-operative means to manage common-pool resources have
achieved successful results in many parts of the world (see: Baland and Platteau, 1996;
Blair, 1996; Berkes, 1989; Feeny et al., 1996; Jentoft and Mikalsen 1994; McCay and
Acheson, 1987; OECD, 1997; Ostrom, 1990; Pinkerton, 1994; Salim, 1996 and
Townsend and Pooley, 1995). Similarly, Dasgupta reached the same conclusion:
"members of local communities have often cooperated in protecting their commons
from excessive use" (Dasgupta, 1996; p. 400). In Benin, for example, the lagoon
fishermen still observe the simple rules for conservation of fish resources that their
ancestors had established some three centuries earlier (FAO, Fisheries Department,
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1999; P. 42). Based on taboos, these customary rules forbade all capture of fingerlings
or juveniles. They also designated rest days when no one was allowed to fish for fear of
incurring the wrath of the gods. The area is guarded by the dabbo hounon, the chief of
the region, who inflicts heavy fines on offenders (ibid.).
Therefore, in thinking about communities and the fishery, the "tragedy of the
commons" thinking that motivated some management strategies needs to be
reconsidered, and a clear distinction must be drawn between open access and
"commons" fisheries. The widespread use of "tragedy of the commons" thinking among
resource managers and policy makers is not restricted to developing countries, but even
in developed countries the role as well as the interest of the local people has been
ignored (Ommer, 1998; p. 5).
Although Hardin does not use the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) in his argument, it
can be represented formally as a PD game. The Prisoner's Dilemma has exercised a
continuing fascination to many scholars because it appears to provide a solid basis for
the conclusion that rational people cannot achieve rational collective outcomes (Wade,
1988). In this game, each individual will try to cheat, regardless of what he expects
others to do. In such a situation the only solutions, as stated above in Hardins'
conclusion, are either coercion from outside the group to force people to reach and
maintain the social optimum, or a change in the rules from outside the group to a
private property regime which, as will be shown later, does not provide a social
optimum in the long run (see section, 3.8).
Although the short term dominant strategy of Hardin's approach was presented
as a single-period Prisoner's Dilemma game, this does not apply in a natural field setting
for three reasons. First, the problem is a multi-period one; the game has an
indeterminate end. As is the case of any community exploiting a common resource,
interaction among the users occur over the years. Second, in the context of a community
exploiting a common resource, individuals are interacting in their daily activities, thus
they are communicating, unlike in the PD game. Thirdly, the PD scenario does not
apply if the resource users value working together and care about their reputation in the
wider community. Therefore, in the context of a natural field setting the game is played
repeatedly by participants who can communicate, negotiate and care for their
reputation, allowing scope for collective action to avoid the tragedy of the commons
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(Bardhan, 1993a; 1993b; Ostrom, 1990; Seabright, 1993; Hackett et al., 1994). In a
fishing village, for example, a fisherman who is seen to defect would find it very
difficult to attract the future cooperation of others.
3.6 The Logic of Collective Action
Mancur Olson (1965) in his book, "The Logic of Collective Action", argues,
"unless the number of the individual in a group is quite small, or unless there is
coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest,
rational self interested individuals will not achieve their common or group interest"
(Olson, 1965; p. 2). When a public good is provided, the rational course of action, for a
self-interested individual, is to take a free ride to enjoy the benefits of the collective
goods without contributing to the cost (Udehn, 1996). Olson states that provision of the
public good depends largely on group size. He divides groups into "small",
"intermediate" and "large". As the size of the group increases, free riding becomes a
dominant strategy. This is found in "large" and "intermediate" groups where the
contributions of individuals to collective goods are not significant and the share of the
benefits as stated by Olson (1965) is also negligible. "Intermediate" groups differ from
large groups in that the contributions of a single individual are noticeable to others.
Thus, the "intermediate" group is not large enough to let a free rider remain anonymous
(Udehn, 1996). In a "small" privileged group, free riding is less of a problem. In such a
group, at least one individual has the incentive to provide the public goods, irrespective
of the others' contributions.
Olson defined "privileged" in this way. If "Ci" is costs and gross benefits are
"Vi" to the individual and net benefits are "Ai", then individual benefits may be defined:
Ai = Vi - Ci. He argued that if Ai is greater than zero for some i then the group is
privileged and may form. If one member in the group finds that the benefits he will
obtain by having the good outweigh the cost of providing the good by himself, then the
group is privileged and the good will be provided even though other members will
consume the good without contributing toward its provision. In this case the total gain is
so large in relation to the total cost, and that an individual's share would be more that
the total cost of provision. However, if Al is less than zero for all i then the group is
"latent" and will fail unless selective incentives (noncollective goods) are introduced to
force individual to contribute (Olson, 1965; pp. 23, 49 - 51). Olson (1965) concludes
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that small groups are more likely to be privileged, whereas large groups are genera)
"latent". Against this claim, Barry and Hardin (1982) argue that in an instance of the
smallest of all possible latent groups in the PD game, the group fails if the net benefit is
less than the costs for both members (Barry, and Hardin, 1982; p. 26). They add that
even if a thousand players, who value the collective goods higher, are added to the PD
game, there are many players for whom the benefit is greater than the cost, so the group
is privileged.
As has been shown by Olson's conjecture above, the likelihood of voluntary
collective action (without selective punishments or inducements) is high for small
groups, low for large ones, and indeterminate for intermediate ones. However, as Barry
and Hardin (1982) argue, Olson's logic can only discriminate between privileged or
latent groups, not whether they are large or small. Because Olson gives little guidance
on how to distinguish the three types of groups, it seems that his conjecture regarding
group size does not fit the study of collective action of the fishing communities
undertaken by this thesis, as it is very difficult to assess if the fishing communities in
South Al-Batinah are "small", "large" or "intennediate".
Sandler (1992) provides a more rigorous analysis of collective action. His
analysis shows that important exceptions exist to the themes proposed by Olson. For
example, the extent of suboptimality may be independent of group size (Comes and
Sandler, 1985; p. 114). Large, homogenous groups may be privileged, and their
provision levels may increase with group expansion (Sandler, 1992; p. 19). The
provision of a public good depend largely on the notion of privilege. A privileged group
will form when at least one individual derives sufficient net benefits from the collective
action to go it alone. The conditions for a privileged group may depend on the
technology of publicness and its relationship to the underling game structure
(Sandler,1992). In Chamberlin's view, the relationship between group size and the
provision of collective goods is more complex than Olson asserts and that, in many
cases, it is the opposite of that suggested by Olson (Chamberlin, 1974; p. 707). In the
same vein, Baland and Platteau, (1996; p. 300) reached the following conclusion:
It 
. there is some sense in saying that large groups are made more like small groups
when their members share common norms possibly enforced by a well-recognced
authority".
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3.7 Game Theory and Common Pool Resources
A collective action problem exists when rational individual action can lead to an
inefficient or Pareto-inferior outcome (Taylor and Singleston, 1993; p. 196; Sandler,
1992; p. 22). Therefore, the fishermen's problem in an overexploited fishery is to move
away from this Pareto-inferior outcome to a Pareto-optimal or a Pareto-superior
outcome 8 . As argued by Taylor and Singleston, (1993; p. 196), "moving to a Pareto-
superior outcome would make at least one actor better off without making anyone
worse off and may make every one better off'. However, institutions that may solve the
collective action problem (i.e., to move to a Pareto-optimal or a Pareto9-superior
outcome) may not exist, simply because the costs of negotiation (transaction costs) are
too high (Dasgupta, 1996; p. 393; Taylor and Singleston, 1993; p. 196). These
transaction costs include searching cost (identify possibilities for cooperation),
bargaining cost (agreeing in one scheme to solve their collective problems), and
enforcement cost (ensuring that all individuals' behaviours are monitored).
Communities that devise solutions to the common problems are those whose members
have sufficient resources to meet the transaction costs (Taylor and Singleston, 1993 and
Hanna, 1995).
Collective problems facing the individual in a common pool resource can be
analysed using game theory. This is because collective action problems are typically
characterised by interdependence among fishermen. In such a situation the contribution
or effort of one fisherman will influence the contribution or effort of other fisherman.
Therefore, because of the interdependent nature of fishermen's activities in a real world
setting, game theory has been proved to be a relevant tool to illustrate many failures and
success of collective action. An individual is said to be trapped in a social dilemma
when he receives a higher pay-off for a defecting strategy than for a cooperative
strategy, but all are better off if all cooperate. In a common fishery, cooperation by
fishermen is required to reduce fishing effort and provide institutions to coordinate
resource use. To establish an institution to manage a resource and to maintain it over an
8 Among the Pareto-superior outcomes, there are some Pareto-optimal from which no Pareto-superior
moves can be made.
9 Pareto efficiency is defined as an acts occurs when there does not exist another feasible vector of acts
that is preferred by at least one agent and which is judged not inferior by any agent (Dasgupta and Heal,
1979; P. 55).
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extended period of time, it is necessary for all users to comply with its rules, norms and
strategies.
Game theory can be used to represent individual rational action. Individual and
collective behaviour can be represented by a variety of models or games, of which the
Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) has been the most common tool used by scholars to predict
individual rational behaviour. The Prisoner's Dilemma appears to provide a solid basis
for the conclusion that rational people cannot achieve rational collective outcome
(Wade, 1988). The dominate strategy of the Prisoner's Dilemma game is similar to
Hardin's conclusion: rational people cannot achieve rational collective outcome
(Hardin, 1968). In the two persons Prisoner's Dilemma (Figure 3.1), the individual gets
a higher pay-off by defecting if the other cooperates. If both actors defect, the outcome
will be worse for both of them. Although mutual cooperation yields the highest
aggregate pay-off, the structure of this game gives individuals incentives to defect. This
is because the defection strategy of this game always makes the individual better-off,
regardless of the other's strategy.
Player 2
Player 1
Strategy Cooperate
_
Defect
Cooperate 3,3 -1,4
Defect 4, -1 0, 0
Figure 3.1 Prisoner's Dilemma Payoff Matrix
To take a cooperative strategy is to risk being a "sucker" and receive the lowest
pay-off if the other defects. Therefore, the dominant strategy of the PD is defection, yet
it is a Pareto-inferior outcome because both actors would be better off under the mutual
cooperation strategy (Ostrom, 1990).
Now consider a fishing community with n fishermen, who must catch fish from
a fixed common fishery. Each fisherman has one of two options. The first option is to
cooperate by applying fishing effort at a level which is advantageous to the whole
group, thus protecting his well-being. Alternatively the individual fisherman may use a
defection strategy (free riding) by applying a fishing effort which, while advantageous
to him, harms the whole group of fishermen by causing overfishing.
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If fishermen devise a new institution to coordinate their use of their common
fishery, then they might obtain better returns from the fishery. However, if the PD logic
illustrates the incentives facing the community, no one will have an incentive to
cooperate and they will all fish at a sub-optimal level, leading to a situation in which all
are made worse off. In the PD model of a common fishery, each fisherman has an
incentive to free ride and fish heavily to increase his immediate gains, overexploiting
the fishery. An individual fisherman in such situations believes that he will receive a
higher payoff if he defects rather than if he cooperates.
To illustrate the rational action of individuals in the commons, assume for
simplicity that there are only two fishermen in the above community. As shown in
Figure 3.2, the first payoff in any box is that of fisherman 1, while the second payoff is
that of fisherman 2. Further assume that each unit of reduction of fishing effort
contributed by either fisherman gives a benefit of four units to both fishermen: the
contributor and non-contributor, at a cost of five units to the provider. Looking at the
matrix of this game it appears that the pay-off structure encourages defection, because
one is always better off (with a gain of 4 or 0) defecting, regardless of the other's
behaviour. Both fishermen are unable to communicate. The only information they have
is that one gets a higher payoff by defecting if the other cooperates. Although if both
cooperate, the highest aggregate pay-off is achieved, there is always a risk of the
cooperative fishermen receiving the lowest payoff (-1) (being a "sucker") if the other
defects.
Fisherman 2
Fisherman 1
_
Strategy Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 3, 3 -1, 4
Defect
0_
4, -1 0,0
Figure 3.2 Payoffs Matrix for Fishermen's PD Game
Fisherman 1 is better off choosing the defection row, as his payoffs in this row
(4 + 0 = 4) exceed the corresponding payoffs in the cooperating row (3 + -1 = 2).
Analogously, fisherman 2 is better off choosing the defection column as the payoffs of
this column exceed the payoffs of the other column. The resulting payoffs in Figure 3.2,
constitute the Prisoner's Dilemma, as the dominant strategy is to defect and, therefore,
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the group is latent and will fail (Sandler, 1992). The outcome of this game is "Pareto-
inferior" because both would be better off with the outcome of mutual cooperation
(Ostrom, 1990). To avoid this Pareto-inferior outcome, incentives to cooperate from
within the group must emerge or outside intervention (Olson, 1965 and Hardin, 1968)
must be applied. In contrast, a Pareto-optimal outcome is achieved when it is not
possible to improve the well-being of one individual without harming at least one other
(Sandler, 1992). In a non cooperative game such as a PD game, both players choose a
dominant strategy, and they produce an equilibrium that is the third best result for both.
This equilibrium is called the "Nash equilibrium", in which neither player has an
incentive to change his strategy (Sandler, 1992).
To model the above situation as a PD, however, two key assumptions must hold:
anonymity in decision-making, and that the game is played only once (Feeny et al.,
1996 and Wade, 1987). The two assumptions clearly fit the core parable of the
Prisoner's Dilemma, where the two prisoners are interrogated separately
(communication is forbidden, no future interaction). Both prisoners know that if each
uses the cooperative strategy and neither confesses, they will receive suspended
sentences, yet if one defects (confesses) he will be released, and the other will receive a
long term prison sentence and will not be able to choose another strategy (confess)
again in the future. If both defect (confess), each gets a reduced sentence. To protect
himself, each has sufficient incentive to defect, regardless of the other's decision. The
same assumptions may also make a useful approximation to the situation of the two
fishermen game. It is difficult to monitor compliance with a rule of restrained fishing.
Therefore, either of the two would use more effort when he can see that his defection
will not be detected. Analogously the other will use the same strategy and both end up
using more fishing effort.
In contrast to the Prisoner's Dilemma game, when taking the case of a common
fishery, the simple PD model does not exactly capture individual rational action
because fishermen jointly using a common do interact among themselves, repeatedly,
over the years. Fishermen play the above game repeatedly and non-anonymously. Each
fisherman accumulates experience of the behaviour of his opponent as he meets him
personally on the fishing ground. If both fishermen know that each will have more
opportunities in the future to alter his decision, there is a chance that one will cooperate
59
today, hoping that the other will do the same. The rational individual can, after all,
perhaps achieve a rational collective outcome (Wade, 1987). Sandler, in his analysis of
collective action problems, supports this argument: "collective action problems need not
imply a Prisoner's Dilemma" (Sandler, 1992; p. 44). If a fisherman sees that others will
contribute to reduce fishing efforts, he will have an incentive to contribute as well.
The dominant strategy of the two-persons PD game can be altered by changing
the game structure (Sandler, 1992). In the above example of the two fishermen, it is
assumed that individual cost exceeds individual benefits, and summation technology
applies (benefits are summed over the units provided); the group is latent. However, if
individual benefit exceeds individual costs and summation technology applies, it can be
shown that the group is fully privileged (Sandler, 1992). For example, suppose that each
unit of reduction in fishing effort contributed by individual fishermen gives a benefit of
five units to each and every individual, at a cost of four units. The payoff structure is
shown in Figure 3.3. If both fishermen use a cooperative strategy, each will receive a
net gain of six units ((5x2)-4). If one cooperates and the other defects, the cooperator
will receive one unit, while the other fisherman will get five units. The dominant
strategy in this case is full cooperation. The payoff structure encourages both fishermen
to cooperate. Therefore, the group is fully privileged. As stated by Sandler, the number
of players would have no effect on whether the good is provided or not-group size is
irrelevant (Sandler, 1992; p. 40).
Fisherman 2
Fisherman 1
Strategy Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 6, 6 1, 5
Defect 5, 1 0, 0
Figure 3.3 Payoffs Matrix for Privileged Group
Another important game form is the game of Chicken'. The Chicken game can
be used to represent a situation where everybody agrees that something is to be done but
the problem is who will actually do it. Many real world situations in marine fisheries
such as provision problems (assigning fishing rights) and appropriation problems
10
The storyline behind the name of this game can be found in Sandler, 1992, p.40.
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(reducing the take from the fishery) may correspond to this game form. In the context of
a fishing community in which its fishing grounds stand threatened by the invasion of an
industrial trawler, a number of fishermen (maybe half of them) can either lobby the
authority or challenge the trawler in the fishing ground. In such a situation, everybody
in the community agrees that something needs to be done to protect the fishing ground
and hence their livelihood. It could be that a number of fishermen decide to avoid the
collective bad voluntarily (lobby the authority or challenge the trawler). This may
happen when the total gain resulting from the avoidance of collective bad (trawler
invasion a traditional fishing ground) is so large in relation to the total cost that an
individual's share of the aggregated gain would exceed the total cost (Baland and
Platteau, 1996; p. 79).
Similarly, reducing the problem of overfishing correspond to this game form. In
an overexploited fishery, if all fishermen continue to increase their fishing efforts, the
overfishing problem will become severe; and they will incur more losses. If only half of
the fishermen reduce their fishing efforts, then the fishery would recover slightly and
everybody will generate additional revenue (provided that others do not increase their
fishing efforts). Off course, the non-contributors will gain more as they incur no costs,
whereas those who reduce their fishing efforts will receive less benefits as they have to
deduct the cost of provision of the collective goods.
Fisherman 1
Fisherman 2
Strategy Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 8,8 6, 10
Defect 10,6 2, 2
Figure 3.4 Payoffs Matrix for Chicken Game Group
For simplicity, the Chicken game is illustrated in Figure 3.4 as a game between
two fishermen whose fishing ground is threatened by the invasion of an industrial
trawler. From Figure 3.4, it is seen that neither fisherman has a dominant strategy in this
game. What each decides to do depends on what he expects the other to do. The payoff
structure (income to each fisherman) reveals that each fisherman prefers that the other
undertakes the avoidance of the collective bad while he refrains from doing so, as he
will get the maximum possible income (10 units). However, unlike PD situations, each
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fisherman cooperates if the other refuses to cooperate as the consequences of nobody
avoiding the collective bad are so disastrous (it is better to be a "sucker" and get 6 units
of income than not to be a "sucker" and get only 2 units. Therefore, there are two pure
strategy Nash equlibria in which one fisherman take the full responsibility to get the
trawler out of the fishing grounds (cooperates) while the other receives the benefits with
out any cost (defects)n.
In a natural world setting, at least some collective goods might be provided with
some form of coordination among participants. The institutional setting in place plays a
crucial role in avoiding the worst outcome.
In some natural world settings, participation of a few players will not lead to the
provision of the collective good. Thus, efforts of everyone are needed for any benefits
to be obtained. For example, the use of dynamite is a technical option, which is
available for fishermen to receive an immediate gain. This technique is used to harvest
fish in coastal waters but killing of immature fish takes place in the process. In such a
situation, if only a few fishermen abstain, their impact on the status of the fishery is
likely to be insignificant (Figure, 3.5). All fishermen need to avoid the collective bad in
order to protect their fishery. It has been a general view that the situation of common
property resources can be represented by an assurance game (Baland and Platteau,
1996; p. 90 and Runge, 1986; p. 628).
Fisherman 2
Fisherman 1
Strategy Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 4,4 -3,0
Defect 0, -3 0, 0
Figure 3.5 Payoffs Matrix for an Assurance Game Group
The payoff structure of the assurance game presented in Figure 3.5 represents
different strategies facing individual fishermen in a fishery in which the use of dynamite
as a fishing technique is widespread. As seen from Figure 3.5, if dynamite is eliminated
There are actually three Nash equlibria: not only (C, D) and (D, C), but also a randomized Nash
equilibrium known as "mixed strategy". A mixed strategy equilibrium is found by allowing each player to
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completely from the fishery (mutual cooperation), net income will return to its previous
level of 4 units each. If only one fisherman abstains, his impact on the fishery is likely
to be insignificant and the status quo landings prevail. In this case, the cooperative
fisherman will bear the cost of his contribution to avoid the collective bad (his payoff is
- 3 units), while the free rider receives no improvement in his income (no provision
cost). If neither of them abstain, the status quo will remain (Figure 3.5).
As argued by Runge "the coordination game described by the Assurance
Problem (AP) suggests that there are incentives to develop and maintain institutions
characterized by rules which make voluntary contribution to public goods a utility-
maximizing strategy" (Runge, 1984; p. 155). When institutions exist to facilitate the
coordination of behaviours by providing information regarding the expectations of
others, they provide assurance, which makes cooperation with the group's action more
attractive than free riding (see Chapter Four for an illustration of the role of institutions
in achieving optimality).
Sandler (1992) states that institutional rules, the technology of public supply and
the payoff structure are the main factors predicting the success or failure of collective
action. As compared to the PD, in the assurance game, both players must contribute if
either is to benefit from their actions. There is no dominant strategy in this game, but
there are two pure Nash equilibrium strategies: either all cooperate or all defect and the
former Pareto dominates the latter (Sandler, 1992; Runge, 1984). If one fisherman
reduces fishing effort to cooperate, the contract is self-enforcing, since the other
fisherman has a strong incentive to reduce his level of fishing effort.
The question of how agreement is implemented into a contract in the case of a
local commons has been clearly answered in a fascinating article by Dasgupta (1996).
According to Dasgupta, there are three mechanisms by which such agreements are
implemented. In the first mechanism, the agreement is translated into a contract, and is
enforced by an established structure of power and authority. This may be the national
government, but it need not be. The power of authority is often vested in tribal elders
and sheikhs in rural communities. For example, within the nomadic tribes in sub-
Saharan Africa the authority is in the hands of tribal elders and sheikhs (Baland and
choose his probability based on the best probability choice of the other player (Sandler, 1992, P. 41;
Baland and Platteau, 1996; p. 81).
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Platteau, 1996 and Dasgupta, 1996). Similarly, in the context of the coastal fisheries in
Oman, the authority is vested in the hands of the master (or chief) of the local
institution (Senat Al-Bahar) who is elected by the users to settle disputes, enforce
contracts, communicate with the authority and so on. What makes such a structure of
authority accepted by people is that general acceptance itself is a self-enforcing
behaviour (Dasgupta, 1996; p. 419). For example, in the context of a fishing village,
when all fishermen accept the structure of authority to coordinate the use of the fishery,
each fisherman has an incentive to accept it. General acceptance is a Nash equilibrium
(Dasgupta, 1996; P. 420).
The second mechanism, according to Dasgupta (1996), consists in the
development of a disposition to abide by agreements, a disposition formed through the
process of communal living and the experience of rewards and punishments. When an
individual internalizes social norms 12 (paying his dues, keeping agreements, returning a
favour and so on), continuing that norm becomes the mainspring of his action. That
person feels shame or guilt in violating a norm, and this is what often prevents him from
doing so. If a majority in the community shares the same norm, the individual is subject
to criticism and social frowning for violating that. It has been found that in communities
where social norms are highly internalized, transaction costs 13 are minimized
considerably.
The third mechanism for the implementation of agreements in local commons
may occur in situation of repeated encounter among the resource users in similar
situations (Dasgupta, 1996). This can take place in situations where far-sighted
individuals (people applying a low subjective discount rate to the future costs and
benefits) know each other and the environment, where they expect to interact repeatedly
under the same conditions. In the context of a small fishing village, for example, if all
fishermen are far-sighted, a credible threat by others that they will impose sanctions on
those who broke the rules would be sufficient to achieve compliance. Tit-for-Tat (where
a player cooperates unless another defect) appears to be a robust strategy which resists
12
A social norm is a rule of behaviour that is commonly obeyed by all. The rule is sustained by the feelings
of embarrassment, anxiety, guilt and shame that a person suffers at the prospect of violating it (Elster,
1989;p. 100).
13 
Transaction costs are those costs incurred in process of initiating collective action.
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challenge from other strategies. However, the trouble with Tit-for-Tat is that in the real
world the first defection often leads to breakdown (Child and Faulkner, 1998; p. 29).
Ridley, (1996; cited in Child and Faulkner, 1998) suggests two alternative strategies
that have been found to be more effective than Tit-for-Tat. They are Pavlov and Finn-
but-Fair. In Pavlov, players stick to their strategy if they win on that strategy and if they
lose, try another strategy. Ridley claims this to be the basis of both dog-training and
child-rearing. In this context, individuals are trained to do things that are rewarded and
stop doing things that are punished. Child and Faulkner (1998) argue that Pavlov is also
powerless against continual defectors. The strategy of Firm-but-Fair seems more
effective than Tit-for-Tat and Pavlov. According to Child and Falukner (1998; p. 29),
"in the firm-but fair, players act successively and can communicate (unlike the PD
game) which leads them to cooperate with cooperators, return to cooperation after
mutual defection, and punish defectors by further defection, but assumes that they
continue to cooperate after being a sucker in the previous round".
3.8 Fisheries Management by the State
To handle the tragedy of the commons, Hardin (1968) suggests mutual coercion
where a strong state control must establish order in the commons. One way to improve
things is to impose regulations on resource users, for example restricting membership to
a community of resource users, and enforce strict sanctions on those who violate its
rules or establish quotas on the quantity of fish harvested. Another is to introduce a
system of taxes (Pigovian taxes) (Dasgupta, 1996; p. 395). However, many scholars
have argued that the capacity of the state to stop the tragedy is questionable (Baland and
Plateau, 1996; Dasgupta and Maler, 1994; Dasgupta, 1996; Dyer and Leard, 1994;
Ostrom, 1990 and Williams, 1997). Social change and the advent of modern institutions
have eroded the effectiveness of the traditional management systems and introduced
fisheries management approaches have generally failed to prevent resource
overexploitation (Doulman, 1993; p. 108 and Williams, 1997; p. 59). Furthermore, lack
of a coherent or a consistent set of operating principles is a problem associated with
state failures to bring order to the commons. Even placing the commons under state
control cannot guarantee exclusion.
There is a potential conflict between the interest of communities and the state in
managing fishery resources (Kuperan and Abdullah, 1994; p. 307). The interest of the
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community may be to use the fish resources for securing a subsistence living, whereas
the state has its development plans to maximize revenue through export, tourism and so
on. In most cases, the state interest to maintain commons institutions may not coincide
with what resource users expect from the commons.
The threat of the tragedy of the commons, especially in developing countries,
comes from development projects carried out by the state (Subir, 1996). Major
advances in the efficiency of fishing gear and vessels and an increase in the demand for
fish over the past twenty to thirty years has contributed to the tragedy in many fisheries.
Accumulation of capital in the fishery by subsidizing the purchase of engines, boats and
fishing gear is observed in many fisheries. Opening new markets and opportunities for
fish export is another example, causing intense pressure on coastal fisheries. Dyer and
Leard, (1994) see the destruction of traditional use patterns by the state and the
ignorance of the resource users knowledge, perceptions, and experiences as other major
contributors to the fisheries' crises. As argued by Dasgupta and Maler (1994; p. 335)
"environmental damages at the local level have often been inflicted upon such
communities (possibly unwittingly) by outside agencies-very often by their own
government". However, this is not to suggest that rural development is to be avoided.
According to Dasgupta, "Resource allocation mechanisms that do not take advantage of
dispersed information, that are insensitive to hidden economic and ecological
interactions, that do not take the long view, and that do not give a sufficiently large
weight to the claims of the poorest within rural population are going to prove
environmentally disastrous" (Dasgupta, 1996; pp. 406 - 407).
Organizing collective management by local users may not be appreciated by
government officials. Government officials, scientist and policy makers may view
collective management initiative as quaint since they do not fit the development and
management strategies devised to avert the tragedy of the coastal commons (Kurien,
1995).
Fish resources are diminishing, and some fisheries are collapsing due to
population growth, fishing pressure, technological changes, overcapitalization, over-
regulation, pollution and habitat loss (Dyer and Leard, 1994; Jodha, 1990; Lim et al.,
1995 and Richards, 1997). These factors individually or jointly contribute to the decline
and in some cases depletion of coastal fisheries. The decline in productivity and
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sustainability of coastal fisheries has been a part of the commons scenario in most
developing countries, where these resources continue to be important in providing
employment and food for a large section of the population. Modern management by the
state has so far addressed such problems inadequately because of a lack of flexibility in
administrative protocol and organization, because of conflicts among agencies and
various special interest groups in fisheries and because of different world views
between managers and users (Dyer and Leard, 1994 and Subir, 1996).
It appears that Hardin's (1968) conclusion was applied since it first appeared to
persuade govenunents to impose a centralized management to set order into the
commons problems and many countries have adopted such policies, particularly
developing countries. Development and management of the fisheries in Oman has been
the responsibility of the government since 1970. The government has frequently
undermined the capability of customary institutions and organizations to manage the
fish resources by transferring authority to government agencies and by imposing
controls that conflict with traditional use patterns. This intervention is viewed as
legitimate, and even necessary, to prevent overexploitation of the fishery if fishermen
were left to their own devices. Thus, as has been the case in many developing countries,
in Oman laws are established to redefine local users' rights and duties with respect to
the pattern of use of the coastal fisheries. However, this intervention often arises from
an insufficient understanding of the capability of traditional institutions. With this
action, government's interventions have frequently resulted in unintended, but
disastrous outcomes (Williams, 1997; p. 60)
For example, coastal fisheries in Oman have been regulated by a licensing
programme for the last two decades. However, instead of restricting the newcomers
from entering the fishery, the government policy has contributed to increasing the
number of fishermen substantially, thus exacerbating resource degradation. There are
three reasons for this. First, this intervention destroyed the basis of the social and
institutional structure that previously regulated access to the fishery. Second, due to the
limited employment opportunities in other sectors of the economy in Oman and in other
Gulf states, more people were attracted to the fishery. Thirdly, the subsidies provided by
the Fisherman's Encouragement Funds (FEF). Individuals holding a fishing licence can
benefit from the programme (FEF) initiated by the Government to develop the fishery.
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The Government programme of mechanization of the fishing crafts and purchasing of
efficient fishing gears has led to over-exploitation of fish resources.
3.9 Conclusion
The literature review presented in this chapter provides some insight into the
social dilemmas individuals may face in their use of a local commons. These dilemmas
occur in situations where individual rationality to produce private interest are in fact in
conflict with the collective rationality, thus creating undesirable consequences for
themselves and for others. We are fortunate to have the opportunity to use game theory
as a tool to study many environmental problems, but it is completely unrealistic to jump
to the immediate conclusion that the incentive facing individuals in such a situation is
similar to the Prisoner's Dilemma model. There is confusion in the literature concerning
the term "common property". The term has been repeatedly used to refer to property
owned by a government, a community or by no one (open access) (Schlager and
Ostrom, 1992; p. 249). This usage leads to confusion in scientific study and this is what
made Hardin (1968) advance the "tragedy of the commons" model which has been the
basis for natural resource management plans around the world. Contrary to Hardin's
recommendation, game theory has clearly demonstrated that in the context of a natural
field setting, the game is played repeatedly by participants who can communicate,
negotiate and care for their reputation, allowing scope for collective action to avoid the
tragedy of the commons (Bardhan, 1993a; 1993b; Ostrom, 1990; Seabright, 1993 and
Hackett et al., 1994;). The role of centralized government to manage coastal fish
resources is questionable, as it may not remedy the situation because the effort may be
impeded by conflicting political interests or lack of enforcement.
The results of previous field research of many local commons indicates that
fishermen as decision-makers can play a significant role in preventing the tragedy of the
commons through collective action. Examples of resource users successfully managing
their resources are noted above. These examples strengthen the case of this study that
individuals using a local common can in fact initiate collective action to further their
well-being.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN
AVOIDANCE OF THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
4.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to determine how different institutional arrangements
used to exploit a common fishery can provide the necessary discouragement of the user's
activities that generate negative externalities. In fact, examples of situations in which
communities have evolved institutional structures to exploit resource as a common property
are legion (see Ostrom, 1990). Although most of these institutions rely very much on
informal laws and convention, it often appears that they are effective in avoiding the tragic
outcome associated with open access (Ostrom, 1990; Baland and Platteau, 1996; Conies
and Sandler, 1996).
In this chapter, two institutional arrangements used to exploit a fish resource will be
compared. The first section of this chapter considers an open access fishery where the
proportional sharing rule is implemented. The Nash equilibrium fishing effort resulting
from such an arrangement is compared to that obtained under the Pareto efficient utilisation
of the fishery. The second section looks more closely at another institution in which the
fishery is exploited as common property, where fishermen agreed to pool the catch (equal
sharing rule) at the end of the fishing day and then divide it among all participants on that
particular day. The total level of fishing effort at the Nash equilibrium under the equal
sharing rule is compared to that found under the proportional sharing rule arrangement.
Examples from real world settings are included to give more support to the analysis.
4.2 Proportional Sharing Rule
An open access situation can be shown to be formally equivalent to an n-person PD
game (defined in Chapter Three). The equilibrium observed in an n-person PD game is
universal defection, yet it is a Pareto-inferior outcome because all actors would be better off
under a mutual cooperation strategy. Similarly, the open access equilibrium as a failure of
collective action leads to an inefficient allocation in which all rents are dissipated, and
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fishermen's profits gravitate toward zero. To show this, a static analysis is presented below.
It is adapted from similar analyses in Comes and Sandler (1996), Baland and Platteau
(1996) and Gibbons (1992).
Consider a fishery in which all fishermen have a right to fish and there are a large
number of fishermen. Since there are no well-defined property rights all fishermen will
enter the fishery as long as the average product of fishing exceeds the price of entry (the
rental price of a vessel, for example).
Let the total amount of catch and number of vessels be denoted by Y and R
respectively and let the total amount of catch depend on the number of fishing vessels.
The production function for this fishery is therefore: Y = F(R). For simplicity,
assume that Y =F(R) can be approximated by the following functional form:
Y = aR—bR2 which is increasing and strictly concave' (i.e., (R)> 0 and F" (R)< 0. ).
It is assumed that unity and c denote the price of fish and the cost of renting a
vessel2 respectively. The individual fisherman's catch and number of vessels are denoted by
y and r respectively. A proportional sharing rule is implemented here, meaning that the
individual fisherman's share of the total catch equals his share of the total fishing effort in
the fishery. It is assumed also that the fish are evenly distributed throughout the fishing
grounds, so that each fisherman catches the same amount This assumption allows us to
represent the individual fisherman's catch to equal his share of the total effort multiplied by
the total catch. Therefore, the payoff or the production function of each fisherman can be
represented as follows:
y =—
R
(aR-bR2)
The efficient solution in this fishery is obtained by choosing the number of vessels that
will maximize the total profit (it) generated from the fishery. The mwdmand is
1 The equation Y = aR-bR2 is Schaefer's model which suggests that yield is related to fishing effort by an
asymmetrical parabola. The values a (the intercept) and b (the slope) can be found from the graphed catch per
unit of effort against fishing effort and then substituted in the production function (Y = aR-b11 2 ) to construct
the yield curve (King, 1995). This type of model is the typical production technology assumed in common
property analysis (Comes and Sandler, 1996 and Baland and Platteau, 1996).
2 Assume that all other costs are negligible.
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7r(R) = (aR–bR2 )– cR
	 (1.2)
The optimal value, R*, is uniquely determined by the first-order condition which is
when the fleet's marginal product is equated to the variable input's price (vessel rental
price, c). This is when:
thr
= (a –2bR)–	 a– c =2bR
dR
R*–  a
2
–Therefore, R*, or the number of vessels at the social equilibrium, is R ac=	 . This2b
amount of effort is required to satisfy the first order condition obtained from equation (1.2).
This allocation would result from competitive exploitation when the property rights are
well defined.
However, maintaining an optimal level of effort is extremely difficult. High profits
will attract more fishermen into the fishery and the effort level will tend to gravitate
towards a higher effort level, especially in fisheries which are not controlled or are under-
controlled. In the Nash equilibrium the individual fisherman will maximize his profit and
treat the rest of the fishing vessels operating in the fishery as exogenous. The fisherman's
problem is:
maximize( {—r
 (aR – bR2 )– cr)	 (1.3)
' R
Using the chain rule to find the derivative, the first order condition of (1.3) is
obtained as follows:
R* r(a-2bR)+ R(aR–bR2 )–r* (aR–bR2) 
c =0
R2
r(a-2bR) +(R–r)(aR–bR2) 
c = 0
R2
c = Ti(a –2bR)+ R–r  (aR–bR2)
R2
Equation (1.6) can be written as:
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c = —
R
(a —2bR)+ R—r (aR—bR2) 
R	 R
	 (1.7)
where (R— r) represents the rest of the fishermen's vessels.
It is clearly shown in equation (1.7) that the price of renting a fishing vessel is
equated to a weighted sum of its marginal ( L. (a —2bR)) and average ( R — r (aR—bR2) )
r
product. At a symmetric equilibrium where there are n fishermen in the fishery, — = _ and
R n
R— r 
=
(n — 1) 
, hence, (1.7) can be expressed as;
c = —
1 (a —2bR)+ (n— 1) (aR— bR2) 
	
(1.8)
In the case of a single fisherman (the fishery is efficiently managed), n = 1, it can be
seen from (1.8) that the price of renting a fishing vessel equals to marginal product and the
Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality are identical.
n = 1	 c = (a —2bR) a — c = 2bR
The number of vessels at this allocation can be obtained:
R
,
 = 
a — c
2b
As the number of fishermen exploiting the fishery grows large (n tends to infinity)
the price of renting a fishing vessel converges to average product and profit approaches
zero.
(1.9)
n--->oo
(aR— bR 2 ) 
c—
	 c = a —bR
The number of vessels operating at this allocation can be written as:
a — c
R" — 	 . (1.10)
or there are Rn number of vessels under the open access arrangement.
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Comparing (1.9) and (1.10) shows that Rn > R: too many vessels are in the Nash
equilibrium compared to the social optimum. As a matter of fact, Rn = 2R* in this example.
In other words, the impact of open access is to double the number of vessels operating in
the fishery, thereby leading to the complete dissipation of the total rent (Baland and
Platteau, 1996; p. 27). As the number of fishermen increases, the ratio of equilibrium to the
optimum (Rn/Ra) of vessels increases. In this sense, overexploitation is exacerbated by an
increase in the number of fishermen (Comes and Sandler, 1996; p. 279). The degree of
inefficiency resulting from common ownership depends on the number of agents operating
in the commons (Baland and Platteau, 1996; p. 31). As is illustrated by equations (1.9) and
(1.10), the lower the number of fishermen, the greater the extent to which they can consider
the negative externality of their action on the productivity of the fishery. For example, when
there	 y	 as	 operates is only one fisherman in the fishe 3 (n = 1 in equation 1.9) he orates R*— a — c2b
which is half of the number of vessels that would be operated under the open access
equilibrium (equation 1.10). In this case the single fisherman takes into account the fall in
his income (the negative consequences of his actions on the productivity of the fishery) if
he has to add one more vessel into the fishery. This implies that group size, as argued by
Olson (1965) is, in part, a root cause of collective failures in this model. However, this
might not be the case as argued by Sandler (1992; p. 35); Comes and Sandler, (1996) and as
will be illustrated in Section (4.3). Sandler (1992) argues that the conditions for an efficient
exploitation of the commons hinge on the institutional rules implemented. Although in an
open access fishery the systematic tendency is toward defection as implied by the model of
the Prisoner's Dilemma, the fact is that institutions can be designed to eliminate defection
as a dominant strategy and to create an underlying game structure that fosters cooperation.
The first order condition (1.7) reflects the incentives faced by a fisherman who is
already operating one vessel but considering adding one more. The value of adding one
R r (aR— bR2)
vessel is
	
	  and its cost is c. The harm to the fisherman's existing vessel is
—
r (a —2bR) and its cost is c. The fishery is overexploited because each fisherman
considers only his incentives, not the effects of his actions on other fishermen. The
inefficient outcome obtains because even in the zone where total income is falling, an
3 The fishery was efficiently managed so as to maximize profits.
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increase in individual fishing effort may cause the fisherman's individual share of income
to rise (Baland and Platteau, 1997a). This effect is shown in equation (1.7) by the positive
sign of the second term (the average product) R—r (aR— bR2) This explains clearly why
decisions which were made at an individual level seem rational from the individual point of
view but prove to be irrational collectively.
As shown by the above analysis, an open access arrangement leads to the full
tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968). A collective failure is clearly shown by the above
analysis when fishermen fail to restrain their fishing effort. The total level of effort at the
Nash equilibrium (equation 1.10) is in excess of the social optimum which requires total
effort to be such that its marginal productivity is equal to zero. Individual fishermen adopt a
defecting strategy by operating more vessels; hence, they overexploit the fishery. A
cooperative strategy where R * vessels are operated achieving the Pareto efficient outcome
would make all fishermen better off.
When the fishery is open to all (open access), individuals have to decide whether
they should enter the fishery or engage in other economic activities (farming for example).
To start exploiting the fishery, individuals have to compare the price of entry that they have
to bear and the benefits they expect to get. As long as the net benefit is greater than the
price of entry, they decide to enter and exploit the resource. The problem is that their
private evaluation of the expected benefits does not take into account the fall in the others'
incomes which is caused by their entry: by their action they impose a negative externality
on other agents (Baland and Platteau, 1996; p. 26).
4.3 Sharing Output
As was shown above, fishermen who enjoy unrestricted access to fishing grounds
seek to maximise their profits in the short run. Initially, the catches of those who start
fishing increase, but as the number of newcomers rises, per vessel catches decline and
overfishing take place, ruining the well-being of all fishermen. Ginkle (1995) described this
situation as a zero-sum game in which one fisherman's gains is another's loss. This
condition was modelled in equation (1.8), the interesting feature of which is that under an
open access arrangement individual fisherman equate the average product of fishing
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R— r (aR—bR2)  to the variable input price of entry, instead of equating the marginal
product of fishing —r (a –2bR) to the price of entry. Consequently, the resource is
overfished in the economic sense.
A growing body of literature has emphasised the importance of self-governance
institutions to solve a wide range of common property resource problems that neither the
state nor the market can effectively tackle alone. These problems can include, for example,
the over-exploitation of resources, the internalization of externalities and problems
associated with conflicts between resource users (Ostrom, 1990). There are many examples
of efficient exploitation of resources in which communities have evolved self-governing
institutions based on formal or informal agreed custom and convention. A commonly cited
example can be found in the case of the Manya fishery in Turkey, where fishermen have
agreed on a system of rotating access to the fishing sites in an equitable manner (Berkes,
1986; Ostrom, 1990 and Baland and Platteau, 1996). This informal institution has been
designed to change the incentive structure facing individual fishermen in Alanya.
The indigenous institution of Alanya will be described here to show how the
incentive structure was changed in order to encourage fishermen to maintain the institution.
The fishermen of Alanya faced a declining fishery during the 1970s caused by unrestrained
use of the resource and competition between fishermen for better fishing sites. The former
had led to declined stock and the latter had increased fishing costs. The pay-off structure of
this game is similar to that found in the Prisoner's Dilemma game; universal defection was
the outcome in this case. To avoid this tragedy, all fishermen in Alanya negotiated a new
institution to coordinate their use of the fishery. The institution was designed to allocate
fishing sites to local fishermen in an equitable manner. After a decade of trial and error,
Alanya's fishermen established their institution which is based on a rotating system of equal
access for all fishermen to the fishing sites. The system can be summarised in three steps.
First, all fishing sites within the area normally fished by Alanya's fishermen are named and
listed. Second, all those who have the right to fish in Alanya are listed as well. Third, in
September of each year, all fishermen gather to participate in the lottery to draw their lots
from the list of fishing sites, and the allocation of the named fishing sites is in effect from
September to May (Berkes, 1986).
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In the above system, consideration is made to allow for spaces between fishing sites
so that nets set in one fishing site will not block fish from being available to the adjacent
sites. Seasonal migration of fish is also considered. This is achieved by allowing individual
fishermen to move east to the next site during September to January and then to move west
after January. This arrangement gives all fishermen equal opportunities to be in the best
fishing sites.
The interesting feature of the above institution is that the enforcement of the system
is carried out by the fishermen themselves as a by-product of the incentive created by the
rotation system. When a fisherman is assigned a better fishing site, he is motivated to use
his rotating turn to the fullest extent Shirking on the system can be detected at a low cost
by those who most want to deter the cheater at that particular time and location. Fishermen
assigned a good fishing site will punish rule breakers by destroying their gears if necessary.
The others will obey the rules as they do not want their rights to be violated when they are
assigned a good fishing site. The fishermen in Alanya have, therefore, broken out of the trap
inherent in the commons dilemma by making a binding contract to commit themselves to a
co-operative strategy. The incentive structure of the Prisoner's Dilemma game of the above
case was transformed to a privileged game in which all fishermen have an interest in
maintaining a universal cooperative strategy.
The solution brought up by the Alanya's fishermen is not the only way to solve a
commons dilemma. It is merely one way (Ostrom, 1990; p. 16). Comes and Sandler (1996)
stated that "one way of managing a common property resource is simply to change the
sharing rule in such a way as to change the incentive structure facing individual
exploiters". If fishermen change the incentive structure, commons dilemmas can be
avoided. To demonstrate this, consider a fishing village in which all fishermen reach an
agreement to change the present proportional sharing rules to an equal shares rule in which
each takes home the fraction 1/n of the catch. It can be shown below that this alteration in
the sharing rule will lead to efficient exploitation. This is similar to changing the rule of the
game in which the Prisoner's Dilemma is transformed into a fully privileged game by
changing the way the game is played (see Sandler, 1992). To demonstrate how the incentive
structure can be changed, in the following section the outcome of the equal shares rule will
be compared to the results obtained in Section 4.2 (proportional sharing rule). The static
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model presented here is based on the analysis of Comes and Sandler (1996) and Baland and
Platteau (1996).
Under the proportional sharing rule, the amount of effort applied at the Nash
equilibrium is double that of the social optimum exploitation (see the result obtain from the
first order condition (1.8). However, as is demonstrated below, the inefficiency associated
with the tragedy of the commons can be reversed if resource users agree to adopt an
alternative institutional arrangement (equal shares rule). An example of sharing the final
output may include fishermen splitting their catch from a jointly owned fishery or a cattle
herd owned collectively by a tribe grazing on reservation land. For example, sharing output
was found to be the dominant method for allocating hunting grounds among aboriginal
cultures (Bailey, 1992; cited in Lueck, 1994).
Suppose that a fishing community enforces a system in which all fishermen's
catches are pooled and landed at one place so that individual fishermen get the fraction 1/n
of the total income at the end of the day. To show this, consider the example of the fishery
presented in Section 4.2, where the total amount of catch and number of vessels is denoted
by Y and R respectively. It is assumed that the price of fish and the cost of renting a vessel
are denoted by unity and c respectively. Let, the total amount of catch depend on the
number of fishing vessels and the individual fisherman's catch and number of vessels is
denoted by y and r respectively. In Section 4.2 where the proportional sharing rule is
adopted the individual fisherman's share of total catch equals his share of the total fishing
effort in the fishery. However, in this section the investigation will focus on the outcome of
equal shares rule where the individual fishermen's share of the total catch equals the
fraction 1/n times the total catch. The production function for individual fishermen can be
written as:
y = 1—(aR — bR2 )
	
(2.1)
where R is the total fishing effort in this fishery which is denoted by: R = R° + r, in
which R° represent the other fishermen's vessels in the fishery. The efficient solution in this
fishery is obtained by choosing the number of vessels that will maximize the total profit (n)
generated from the fishery. The maximand for one fisherman is
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(2.3)
(2.4)
n(R) = —1 (aR—bR2)—cr	 (2.2)
n
To establish the first order profit maximization condition with respect to r, the
partial derivative with respect to r is derived and set equal to zero.
Orr(R) 1
= (a —2bR)— c
a-	 n
Therefore, the first-order condition implies that:
a —2bR
=c
n
In the previous section (assuming the proportional sharing rule) it was shown that
the price of renting a fishing vessel is equated to a weighted sum of its marginal and
average product, a classic open access dissipation of rents. Equation (2.4) gives different
results. The price of renting a fishing vessel is equated to the marginal productivity. This
implies that the Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality are identical, an interesting feature
of this first order condition at the Nash equilibrium (when n = 1). The intuition behind this
theoretical result is that the new institution plays an important role in forcing some of the
cost of externality back on the fishermen. The efficient exploitation of the commons is then
achieved as individual fishermen have no incentive to increase their effort beyond that
required for the social optimum.
The equal sharing rule implies that the externality generated by each fisherman is
forced back on its perpetrator. Under this model it does this to such an extent that the effort
induced falls below the economic optimum when n is greater than 1.
The total level at the Nash equilibrium effort is in fact lower in this case, as will be
shown below, than the social optimum which requires total effort to be such that its
marginal productivity is equal to zero. Individual fishermen will increase their effort until
the first order condition of equation (2.3) is satisfied.
From equation (2.4) the following result is obtained:
a— cn
R= 	
2b
(2.5)
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YEquation (2.5) represents a common (R) value at equilibrium for any (n). At the
symmetric Pareto optimum (n = 1), where the marginal product equals the price of renting a
fishing vessel, the optimum number of vessels (R s) can be obtained directly from equation
(2.5).
Rs— a — c
2b .
On the other hand, the Nash fleet, R, for this fishery can be obtained from equation
(2.5) (i.e., when n tends to oo). It is clearly shown that Rn cannot rise beyond Rs—  a — c
2b '
because as (n) increases R falls. Furthermore, as seen in Figure 4.1, the production function
will cross the x-axis when profit is zero before R reaching (co). Therefore, the above results
confirm that Rn < Rs when the equal shares rule is implemented.
(2.6)
Figure 4.1 A Typical Production Function for a Fishery
Comparing this allocation of effort to that obtained with the proportional sharing
rule, it can be concluded that the proportional sharing rule leads to higher effort, which is
higher than the level required for efficient exploitation of the commons (Comes and
Sandler, 1996). Since le < R s, the results obtained from equal shares rule reverse the
overexploitation of the fishery commonly found under the open access situations.
Therefore, different institutional frameworks imply different outcomes. This result is
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consistent with those achieved by Comes and Sandler (1996), Sandler (1992) and Lueck
(1994).
In fact, as shown in Table 4.1, it was confirmed here that fishing effort applied to a
fishery under the equal sharing rule is lower than that required for the social optimum
a — c
allocation (R* = 2b ). This is because when an individual fisherman considers adding
1
more effort to fishing, he counts only the fraction — of any extra benefit to himself. In this
sense, individual fishermen impose a positive, not a negative, externality on others (Comes
and Sandler, 1996; p. 287). When communities design institutions to coordinate their use of
the commons, the dominant strategy of defection is eliminated and the situation creates an
underlying game structure that fosters cooperation.
Table 4.1 Fishing Efforts Under Two Catch-Sharing Systems
Proportional sharing rule Equal sharing rule
Nash fleet Pareto Nash fleet Pareto
Rn
 — a — c R*=a — c
Rn< 1Z* R* — a — cb 2b 2b
To take a real world application of the equal shares rule, the informal lobster
territories in Maine (Acheson, 1989) will be highlighted. The lobster resource in Maine is
owned by private groups known as harbour gangs. Gang members harvest lobster and
exclude outsiders from their territories. Gang members also agree to limit the number of
traps each fisherman may use. The individual lobstemian owns his vessel, traps and
ultimately the catch in his traps. The lobster resource in Maine is, therefore, managed as a
common property by the resource owners. It is apparent that group member are
homogeneous and that cultural norms (all come from the local town), technological
constraints (limited number of traps), and limited membership (outsiders excluded)
strengthen this homogeneity. One of the interesting features of the Maine lobster case is that
gang members have instituted an equal sharing rule by limiting the number of traps
individual fishermen may use. The outcome achieved by this sharing rule is a more efficient
exploitation of the lobster resource in Maine.
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Another example of the use of equal shares rule in the fisheries sector is given by
Lopez (1984, cited in Baland and Platteau, 1997b; p. 12) in his study of fisheries in Batanes
Islands, Philippines. The number of vessels that go fishing in Batanes Islands is determined
on the basis of a scout's report of the days potential catch, but the catch is divided equally
among all households, regardless of the number of vessels operating (ibid., p. 13)
4.4 Conclusion
The above analysis lead us to conclude that small changes brought about by
institutions can change the incentive structure facing individual fishermen. The dominant
strategy of individual fishermen under the proportional sharing rule is universal defection.
This non-cooperative game is changed by modifying the sharing rule into a game in which
the dominant strategy of all fishermen is to cooperate.
This section shows that the equal shares rule can produce an outcome opposite to
that characterized by Hardin (1968) as the tragedy of the commons. However, care should
be taken when considering the above analysis as it can only be relevant in cases of
homogeneous groups in which similar technology is used.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
5. 1 Introduction
To satisfy the general aim of this study, which is to investigate the factors that
contribute to the emergence and evolution of collective action in fishermen's communities
to manage their coastal fish resources, a conceptual framework is needed to clarify the
predicted nature of the relationships among the different factors covered by the study. The
conceptual framework developed in this section is very useful to guide the selection of
variables for testing of hypotheses and to check their relevance in order to verify the
empirical results achieved. More specifically, the framework proposed here will try to reach
a systematic answer to the basic question raised in this study: what are the factors that
influence the individual fishermen's decision-making to participate in collective action to
manage their fishery? This framework, is therefore, a representation of reality; it delineates
those aspects of the real world which are considered to be relevant to our investigation; it
makes explicit the significant relationships among those aspects, and it enables the
formulation of empirically testable propositions regarding the nature of these relationships
(Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996; p. 44).
The study focuses on understanding why fishermen choose to participate (or not
participate) in local collective action to manage fish resources. Figure 5.1 shows a
framework for assessing the factors that contribute to the emergence and evolution of
collective action in fishermen's communities. The collective action consists of fishermen
obeying the group rules and participating in collective effort to manage the coastal fish
resources in South Al-Batinah. The degree to which the following variables influences each
other and fishermen's willingness to participate in collective action can provide some useful
information. This framework can also be used to verify the results of testing the hypotheses
and assumptions proposed by this study. The structure of the framework, as well as the
•elationships among its variables, is then tested using the empirical results of the data
collected from the field.
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Before examining the central question of which factors are likely to influence
fishermen's decision to participate in collective action, we first need to understand how
collective action emerges. Following White and Runge's suggestions, what happens in the
cases of collective action in a fishery can be understood to occur in three phases: (1) a
challenge to the status quo and proposal for collective action; (2) choices by individuals
between participating and not participating in the collective action and (3) the emergence of
the collective action (White and Runge, 1995; P. 1685). In a real world setting, phase (1)
occurs when individuals face a commons dilemma or externalities which render the use of
the resource inefficient and which establish the rationale to change the current situation. For
example, fishermen facing a depleted fishery and hence declining revenues may be
motivated to look for ways to mitigate the problem. The losses resulting from an
overexploited fishery may provide incentives for fishermen to engage in collective action to
set restrictions on entry and on the amount harvested.
In situations where the status quo needs to be changed, the demand for new rules or
the establishment of an institution to coordinate the use of the fishery always arises.
However, the demand for changes in the existing rules might face great difficulties. As
argued by Ostrom (1990; p. 202), the status quo operational rules always protect some
individuals and expose others. Thus, changes in property institutions involve the risk of
being worse off for some individuals, especially those who are usually profited by the status
quo (Libecap, 1994; p. 567). Therefore, for the current rules to be changed, the support of a
set of individuals large enough (critical mass in Wade's (1986) words) to have them
changed is required. When there are enough fishermen to support the change, the rules are
changed either by the users themselves, in cases of informal management institutions, or by
the authority, in cases where the state has some control over the resource. However, even
when fishermen are facing a declining incomes, collective action may not emerge directly
due to the higher transaction coasts involved (Taylor and Singleston, 1993; P. 196) and
because of imperfect information concerning the impacts of resource use and the
expectations regarding the behaviour of other fishermen in the group (Baland and Platteau,
1996; p. 290). Therefore, the process may take quite a long time, as was observed in
Alanya, Turkey, in which an agreement between fishermen to manage their fishery was
reached after ten years of trial and error (Ostrom, 1990).
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In the second phase, fishermen choose either to cooperate or to defect As proposed
by Ostrom (1990), it is essential, therefore, to analyse the collective choice from the
perspective of the individual fishermen. The outcome of this phase depend on a number of
factors. For example, the individual decision is determined by the configuration of variables
relating to the physical world, the institution rules in use and the attributes of the individual
involved in the situation (Ostrom, 1990; pp. 192 - 206). The three variables are denoted as
situational variables according to Ostrom (1990). However, not all situational variables
advanced by Ostrom (1990) have a deterministic effect on the success or failure of
collective action and the data for many are not readily available because of the difficulty in
their operationalization and measurement. The choices made in phase (2) (individual
participation choice) are determined and explained by the factors listed in the boxes shown
at the bottom of Figure 5.1 and discussed in sections 5.2.1 to 5.2.8.
In the third phase, the final decision taken by fishermen in phase two determines the
collective outcome of phase (3) (outputs). In this phase the "outputs" are differentiated into
decision and action. Even when the individual fisherman supports the proposed change of
existing rules, he might not be able to execute his decision into action unilaterally. As
argued by White and Runge (1995; p. 1685) individual choice will be contingent on the
expected behaviour of the other participants and the probability attached to certain
outcomes. Whether or not a change in status quo will be accomplished depends on the level
of support for the change. Thus, the sum of individual fishermen's decisions to cooperate
might result in a change in the status quo. Therefore, when the majority (critical mass) of
those involved in collective action agree on certain procedures to change the current
situation, collective action is likely to emerge. As shown in Figure 5.1, the three phases are
interrelated, with "feedback" performing the functions of continuity or change. This study
tries to explain how individual fishermen in Oman react to "input", how the factors listed in
Figure 5.1 influence decisions and how outputs, through "feedback" change or preserve the
nature of inputs (the status quo).
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Figure 5.1 Conceptual Framework: Assessing the Emergence of
Collective Action
As discussed above, not all the factors advanced by Ostrom (1990) have a
deterministic effect on the final collective outcomes. Therefore, the study focuses only on a
number of factors for which operationalization and measurements proved possible and
accurate information could be obtained. These factors are derived from the assumptions
outlined in the statement of the hypotheses presented at the end of this chapter. The
proposed framework shown in Figure 5.1 is derived from these assumptions.
5.2 Factors Affecting Individual Choice
We have seen in Figure 5.1 that when fishermen engage in collective choice
decisions, their action can be explained and determined by a number of factors. As will be
seen later, some of these factors influence fishermen's decisions directly, others may
influence each other, thus creating indirect relationships. In the following sections, the
factors selected for the present study and their operationalization are discussed in turn.
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5. 2.1 Economic factors
5.2.1.1 Economic dependence on the fishery
The notion that economic dependence on a common pool natural resource as a
source of livelihood promotes the emergence of collective action has received considerable
support in the literature. The more the user group depends on the resource as a source of
livelihood, the more likely its members will achieve endogenous solutions to the commons
problems (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Jodha, 1990; Runge, 1986; Shanmugaratnam, 1996
and Wade, 1987). Therefore, it is expected here that economic dependence on the fishery
will have a positive influence on the collective outcome.
Consequently, economic dependence on fishing is hypothesised to have a positive
influence on cooperation (Table 5.1). The independent variable "economic dependence"
was operationalised as the relative importance of respondent's income from fishing to the
overall household income. For the purpose of this study, only net income earned directly
from fish sales by individual vessel owners was counted as fishing income. Therefore,
"household dependence on respondent's fishing income" (RED) was calculated as the
respondent's annual income from fishing divided by total household income (fishing and
non-fishing income earned by the respondent and other members of the household).
RED —  respondent's annual income from fishing
total household income
Another factor, which is hypothesised to be inversely related to fishermen's
decision to cooperate in the commons, is the respondent's economic dependence on non-
fishing income. This situation is illustrated by the following account from a study of
rangelands which were used as common property resources in Western Rajasthan, India:
"Households with large and irrigated private holdings, being highly independent of the
gochar for biomass, are not likely to be motivated to commit themselves to collective action
for managing the commons" (Shanmugaratnam, 1996; p. 183). The study anticipated that
those who are less dependent on their fishery would show less indication to cooperate.
Therefore, the concept "economic independence" was operationalised as the relative
importance of respondent's non-fishing income to the overall household income. The
variable "respondent's economic independence" (RED was therefore calculated as the
respondent's annual non-fishing income divided by total household income (fishing and
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non-fishing income earned by the respondent and other members of the household) as
shown in the following equation.
respondent's non - fishing income
REI—
total household income
Table 5.1 Operationalization and Measurement of
Association for Economic Dependence with Attitude toward
Cooperation.
Dependent variable
(Interval variable)
Independent variables Test
Indicators Type
Cooperation
RED
REI
Ratio
Ratio
Pearson's r
Pearson's r
5.2.1.2 Perception of risk
Economic factors such as income, debt levels as well as future discount rates and
risk preferences, are potentially important determinants of a fisherman's willingness to
manage fish resources (Ostrom, 1990; Baland and Plateau, 1996; Fernandez-Cornejo eta!.,
1994 and Ka1aitzandonakes and Monson, 1994). For example high debt and low income
levels could prevent the fisherman from investing in conservation practices (changing his
gill net to a lager mesh size to avoid catching juvenile fish). This is because the productivity
gains due to resource conservation are usually not immediate. Similarly, situations of high
risk and uncertainty play a crucial role in fishermen's decisions to take a particular strategy.
Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (1994; p. 161) in their study of the factors that influence
the adoption of Integrated Pest Management (IPM) technique argue that the perception of
increased risk inhibits adoption among farmers. Their empirical results support the
hypothesis that the perception of risk has a negative influence on IPM adoption (adopters
are less risk-averse than non-adopters). However, Kalaitzandonakes and Monson (1994; p.
202) state that risk aversion is expected to be positively related to conservation effort. They
state that risk-averse fanners are likely to expend greater conservation effort in order to
avoid future losses. Robison and Barry (1987) support this view, finding that farmers with a
large debt to asset ratio (less risk-averse) may also want to reduce their business risk, which
will make them less inclined to cooperate (cited from Fernandez-Comejo et al.,1994).
87
Therefore, risk aversion can be both positively and negatively associated with conservation
efforts and the final outcome depends on the certainty of the productivity benefits resulting
from the conservation effort. For example, when the potential benefits from collective
action are considered certain, more risk-averse individuals may be likely to expend greater
conservation efforts in order to avoid losses in the productivity of the resource
(Kalaitzandonakes and Monson, 1994; P. 201). In this study, risk aversion is expected to be
positively associated with higher willingness to participate in collective action.
To operationalize the concept of risk perceptions using fishermen's attributes
obtained from the questionnaire, the study considers two factors generally associated with
fishermen's risk attitudes. The first is debt to asset ratio (D/A) which measures fmancial risk
(Fernandez-Comejo et al., 1994; p. 161). Fishermen with a high D/A ratio are likely to be
less risk averse (or they have a greater willingness to accept some risk). Therefore,
fishermen with a large D/A ratio may be willing to accept greater business risks, and
therefore they may be less willing to cooperate in managing their fishery. This is because
the productivity gains due to resource conservation are usually not immediate. Furthermore,
they are not assured that many others in the group would share their efforts to conserve the
resource. Assets included here are those that represent mainly fishing assets such as fishing
vessels, engines, fishing gears and other fishing accessories.
The second indicator used to measure perception of risk is the total number of
fishing gear types owned by vessel owners i . This indicator is used as a proxy for a
fisherman's willingness to assume risk When fishermen own many types of fishing gears,
they are willing to accept some risk because they have invested more. Thus, the more types
of fishing gears a fisherman owns, the less a risk-averse he is and the less likely to show a
high level of cooperation in the commons.
5.2.2 Social identity
In her analysis of Japanese villages' managing of local-level common property
resources, McKean argues that one of the factors behind the success of collective action
was the very strong community identity and a sense of mutual interdependence (McKean,
1Number of fishing gear types: discrete variable equal to the total number of fishing gear types owned by each
vessel owners. The most six popular types of fishing gears used in the area are included in the index. These
are: drift net for tunas, drift net for kingfish, drift net for mackerel, traps, encircling net for mackerel and
encircling net for sardine. The index ranges from one (high risk-averse) to six (low risk-averse).
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1986; cited in Baland and Platteau, 1996; p. 288). In this study it is expected that the
stronger the individual's social identity as a fisherman, the higher will be his willingness to
adopt a cooperative strategy. Therefore, it is expected here that strong social identity will
enhance fishermen's ability to reach a cooperative arrangement to solve some of the
dilemmas they are facing. The assumption made here is that when people from outside the
fishing village enter the fishery (outsiders are not excluded as is the case in the open access
situation) they will not be ready to comply with the rules devised by the local fishermen. As
the number of outsiders increases, the function of the local institution is weakened. This
eventually makes local collective efforts to conserve the fishery difficult to achieve. This is
because fishermen inherited fishing rules and fishing knowledge from their fathers and
grandfathers; thus, they tend to have strong awareness of the activities that might harm their
fishery compared to newcomers.
Three indicators: fisherman's family involvement in fishing, his principal work, and
his experience in fishing were devised to measure social identity of individual fisherman
(Table 5.2). The first indicator of social identity was operationalized in terms of family
involvement in fishing. It is assumed here that fishermen with more family involvement in
fishing have a strong social identity as fishermen. To measure this variable, a value of one
was given for each kin relation involved in fishing. The measure ranges from weak social
identity, with a value of zero where no other member of the respondenfs family is involved
in fishing, to strong social identity, with a value of five, where his father, brothers, sons,
uncles and cousins were identified as fishermen. Cousins and uncles were included in the
index because of the extended family characteristics in the Omani culture.
The second indicator of social identity is operationalized as the number of years the
respondent spent working as a fisherman (fishing experience) 2 (Caffey et al., 1994; p. 268).
The more years the respondent has spent in fishing the stronger is his social identity. The
researcher anticipated a positive relationship between the number of years the respondent
has spent in fishing and his willingness to cooperate.
The third indicator of social identity was the respondents' fishing status. A value of
one is given to a fisherman citing only fishing as the main occupation and identified here as
2& fishing (the first 14 years of adult life) was excluded because it was found that respondents included
their childhood fishing in their reponces. In the study area, it was observed that children at the age of ten go
fishing with their fathers.
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a full-time fisherman. Part-time fishermen, on the other hand, are those who are engaged in
fixed employment such as working in government offices or the non-fishing private sector.
These were given a value of zero, based on the assumption that a fisherman having a secure
employment besides fishing (part-time fishermen) has a lower social identity as a
fisherman.
Table 5.2 Operationalization and measurement of association
for social identity with attitude toward cooperation.
Dependent
variable
Independent variables Test
(Interval variable) Indicators
Cooperation
Social identity
a. Family involvement Interval
Interval
Nominal
Pearson's r
Pearson's r
t-test
b. Experience
e. principal work
5.23 Awareness of resource exploitation problems
A third essential condition for collective success is that fishermen must be aware of
the status of their fishery and the potential benefit from participation in collective efforts to
manage the resources. For example, when fish resources are abundant, fishermen are
unlikely to participate in collective effort reduction, as the future benefits gained might be
insignificant while the cost incurred is high. It is expected, therefore, that resource scarcity
may give an incentive for cooperation. Sharing similar awareness and perception about
harvesting activities by some may create the necessary consensus for resource users to
adopt cooperative behaviour. Possession of information about the status of the resource is
important for the emergence of collective action, as this will reduce the transaction cost
allowing agreements of cooperative behaviour to take place (Ostrom, 1990). As argued by
Baland and Platteau, "one of the conditions for successful collective action is that resource
users are well informed about the status of the resources and the possible impact of use
behaviour on its stocks" (Baland and Platteau, 1996; p. 290). It is expected in this study that
the more the fishermen are aware of resource exploitation problems and the potential
benefits from collective action, the more is their willingness to cooperate.
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Using the concept of rational action, the individual fisherman is expected to select
strategies whose expected benefits exceed the expected costs. (Osborn, 1990; p. 193). The
individual fisherman's evaluations of his expected benefits and cost is based on the
information available to him concerning the potential benefits (or harm) he is likely to gain
from an alternative set of rules as compared with the benefits (or harm) he is likely to gain
from maintaining the status quo rules (ibid.).
Four indicators are used to measure fishermen's awareness of their resource
exploitation problems3. The first indicator is "awareness of resource status". For this
indicator the researcher used a scale containing a number of statements designed to assess
different aspects of resource status. The second indicator of fishermen's awareness of
resource exploitation problems is operationalized in terms of their awareness of the factors
that cause overfishing. A multi-item scale was designed in order to determine the factors
that are responsible for the depletion of the fishery. The third indicator is the fishermen's
perception of the consequences of overfishing. To test their perception, a multi-item scale
containing a number of statements was administered to the fishermen. The fourth indicator
is operationalized as their perception of the externalities in coastal fisheries. Similarly, a
multi-item scale was used to measure this variable.
5.2.4 Demographic variables
Although demographic variables may not have a crucial deterministic effect on the
success or failure of collective action, some of these variables such as age, education and
household size are expected to have some influence on fishermen's decision to participate
in collective action. Due to the long-run nature of productivity benefits from resource
conservation, long planning horizons are expected to positively influence fishermen's
decision to participate in managing their resources (Kalaitzandonakes and Monson, 1994;
p. 202). Younger fishermen are thus more likely to participate in collective effort than older
fishermen. Similarly, fishermen with higher education might be expected to be willing to
participate more in fishery conservation. This is because higher education is associated with
greater information on the productivity implications of overfishing and the benefits of
various collective conservation efforts. The effects of these social and demographic
attributes may not influence fishermen's decisions directly. However, it is expected that
3 The process of designing these scales is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six.
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some of these variables may have an indirect influence on the final outcome by influencing
other variables. For example, household size raises the economic dependence of the
fishermen on the resources and hence may improve the fishermen's participation in
conservation efforts. The rational action for a fisherman with many dependants is to avoid
his livelihood being jeopardised. Thus, he has great interest in participating in collective
action. Therefore, although household size might not have a direct influence on fishermen's
decision, it directly influences economic dependence, which in turn is positively associated
with greater conservation efforts.
5.2.5 Vessel configuration
Differences in vessel configuration are thought to be an important determinant of
fishermen's decision to participate in collective action. It is a widely accepted view that the
larger the vessel and the more powerful its engine, the higher is its ability to catch fish.
Thus, large difference in vessel configuration across individuals will lead to different catch
rates. This makes collective decision to restrain the take from the fishery difficult to
achieve. The emergence of collective action is seriously hampered by the existence of
different interests, notably between users of different technology. Fishermen with bigger
vessels have the opportunity to exploit new fishing grounds away from the coast. Therefore,
they might not be interested in joining local collective effort to reduce the take from the
fishery, especially if they expect that their vessel productivity needs to be reduced. In such
cases, collective failure is likely to occur as seen by Johnson and Libecap (1982) when they
found that fishermen's willingness to organise with others is made more difficult because
they are equipped with different fishing techniques.
5.2.6 Group size
One of the conditions for successful collective action that has received considerable
attention in the empirical literature is group size. For many scholars, a small group is a
prerequisite for successful collective action (Olson, 1965). In Olson's view the provision of
public goods is reduced as the size of the group increases. However, there are others who
disagree with Olson's view with respect to the relationship between group size and
provision level (Barry and Hardin, 1982; Baland and Platteau, 1996; Chamberlin, 1974;
Sandler, 1992 and Wade, 1988). The effect of group size on individual ability to participate
in collective action has been dealt with in greater detail in Chapter Three; thus no further
discussion is needed in this section. Based on the findings of Barry and Hardin (1982);
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Baland and Platteau (1996); Chamberlin (1974); Sandler (1992) and Wade (1988), it is
hypothesised in this study that group size has no effect on the resource users' level of
participation on collective action.
5.2.7 Group heterogeneity
Of fundamental relevance to the study of collective action is the relationship
between group heterogeneity and the success of collective action. Based on the literature
review, three sources of heterogeneity that hamper the capacity of resource users to
participate in collective action were identified. These sources originate from the following:
ethnic, racial, or other kinds of cultural divisions; differences in the nature of interests
various individuals may have in a particular collective action and inter-individual variations
in some critical endowments, that are reflected in varying intensities of interest (Baland and
Plateau 1996; p. 302). Baland and Platteau (1996; 1997a and 1997b) further asserted that
while the first two are considered as causing a strong obstruction to collective action, the
same can not be said of the third case. Operationalization and measurement of the three
sources of heterogeneity will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter Nine (Section 9.4.8).
5.2.8 Institutional rules in use
Among other variables discussed, institutional rules in use are by far the most
important factor for the success of collective action. It is a widely accepted view among
scholars that different institutional arrangements used to exploit a common fishery can
provide the necessary discouragement of users' activities that generate negative externalities
(Sandler, 1992; Ostrom, 1990; Baland and Platteau, 1996). In fact examples of situations in
which communities have evolved rules to exploit resources as a common property are
legion (see Ostrom, 1990). It often appears that these institutional rules are effective in
avoiding the tragic outcome associated with open access (Ostrom, 1990; Baland and
Plateau, 1996; Comes and Sandler, 1996).
As argued by Sandler (1992) and Comes and Sandler (1996), small changes brought
about by institutions can change the incentive structure facing individual fishermen. As was
proved mathematically in Chapter Four, the dominant strategy of individual fishermen under
the proportional sharing rule is universal defection. This non-cooperative game has been
changed by modifying the sharing rule into a game of equal shares in which the dominant
strategy of all fishermen is to cooperate. Institutional rules in use provide the enforcement
mechanism needed to organize a change in fishermen's behaviour.
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5.3 Measurement of the Dependent Variable
The attitude toward cooperation is the dependent variable for this study, measured as
an index. Cooperation is operationalised as fishermen's obeying the group rules and
participating in collective efforts to manage the resource. Ideally, cooperation should be
measured as fishermen's self restraint in harvesting the resource when it is depleted, but
measuring such a concept, either directly or indirectly, proved difficult. Therefore, the
researcher measured fishermen's willingness to cooperate from different dimensions.
Although the index contains items describing activities not related explicitly to harvesting
behaviour (or resource use), these items could be viewed as a demonstration of cooperation
to manage the fishery and to support the local management institution (Senat Al-Bahar).
Therefore, attitudes and beliefs towards issues such as returning under-sized fish, observing
the distance rule, participation in conflict resolution, renewing the fishing licence, persuading
others to follow fishing rules and many other issues are related to the fundamental values that
form the individual's cooperation attitude. Hence, beliefs on such issues can be used to elicit
the individual's fishermen's cooperation attitude. The construction of this index is discussed
in greater detail in Chapter Six and its results are presented in Chapter Nine.
5.4 Statements of the Hypotheses
Based on the above assumptions, a number of hypotheses are proposed in this
section to examine factors that may be influential in fishermen's decisions to adopt a
cooperative behaviour. The dependent variable for the analysis is fishermen's willingness to
cooperate in managing their fishery, which will be tested against a number of factors which
was discussed above and presented in Figure 5.1. Therefore, the hypotheses (null
hypotheses) advanced for the purpose of this study are as follows:
Hypothesis one: There is no significant correlation between fishermen's economic
dependence on the fishery and their attitude toward cooperation.
Hypothesis two: There is no significant correlation between respondents' social identity as
fishermen and their attitude toward cooperation to manage their fishery.
Hypothesis three: There is no significant correlation between the attitude toward
cooperation and fishermen's perception of the status of the resource.
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Hypothesis four: There is no significant correlation between fishermen's awareness of the
causes of overfishing and attitudes toward cooperation.
Hypothesis five: There is no significant correlation between fishermen's awareness of the
consequence of overfishing and attitude toward cooperation.
Hypothesis six: There is no significant correlation between fishermen's awareness of
externalities in coastal fisheries and attitude toward cooperation.
Hypothesis seven: There is no sigdificant4
 correlation between fishermen's willingness to
cooperate in the commons and their personal profiles.
Hypothesis eight: There is no significant correlation between attitude toward cooperation
and vessel characteristics.
Hypothesis nine: There is no significant relationship between attitude toward cooperation
and risk aversion
Hypothesis ten: There is no significant relationship between group size and fishermen's
willingness to cooperate in managing their fishery.
Hypothesis eleven: There is no significant difference in willingness to cooperation between
fishermen with different objectives concerning the use of the fishery.
Hypothesis twelve: There is no significant relationship between income inequality and
individual fishermen's willingness to cooperate.
The results of testing the above hypotheses will provide some insight into the factors
that influence the emergence of collective action to manage coastal fisheries. The results of
testing the above hypotheses are presented in Chapter Nine.
4 Thi.s means statistically significant at the five-percent significance level.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
6.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to give a description of the procedures that were followed in
this research in order to collect the data related to the issue of this study. Research
designs provide many functions: they provide the researcher with a blueprint for
studying social questions; dictate boundaries of research activity and enable the
investigator to channel his energies in specific directions; and they enable the
researcher to anticipate potential problems during the implementation stage (Black and
Champion, 1976). The chapter begins by setting the rationale for the selection of the
data collection methods. Then the chapter focuses on the survey population and the
procedures implemented to select the study sample. The chapter also describes the
techniques used to collect the baseline data including the design of Likert scales and
their validity and reliability. An explanation is then given of the implementation of the
data collection process. The final section is devoted to a description of the statistical
techniques used in the analysis of the data.
6.2 Selection of the Methodology
The choice of a design setting for any research project is generally an important
concern to the researcher, who seeks to determine the validity of a hypothesis and how
best to discover evidence to either accept or reject it (Miller, 1991; p. 21). The rationale
for the selection of the method depends on the research questions and the setting of the
study area. As the purpose of this study is to assess the collective choice in coastal
communities in South Al-Batinah, individual vessel owners' strategies must be
investigated. Thus, individual vessel owners are selected as the unit of analysis in this
study. Babbie (1975) defined the unit of analysis as the people or things whose
individual characteristics are aggregated for purpose of describing some large group.
A cross sectional survey study is used to carry out the investigation of this study.
Survey research has been defined as "specifications of procedures for gathering
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information about a large number of people by collecting information from a few of
them" (Black and Champion, 1976; p. 85). The data gathered in the survey through
different data collection techniques enable the researcher to test certain assumptions
and hypotheses and to describe several dimensions of group behaviour. Furthermore,
surveys are very flexible as they permit the use of multi-methods of data collection
techniques (Black and Champion, 1976). For example, observation, questionnaire and
in-depth interviews can be used in a survey method to collect information about the
target population. Survey methods are more appropriate in cases where quantitative data
are required and when the information sought is specific and familiar to respondents
(Bulmer and Warwick, 1983).
The past three decades have seen a growing recognition of the need for multiple-
sources research methodology. The weaknesses of individual methods can be overcome
or reduced by merging two or more methods of data collection together to produce
accurate results. In general the advantage of adding information from separate data
sources depends entirely on the purpose of the research and the feasibility of obtaining
the additional information sought (Warwick, 1983).
To carry out this study, a questionnaire was employed as the main method of
data collection. The researcher, however, felt that a questionnaire alone would not fulfil
the purpose of this study, so a decision was made to supplement the questionnaire by (a)
semi-structured interviews of key-informants and (b) observations of the fishing
operations and activities of fishermen in their villages. The three methods offer
different types of data, which fit well together. In this case the researcher has more
confidence concerning his conclusions than he would have if he had employed a single
method (Whyte and Alberti, 1983).
6.3 Designing Sample
The way in which a researcher designs a sample depends on his research
objectives. As argued by Arber, "some researchers select samples in order to provide
the maximum theoretical understanding, while others are primarily concerned to obtain
a representative sample so that they can make inferences about the whole population"
(Arber, 1993; p. 86). The concern of this study is to obtain a representative sample of
fishermen so that inferences can be made about the whole fishermen population in Al-
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Batinah. To carry out this study, it would be ideal to interview all fishermen in the area
rather than just a sample taken from that population. However, to study the whole
population would not be possible, given the time and resources available for the study.
Furthermore, researching a sample can yield more accurate results than using the
complete population (Arber, 1993; p. 69). When fewer people are interviewed, more
resources and time can be spent on each interview, permitting the employment of
trained interviewers.
There are many sampling techniques available, and the choice of a particular
technique is determined by the purpose and the design of the study and by the time and
resources available. The most popular sampling procedure is probability sampling.
Here, the sample is drawn in such a way that each member of the population has an
equal probability of being included in the sample (Weisberg and Bowen, 1977). The
sample of our study must be representative of the whole population from which it is
selected if it is to provide useful estimates about the characteristics of that population.
For instance, there should be same proportion of fishermen from each village in Al-
Batinah in both the sample and the population. A sample will be representative of the
population from which it is drawn if all elements of the population have a specific non-
zero probability of being included in the sample (Oppenheim, 1992). Babbie (1975; p.
140) argues that samples need not be representative in all respects; representativeness is
limited to those characteristics that are relevant to the substantive interests of the study.
The ultimate purpose of survey sampling is to select a set of members from a
population so that a description of those members accurately describes the whole
population from which they are drawn. Probability sampling provides a method to meet
such criteria. Babbie (1975; p. 145) argues that "random selection offers the researcher
access to the body of probability theory, which provides the basis for his estimates of
population parameters and estimates of errors".
The main purpose of this study, which is to describe accurately the strategic
choices of individual fishermen, raises the need for probability sampling. As argued by
Arber (1993), a probability sample is most appropriate for analytic studies, which
involves testing empirical hypotheses. There are many random sampling techniques
used to ensure that the sample selected represent the characteristics of the population
studied. Simple random sampling is the most direct method that gives an unbiased
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sample without much difficulty. However, although unbiased selection can be avoided,
the sample may not represent the population at large, especially when the population is
not homogenous. This is particularly true for this study because the fishery of Al-
Batinah is divided into small villages scattered along the coast. Fishing activities carried
out in one village might not be found in other villages. A simple random sample from
these villages might produce a high sampling error'. Suppose we want to study the
collective choice of fishermen in Al-Batinah coast and have sufficient resources to
interview 250 fishermen. With simple random sampling, it would be possible to draw a
sample which under-represents fishermen from some villages and over-represents
others. Collective choices are likely to be closely linked to the behaviour of fishermen
in each village, so it is desirable that the sample should have the correct representation
of the fishermen's villages. Therefore, care must be taken when drawing the sample to
avoid over-representation of some villages and/or under-representation of others.
To cope with these differences, a stratified random sampling technique seems to
be more appropriate to achieve the objectives of this study. A stratified random sample
is one in which the population is divided into groups or "strata" and a random sample is
then selected from each subgroup (Babbie, 1975; Black and Champion, 1976 and Fink,
1995). The ultimate function of stratification is then to organise the population into
homogenous subsets and to select the appropriate number of elements from each
(Babbie, 1975; p. 156). This method of sampling gives a greater degree of
representation and decreases the probable sampling error that would occur with a
sample of the same size.
Before the sample was drawn, all fishermen included in the study were listed in
the sampling frame according to their villages. A sampling frame is a list of the survey
population from which a sample can be drawn (Babble, 1975; Hoinville and Jowell,
1978). As well as listing all elements, the sampling frame provides some identification
of those elements (address, location, etc.), so that each element can be easily identified
in the field. If the sampling frame is to fulfil its purpose it must meet a number of
criteria. It must be accurate, free from omissions and duplications and up to date
(Murthy and Roy, 1983).
1
Sampling error is the difference between a sample estimate and the population value that would have
been found by a 100 % census conducted with identical procedures (Bulmer, 1983).
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Most survey methods text books were written with developed countries in mind,
such as those written about North America and western Europe (see for example:
Babbie, 1975; Black and Champion, 1976; Hoinville and Jowell, 1978; Miller, 1991;
Oppenheim, 1992, etc.) and they take for granted the availability of an adequate
sampling frame. The case of developing countries is different from those stated above.
As argued by Bulmer (1983; p. 93), "In developing countries, such extensive
information is either not available at all, or where it is available is subject to a
considerable degree of error". Therefore, it is very important to determine the accuracy
of the sampling frame as the exclusion of fishermen in the population from the
sampling frame will lead to bias in the sample which is a source of non-sampling error.
Earlier in this section, it was noted that care were taken to minimize sampling error by
choosing a stratified sampling method which yields a representative sample with less
sampling error. Nevertheless, reducing sampling error will be inadequate to reduce total
error. Reduction in error requires attention to both sampling and non-sampling errors
(Bulmer, 1983; p. 97). Therefore, non-sampling errors that occur from an inaccurate
sampling frame, untrained field staff, literacy, lack of cooperation from respondents and
other factors must be minimized as far as possible.
To survey the fishermen population in Al-Batinah, fishing vessel registration
record of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries could have been used to prepare the
sampling frame. The researcher felt, however, that such a record would probably be
inaccurate and not up to date. Fishing vessels registered during the eighties, for
example, might not be in operation during the survey, which would lead to difficulties
in the field. In addition, the fishing registration record does not classify fishing vessels
according to the type of fishing gear used, nor does it give the location of the owner of
the vessel.
The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries carried out an extensive census of
fishing vessels in Oman in 1995. The results of this census are available in a data base
format, which gives information such as the name of the owner, his address, age, type
of vessel, and other information. The results of the census classify fishing vessels and
the type of fishing gears operated in each village. The researcher was very fortunate to
gain access to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries computer system. A list of
fishing vessels and their owners, obtained from the 1995 fishing vessel census, was used
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as a sampling frame. The census gives essential information for this study as it gives
detailed information about the target population, which is useful for stratifying groups
of fishermen by their fishing villages.
There is no clear-cut answer in the literature on the appropriate sample size.
However, some advice was found in Upton (1973) and Cohen and Manion (1980). They
suggested that a sample size of thirty in each stratum is sufficient if the researcher plans
some forms of statistical analysis of his data. A large sample size, however, is not
sufficient to guarantee the accuracy of the results. It is true that in some designs, an
increase in sample size will increase the precision of the results, but it will not reduce
bias caused by an inaccurate sampling frame. Therefore, the size of the sample is not in
itself enough to guarantee that all will be well (Moser and Kalton, 1971; p. 79).
The fishermen population was stratified in relation to geographical location_
Prior to sample selection, the sampling frame was divided into towns (strata). Within
each fishing town, the vessel population was further stratified according to their
respective fishing villages (Table 6.1). Systematic selection from a list ordered by one
or more stratification factors automatically forces the sample to be representative on
these factors (Arber, 1995; p. 88). The vessel owners' population consisted of 962
fishing vessels in South Al-Batinah. The researcher aimed to interview 201 vessel
owners' for this study using a proportional stratified sample in which each stratum is
represented exactly in proportion to its size in the population from which the sample
was drawn.
Theories of collective action consider group size as an important factor that
effects the emergence of successful collective action (as described in Chapters Three
and Five). Fishermen in the study area are scattered along the coast in villages of
different sizes. Therefore, fishing villages in each town are separated into two strata:
small and large. A decision was made to consider villages with more than 40 vessels as
large and those with less than 40 as small. Therefore, small villages were grouped
together to form a stratum and a systematic sample was then drawn from this stratum
and care was taken to make the sample proportionate to its size in the population from
which the sample was drawn. The same thing was done for large villages in each town_
All villages with more than 40 vessels were grouped together.
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Table 6.1 Sampling Frame for South Al-Batinah2.
Town Village
size
Village Total
population
Target
sample
Actual
sample
•• of
poptikition4
44, of target
mm*3
Large Al-Swadi 160 31 31 11 7 100
Al-Haradi 105
Barka Small Al-Maragh 32
AI-Shamal 10
Al-Marisi 20 30 30 385 100
Al-Hufri 16
Sub-
total
343 61 61 17.8 100
Large Wadam 59
Aweed 43 30 30 20 100
Masanhgnoz 42
Masn'a Small Abuabali radah 19
Abuabali sahil 16
AI-Greem 17
Al-Shurus 14 30 30 33 100
Allbreak 10
Masanhfager 16
Sub-
total
236 60 60 25 100
Large Al-Jaleel 97
Al-Quarha 65 50 43 19 88
Badewooh 57
Hagerah 40
Suwaiq Small Dayaan 25
Rhadah 11
Khadrasaad 12
Aweedat 15
Khadrarasheed 14 30 30 22 100
Albatha 22
Almatamur 13
Halatswooq 12
Sub-
total
383 80 73 20 93
Total 962 201 194 20 97
,
The three towns that represent South Al-Batinah and were selected for this study
are: Barka, Masn'a and Suwaiq. These three towns represent the first stratification of
the whole fishermen population. Further stratification was carried out for each town.
For example, fishermen in Barka were stratified into two groups: those who came from
large villages and those who came from small villages. As shown in Table 6.1 there are
2 Proportional stratified sample, i.e., each stratum is represented exactly in proportion to its size in the
population from which the sample was drawn.
3 Actual sample as a percentage of target sample.
4 
Target sample as a percentage of total population.
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six villages in Barka, two large villages, Al-Sawadi (160 fishermen) and Al-Haradi (105
fishermen) and four small villages, Al-Maragh (32 fishermen), Al-Marisi (20
fishermen), Al-Hufri (16 fishermen), and Al-Shamal (10 fishermen). The two large
villages form a stratum where a sample of 31 fishermen was selected. Another 30
fishermen were selected from the other stratum (small villages). Hence, a total of 61
fishermen from Barka were selected to be in the sample for this study. The target
samples for Masn'a and Suwaiq were 60 and 80 respectively. This facilitates our
comparison of the dependent variable "willingness to cooperate" of fishermen from
small and large villages. This helps determine the effect of group size on collective
activities in coastal communities.
6.4 The Questionnaires
To operationalize the general concepts of this study, the researcher employed a
questionnaire as the main research method of data collection. Babbie defined
operationalization as the process through which the researcher devises procedures and
operations that will result in observations relevant to general concepts he is interested in
studying (Babbie, 1975; p. 105). The questionnaire is a very popular tool of
operationalization in which concepts are operationalized in the form of questions,
which are then put to the people under study. The questionnaire was administered to the
fishermen and the researcher himself recorded their responses. The researcher preferred
this method because it was already known that most of the fishermen in the study area
were illiterate. An administered questionnaire would also enhance the completion rate,
reduce the number of unanswered questions, and enable probing and controlled
clarification (Babbie, 1975; p. 275).
To achieve high accuracy in obtaining the data, the questionnaire schedule is
divided into several sections and used a mixture of closed questions, open questions and
attitudinal scales.
The first section of the questionnaire concerns general information, such as
fisherman's name, village, Walayah (town) and the serial number given. This
information was obtained from the sampling frame prior to the fieldwork to facilitate
the work of the researcher. The second section concerns fishing assets owned by the
respondent. It is divided into fishing vessels owned, number and horsepower of enoines
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used, fishing gear, and fishing accessories and other assets owned. The section provides
background information about the respondent which is needed for testing research
hypotheses. The third section is on fishing activities and fish marketing. Under this
section there are a number of questions used to elicit information about the pattern of
fishing activities and the way fish is marketed.
The fourth section concerns the current status of fish resources. The section
aims to elicit fishermen's perception of the status of their resources. Four attitudinal
scales are included in this section to measure fishermen's attitude. These scales were
developed originally by Salim (1996) to collect data on fishennetes attitude towards
collective action in fishing in West Johor (Malaysia). The developer of the
questionnaire administered them to 144 fishermen in West Johor where high internal
reliability was achieved. Cronbach's alpha for the four scales was between 0.84 to 0.92
(Salim, 1996). Despite the cultural differences between Malaysia where the four scales
were developed and administered, and Oman where it was applied in this research, the
researcher felt that the scales are appropriate, although differences in responses were to
be expected in this case. To cope with cultural differences and to make the
questionnaire suitable for this particular research, some modifications were made.
The fifth section is on collective activities in fishing communities. The sixth
section asks questions about the influence of group size, fishing technology constraints,
institutional factors, economic dependence on fishing and the social identity on
collective activities. The seventh section is on the attitude toward investment in fishing.
The eighth section is on the establishment of clubs. Fishermen were asked to give their
views about establishing fish producers' associations. The last section contains an index
to measure fishermen's attitudes towards cooperation.
The questionnaire set contains two categories of questions. The first type is
factual questions which are designed to obtain objective information from the
respondents regarding their backgrounds and their habits. Questions regarding
respondent age, education, income, degree of wealth and the like are grouped under
"factual questions" described above. The second category of questions concerns the
fishermen's attitudes towards the status of the fishery in which they are operating_
Attitudes are defined as general orientations that can incline a person to act or react in a
certain manner when he confronted with certain stimuli (Naclunias and Naclunias,
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1996; p. 252). Attitude is normally measured by more than one question, because unlike
factual questions, respondents may not have an attitude toward the concept and because
many attitudes have numerous aspects; the respondent may agree with one aspect and
disagree with another. As argued by Nachmias and Nachmias (1996), "by using several
attitude statements, a researcher can more accurately ascertain both the strength of a
respondent's attitude and the conditions under which his or her attitude may change".
Fishermen's attitude toward Resource Status, Overfishing, Consequences of
Overfishing and Externalities are measured using attitude scales consisting of five or
more attitude statements, to which respondents were asked to indicate their degree of
agreement or disagreement. This approach to measurement is called a summated scale,
which was devised by Likert (1932), and it is the most widely used approach to
measurement in the social sciences today'. Most Likert-type scales use a 5-point
response composed of (1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) undecided, (4) disagree, and (5)
strongly disagree. Adams and Schvaneveldt (1991; p. 160) state that fewer or more
response categories have been used. Considering the respondents' level of illiteracy, the
researcher felt that using five response categories in the scale would confuse fishermen
and possibly produce biased results. This is because it is difficult for an uneducated
fisherman to differentiate between "strongly agree" and "agree". This was confirmed
during the pilot study when the researcher observed that a five point scale made
fishermen confused and the researcher found it difficult to record accurately
fishermen's reaction to the items of the scale. A decision was made at this stage to
reduce the scale response categories from five points to three points, namely, (3) agree,
(2) indifferent, (1) disagree.
As mentioned above, to meet the aims and objective of this research, four scales
were devised to measure Fishermen's Perception of their Resources, the Cause of
Overfishing, the Consequences of Overfishing and the Externality in Coastal Fishing.
An index was also constructed to measure fishermen's cooperation. In the following
sections, the processes of modification of these scales and construction of the index will
be highlighted.
5 Another method of scaling is the Guttman scaling technique developed in early 1940s by Louis
Guttman. A Guttman scale is unidimensional as well as cumulative, in that information on the position of
any respondent's last positive response allows the researcher to predict all of that person's responses to the
other items (Naclunias and Nachmias, 1996; p. 474).
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6.4.1 Fishermen's perception of their resources
This instrument was first developed by Salim (1996) to measure fishermen's
perception of their fish resources in West Johor (Malaysia). The scale contains five
statements devised to measure fishermen's awareness of the status of their fishery (see
Table 6.2).
Table 6.2 Perception of Resource Status (original scale)
Statement
1 Your fish catch per trip declines
2 Your prawn catch rate per trip declines
3 Your target species is difficult to catch
4 The large fish are difficult to find or catch
5 The percentage of trash fish in your daily catch has
increased.
The researcher felt that the scale is relevant to the present study. However, some
modification needed to be carried out because the original scale was developed for a
prawn trawl fishery, whereas the present study concerns a small scale fishery where
mobile gear such as gill nets and static gears such as traps are used. Item (2) was
removed because the target species is not prawn in the present study, and indeed the
fishery is considered as multi-species. One item was added to the original scale: "We
need to spend longer hours looking for fish than we used to". The fishermen's
agreement with this statement would also reflect another aspect of overfishing in Al-
Batinah (see Table 6.3).
Table 6.3 Perception of Resources Status
Statement
Your fish catch per trip declines
2 Your target species per trip decline
3 The large fish are difficult to find or catch
4 We need to spend longer hours looking for fish then we used to
5 The percentage of trash fish in your daily catch has increased.
6.4.2 Perceptions towards the cause of overfishing
The scale is also adapted from Salim (1996). This scale contains nine statements
devised to measure fishermen's perception of the cause of overfishing (Table 6.4). The
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researcher found that the scale is relevant to the present study to measure fishermen's
perception of the causes of overfishing in their fishery.
Table 6.4 Perception towards the Causes of Overfishing (original scale)
Statement
1 Fish resources decline if too many vessels are operating in the same area
2 Fish resources are limited due to small area
3 Fish resources decline if all vessel are large in size
4 Fish resources decline if all vessels use high horse-powered engines
5 Fish resources decline if all vessels employ huge nets
6 Fish resources decline if fishermen increase their fishing time per trip
7 Fish resources decline if fishermen increase their fishing days per month
8 Fish resources decline due to pollution
9 Fish resources decline due to weather
To adapt the scale to the present study, the researcher made some modification.
One item (10) was added so the scale contains ten items or statements which measure
fishermen's perception of the likely causes of over fishing (see Table 6.5). Before the
start of the study, the researcher visited a number of fishing villages in the study area
and interviewed some fishermen. The researcher found that one of the causes of
overfishing reported by fishermen in the area is the introduction of purse seining or
encircling gear into the fishery during the last three years. Therefore, item 10 was added
to see if fishermen claim that encircling gears which have been introduced recently into
the fishery have a negative impact on fish stocks in Al-Batinah. In addition, the
researcher modified item 5 by changing the words (huge nets) to (a large number of
nets). This is because the original scale was developed for fishermen operating trawl
nets, and the amount of catch rises with the size of the trawl net, whereas, in the present
study, the target sample was small scale fishermen operating gill nets and traps among
other fishing gears and the number of units owned by each fisherman determines his
catch.
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Table 6.5 Perception Towards the Causes of Overfishing
-	
Statement
1 Fish resources decline if too many vessels are operating in the same
area
2 Fish resources are limited due to small area
3 Fish resources decline if all vessel are large in size
Fish resources decline if all vessels use high horse-powered engines
5 Fish resources decline if all vessels employ a large no. of nets
6 Fish resources decline if fishermen increase their fishing time per trip
7 Fish resources decline if fishermen increase their fishing days per
month
8 Fish resources decline due to pollution
9 Fish resources decline due to weather
10 Fish resources decline if fishermen use encircling gear
6.43 The consequences of overfishing
The third scale employed for the present study is to measure Fishermen's
Awareness of the Consequences of Overfishing. The original scale contains seven
independent items developed by Salim (1996) to test trawl skippers' awareness of the
consequences of overfishing in West Johor (Malaysia). The scale is important for the
present study because it tests whether fishermen in the study area are aware of the
consequences of overfishing in their fishery (see Table 6.6). If the results confirm this,
we may conclude that fishermen in Al-Batinah would respond favourably to the chance
of playing a better game (privilege game for example) as an alternative to solve their
common problem.
Table 6.6 The Consequences of Overfishing (original scale)
Statement
1 Your catch contains a high proportion of trash fish
2 Your fishing area becomes further away from your village
3 Your fishing hours become longer
4 Your fuel consumption increases
5 Many fishing areas are barren
6 You have to use high horse-power engine to catch fish
	 You want always to have abundant fishery resources
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The researcher made some modification for the original scale in order to adopt it
to the present study. First, three items (1, 6 and 7) were removed from the scale. Item 1
is already used in scale 1 (Table 6.2), "Status of fish resources", so the researcher
decided to remove it. Item 6 was removed because there is no direct relationship
between high horse-power and amount of catch in the trap and gill net fishery in the
present study, as compared to the trawl fishery where the scale was first tested. Item 7
was removed because it does not reflect an aspect of overfishing and does not
contribute to the overall scale results. In addition, two items were added to the scale
(see Table 6.7). Item 5, "you have to use more fishing gears to catch fish" was added to
test fishermen's awareness of the consequences of overfishing in their fishery. Item 7,
"It is in God's hand how much fish remains in the sea" was also added so the scale
contains seven independent items.
Table 6.7 The Consequences of Overfishing
Statement
1 Your fishing area becomes further away from your village
2 Your fishing hours become longer
3 Your fuel consumption increases
4 Many fishing areas are barren
5 You have to use more fishing gears to catch fish
6 Your income declines
7 It is in God's hand how much fish remains in the sea
6.4.4 Externalities in coastal fishing
When resources are scarce, fishermen start to compete for limited resources.
The ultimate results are negative externalities. Externalities in coastal fisheries are a
sign of overfishing when conflicts among fishermen raises and the cost of fishing
increases at the same time. To measure externality in Al-Batinah fishery, a scale that
measures externalities in coastal fisheries was adopted. Salim (1996) first administered
the scale to prawn trawl skippers in West Johor (Malaysia) (Table 6.8). The scale is
appropriate for the present study to measure fishermen's awareness of the types of
externality that exist in their fishery. The scale contains five independent items covering
different dimensions of externalities such as mobile and static gear interaction,
competition for good fishing spots, etc.
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Table 6.8 Externalities in Coastal Fisheries (original scale)
Statement
1 You may face some difficulty in fishing if too many vessels operate
in a small area
2 Net entanglement problems often occur if too many vessels operate
in the same area
3 You cannot fish in the area where your colleague is fishing
4 Less catch is expected if you operate in the area which has just been
fished by your colleagues
5 You may face a higher cost if fishery resources deplete 	
_
In order to adapt the scale to the present study some modifications were made.
First, item 5 was removed from the scale and three items (4, 6 and 7) were added, so it
contains seven independent statements (see Table 6.9).
Table 6.9 Externalities in Coastal Fisheries
Statement
1 You may face some difficulty in fishing if too many vessels operate
in a small area
2 Net entanglement problems often occur if too many vessels operate
in the same area
3 You cannot fish in the area where your colleague is fishing
4 You cannot fish in the area where many colleagues are fishing
5 Less catch is expected if you operate in the area which has just been
fished by many colleagues
6 Less catch is expected if you operate in the area which has just been
fished by a colleague
, 7 Conflicts among fishermen at sea are rising
6.4.5 Willingness to cooperate
One way of measuring a fisherman's cooperation is by predicting his willingness
to limit his take from the fish stock when it is scarce, as well as his willingness to
contribute toward the provision of institutions to manage the resources. There are no
previous published studies, to the researcher' knowledge, that use an attitudinal scale to
measure fishermen's cooperation towards the conservation of fish resources. Such a
concept consists of a complex combination of phenomena and therefore it is difficult to
measure using a single indicator or statement, because no single indicator will cover all
the dimensions of the concept.
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MacDonald (1993), for example, measured fishermen's cooperation by two
indicators. The first indicator is fishermen's records of dues payment and the second is
the number of organization meetings attended by fishermen. The index measures the
individual's contribution of time and money to resolve a common problem. She devised
a variable index where those who paid all their dues and attended meetings frequently
were regarded as more cooperative than those who did not. The researcher felt that such
a measure is inadequate for the present study because it only covers two dimensions of
our concept. A fisherman could pay his money dues and attend the cooperative's
meetings frequently, but may use destructive gear or free ride on the efforts of other
fishermen to conserve their fish resource. Based on the above argument, by using
several attitude statements, the researcher is more confident of being able to ascertain
both the strength of a fisherman's attitude toward cooperation and the conditions under
which his attitude may change.
The researcher decided to develop an index with several attitudinal statements
to measure the dependent variable "willingness to cooperate". According to Nachmias
and Nachmias (1996; p. 548), "the index should contain a number of indicators
carefully selected, each of which has a specific purpose that must be set forth and
explained prior to construction of the index". The index developed for this study
contains 14 independent items or statements, each highlighting an aspect of
cooperation. Some of these items concern fishermen's contributions of time and money
to solve common problems, such as informing on rule-breaking, renewing their fishing
and vessel licence, and attending extension workshops (see Table 6.10). Other items
concern the conservation of fish stocks such as returning undersized fish when caught in
their nets, opposing the use of modern gear such as purse seines which may harm the
resources and building artificial reefs to rehabilitate fish stocks. Numerical values are
assigned to the items where a "yes" response to a statement in the index is given a value
of one (1) and a "no" response is given a value of zero (0) and these values are then
added to obtain the total scores. The scores are interpreted as indicators of the
cooperative attitude of individual fishermen. A fisherman who obtains a high score on
the index is more willing to cooperate than those who obtain low scores.
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Table 6.10 Willingness to Cooperate
Item
_
Yes No
1 You return under-sized fish into the sea when caught in your
net
1 0
2 Set your nets at a distance from other fishermen's gears 1 0
3 Inform on colleagues who break the fishing rules 1 0
4 Attend workshops arranged by the Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries
1 0
5 Renew your fishing licence and vessel licence 1 0
6 Speak to the head of the tribe about the problem of your fishery 1 0
7 Discuss fishing problems frequently with	 more than one
fisherman
1 0
8 Participate in a group to resolve conflicts in fishing 1 0
9 Persuade others to follow fishing rules 1 0
10 Participate in reef construction in your village 1 0
11 Share important information 1 0
12 Share information about fish concentration on the grounds 1 0
13 Tell your colleague about new technical developments 1 0
14 Share information about low cost sources of inputs 1 0
The development of the questionnaires was of paramount importance. Care was
taken to obtain the necessary information without unduly influencing the respondents.
Care was also taken to translate the research objective into specific questions. This is
vital in questionnaire construction to ensure that answers to such questions will provide
the data for hypotheses testing. The question must also motivate the respondent to
provide the information being sought (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996; p. 250). During
the questionnaire development, consideration of the content, structure, format, and
sequence of the questions was taken into account.
The first draft of the questionnaire was tested on a few fishermen of a fishing
village in Barka to make sure that all the questions were clear and to measure the time
required for each interview. Fishermen participating in the pilot study were excluded
from the sampling frame so that they were not interviewed again. The first draft
contained 12 pages and the average completion time for each respondent was 60
minutes. The results of the pilot study indicated that the questionnaire was too long and
respondents became bored after about 40 minutes of interviewing. A decision was made
to reduce the number of questions and the questionnaires were tested again. The pilot
study, together with consultation with experts in the field, resulted in a number of
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refinements and alterations being incorporated into the final questionnaire which is now
presented in the form used for the present study (see Appendix 1).
6.5 The Semi-structured Interview
Nachmias and Nachmias (1996) define an interview as a face to face
interpersonal role situation in which an interviewer asks the respondent questions
designed to elicit answers pertinent to the research hypotheses. In Section 6.4, the
questionnaire survey, which is the main method of data collection in this study, was
described. The feature of the questionnaire survey is its lack of flexibility, where the
number of questions and wording of the questions are the same for all respondents. In
this case the interviewer must ask questions in the same sequence in every interview
and the researcher cannot probe to obtain more information. More flexibility in
interviewing can be found in semi-structured in-depth interviews. Semi-structured
interviews are used as a second method of data collection in which the interviewer does
not need to use a schedule to ask a prepared set of questions. It is also not necessary to
ask questions in the same sequence or wording in every interview (Fielding, 1993).
While conducting semi-structured interview, the interviewer must have a clear
focus of inquiry in his mind by which he tactfully asks and actively listens to
respondent. The interviewer asks questions pertinent to the study as each opportunity
arises, then listen closely to responses for clues as to what question to ask next (Maykut
and Morehouse, 1994).
Semi-structured interviews are carried out to add to the richness of the
quantitative data obtained by the questionnaires. They generate qualitative data to
support the research findings and to validate the results. The approach is very flexible
where the respondents are encouraged to talk about the topic raised by the researcher
from their perspective. The role of the researcher in semi-structured interviews is as a
mediator to direct and control the interview. The researcher probes for more
information when he feels that at a particular point during the course of the interview
there is a gap in information which needs to be filled.
The researcher developed an interview guide containing a list of topics which
were not covered by the questionnaires or needed more elaboration to support the
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evidence (Appendix 3). The topics focused on the changes in the fishery during the last
30 years, pattern of fishing activities, fish markets, collective activities, and possible
solutions to the commons problem. The researcher discussed the indigenous institutions
used by fishermen to manage their fish resources for many decades. The researcher was
interested to determine the incentive structure of the system that encourages or impedes
collective action at the village level. To obtain rapport and to build up a good
information base, factual questions were asked first. These included the respondent's
age, current occupation, involvement in the sector and experience.
The selection of interviewees was based on their long involvement in fishing,
leadership and familiarity with the customs and rules of the indigenous fish
management system. Key informants were selected so that they represented the three
fishing areas chosen for this study. Fifteen interviews were conducted immediately after
the completion of the questionnaire survey (16th to 30 th May 1998). Each interview
took around three hours. The researcher carried out all interviews and they were tape
recorded and then transcribed immediately. It is recommended to transcribe the
interview soon after it has occurred, while it is still fresh in the interviewer's mind
(Maykut and Morehouse, 1994; p. 100).
All interviews were carried out in the key informants' houses. The researcher
visited the key informant and after introducing himself he explained the objectives of
the research and how the respondent had been selected for the interview. A letter from
the Wali's (Governor's) Office permitting the researcher to carry out his study was
shown as well, to make the respondent more comfortable talking to the researcher.
Permission to use a tape recording was obtained before the start of the interview. The
first topic asked was the status of fish resources in the area. The respondent then
described the status of fish resources and the decline in landings at present. The
researcher acted here as a listener with attention to what the respondent was saying to
make the conversation more interesting to him. During the course of the interview the
researcher felt that the interview has moved away from surface talk to a rich discussion
of thoughts and feelings.
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6.6 Observation of Fishing Operation and other Activities
The third method used to obtain data for the present study was field observation.
Observation combines well with the questionnaire survey and semi-structured
interview, to overcome any limitation of either method. In addition, observation was
employed to collect supplementary data for use in interpreting or qualifying findings by
other methods (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996; p. 207). To understand, explain and
predict fishermen's daily activities in their villages the researcher went into the field
and observed their activities while they beached their vessels, mended and repaired
fishing tackle and interacted with each other. The researcher's aim here was to have an
insight into aspect of collective actions that take place on the beach. The researcher
visited all 27 villages covered by the present study.
Field observation was carried out at the same time as implementing the
questionnaire survey. On the beach and while the researcher was waiting for a
respondent to arrive, he spent this time observing some of the activities. This helped the
researcher to understand the interpersonal relationships of fishermen in the village,
including those that may differ from one village to the other. Observations helped to
explain how and why fishermen help each other in certain aspects of their daily
activities. For example, seeing fishermen gathering to help beaching a fishing vessel of
their colleague reflects the collective behaviour of the group. Another example of
collective activity observed was a gathering of fishermen to help their poor colleague by
mending his only gill net after it was entangled in an artificial reef.
The researcher observed the types of vessels employed, fishing nets and
accessories, and landings and handling of fresh fish. The researcher visited a number of
fish markets and auctions to gain a general idea of the selling practices. The researcher
recorded these daily activities which helped him to remember the characteristics and
activities of each village as well as helping him to interpret the results.
6.7 Validity
The question of validity draws attention to how far a measure really measures
the concept that it purports to measure (Bryman and Cramer, 1997; p. 65). The five
scales used in this study are intended to measure different concepts such as Fishermen's
Awareness of the Status of the Resource, Awareness of the Cause of Overfishing,
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Awareness of the Consequence of Overfishing, Externalities in Coastal Fisheries and
Willingness to Cooperate. The items in these scales measure the concepts from
different dimensions and therefore these measurements are indirect. In this
circumstance it is not certain that they are measuring the variable for which they
designed for and hence supporting evidence is needed to prove that a scale is measuring
what it appears to measure. This supporting evidence is obtained by testing the validity
of the scale, which is a measure of scale's accuracy.
Several types of validity are typically measured when assessing the performance
of a survey instrument: face, content, criterion and construct (Litwin, 1995; p. 34).
Criterion and construct validity are difficult to measure because the former needs to be
judged against some other method, known as a "gold standard", for assessing the same
concept and the latter is determined only after years of experience with the instrument.
As there is no known "gold standard" for the scales used in this study to be used to
determine the criterion validity, the researcher had to settle for testing the face and
content validity of the scales. As argued by Bryman and Cramer (1997; p. 66) "at the
very minimum, a researcher who develops a new measure or tests a used measure on a
different population should establish that it has face validity-that is, that the meaning
apparently reflects the content of the concept in question".
6.7.1 Face validity
Face validity is the least scientific of the all validity measures (Litwin, 1995; p.
35). The researcher took the following steps to make sure that the questionnaire has
high face validity. First, the questionnaire was reviewed thoroughly by the researcher
and his supervisor to check on the clarity of the questions and to ensure that the
contents were accurately interpreted. Then, the items were also shown to friends and
fellow fisheries students at the University of Hull to rate scales' appropriateness to the
variable they purport to measure. Their comments were considered and some of the
questions and statements were modified accordingly.
The questionnaire was first written in English and then the researcher translated
it into Arabic (Appendix 2). To ensure that colloquial terms and meanings were
equivalent in both English and Arabic versions, the researcher gave both versions to an
expert in Oman who is competent in translation from English into Arabic and vice
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versa. This ensured that the Arabic version of the questionnaire generated similar
meaning to the English version.
6.7.2 Content validity
Content validity is a measure of how appropriate the items are to the scale as
observed by referees who have some knowledge of the subject. To obtain the content
validity of the scales used in the present study the researcher consulted a number of
specialists in fisheries to rate the appropriateness of each item in the scale. The
specialists were given the scales with a covering letter indicating the nature and purpose
of the study and a description of each scale (Appendix 5a). Eleven specialists, five
lecturers in fisheries from the Hull International Fisheries Institute, University of Hull
and five lecturers in fisheries from the college of Agriculture, Sultan Qaboos University
and a director from the Directorate General of Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries (Oman) were given a copy of the questionnaire. They were asked to respond
to whether the items are appropriate for the variable they designed to measure. They
were asked to give their responses for each item on a scale of five, (extremely
appropriate (5), appropriate (4), moderate (3), fairly appropriate (2) and not at all
appropriate (1). They were asked also to add any comments or correct any item in order
to improve the validity of the scale.
The specialists' responses were analysed and the mean value for each scale was
determined. Items that scored less than the mean were then removed from the scales.
The first scale, "Awareness of the Status of Fish Resources", scored a mean of (4). The
five items in this scale scored appropriate (4) or above and therefore, they were all
retained in the scale as they have high content validity (see Table 1 in Appendix 5b).
The second scale, "Awareness of the Cause of Overfishing", scored a mean of (4)
(appropriate). Items 2, 8 and 9 scored means of (3), (3) and (2) respectively which are
lower than the mean value (4) and therefore a decision was made to remove them from
the scale (see Table 2 in Appendix 5b). The mean value for the scale "the Consequence
of overfishing" was (4). All items in the scale scored four or above except item 8, the
mean for this item was (2.64), therefore, it was removed from the scale because its
mean is lower than the overall scale mean (Table 3 in Appendix 5b).
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The scale that measures Externalities in Coastal Fisheries contains seven items.
The results obtained from the analysis of the specialist's response gave a mean score of
(4) (appropriate). Four items scored (4) or above and two items, 3 and 6 scored below
the mean so they were removed from the scale. Item 7 scored below the mean but it was
retained as it measures an important aspect of coastal externality (Table 4 in Appendix
5b). The final scale then contains five items or statements designed to measure
Externalities in Coastal Fisheries.
The scale designed to measure fishermen's willingness to cooperate contained
initially 14 statements. The mean score for this scale is (4). The results indicated that
most items scored above the mean. Although items 9 and 10 scored (3.73) and (3.91)
respectively, the researcher decided to retain them as they reflect an important
dimension of cooperation (Table 5 in Appendix 5b). Comments and notes of the
referees were considered. According to their recommendations four items (11, 12, 13,
and 14) were removed from the scale because: their mean was less than (4), to make the
questionnaire as short as possible and because they did not highlight a real dimension of
fishermen's willingness to cooperate. In addition, the referees recommended the
addition of two items (M97) and (M98). Both items are included in the index and can
be seen in the final version of the questionnaire (Appendix 1). They were important as
they reflect another aspect of the concept measured which was not covered by other
items in the scale. The former, "Have you been to the Governor's office to raise a case
against those who violate the fishery rules?" reflects an effort by a fisherman when he
visited the Governor's office to stop rule violators. The latter, "Do you oppose the use of
purse seine nets to catch sardines in your fishery" reflects fishermen's concern about the
introduction of modern technology that may affect their livelihood (see Appendix 1).
The researcher modified the statements according to the specialists' comments before
the implementation of the questionnaire to ensure that the scales measure what they
purport to measure.
6.8 Reliability
Reliability is of central concern to social scientists because the measuring
instruments (scales) are rarely completely valid (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996; p.
170). This is because measurements in the social science are indirect and therefore,
118
more errors are encountered when social variables are measured as compared to
physical variables (Nachmias and Naclunias, 1996). For example, in the present study
fishermen's awareness of the status of fish resources is measured with a scale
containing five statements. These indicators are indirect as they measure fishermen's
attitude towards a concept. In addition, the validity analysis carried out for this scale is
a subjective one (face and content validity); therefore, the scale may not be completely
valid and the researcher must evaluate the scale with respect to other characteristics.
The degree of reliability is a method commonly used to evaluate the consistency of
scales or instruments. Litwin (1995; p. 6) defines reliability as a statistical measure of
how reproducible the survey instrument's data are. In other words, the researcher should
expect the same results if he applied the same scale on different occasions or with a
different set from an equivalent population.
Reliability analysis is carried out to assure the researcher that the scales are
reliable and have a little as possible measurement error. Nachmias and Nachmias
(1996; p. 170) argue that a measuring instrument contains variable errors, that is, errors
that appear inconsistently from observation to observation during any one measurement
attempt or that vary each time a given unit is measured by the same instrument.
Therefore, each measurement contains a true component and an error component.
Therefore, reliability can be defined as the ratio of the true score variance to the total
variance in the score as measured (Helmstadter, 1970; cited in Nachmias and
Nachmias, 1996; p. 171). From the above definition it can be seen that if there is no
variable error the ratio of the true score variance to the total variance becomes one, and
the scale is perfectly reliable. However, when the measurement contains only error, the
above ratio tends to zero, and the scale is completely unreliable. The reliability measure
varies on a scale from 0 to 1, where a value close to zero is an indicator of an unreliable
scale and a value close to one is an indicator of a reliable measure.
When considering measurement reliability, a distinction is made between
external and internal reliability. External reliability refers to the degree of consistency
of a measure over time, or the possibility of an independent researcher replicating the
same study in a similar setting. Internal reliability measures the consistency of the scale.
It is applied to a scale containing several items that are thought to measure different
aspects of the same concept (Litwin, 1995). High internal reliability indicates how
119
different items measure a single concept. This is important for the present study as there
are five scales to measure different concepts, each containing five or more statements.
The aim here is to make sure that a group of items in a particular scale which purport to
measure one variable should focus on that variable only.
Several procedures are commonly used to determine measurement reliability.
Among the most common methods are:
(a) Test- retest, where the scale is administered to the same group on two
separate occasions and then the correlation between the two sets of observation is
computed. A high correlation between the two tests is an indicator of high reliability.
Test-retest has two main limitations (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996; P. 172). First,
measurement on one occasion may influence measurements on subsequent occasions.
Second, changes may have occurred in the measured variable during the period between
the two tests which may cause low reliability.
(b) Parallel forms technique, where the researcher develops two parallel
versions of the same scale and administers both forms to the same group. Correlation
between the two versions is then computed to obtain an estimate of reliability.
(c) Internal consistency is another commonly used technique to assess
instruments and scale reliability. Internal consistency determines whether each scale is
measuring a single concept and hence the items contained in the scale are internally
consistent. Internal reliability can be measured statistically by two procedures. First,
Cronbach's coefficient, alpha, is the most frequently used measure of reliability. This
coefficient is named after the 20th-century psychometrician who first reported it in
1951. It measures the internal consistency and homogeneity of a group of items
combined to form a single scale (Litwin, 1995). Alpha varies between zero and one and
the nearer the result is to one-preferably at or over 0.8 — the more reliable is the scale
(Bryman and Cramer, 1997; p. 63) 6. Secondly, a split-half reliability test is used. Here,
the items in a scale are divided into two groups (on an odd-even basis) and the
correlation between the respondent's scores for the two halves is computed. The rule of
thumb is that the resulting coefficient should be 0.8 or above. Some authors argue that a
6 A 0.70 alpha is an acceptable level that indicates the items in the scale are "tightly connected" (Nachmias
and Nachmias, 1996, p. 467).
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coefficient above 0.6 is acceptable for exploratory research, although values over 0.7
are preferred (Bagozzi, 1994). Borg (1981; pp. 218 - 219) states that correlations below
0.35 show only very slight relationship between variables and have limited meaning in
exploratory relationship, whereas a correlation within the range 0.35 and 0.65 shows a
strong enough relationship between variables and is statistically significant beyond the
1 percent level'. The above points were taken into consideration, and any item with a
correlation of less than 0.35 was omitted from the scale.
6.8.1 Internal reliability test for the main study
The researcher implemented six scales in the present study to collect the
necessary data. It is important to note here that the five scales adapted for this study
were tested for standard reliability by their developer. For instance, Salim (1996) used
Cronbach's alpha; the results for Awareness about Resource Status, Awareness about
Overfishing, Awareness about the Consequences of Overfishing and Awareness about
the Externalities Problems were 0.92, 0.86, 0.85, and 0.84 respectively.
1. Awareness of resource status
The researcher tested the reliability analysis for all scales used in this study by
using Cronbach's alpha (Appendix 7). As seen in Table 6.11 Cronbach's alpha for the
Fishermen's Awareness of Resource Status scale is 0.76. This is above the 0.70 level
and only just short of the 0.8 criterion and would be regarded as internally reliable for
the purpose of this study. Inter item total correlation for this scale range from 0.37 to
0.69 and therefore, all items were retained in the scale.
Table 6.11 Perception of Resources Status (N=194)
No The items Item total
correlation
Alpha if
item deleted
E19 Your fish catch per trip declines 0.65 0.70
E20 Your target species is difficult to catch 0.69 0.68
E21 The large fish are difficult to find or catch 0.53 0.71
E22 We need to spend longer hours looking for
fish then we used to
0.63 0.67
E23 The percentage of trash fish in your daily
	  catch has increased.
0.37 0.82
7	 .	 .Limn (1995) reported similar figures where he stated that correlation within the range between 0.25 and
0.55 have a strong relationship between variables.
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It can be seen from Table 6.11 that if item E23 is removed, scale reliability or
Cronbach's alpha is improved from 0.76 to 0.82. However, the item was retained in the
scale as it measures an important dimension of resource status that was not covered by
other items. In addition, the calculated alpha (0.76) for the scale was sufficient to carry
out further analysis.
2. Perception towards the causes of overfishing
The alpha coefficient for the six items in the Perception towards the Causes of
Overfishing scale was 0.76 and the item total correlation ranged between 0.31 to 0.60.
Cronbach's alpha is almost 0.8 and all items have total correlation above 0.35 except
item F28. The researcher decided to retain this item on two grounds. First, the item
reflects an important aspect of the cause of overfishing, so it is preferable to have this
item within the scale. Secondly, removing this item will not result in a significant
improvement in the overall scale reliability as can be seen in Table 6.12 (SPSS outputs
are shown in Appendix 7); If the item is deleted the alpha for the scale is 0.76, which is
similar to the scale overall reliability coefficient.
Table 6.12 Perception Towards the Causes of Overfishing
No The items Item total
correlation
Alpha if
item deleted
F24 Fish resources decline if too many vessels are
operating in the same area
0.51 0.72
F25 Fish resources decline if all vessel are large in size 0.60 0.70
F26 Fish resources decline if all vessels use high
horse-powered engines
0.53 0.71
F27 Fish resources decline if all vessels employ large
no. of nets
0.47 0.73
F28 Fish resources decline if fishermen use encircling
gear
0.30 0.76
F29 Fish resources decline if fishermen increase their
	  fishing time per trip
0.57 0.70
3. Awareness of the consequence of overfishing
This scale contains six items and their Cronbach's alpha was 0.79, highly
reliable for most purposes. Item total correlations ranged between 0.50 to 0.68, well
above Borge's (1981) 0.35 criterion, and therefore were retained in the scale (see Table
6.13).
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Table 6.13 The Consequences of Overfishing (N=194)
No The items Item total
correlation
Alpha if
item deleted
G30 Your fishing	 area becomes further away
from your village
0.60 0.75
G31 Your fishing hours become longer 0.50 0.77
G32 Your fuel consumption increases 0.56 0.75
G33 Many fishing areas are barren 0.68 0.72
G34 You have to use more fishing gears to catch
fish
0.55 0.76
G35 Your income declines 0.51 0.77
4. Externality problems in coastal fishery
Cronbach's alpha for the five items scale was 0.77, which indicates that the
scale has high internal consistency. Inter-item total correlation ranges from 0.38 to 0.73
and therefore the scale is adequately reliable and homogenous to measure externalities
in the coastal fishery (Table 6.14).
Table 6.14 Externalities in Coastal Fisheries (N=194)
No The items Item total
correlation
Alpha if
item deleted
H36 You may face some difficulty in fishing if too
many vessels operate in a small area
0.61 0.71
H37 Net entanglement problems often occur if too
many vessels operate in the same area
0.73 0.66
H38 You cannot fish in the area where many
colleagues are fishing
0.59 0.73
H39 Less catch is expected if you operate in the
area which	 has just been fished by many
colleagues
0.53 0.74
H40 Conflicts among fishermen at sea are rising 0.38 0.79
5. Benefits from collective conservation activities
The alpha coefficient for the four items in this scale was 0.29, which indicate
that the scale has low internal consistency. Item total correlation ranged between 0.04 to
0.22 and therefore the scale is not reliable. Because Cronbach's alpha was very low and
all items have total correlation below 0.35, the researcher decided to remove the scale
from further analysis (see section E in Appendix 7).
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6. Willingness to cooperate
This index was developed by the researcher to measure fishermen's willingness
to cooperate to conserve their resource. The index contains 12 items each measuring a
dimension of the concept. The alpha coefficient for the 12 items is 0.76 and the inter-
item correlation ranges from - 0.01 to 0.65 (Table 6.15). Item N99 has an inter-item
correlation lower than 0.35 and therefore it was removed from the index when testing
hypotheses. When this item was removed, the alpha coefficient have increased from
0.76 to 0.80.
Table 6.15 Willingness to Cooperate
No The items Item total
correlation
Alpha if item
deleted
N88 You return under-sized fish into the sea when
caught in your net
0.55 0.74
N89 Set	 your nets at a distance from other
fishermen gears
0.52 0.74
N90 Inform on colleague who break the fishing
rules
0.53 0.73
N91 Attend workshops arranged by the Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries
0.24 0.77
N92 Renew your fishing licence and vessel licence 0.13 0.78
N93 Speak to the	 head of the tribe about the
problem of your fishery
0.65 0.72
N94 Discuss	 fishing problems frequently with
more than one fisherman
0.53 0.74
N95 Participate in a group to resolve conflicts in
fishing
0.48 0.74
N96 Persuade others to follow fishing rules 0.43 0.74
N97 Visit	 the Governor's office to raise a case
against rules violators
0.49 0.74
N98 Oppose catching sardine with purse seine nets 0.57 0.73
N99
, 	
Participated	 in reef construction in your
village
-0.01 0.80
6.9 Implementation of the Questionnaires
During the first stage of this study, the researcher started by preparing the
sampling frame and meeting officials at the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries to
gather basic information about the study area. Field officers from the Extension
Department in the Ministry stated thA "based on their experience, fishermen in the
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study area show no interest in previous studies conducted by the Afinutrt and the, we
less cooperative with them compared with fishermen from other regions'. On the
contrary, the researcher found that fishermen in the study area were very supportive of
his study and showed a high level of willingness to participate in the sun ey This can be
attributed to the approach used by the researcher before he commenced the actual
survey.
Prior to the start of the actual survey, the researcher visited all fishing villages
and had informal talks with some fishermen explaining to them his objectives and the
importance of his study to their fishery. Official letters from Sultan Qaboos University
(the researcher's employer) were sent to Wali's Office in the three towns chosen for this
study to facilitate the work of the researcher. The Walls in their turn were very
supportive and, therefore, wrote to the heads of the tribes to inform fishermen in their
villages about this research (Appendix 6). All this contributed to raise fishermen's
awareness of the importance of this study, which was essential for the success of this
work_
The researcher himself carried out all interviews. The process was conducted on
a face to face basis and normally took place either in the fishermen's houses or on the
beach while they prepared their nets and vessel for the next fishing trip. Field visits
started early in the morning at 8.00 a.m. and extended until 5.00 p.m. Fishermen are
normally available after nine o'clock in the morning after they have returned from the
fishing trip and selling of their catch in the market Interviews were carried out between
9.00 am. and 1.00 p.m. and again between 3.30 p.m. and 5.00 p.m. Because of the hot
weather in Oman it was not possible to interview fishermen between 1.00 p.m. and 3.30
p.m. as they go to pray, have their lunch and rest until 3.30 in the afternoon when they
come again to the beach to prepare their fishing gear. Most fishermen in the target
sample were located and sometimes the researcher had to visit the same village several
times to interview a fisherman who was not available on the first visit. When a
respondent was reported to be out of the village, had sold his vessel and had quit fishing
or moved to another village, another fisherman was selected randomly.
Field work began on the 15 th of March 1998 in Masn'a and finished on the 15th
of May 1998 in Barka. A total of 194 fishermen were interviewed in 53 days and a very
high response rate (97 %) was achieved.
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6.10 Statistical Analysis of the Data
All fishermen responses for each question were processed and analysed by using
the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS). Due to the type of instruments used
(different kinds of questionnaires and the data collected are nominal, ordinal and
interval), the researcher decided to employ both parametric and non-parametric
statistical tests. Each type has its own advantages and disadvantages. For example, the
non-parametric tests do not specify conditions about the parameters of the population
from which the sample was drawn (Norusis, 1991 and Bryman and Cramer, 1997).
What this means is that the test requires very limited assumptions about the distribution
of the data (the tests do not assume that the data is normally distributed). However,
these tests have been criticized based on the ground that they are not as powerful as
their parametric counterparts (Hubert and Blalook, 1979; Bryman and Cramer, 1997
and Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1990).
Parametric tests are more powerful tools in statistical analysis. Although the
prerequisite for these tests is that the population from which the parameters are
obtained is normally distributed, many researcher argue that it is almost impossible to
find data that are exactly normally distributed; thus, approximation to normality is
sufficient for such tests (Bryman and Cramer, 1997 and Norusis, 1991). Based on this
criterion, for variables which did not satisfy the normality criterion, non-parametric
tests were employed, whereas for those variables which are proved to be normally or
approximately normally distributed, parametric tests were used.
6.10.1 Parametric tests
Among the parametric tests used, the researcher employed the following:
(a) Pearson's Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient
This test is ofien termed Pearson's r, which is the most common measure of
correlation when the variables are measured in the interval or in the ratio scale.
Correlation entails the provision of a yardstick whereby the intensity or strength of a
relationship can be gauged (Bryman and Cramer, 1997; p. 172). Whether high scores on
one variable tend to be found with high scores on an other variable, low scores with low
scores and so on is assessed.
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Pearson's r allows the strength and direction of liner relationships between
variables to be gauged. The value for Pearson's r varies between -1 and +1. A
relationship of -1 or +1 would indicate a perfect relationship, ne gathe or posithe
respectively, whereas a value of zero indicates no relationship. The closer the Nalue of r
is to 1 (+ or -), the stronger the relationship between the two variables.
(b) The t-test
This test is used to determine if the means of two groups differ statistically. The
t-test is calculated by comparing the difference between the two means with the
standard error of the difference in the means of the different groups (Bryman and
Cramer, 1997; p. 142). If the difference in the means of the two groups is close to zero,
it is more likely that this difference is due to chance. To reject a null hypothesis„ it is
important to calculate the degree of freedom (df) which is the number of subjects or
respondents (N-1). If the calculated value oft is large than or equal to a critical value
(in the t-distribution table) at the significant level of less than 0.058 (P-value is less or
equal to 0.05), the null hypothesis can be rejected at that particular significant level9
and degree of freedom.
(e) One-way analysis of variance
To compare the means of three or more groups, such as the mean fishermen's
willingness to cooperate of the three fishermen groups (in the three towns selected in
this study), it is necessary to compute a one-way analysis of variance. The test is often
termed an F-test, in which an estimate of the between-groups variance (or mean square)
is compared with an estimate of the within-groups variance (or mean square) by
dividing the former by the latter (Bryman and Cramer, 1997; p. 146). The total amount
of variance in the dependent variable (i.e., fishermen's willingness to cooperate) is often
due to the independent variable (i.e., difference in attitude of the three fishermen
s_	 .Significance levels commonly used in statistical research are the 005, 0 01 and 0 001 levels, though the
usage of the 0,05 level is the most common (Hubert and Blalock, 1979; p 161).
9 The level of significance has nothing to do with the size or importance of a difference It is simply
concerned with the probability of that difference arising by chance For example, if the level of significance
is set at 0.05, it would be expected that the probability of that difference arising by chance is five times out
of a hundred (i e, five times for every hundred times the same sample is collected from the same
population).
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groups) and that which is due to other factors. The variance that is due to the
independent factors is referred to as explained variance, whereas the variance that is
caused by other factors is described as error or residual variance. If the explained
variance (between-groups) is considerably larger than the error or (residual) variance
(within groups), then the F-ratio will be higher, which implies that the difference
between the means is unlikely to be due to chance.
(d) Regression analysis
Regression analysis, in the form of multiple regression, is regarded as the most
widely used and powerful tools for summarizing the relationship between variables and
for prediction of the dependent variable (Bryman and Cramer, 1997; p. 256). In the
computation of the multiple-regression equation, the researcher employed a procedure
called stepwise to decide the sequence of the entry of variables into the equation. The
stepwise selection of independent variables is the most commonly used method in
testing regression (Norusis, 1993; p. 350, Bry-man and Cramer, 1997; p. 267). It is a
combination of forward and backward selection.
6.10.2 Non-parametric tests
From the variety of non-parametric tests available, the researcher decided to use
the chi-square test. The chi-square test is widely used in conjunction with contingency
tables (crosstabulation) which contains a cell for each combination of categories of the
two variables'''. It is used to test statistical significance, meaning that it allows the
researcher to ascertain the probability that the observed relationship between the two
variables may have arisen by chance. The test is calculated by comparing the observed
frequencies in each cell in a contingency table with those that would occur if there was
no relationship between the two variables (Bryman and Cramer, 1997; p. 168).
6.11 Conclusion
This chapter has explained the methods used to carry out the empirical survey to
assess the collective choices of fishermen in South Al-Batinah, Oman. A triangulation
method was employed to collect both qualitative and quantitative data. The data
io The test is used with ordinal and nominal scales.
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gathered in the survey through different collection techniques provide more accurate
testing of the assumption and hypotheses made by this study and to describe several
dimensions of fishermen behaviour. The main survey instrument was a questionnaire,
designed to provide quantitative data. The questionnaire was supplemented by
qualitative data derived from interviews with key informants and observation of the
daily activities of the target population. The interview and observations were useful in
understanding the actual field situation and the issues that were not covered by the main
survey instrument. The three methods, therefore, offer different types of data, which fit
well together. In this case the researcher has more confidence concerning his
conclusions than he would have if he had employed a single method.
The respondents included in this study were selected by a proportional stratified
random sampling method. Beside its greater degree of representation and decreases the
probable sampling error, the sampling technique selected minimize time and cost.
Before ending this chapter it is important to explain at this stage that all testing
of hypotheses carried out in the following chapters was conducted at 0.05 level of
significance. The t-test has been interpreted on the two-tailed test.
In the next chapters, the researcher will present the findings derived from these
data. First, Chapter Seven presents the results of the socio-economic condition of the
respondents.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
A SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF
THE TRADITIONAL FISHERMEN IN SOUTH AL-BATINAH
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the results of the data collected to describe the study population,
namely fishing vessel owners in South Al-Batinah (Barka, Masn'a and Suwaiq), are
presented. Among the socioeconomic aspects of the vessel owners considered are their
demographic attributes, income, assets and liabilities. A comparison is made, wherever
possible, of their standard of living with that of other socioeconomic groups in the
country. The figures presented in this chapter are based on a cross-sectional study
carried out in the study area between February and May 1998 and therefore reflect the
socioeconomic conditions of those included in the sample at the time of survey. The
chapter aims to give a general picture of the structure, standard of living and other
activities of fishermen in coastal fishing villages in South Al-Batinah.
The results presented in this chapter are very important when trying to assess the
collective behaviour of traditional fishermen in coastal fisheries as they describe the
different characteristics of the study population. Fishermen in Al-Batinah are living in
fishing communities or villages within each town scattered along the coast. The
collective behaviour in each town, therefore, can be assessed separately because each
town forms a group where its members are interacting with each other more than with
people from other towns. In terms of the number of vessel owners in each village, the
size of some of these towns is relatively small while others are large. This could be
analogous to Olson's (1965) terminology of group size in which he differentiates
between small "privileged" groups and intermediate and large groups. Olson (1965), for
example, predicts that the provision of the public good depends on group size (the
smaller the group, the more it will succeed in providing public goods), so it might be
thought, if Olson's hypothesis is correct, that collective action is more successful in
smaller towns. Failure in the provision of public goods is also attributed to group
heterogeneity (Olson, 1965; Baland and Platteau, 1996 and Libecap, 1994). These
differences plus many others were seen in the present research project to create
conflicting interests among fishermen relative to changes in the current situation.
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Therefore, a description of the vessel owners' characteristics is presented in the
following sections. The results obtained here are used for hypotheses testing in the
following chapters.
7.2 General Profile
Oman can be described as a one-race, one-religion country. The 1993 General
Census results of the population in Oman revealed that there is a negligible percentage
of non-Muslim Omanis (Ministry of Development, 1993). As expected, the study
population can be described as Muslim with an Arab origin. They speak a common
language, Arabic, by means of which good communication between all resource users in
the study area is guaranteed. Race, religion and language are commonly cited as factors
that may promote or impede collective action (Baland and Platteau, 1996). In cases
where resource users have a common language, common religion and originate from the
same race, the chances of promoting collective action might be reasonably high.
Therefore, it can be inferred here that religion, race and language cannot be considered
as obstacles to collective action in the study area.
The role of religion in shaping people's behaviour is vital. Muslims perform five
prayers per day and are asked to conduct their prayers in the Mosque (if possible).
While in the field, the researcher observed that fishermen from the same village meet
regularly in the Mosque and discuss various aspects of daily life after they have finished
their prayer. One of the group discussions that the researcher held with fishermen was in
the Mosque after a prayerl . The place was chosen because most of people in that village
attend the prayer. The Mosque is therefore, a common place for each group of
fishermen to meet regularly and such meetings are normally considered to facilitate the
emergence of collective action. As described by Berkes (1986), the emergence of
collective action started from a coffee shop in Alanya (Turkey) where fishermen meet
regularly. For the present study, the Mosque can play the same basic role as the coffee
shop and may witness the emergence of collective action to solve common problems. In
such cases the cost of organising collective action would become relatively low.
To model the collective behaviour of the fishermen in the study area using a
game theory approach it can be seen that the two-core parable of the Prisoners'
Dilemma game does not hold (communication is forbidden and no future interaction). In
1 The group discussion was held on March 15 th, 1098.
131
contrast to the Prisoners' Dilemma game, when examining this fishery, the simple PD
model does not exactly capture individual rational action because the vessel owners
jointly using common fishing grounds interact among themselves. They play a game
repeatedly and non-anonymously, features which rule out the simple PD model as an
appropriate description.
7.3 Respondents' Age
The fishermen's average age was 44.40 years, the oldest being 70 years and the
youngest being 20 years. Table 7.1 shows age categories of the sampled vessel owners
in South Al-Batinah. The largest age group is the older one (41-55 years), accounting
for 64 percent of the total vessel owners, followed by the middle age group (26-40
years) which accounts for another 24 percent. When these two age groups are combined
together they account for 88 percent of the total vessel owners. The youngest age group
(less than 26 years) accounts for only 4.6 % of the total vessel owners. The results
indicate that there is little variation in age structure between locations: fewer vessel
owners under 40 years old are found in Suwaiq (21.9 %) compared to corresponding
values in Barka (31.2 %) and in Masn'a (35 %). An earlier study found that the mean
age of fishermen in the study area in 1979 was 35 years (Pollnac et al., 1984; p. 5).
Table 7.1 Fishermen's Age in Years by Town (N = 194)
Age category
(years)
Barka
(n = 61)
Masn'a
(n = 60)
Suwaiq
(n=73)
All sample
(N = 194)
Less than 25 6.6% 3.3% 4.1% 4.6%
26 - 40 24.6% 31.7% 17.8% 24%
41 - 55 65.6 % 58.3 % 68.5 % 64.4 %
more than 55 3.3 % 6.7 % 9.6 % 6.7 %
Mean 43.4 43.9 45.7 44.4
Std. Deviation 8.4 8.3 9.35 8.77
7.4 Education
Among the demographic variables that may have an important influence on the
success or failure of collective action is educational attainment. Due to the long-run
nature of productivity benefits from resource conservation, long planning horizons are
expected to influence positively the individual's decision to participate in managing
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shared resources (Kalaitzandonakes and Monson, 1994; P. 202). Therefore, fishermen
with higher educational attainments are expected to devote greater participation to
conserve their fish resources. This is because higher education is associated with greater
information on the productivity implication of overfishing and the benefits of various
collective conservation efforts.
The educational attainment of the sampled fishermen is grouped into three levels
according to the education system in Oman: elementary (six years), preparatory or
lower secondary (three years) and secondary (three years) (Table 7.2). The results
indicate that none of the sampled fishermen have education beyond the secondary level.
Further, the results indicate a very low level of educational attainment. The mean
education level is 1.10 years with a standard deviation of 2.58 years. From Table 7.2, it
can be observed that the majority of the respondents (79 %) are virtually illiterate,
whereas 13.4 percent are reported to have some form of elementary education, i.e., they
have achieved between one to six years of elementary education2. Fishermen who have
no formal education but have writing and reading abilities, which are gained by
studying in the "Ko'ranic schools" 3, are regarded for the purpose of this study as having
one year of formal education and are grouped under elementary education.
Table 7.2 Educational Attainment of Fishermen (N=194)
Education
attainment (years)
Barka Masn'a Suwaiq All sample
Illiterate 73.8% 81.7% 82.2% 79.4%
1 - 6 18 % 10 % 12.3 % 13.4 %
7 - 9 6.6 % 8.3 % 4.1 % 6.2 %
10 - 12 1.6% 0% 1.4% 1%
Mean 1.34 1.08 0.90 1.10
Std. Deviation 2.91 2.52 2.34 2.58	 ,
Variations in educational attainment by location can be noticed from Table 7.2
where the level of illiteracy is higher in Suwaiq (82 %) and Masn'a (82 %) as compared
to its corresponding value in Barka (74 %). To compare the educational attainment of
2 In Oman 29 percent of the male population aged 15 years and over are illiterate based on the 1993
General Census of the population (Ministry of Development, 1993).
3	 ,	 .Ko rasuc schools are schools where the Koran (the sacred book of Islam) is taught. These schools teach
how to read the Holy Book. Writing skills are taught as well. They were abundant before the start of
formal education in 1970.
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the respondents from the three towns, one-way analysis of variance was used (Table
7.3). From Table 7.3, it can be seen that these differences are not statistically significant
at the 0.05 significance level. The F-ratio (the between-group mean divided by the
within-groups mean (3.22 / 6.70 = 0.482)), is very small; thus, it is not significant
(Table 7.3). Consequently, there is no statistically significant difference in educational
attainment between respondents from the three towns as the P-value for the F test was
greater than 0.05, although fishermen in Barka have slightly higher education (mean =
1.34 year) compared to those in Suwaiq (mean = 0.9 years) and Masn'a (mean = 1.08
years).
Table 7.3 A One-way Analysis of Variance of Educational Attainment
Across Towns (N=194)
DF Sum of
Squares
Mean
Square
F-ratio
Between groups 2 6.46 3.22
0.482; P> 0.05Within groups 191 1278.68 6.70
Total 193 1285.14
The very low level of education in the study area may be attributed to two
factors. First, the relatively older aged group (41-55 years) is expected to have lower
mean education level because its members missed the chance to enter schools as the
formal education in the country was first started in 1970. This was confirmed when
education attainment was crosstabulated with respondent's age (see Table 7.4). The
results indicate that 94 respondents (61 %) of the illiterate fishermen are over 44.4 years
old compared to 60 respondents (39 %) who are below that age, which confirmed our
predication that they might have missed their chance of getting into schools. The result
of the Chi-Square test indicates that the difference is statistically significant at the 0.001
level as shown in Table 7.4; thus, there is a statistically significant difference between
the two age groups with regards to their education level.
4 The sample was divided into two groups so that two age groups are formed, one below the mean (age
mean is 44.4 years) and the other above the mean.
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Table 7.4 Education Levels Crosstabulated with Age Groups (N=194)
Age Literate * Total *
Yes No
Below mean
Above mean
33 (83)
7(17)
60 (39)
94(61)
93 (48)
101 (52)
Total 40 154 194
Chi-Square	 Value	 DF	 Significance
Pearson	 24.11	 1	 0.000 
* Figures in parentheses are column percentages
Second, fishermen leave school at less than 13 years old because they might be
asked to do so by their parents to work as fishermen to provide another source of
income for the family. A respondent told the researcher that two of his sons left school
at the age of 12 years and 15 years respectively, and work as crew with him to help him
to support the family.
There are two implications for the present study from the above statistics. First,
owing to the low educational attainment of fishermen, employment opportunities
outside the fisheries sector are reduced. Even in cases where fishermen might have
occupations outside the fishing sector, these works are likely to be non-skilled, thus
generating a very low income which makes them still economically dependent on
fishing. Economic dependence on the resource can promote the emergence of collective
action because the users consider their resource as generating an important source of
income to support their families. The second implication concerns fisheries extension
and training programmes in fishing communities. The low level of literacy implies that
extension and training programmes need to be specially designed for communities.
7.5 Household size
Another demographic variable included in this study was household size. The
results indicate that the average household size in the study area is relatively large. The
average household size in the study area is 12.4 members with a standard deviation of
4.90 members. The average household size in the study area is higher than the average
national family size of eight members 5. The minimum size was found to be two
members and the maximum was 30 members. Family size includes the respondent
5 Average household in Oman is 8 members (Ministry of Development, 1993).
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himself, his wife and children, parents and sometimes his brothers sharing the same
house and meals. The Omani family is typically an extended family, and is not confined
to parents and children only, but includes many branches and sub-branches which
reflects a high degree of social cohesion (Ministry of Development, 1993; p. 64). Field
observation indicates that large family size occurs because in some cases three or four
brothers each have their own family sharing the house they have inherited from their
parents. It is common to see a fisherman with more than ten sons and daughters living in
the same house. Table 7.5 shows the percentage of vessel owners falling under each of
the four household size categories: small household (less than 4 members), medium (5
to 9 members), large (between 10 to 14 members) and very large (more than 14
members). The results indicated that only 30.9 percent of the total fishermen
interviewed have less than nine members in their house. Around 39 percent of all
respondent's household is large-sized with 10 to 14 members. The second largest group
is "very large" (29.9 %) with more than 14 members sharing the same house. There is a
slight variation among the three towns. Around 77 percent of the respondent's
household have more than nine members in Suwaiq; lower average figures are found in
Masn'a (68 %) and in Barka (70 %).
Table 7.5 Household Size by Town (N=194)6
Size category Barka Masn'a Suwaiq
0%
All sample
3.1%Small (1-4) 1.6% 8.3%
Medium (5-9) 27.9 % 23.3 % 23.3 % 27.8 %
Large (10-14) 39.3 % 38.3 % 39.7 % 39.2 %
Very large (more than 14) 31.2% 30.1% 37.0% 29.9%
Mean (members) 12.4 11.9 12.8 12.4
Std. Deviation __4.5 4.9 5.2 4.90
With such large families, one would expect to see large numbers of working
members per family. On the contrary, the results indicate that the average number of
working members per family is 0.75 members7
 and the standard deviation is 0.84. This
indicates that there is high economic dependency on the fish resources. The figure
represents only those working in the public or private sectors. Other family members
working as fishermen are not included as the figure includes only those who have a
permanent jobs. When the working members are expressed as a percentage of the
6Includes the vessel owner.
7Excludes the vessel owner.
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household size, it is found that the average number of working members as a percentage
of family size is 6.3 percent. Table 7.6 shows working members as a percentage of
family size by categories. The results indicate that there are 87 households (45 % of the
total sample) dependent on the household head only. Families having between one and
ten percent of their members occupying permanent jobs represent around 32.5 percent
of the total vessel owners sampled. The third category (11 to 20 percent of the family
members having permanent jobs) represents 19 percent of the sample. The average
members with permanent jobs as a percentage of family size for the three towns Barka,
Masn'a and Suwaiq are 6 percent, 7 percent and 5.9 percent respectively.
The results show that few members of the family have permanent jobs. This
could be attributed to the lack of employment opportunities in these communities or to
low literacy levels. It is clear that the household head (the vessel owner) provides a
large proportion of the fishing household's income which makes him highly dependent
on fish resources to earn his income, which might influence his willingness to
cooperate.
Table 7.6 Members with Permanent Job as a Percentage of Family
Size (N= 194)
Category Frequency Percentage
No working members 87 44.8
1 to 10 % 63 32.5
llto 20 % 37 19.1
More than 20 % 7 3.6
Total 194 100
7.6 Occupational Structure
Fishermen were asked if they had other occupations besides fishing. The results
of the analysis of the occupation structure crosstabulated with towns can be found in
Table 7.7. It is clearly shown in Table 7.7 that vessel owners in the study area undertake
supplementary occupations concurrently with fishing. Fishermen are undertaking
fishing-related occupations such as fish trading as well as unrelated occupations to
fishing such as working on agricultural gardens and working in Government offices.
These supplementary occupations help to diversify the fishermen's income away from
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the highly uncertain and seasonal fishing operations. The percentage of vessel owners
engaged in supplementary occupation is related to their need for such supplements, the
profitability of fishing and the availability of employment opportunities in their
communities or the surroundings area.
Table 7.7 Distribution of Vessel Owners by Occupation, South Al-Batinah
(N=91)8
Occupation Barka Masn'a Suwaiq All
sample
Farming 9 (25.7) 5 (22.8) 20 (58.8) 34 (37.4)
Government 25 (71.4) 16 (72.7) 7 (20.6) 48 (52.7)
Other jobs 1 (2.9) 1 (4.5) 7 (20.6) 9 (9.9)
Total 35 22 34 91
* Figures in parentheses are column percentages
When these supplementary occupations are subdivided into gardening,
government jobs and other jobs (Table 7.7), it was found that 47 percent of the sampled
vessel owners are occupational pluralists, that is, they combine fishing and other
occupations to make their living, whereas 53 percent are pure owner-operators of
fishing units. The most common combination of employment is fishing with non-fishing
activities rather than with fishing related activities such as fish trading. Government
jobs attracted 52.7 percent of the sampled vessel owners who have other occupations,
whereas 37.4 percent combine fishing and gardening. Under the other jobs category,
which accounts for only 9.9 percent of those who combine fishing and other
occupations, small businesses, taxi drivers, fish traders and other activities are grouped
together. The highest percentage of "pure" fishing vessel operators among vessel
owners was found in Masn'a (63.3 %) and the lowest was found in Barka (42.6 %), with
Suwaiq falling somewhere between these two.
Most of the fishermen who own gardens are actually keeping palm tree gardens
to produce dates. In the coastal region of South Al-Batinah large farmed area have
experienced salt-water intrusion into depleted aquifers since the early 1980s
(incidentally, another example of a collective failure). Saline water has made irrigation
impossible in many areas, with farmers' incomes falling rapidly in recent years. What
8 Some boat owners combined fishing with more than one non-fishing occupation. For example, some
fishermen combined fishing, fanning and government job.
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remain of these gardens are usually palm trees which are either insufficient or just
sufficient to meet the household's needs. In the semi-structured interview a respondent
stated that in most cases, little or no produce is left over for sale and, in general, garden-
owning fishermen do not see gardens as equally important to fishing in terms of
generating cash income. Another respondent stated that fishermen keep these farms as a
security pledged for the repayment of loans (collateral). Farming seems to be less
important in Barka (25.7 %) and Masn'a (22.8 %), whereas in Suwaiq 58.8 percent of
those who have other occupations besides fishing are engaged in farming. As mentioned
above, government jobs seem to attract a higher percentage of fishermen because these
jobs provide secure and sustainable sources of income for the household.
Based on the above discussion and due to the salinity problem that affects farm
production in the study area, it can be assumed that among the total number of
respondents, only 29 percent have jobs that provide secure and sustainable sources of
income. Therefore, it can be concluded that the majority of the fishermen (71 percent)
included in this study are economically dependent on incomes derived from fishing.
Variation in the number of vessel owners working in government offices across
the three towns may reflect the variations in employment opportunities among the three
towns. For example, among those who reported having another occupation besides
fishing, 71.4 percent of the surveyed vessel owners in Barka work in government
offices whereas the corresponding figure in Masn'a and Suwaiq are 72.7 percent and
20.6 percent respectively (see Table 7.7). The geographical location of the three towns
along the coast, especially their distance from Muscat (the country's capital) where
most government offices are situated, and industrial activities and other businesses are
located, accounts for the variation in employment opportunities outside the fisheries
sector. Barka is the nearest town to the capital followed by Masn'a and then Suwaiq.
The lower percentage of the vessel owners (20.6 %) in Suwaiq working in government
offices can be attributed to its distance from the capital, Muscat (Table 7.7).
In an attempt to determine the characteristics of vessel owners who have other
occupations besides fishing, other occupations were crosstabulated with age 9 and
education level. To test the significance of the difference between these variables, a
Chi-Square test was used. Table 7.8 indicates that younger fishermen (57 %) are more
9 The sample was divided into two groups so that two age groups are formed, one below the mean (age
mean is 44.4 years) and the other above the mean.
139
likely to have other occupations than older fishermen (38 %). The results obtained from
the Chi-Square indicated that the difference between these two groups is statistically
significant at the 0.05 level. This suggests that younger fishermen have better chances to
be employed in non-fishing sectors than older fishermen.
Table 7.8 Age Crosstabulated with Other Occupation (N=194)
Age Other occupation Total
Yes No
Below mean
Above mean
53
38
(57)
(38)
40
63
(43)
(62)
93
101
Total 91 103 194
Chi-Square Value DF Significance
Pearson 7.29 1 0.007
* Figures in parentheses are row percentages
Other occupations were then crosstabulated with education level. Table 7.9
demonstrates that 65 percent of the literate respondents have other occupations as
compared to 42 percent of the illiterate respondents. On the other hand, the difference is
statistically significant at the 0.05 level as well since the p-value of the test is less than
the 0.05 significance level.
Table 7.9 Literacy Crosstabulated with other Occupation
literate Other occupation Total
Yes No
Yes
No
26 (65)
65(42)
14 (35)
89(58)
40
154
Total 91(47) 103 (53) 194
Chi-Square Value	 DF Significance
Pearson 6.62	 1 0.01
* Figures in parentheses are row percentages
Differences in age and literacy status were also tested against government jobs-
the highest frequency source of other occupations (Table 7.10). The Chi-Square test
results indicate that there is a statistically significant relationship between age and
working in government offices. Younger vessel owners are more likely to have a
government job than older fishermen. The difference was statistically significant at the
0.05 level (P-value <0.05). When government jobs was tested against education level, it
was found that respondents with better education are likely to be engaged in
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government jobs beside their fishing occupation. The result of the Chi-Square test
shows that the difference was statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level
(Table 7.10). It can be concluded here that government jobs available for these groups
are likely to attract younger and educated respondents. As indicated by the findings of
this study, the largest age group is the older one (41-55 years) accounting for 64 percent
of the total vessel owners. Thus, it can be concluded here that owing to their age and
low educational attainment, the majority of the respondents have a high economic
dependence on their fishery.
Table 7.10 Results of the Chi-Square Test Between Working in Government
and Respondents Age and Literacy Level
Chi-Square Value DF Significance
Age Pearson 17.12 1 0.000
Literacy level Pearson 10.40 1 0.001
Fishermen in South Al-Batinah noted that employment opportunities are
difficult for them and their family members at present. When they were asked how easy
it is to find another job, 122 respondents answered this question; the remaining 72
respondents reported that they have another occupation besides fishing10 . The results in
Table 7.11 show that out of the 122 respondents, 90 respondents (74 %) claimed that it
is not easy to find another job at present, the remaining 32 respondents (26 %) reported
that they are not sure about the difficulties of getting another job.
Table 7.11 Difficulties of Finding another Occupation (N= 194)
Questions Yes No Not
sure
Total
sample
Is	 it	 easy to find
another job
0 90 32 122
	  0% 74% 26% 63%
Respondents were then asked why it is difficult to find another job. The answer
to this question is found in Table 7.12. Around 53 percent stated that there is no work
10 Even those who report gardening as a second occupation are in fact looking for other work, especially
in Government offices, to secure their family income. The reason why 122 respondents answered this
question is because this figure includes those who do not have a job plus those who have farming as a
second occupation besides fishing but are looking for a more secure job.
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available and 22 percent attributed these difficulties to their old age and stated that no
one will hire them at this age. The remaining 25 percent noted that they are happy with
their fishing occupation and have not searched for employment opportunities.
Table 7.12 Reasons for Difficulties in Finding another Occupation
All sample
Reasons Frequency %
1- No work available 64 53%
2- Age 27 22%
3- Did not look 31 25%
Total 122 100%
7.7 Crew Structure
In general, crew size varies according to vessel size—the larger the vessel, the
larger the crew- and to the type of fishing operation. For example, a crew of two or
three is common in the gill net fishery, five crew in the purse seine fishery and the
number often reaches as large as 15 to 18 members in the beach seine fishery. During
the fieldwork, a crew as large as 30 (men and women) was observed operating a beach
seine.
Because the vessels used are relatively small, the mean crew size aboard these
vessels is 1.86 fishermen (including the skipper) with a standard deviation of 0.63
fishermen. The majority of respondents (68 %) go fishing with one crew member only,
whereas 47 respondents (24.3 %) go fishing alone, and 15 respondents (7.7 %) go
fishing with more than one crew member. Crew members were frequently from the
same family; father and son teams are very common; brothers and other family relations
were also observed. If not close family, they are frequently neighbours and friends from
the same village. As shown in Table 7.13, out of the total respondents interviewed, 111
respondents (57 %) recruit family members as crew, whereas 47 respondents (24 %) go
fishing alone, and the remaining 36 respondents (19 %) hire crew other than family
members.
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Table 7.13 Crew Structure
Crew source Frequency Percentage
(a) Family member 111 57.2
(b) Go fishing alone 47 24.2
(c) Hired labour 36 18.6
The systems for dividing the return from fishing between the vessel owner and
the crew are influenced by several factors, including the relationship between crew and
owner, fishing type and the availability of crew in that village. For example, from the
semi-structured interviews it was found that when the crew and owner are from the
same household, the return from fishing is often pooled into the household. Sons of the
owner who still live with him in the same house and work as crew in his vessel receive
pocket money from their father and the proceeds go into the household. Looking at the
results, it was found that fishing is mainly a family occupation. It was found that out of
the 194 respondents included in the sample, only 36 vessel owners (19 %) employ crew
other than their family members.
Crew wages are calculated by two different systems encountered in the study
area. The most frequently encountered, after deducting the cash operating expenses, is
for total daily sales to be divided into one equal share for each crew and the vessel
(including fishing gear). For example, when one crew member works with the vessel
owner, the crew receive one-third and two-thirds goes to the owner, made up of his
share which is the labour cost plus the vessel share which is the return to capital
investment. In the second system, after deducting operating cost and auction
commission, the balance of the daily sales is divided into two equal shares; one part
goes to the vessel and the other is divided equally among crew members. The owner
receives one share as his labour wage from the crew share. In this case, if one crew
member works with the owner, the crew receive one-quarter, and the owner receives
three-quarters of the balance from total fish sales. The results indicated that out of the
55 respondents who reported sharing the catch with the crew, 64 percent use the first
system, whereas 36 percent use the second system. The same system of calculating crew
wages was also observed in use among fishermen in the A'Sharquiyah region (the
eastern part of Oman) (Omezzine, Zaibet, and Al-Oufi, 1996).
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As noted above, the system of dividing fish sales is influenced by the
availability of labour in the community with fishing skills. This could explain the
difference between the two systems. The second system seems to be encountered in
cases where there are plenty of fishermen with no capital assets or limited access to
capital, coupled with paucity of alternative employment opportunities outside the
fishery.
The average annual income of crew fishermen in the study area was higher in
Suwaiq (RO 845) followed by Masn'a (RO 762) and then Barka (RO 745). When crew
wage is compared to the national minimum wage (RO 1440 per year' 1), it was found
that crew fishermen in South Al-Batinah receive less than the national minimum wage.
Crew fishermen were not included in this study to examine the way they supplemented
their household total income. The decision making during the fishing operation lies in
the hands of the vessel's operator, who in the case of the present study is the owner.
7.8 Fishing Income
Considering the occupational structure described above, a fishing household's
income may be broken down into fishing and non-fishing income. Furthermore, the
household's income may be broken down into income earned by the vessel owner
himself and by other family members. Additional household income may be received in
non-cash form by consuming part of his own catch or by non-cash payments to hired
labour. A contribution from the system of welfare and/or reciprocity in the fishing
villages may provide part of the household income especially in the more traditional
communities. It was observed that some of the catch was given to those who
approached the vessel and asked for some fish. Frequently, those who receive part of the
catch are the poorest neighbours and fishermen who did not go fishing that day.
Describing this reciprocal system, a respondent stated that he expects like treatment on
days that he does not (or cannot) go fishing. Because non-cash payments and the
contribution of the welfare system in these communities are difficult to quantify, this
study concentrates on income derived in cash by the vessel owners and/or that provided
by other members of the household.
11 Ministerial Decree, Cited from, Oman Daily Newspaper No. 6241, July, 4th 1998.
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Because incomes reported directly can be over—or under-estimated due to failure
to subtract certain costs or because respondents expect more government subsidies 12, it
would be ideal to compare the reported income in this study to net income obtained
from previous studies. Accurate figures for fishing income was difficult to achieve as
there are no previous studies concerned with analysing cost and earning of fishing in the
study area nor is there a reliable source to depend on (a cooperative for example) to
determine fishermen's daily income from fishing. Therefore, the estimation of annual
income from fishing was based on the amount of money declared by the vessel owners.
Indirect questions were used to avoid under-reporting of income by respondents. Total
fishing income of individual vessel owners was estimated using gross revenues for each
vessel (by type of gear) reported by the respondent during the fishing season. The
respondent was asked about the average daily sale, number of days fishing per month
and the number of months fishing per year (by type of gear). Taking each fishing gear
operated by the respondent, gross revenue was, therefore, calculated by multiplying the
average sale per day times the number of days fishing per months times the number of
months fishing per year. Net income was obtained by deducting cash operating costs
(fuel, oil, ice, food and auction commission) from gross revenue and the balance was
finally aggregated to determine the annual net income of individual vessel owner
Panayotou, 1984). Net income obtained in this manner is in fact composed of labour
compensation, vessel and gear consumption (capital consumption) and fishing rent.
When vessel owner's income is examined, the statistics revealed that the average
annual income from fishing in the study area is RO 1869 with a high standard deviation
of RO 1338 (Table 7.15). The high standard deviation explains the high disparity of
income distribution. From Table 7.15, it can be observed that annual income varies
across the three towns. Individual fisherman in Suwaiq earns an average of RO 1982,
higher than those in Masn'a (RO 1897) and Barka (RO 1707). It is interesting to
examine whether there are differences in income among respondents from the three
towns. A one-way analysis of variance is used to test the null hypothesis that there is no
significant difference in income among fishermen from the three towns (Table 7.14).
12 Under reporting of income due to the fear of taxation is unlikely as there is no income tax on
individuals encountered in the country.
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Table 7.14 A one-way Analysis of Variance of Income in the Three
Towns (N=194)
DF Sum of
Squares
Mean
Square
F-ratio
Between groups 2 2556793 1278397
0.71; P > 0.05Within groups 191 3.4 *108 1804114
Total 193 3.5 *108
From Table 7.14, it can be observed that the results failed to reject the null
hypothesis (p-value > 0.05). Thus, the difference in respondent's income between the
three towns is not statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level.
As shown in Table 7.15, income is grouped into low (0 to 1000), medium (1000
to 2000) and high (more than 2000). The results indicated that the majority (71.6 %) of
the vessel owners in the study area fall in the medium and high income group which
means that they receive incomes higher than the national minimum wage. Slight
variation in income groups among the three towns can be observed from Table 7.15. For
example, in Suwaiq the percentage of those having high earnings and those who have
low earnings from fishing are greater than those who have medium earnings, whereas
the opposite is found in Barka and Masn'a where the medium earner dominates the
three income groups.
Table 7.15 Vessel Owner's Annual Income from Fishing by Town
' 	
Fishing income Barka Masn'a Suwaiq All sample
Low 15 16 24 55
(Less than 1000) (24.6) (26.7) (32.9) (28.4)
Medium 28 24 17 69
(1000 —2000) (45.9) (40) (23.3) (35.6)
High 18 20 32 70
(more than 2000) (29.5) (33.3) (43.8) (36)
Total 61 60 73 194
Mean (RO) 1707 1897 1982 1869
Std. Deviation 1108 1352 1498 1338
* Figures in parentheses are column percentages
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Although annual fishing income is higher than the minimum national wage, the
figure does not account for capital consumption (vessel and gear depreciation and loan
repayments).
Having obtained income from fishing, it is a matter of aggregating fishing
income and non-fishing income to obtain total income (Table 7.16). When examining
vessel owners' dependence on fishing it was found that income from fishing accounted
for about 74 percent of the total income, while non-fishing income accounted for only
26 percent (Table 7.16). The dependence on fishing as a source of income is similar for
Masn'a (81 %) and Suwaiq (80 %), but considerably lower for Barka (60 %). As
mentioned earlier, vessel owners undertake supplementary occupations and the
contribution to the total respondent income from these occupations ranges from around
20 percent in both Masn'a and Suwaiq to 40 percent in Barka (Table 7.16).
Table 7.16 Annual Average Net Income (RO) of Vessel Owners by
Source, South Al-Batinah
Owner Total income
Fishing Non-fishing
Barka 1707 1119 2826
% of total 60 40 100
Masn'a 1897 443 2340
% of total 81 19 100
Suwaiq 1982 483 2465
% of total 80 20 100
All sample 1869 670 2539
% of total 74 26 100
A number of hypotheses may be advanced to explain the differences in
economic dependence on fishing between Masn'a and Suwaiq in one side and Barka on
the other side. The first hypothesis is the time spent fishing. As mentioned earlier,
among those who reported other occupations besides fishing, 71.4 percent of the vessel
owners in Barka are engaged in government jobs. This means that they have less time
for fishing and marketing of their catch as compared to those in Masn'a and Suwaiq.
For example, Barka's fishermen rushing to their work in the early morning after they
have returned from a fishing trip sell their catch to fish dealers or middlemen and have
no alternatives but to agree with prices offered by the dealers. This can be confirmed by
examining fishermen's choices of marketing channels. In Barka, where 71.4 percent of
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respondents who have other occupations are engaged in government jobs, 47.5 percent
of them sold their catch to fish dealers because they could not wait for the auction. The
corresponding figure for Masn'a was 15 percent only, and although in Suwaiq the figure
was slightly lower than Barka (43.8 %), the figures have to be taken with caution as
there is no auction in this town and therefore, the presence of middlemen is anticipated
anyway.
Another hypothesis is the degree of competition in input markets. A positive
relationship exists between income level and current value of fishing assets. The current
value of fishing assets (hull, engine and gear) was obtained as an index of catching
power in the study area. The average value of these assets per vessel owner for all
respondents was RO 3224 with a standard deviation of RO 2051. The average value of
fishing assets per owner was RO 3929 in Suwaiq compared with RO 2923 in Barka and
RO 2674 in Masn'a (Table 7.17). More capital investment in Suwaiq may explain the
higher income from fishing, especially if we consider that larger fishing vessels and
high-powered engines mean more extensive fishing grounds.
The apparent negative relationship between incomes from fishing and input of
capital in Barka may be explained by the availability of non-fishing jobs which permit
respondents to have access to credits either from local creditors or from the Bank of
Agriculture and Fisheries and other commercial banks. It can be seen from Table 7.16
that non-fishing income in Barka is around 2.3 — 2.5 times higher than its counterpart in
Masn'a and Suwaiq respectively. The lack of alternative work opportunities in Masn'a
and Suwaiq, therefore, implies high economic dependence on fishing.
Table 7.17 Current Value of Fishing Assets by Town (RO)
Barka Masn' a Suwaic All sample
Average %Average % Average Average %
Vessel 954 32.6 843 31.5 1120 28.5 982 30.5
Engine 798 27.3 809 30.3 1089 27.7 910 28.2
Gear 1119 38.3 912 34.1 1597 40.7 1235 38.3
Others' 52 1.8 110 4.1 123 3.2 97 3.0
Total 2923 100 2674 100 3929 100 3224 100
a. Includes trap hauler and cars used to tow fishing vessels out of the sea.
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Having obtained fishing and non-fishing income of vessel owners, income of
other family members can be added to arrive at the total household income in each
town. As presented in Table 7.18, average total household income was highest in Barka
(RO 5009), followed by Suwaiq (RO 4753), and the lowest average total household
income was found in Masn'a (RO 4409). The high household income in Barka can be
explained by the availability of employment opportunities outside the fisheries sector
because of its relative closeness to the capital, Muscat, where the industrial city and
other businesses are located.
Table 7.18. Annual Average Income per Household by Source in South Al-
Batinah (RO)
Owner Other
members
Total
income
Fishing Non-fishing
Barka 1707 1119 2183 5009
% of total 34 22 44 100
Masn'a 1897 443 2069 4409
% of total 43 10 47 100
Suwaiq 1982 483 2288 4753
% of total 42 10 48 100
All sample 1869 670 2187 4727
% of total 40 14 46 100
An index of the well-being and prosperity of citizens in any country is
commonly measured by the average net value of production of that country which is its
GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita 13. To have a general picture of the vessel
owner's well-being as compared to the rest of the population, GDP per capita (national)
can be compared to the income of vessel owners in the study area. Furthermore, income
earned from fishing in the study area can be compared to the average well-being of
other productive groups in the country. For example, income from fishing can be
compared to the GDP per capita in the fisheries sector and the GDP per capita in the
agriculture sector. Table 7.19 presents the national GDP, the fisheries GDP and the
agriculture GDP as measured in 1996. As indicated above, the average annual income
13 Gross National Product (GNP) or the total value of a country's output is defined as the sum of values
of both final goods and services and investment goods in a country (Marsh, 1992; p. 199). Income earned
by the country's citizens working aboard and investments that take place aboard are accounted for to
obtain the GNP. When the focus is on all production that takes place within the national boundaries, the
measure is expressed as the Gross Domestic product (GDP) (Marsh, 1992; p. 199).
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from fishing in the study area is RO 1869 14 . The average share of individual of the GDP
in Oman (GDP per capita) for 1996 at market prices is RO 2620. It is clearly shown that
the average annual income of vessel owners from fishing is slightly lower than the
national GDP per capita and fisheries GDP per capita, but higher than the agriculture
GDP per capita.
Table 7.19 GDP and GDP per Capita (RO) in the Sultanate of Oman for
(1996)
Sector GDP Population GDP / capita
I. National 5890x 106 2,214,720 2659
2. Fishing 59 x 106 24,338 2320
3. Agriculture 100.8x 106 55,257 1824.2
_
Source: Ministry of Development, 1997
7.9 Income Inequality
As noted above, the mean fishing income was associated with a high standard
deviation. This indicates that earnings from fishing do not cluster around the mean
income or there are some fishermen who earn low and others earn high incomes.
Information concerning the variation in income can be embodied in an inequality curve
which known as the Lorenz curve. The curve is constructed by plotting the percentage
of the income received by different percentages of the population when the latter are
cumulated from the bottom (Grand et al., 1992; p. 188). This means that income
distribution is displayed by plotting cumulative income shares against the cumulative
percentage of the population. When there is full equality, e.g. when the bottom forty
percent of the population receive forty percent of the total income, then the Lorenz
curve will be completely straight, described by the diagonal line in Figure 7.1. Hence,
the nearer the empirical line comes to the diagonal, the nearer is the income distribution
to full equality (Grand eta!., 1992; p. 188). Therefore, it would be possible to obtain an
indicator of the extent of inequality in a given distribution by observing the position of
the Lorenz curve in relation to the diagonal line of full equality.
The analysis of income distribution is confined to fishing income received by
the vessel owners only. The Lorenz curve shown in Figure 7.1, therefore, represents the
14 The figure does not account for capital consumption (vessel and gear depreciation).
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fishing income of vessel owners. A look at the Lorenz curve reveals the great disparity
in income distribution, as shown by the deviation of the inequality curve from the
absolute equality curve (Figure 7.1). The bottom 20 percent of the vessel owners receive
merely five percent of the total income, while the top 20 percent receive 45 percent. To
present the inequality figures differently, it can be stated that the income of the top 20
percent of the vessel owners is about nine times higher than the corresponding incomes
of the bottom 20 percent. Though the method of collecting fishermen's income from
fishing may not be very accurate, Figure 7.1 gives a first approximation of the
magnitude of income inequality of fishermen in the study area.
Figure 7.1 Distribution of Vessel Owners' Income in the Study Area (Lorenz
Curve)
Another measure frequently used by economists to summarize the distribution of
income is the Gini coefficient. Unlike the Lorenz curve which conveys a visual
interpretation of income distribution, the Gini coefficient provides a measure of the
amount of inequality implicit in the Lorenz curve. The Gini coefficient can be obtained
geometrically from the Lorenz curve, since a computationally-convenient formula exists
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Town	 Gini coefficient
Barka	 0.34
Masn' a	 0.37
Suwaiq	 0.40
All sample	 0.39
(Cowell, 1977; P. 116) for computing the Gini coefficient. The formula is presented
2 v Da N+115here: Gini coefficient — _
X * N2 44	 N
s
Values for the Gini coefficient vary between zero (perfect equality) and one
(perfect inequality). The closer the value to zero, the nearer is the distribution to full
equality (Atkinson, 1983; p. 53). Perhaps a fair way to evaluate income distribution in
the study area is to compare the Gini coefficient in the three towns. As Table 7.20
revealed, the Gini coefficient of income inequality for all sample was found to be 0.39.
Variation among the three towns is observed where the highest Gini coefficient was
found in Suwaiq (0.40) and the lowest was recorded in Barka (0.34), with Masn'a lying
in between. As can be seen from Table 7.20, the figure for the Gini coefficient deviated
away from zero and hence it can be concluded here that income inequality was highest
in Suwaiq as compared to Barka and Masn'a.
Table 7.20 Gini Coefficient Measure of Income Inequality in
South AL-Batinah
7.10 Conclusion
The findings presented in this chapter are vital for studies that concern the
assessment of the collective behaviour of people exploiting a common resource. In this
study, it was found that the fishermen in the study area share the same race, religion and
the language. This has a great implication for the study of collective action. Race,
religion and language are among the factors that are responsible for the success or
failure of collective action. As indicated in this chapter, fishermen in the study area have
a common language, share the same religious belief and originate from the same race;
thus, they are more or less homogeneous with respect to the above factors, a fact which
15 E ixi is a weighted sum of the data values, where the weight is the unit's rank order in the income
distribution (Marsh, 1992). Y is the average income and N is the number of respondents.
152
may induce fishermen to work collectively to manage their fishery. In such groups,
rules are easier to formulate and enforce because fishermen's behaviour tends to be
more predictable. Thus, they can establish institutions to manage the resources at low
cost. The study also found that fishermen in the study area are living in fishing
communities or villages scattered along the cost. Homogeneity coupled with high
interdependence between fishermen in their daily lives in these small villages
encourages compliance with the rules.
The study found that fishermen have a low level of educational attainment. The
low level of education coupled with lack of skills reduces the chance of getting another
occupation outside the fishing sector; thus, fishermen in the study area are highly
dependent on the fishery. Regarding family size, the results indicate that the household
size is relatively large (higher than the average national family size) suggesting a high
population growth. To diversify the household income, fishermen in the study area are
undertaking supplementary occupations concurrently with fishing. This has a negative
impact on the success of collective action because fishermen who are involved in
activities that take them away from their fishery and into an economy in which other
opportunities exist are likely to adopt a higher subjective discount rate because they
may care less about the future of their fishing incomes. It was found that slightly less
than half of the sampled fishermen are occupational pluralists, i.e., they combine fishing
and other occupations to make their living. However, most of the work in which they
engage is that which requires little or no skill, generating low incomes, which makes
them return to their fishing activities after working hours. Shortage of employment
opportunities in South Al-Batinah at present could accelerate the pressure on fish
resources in coastal areas. The low level of education, lack of skills and large family
size make fishermen more economically dependent on fishing. High economic
dependence can promote the emergence of collective action to manage the fishery; a
rational strategy that might be considered by fishermen to avoid further deterioration of
their livelihood.
The results indicate that the average income of vessel owners from fishing is
slightly lower than the national GDP per capita, fisheries GDP per capita, but higher
than the agriculture GDP per capita. The analysis of income distribution using the
Lorenz curve indicates that there is a great disparity in income distribution between
fishermen. It was found that the income of the top 20 percent is around nine times
153
higher than the incomes of the bottom 20 percent The Gini coefficient was also used to
analyse the income distribution across the three towns included in the present study. The
results indicate that the highest income inequality was found in Suwaiq, while the
lowest was found in Barka.
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that fishermen in the study area
are more or less homogenous in many respects. However, the higher income inequality
could be an obstacle to collective action as agreements to restrain the take from the
fishery become more difficult as the difference in endowments among fishermen
increased. The findings of this chapter will be used as the basis for further analysis of
the collective choice carried out in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TRADITIONAL FISHERY
8.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the characteristics of the traditional
fishery in South Al-Batinah. The chapter begins by examining in detail the fishing
activities and operations of the traditional fishermen in the study area. The chapter also
goes on to evaluate fishermen's awareness of the common dilemmas they are
encountering in this fishery.
The last section of this chapter covers the local institutions that govern the
fishery in the study area. Evidence gathered through survey questionnaire, semi-
structured interviews and researcher observation are used to highlight specific problems
associated with the fishery and their outcomes. The researcher made substantial use of
the qualitative data collected through semi-structured interviews.
8.2 Fishing Gears
Al-Batinah's fishermen use a variety of fishing gear. The employment of various
gears depends on the types of fish available or the fishing season. There are eleven types
of fishing gear recorded in the study area, the most common gear overall being gill nets,
which are deployed in several ways in the study area. Netting materials made of
multifilament nylon appear to have occurred in the fishery about the mid-1960s to
replace cotton and other natural fibres used as netting material (the University of
Durham report, 1978). As mentioned above, gill nets are employed in several ways: as
drift nets to catch small and large pelagics, as fixed (set) nets to catch semi-pelagics
species and as encircling nets to encircle a school of fish.
Because fishing in the study area is seasonal, fishermen tend to own several
types of fishing gear in order to use them around the year. For example, a drift net for
kingfish (Scomberomorus commerson) is used in winter (December to February) for
three months only followed by Indian mackerel (Rastrelliger kanagurta) drift nets from
February to the May. The results indicate that the average number of types of fishing
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gear owned by a single fisherman was three, with a standard deviation of 1.2 types. The
minimum number was one and the maximum was seven types of fishing gear.
According to the fishing operation, fishing gear can be classified into drift
fishing nets which contain all types of drift gill nets, static fishing gear including traps
and set (or fixed) gill nets, beach seine, handline and encircling nets. A glance at Table
8.1 reveals that there were 339 drift nets owned by the surveyed vessel owners, 45 units
of encircling nets, 170 static fishing gear, 29 handlines 1 and 18 beach seines. Out of the
total drift nets recorded, kingfish drift nets were widely used by fishermen, representing
36 percent, followed by mackerel drift nets which represent another 34.5 percent. These
two species are commonly fished in the coastal areas at a depth range between 6 to 12
fathoms (around 30 to 40 minutes steaming time from the shore).
Drift nets (called Havyali locally) are usually used to catch pelagic species of
different sizes. Therefore, they tend to be of a variety of mesh sizes. One drift net is
generally made up of two or more separate pieces of netting joined end to end. Drift
nets made up of as many as 14 separate pieces were recorded during the survey, though
the average number of pieces in each drift net is around 7.3. Table 8.2 reveals that the
majority (80 %) of respondents who owned gill nets joined between five and nine pieces
of netting together to form a single unit of gill net. As fish get scarce, fishermen tend to
add more pieces of gill net to increase their catch. Comparing this result to that collected
by the University of Durham between 1974 —1976 (University of Durham, 1978; p. 27)
the average number of pieces per drift net (tma2 drift nets) has increased from 4.5
pieces in 1976 to 7.3 pieces in 1998.
1 Almost all fishermen use handlines occasionally but such users are not recorded in this study. Those
recorded as using handlines actually employ handlines as a main fishing gear.
2 Species targeted by fishermen in Al-Batinah using drift nets include Sahwa (Thunnus (onggol), Suda
(Euthynnus affinis), Yellowfin tuna or Gavdhar locally (77iunnus albacares).
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Table 8.1 Type of Gear Used by Surveyed Fishermen
Gear type Suwaiq Masn'a Barka Total
a). Drift nets
Tunas drift net 45 18 16 79
Kingfish drift net 38 40 45 123
Halwayooh3
 drift net 18 0 2 20
Mackerel drift net 36 38 43 117
total
b). Encircling nets
137 96 106 339
Encircling gear for kingfish 0 1 4 5
Encircling gear for mackerel 3 11 16 30
Encircling gear for sardine 3 5 2 10
total
c). Static gear
6 17 22 45
Traps 51 36 26 113
Kingfish set gill net 23 9 25 57
total 74 45 51 170
d). Beach seine 18 0 0 18
e). Handlines 14 7 8 29
As shown in Table 8.2, the difference between the mean number of pieces in the
two studies was found to be statistically significanfs at the 0.001 level, which suggests
that more fishing effort has been added into the fishery. This could be attributed to the
facilities provided by the Government in terms of subsidised fishing gears and the
availability of credit from the Bank of Agriculture and Fisheries to purchase fishing
vessels, engines and fishing gears.
3 The English name for this fish specie is Grater Amber Jack in the family CARANG1DAE.
4 An independent t-test was carried out to determine whether or not there is any significant difference
between the mean values of the number of pieces of gill nets provided by the two studies.
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Table 8.2 Distribution of the Number of Pieces per Yellowfin Tuna Gill
Net
No.of pieces / gill net No. of fishermen Percentage
a. 1 — 4 6 7.6
b. 5 — 9 63 79.7
c.	 10 — 14 6 12.7
d. > 14 0 0
Total 79 100
Mean =7.25 pieces
_ 
St. deviation = 1.92 
* t - value = -12.7; P = 000
Another fishing gear widely used by fishermen in the study area is traps, which
are deployed to catch demersal fish species and cuttlefish. Out of the 194 respondents
interviewed, 113 respondents (58 %) were found to own fishing traps. Material for traps
is normally precut wire mesh or steel cables assembled to form a flat-bottomed dome
with an intrusive cone-shaped entrance on the side. Trap sizes vary; the approximate
size may range from 1.5-metres diameter by 1.5-metres height to 2.5-metres diameter
by 2.5-metres height. Traps are baited and set in areas where demersal species are
known to be found. Fishermen who own artificial reefs set their traps close to the reefs
and they check the traps to empty the catch every two or three days. A few fishermen
mark their traps by a buoy on the surface of the sea, but the majority of them join five to
ten traps together and then submerge them. They adopted this technique in their effort to
avoid conflicts with mobile gear operators. Fishermen identify the location of their traps
with the aid of landmarks (see footnote 9 for a description of this process). They tend to
hide their traps as the incidences of trap theft and traps becoming entangled on drift nets
and on passing vessels' propellers have increased rapidly indicating congestion
problems. A respondent stated that "nowadays, when a trap mark or buoy gets caught on
a vessel's propeller or a drift net it will normally be cut loose". This creates negative
externalities represented by the catch and cost of the lost trap and by the phenomenon
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known as ghost fishing5. Methods of avoiding net entanglement problems are discussed
later in section 8.6.3.
From Table 8.3, the average number of fish traps per vessel owner was 26.3
traps with a standard deviation of 23.5 traps. The minimum number owned were two
traps and the maximum number of traps owned by a single vessel owner was 100 traps.
As shown in Table 8.3, around two-thirds (64.5 %) of the respondents owned 25 traps
or less, whereas one-third (35.4 %) owned more than 26 traps. According to the
University of Durham report, the average number of traps per fishermen in 1976 was
just over six (6.23 traps) and two-thirds of the surveyed fishermen had 6 or less traps
(University of Durham, 1978; p. 36). In an attempt to investigate the difference between
the mean number of traps found in both studies, a paired sample t-test was carried out.
The results of the t-test indicated that the t-value (9.1; p < 0.001) is statistically
significant at the 0.001 significance level, and there is statistically significant difference
between the mean number of traps in both studies (Table 8.3).
Table 8.3 Distribution of the Number of Traps among Vessel Owners
No. of traps No. of fishermen Percentage
a)
	
1-10 39 34.5
b)	 11 — 25 34 30.1
c)	 26 — 50 26 23
d)	 >50 14 12.4
Total 113 100
Mean =26.34 traps
St. deviation = 23.5 
* t - value = 9.1; P = 000
Encircling nets or seines are also worked on the South AL-Batinah coast to catch
small and large pelagic fish species. No special net is needed for this type of fishing. A
drift net of four to five pieces joined together can be used as a seine net, though mesh
size depends on the target species. Fishing vessels start searching for fish shoals and
when a school of fish is spotted the actual encirclement of the fish must be carried out at
the maximum vessel speed possible. For small pelagic species such as sardine
5 .Fishermen reported that the average life span of traps is around six months to one year; after that it will
have rusted through. When a trap is lost it will continue fishing for several months and fish caught inside
will be bait for other fishes to enter.
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(SardineIla longiceps) and Indian mackerel, the fishing operation is carried out during
the day because it is easy to spot fish shoals whereas kingfish concentrate near the sea
surface in shoals on moonlit nights, which makes them vulnerable to this Lind of
fishing.
Based on the questionnaire survey, semi-structured interviews and observation,
encircling nets were found not to be popular among fishermen in the study area. It was
found that out of the 194 respondents surveyed, the number who owned encircling nets
was only 45 (23 %); 50 percent of these were in Barka_ In general, Suwaiq fishermen
seem reluctant to use encircling nets in their fishery as they see this type of gear as a
new innovation recently introduced and unacceptable to the majority of fishermen in the
study area and particularly in Suwaiq. This is confirmed by the results presented in
Table 8.1, where out of the 73 fishermen interviewed in Suwaiq, no fisherman deployed
kingfish encircling nets. Similar results were obtained for the Indian mackerel encircling
nets; only three fishermen (4 %) in Suwaiq used Indian mackerel encircling nets,
compared to 11(18 %) in Masn'a and 16 (26 %) in Barka.
As mentioned above, encircling nets are new in the fishery and the exact year of
their appearance in the fishery is not known. Many fishermen reported that this
technique was first introduced five to ten years ago to catch large pelagics such as
kingfish while sardine seine nets occurred in the fishery only three years ago.
83 Fishing Vessels
The most notable change that has taken place in the composition of the fishing
fleet during the last thirty years is the introduction of fibreglass vessels and outboard
engines to replace the non-mechanised wooden vessels. As noted above, the outboard
engine was introduced in the area in the mid-1960s, to motorise wooden vessels. Then,
during the early 1970s, fibreglass vessels powered by outboard engines started to appear
in the area to replace wooden vessels. The acceleration of these changes can be
attributed to the Fishermen's Encouragement Fund established by the Government in
late 1970s which resulted in almost all wooden vessels being replaced by fibreglass
vessels. For example, among the fishing fleet, the current number of wooden vessels in
Barka, Masn'a and Suwaiq was found to be 17 (3.5 %), 10(3.4 °o) and 2(0.24 °o)
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respectively. During the field work, wooden vessels were not observed fishing or
landing fish on the market.
The mean vessel length of the sampled vessels was 6.74 metres. There was no
significant difference in vessels length across the three towns. Vessel length was then
categorised into three groups: small (4.5 - 5.9 metres), medium (6.0 - 7.0 metres) and
large (7.1 - 8.5 metres). As can be seen in Table 8.4, medium sized vessels (6.0 - 7.0
metres) constitute the majority (54.2 %) of the total vessels owned by respondents
included in this study, followed by large sized vessels which represent 27.8 percent.
Table 8.4 Vessel Length by Town
Vessel size (metres) Suwaiq Masn'a Barka All sample
Small (4.5 - 5.9) 18 (24.7) 11 (18.3) 6(9.8) 35(18)
Medium (6.0 - 7.0) 26 (35.6) 37 (61.7) 42 (68.9) 105 (54.2)
Large (7.1 - 8.5) 29 (39.7) 12 (20) 13 (21.3) 54 (27.8)
Total 73 (100) 60(100) 61 (100) 194 (100)
Mean 6.77 6.68 6.77 6.74
St. deviation 0.85 0.73 0.62 0.73
* Figures in parentheses are percentage of the total
When considering vessel length groups in the three towns, Table 8.4 presents
some interesting data. The large vessel size constituted around 40 percent of the total
fleet in Suwaiq, whereas the corresponding figures in Barka and Masn'a were 21
percent and 20 percent respectively. This finding confirms earlier results on income and
amount of investment, which showed that fishermen in Suwaiq have the highest income
from fishing and the highest capital investment. Vessel size can represent productivity
somewhat loosely, especially if we consider that larger fishing vessels mean more
extensive fishing grounds, can carry more fishing gears and withstand rough weather
conditions better than smaller vessels.
Field observations and interviews with key-informants found that fishermen in
Suwaiq choose large vessels to suit their conditions as they go fishing in the offshore
waters to catch yellowfin tuna. The time required to reach the fishing ground is around
three to four hours, so larger vessels are needed, especially when the weather gets bad
while they are on the fishing ground. Another interesting finding is that as there are
limited non-fishing work opportunities in Suwaiq, as described in Chapter Seven, the
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fishermen depend largely on the fishery and this encourages them to explore fishing
grounds away from their home village.
It can be observed here that fishermen in the study area are using similar fishing
vessels, a result which indicates that they constitute a homogenous group with respect to
their fishing fleet.
The survey questions also asked the age of the vessel (Table 8.5). This
information provides information concerning the status of the fishing fleet. The results
in Table 8.5 indicate that the mean age of the fishing vessels was 11.8 years with a
standard deviation of 5.3 years. Key-informants reported that the useful life of this type
of vessels is around 20 to 25 years. In an attempt to determine the status of the fleet,
vessel age was dichotomised at the mean age (11.8 years), i.e., two groups are formed,
one below the mean and the other above the mean. The results indicated that 113 vessels
(58 %) were 11.8 years or older and 81 vessels (42 %) were less than 11.8 years old
(Table 8.5).
Table 8.5 Vessel Age by Town
Vessel age Suwaiq Masn'a Barka All sample
Less than 11 years 31 (42.5) 31 (51.7) 19 (31.1) 81 (41.8)
More than i i years 42 (57.5) 29 (48.3) 42 (68.9) 113 (58.2)
,	 Total 73 (100) 60(100) 61(100) 194 (100)
Mean 12.2 10.6 12.4 11.8
St. deviation 6.2 5.1 4.3 5.3
* Figures in parentheses are column percentages
To determine the variation in fleet age among the three towns, vessel age was
crosstabulated in the three towns. A noticeable, though not statistically significant
difference, in vessel age was found in Barka where 70 percent of the vessels are older
than 11.8 years (the mean age) as compared to 48 percent in Masn'a and 58 percent in
Suwaiq. This suggests that fewer fishing vessels are being added to the fishery in Barka.
Respondents were also asked the source of finance for their vessels. The results
indicated that the majority of the surveyed vessel owners (69 %) purchased their vessels
using their own savings. Vessels subsidised by the Government accounted for only 27
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percent, whereas vessels financed through the Bank of Agriculture and Fisheries
accounted for only 3.6 percent.
8.4 Engine Horse Power
Fishing vessels in the study area are all powered by outboard motors. The results
shown that one-third (29 %) of the vessels are powered by two outboard motors, a main
motor and an auxiliary one which is used to increase the speed of the vessel as well as
an emergency motor in case of failure of the main motor. Vessels with two motors are
likely to be larger ones, which are used for offshore fishing. As explained above, bigger
vessels mean that fish resources found beyond the continental shelf can be exploited.
Unlike the trawl fishery where faster vessels means more catch as the vessels can tow
the net at a certain speed, most traditional fishing methods used in the study area do not
depend on the size of the engine. The engine is used only to travel from and to the
fishing ground. It may be claimed that faster vessels can transport the catch from the
fishing ground to the market in a short time period, which benefits the fishermen and
the market by providing high quality fish. Therefore, individual vessel owners may tend
to achieve this by using more highly-powered motors so that more time is devoted to
fishing rather than steaming from and to the fishing grounds. However, some of them
might use more powered motors to make multiple fishing trips in the vicinity of the
village per day, hence, to increase fishing effort.
The mean horsepower of the surveyed vessels was 57.4 horse-power with a
standard deviation of 31.0 horse-power (Table 8.6). Two-thirds of the respondents (69.6
%) had medium engines with horse-power between 40 and 80. Those who used larger
motors (more than 80 HP) represented 18 percent of the total sampled vessels. The
results indicate that only 24 respondents or 12.4 percent had motors less than 40 horse-
power. The results in Table 8.6 reveal that the mean motor horse-power in Suwaiq is
higher than those in Barka and Masn'a. In addition to the mean motor higher horse-
power in Suwaiq, it was found that more respondents in Suwaiq (24.7 %) have motcrrs
with more than 80 horse-power, as compared to Barka (13.1 %) and Masn'a (15 %).
This result is in line with earlier findings of larger vessel size, higher income and high
investment in fishing in Suwaiq compared to the other two towns, Barka and Masn'a.
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Table 8.6 Vessel Engine Horse-Power by Town
Engine HP Suwaiq Masn'a Barka All sample
Less than 40 15 (20.5) 7(11.7) 2(3.3) 24 (12.4)
40 to 80 40 (54.8) 44 (73.3) 51 (83.6) 135 (69.6)
More than 80 18 (24.7) 9(15) 8(13.1) 35(18)
Total 73(100) 60(100) 61(100) 194 (100)
Mean 64.3 53.4 53 57.4
St. deviation 36.0 29.7 24.0 31.0
* Figures in parentheses are column percentages
8.5 Fishing Operations
Data obtain from field observation, interviews with key-informants and the
questionnaire provide a general picture of the type and timing of fishing trips conducted
by fishermen in the study area. In general departure time, duration and the return time
all depend on the type of fishing gear employed. Where all drift net fishing is done at
night, traps are set, inspected and emptied during the day. Because multifilament netting
is visible to the fish during the daylight, fishing by drift net is restricted to night time
only. This technical obstacle prevents fishermen from extending their fishing hours
beyond what has normally been practised in the area for several generations. The use of
monofilament netting would permit the use of such material during the day, but the
government has banned this material. While the researcher was in the field, no
observations of such nets were recorded in the study area; thus, full compliance with the
rule has been achieved.
The departure time for the offshore drift net fishing is normally a few hours
before dusk. All respondents reported that they have to be on the fishing ground just
before sunset in order to set their nets in good fishing spots and to avoid net
entanglement with other fishermen's nets. Fishermen reported that their drift nets are
soaked and drifted by the current with the vessel for four to six hours. After that and
around midnight the net is hauled in and the catch is emptied. The majority of fishermen
set their nets again to be retrieved before dawn, although those who obtained a big catch
at the first haul return to the village at midnight. In general, fishermen who remain on
the fishing ground the whole night haul in their nets few hours before dawn to arrive at
the market on time.
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Fishermen targeting kingfish, Indian mackerel and other pelagic species which
are found on the coastal waters (20 to 45 minutes steaming time) normally depart from
their villages just before sunset. The nets are set adrift with the vessel for around three
hours and then hauled and emptied. Because the fishing ground is in the vicinity of the
village, the fishermen return home two to three hours before midnight to sleep. Some
fishermen, especially those who do not have to be at their work early in the morning,
return to the fishing ground during the last quarter of the night to fish and then haul the
nets just before dawn, to be in the market at the appropriate time.
Trap fishermen depart the fishing villages just before dawn to be in the fishing
ground after sunset. After the catch has been emptied, the traps are then baited and
moved to another location if needed and set again. The fishermen then head to the
market to sell their catch.
8.6 Common Dilemmas
Information collected through questionnaire, key-informants interviews and
observation were used to identify problems of resource use encountered by fishermen in
South AL-Batinah. Problems of resource use that constitute common dilemmas are
those situations in which fishermen continue to harvest their fishery at a sub-optimal
level even though an optimal level can be reached unilaterally or collectively. The main
theme here is, therefore, to evaluate fishermen's awareness of the common dilemmas
they are encountering in this fishery.
Lack of information about common dilemmas may hamper the emergence of
collective action, as those who are not aware of the problem are likely to be reluctant to
participate in collective action. In an attempt to present a clear picture of the common
dilemmas in this fishery and following Gardner et al. (1990) and Ostrom (1990),
common dilemmas are divided into two broad classes: appropriation problems and
provision problems. Appropriation problems are those related directly to resource use
(i.e., appropriation externalities, technological externalities and assignment problems)
whereas, provision problems are those pertaining to the supply and maintenance of CPR
institutions (Schlager et al., 1994; p. 296). Common dilemmas and the consequences
associated with sub-optimal use of the fishery are described in this section.
165
8.6.1 Overall status of the fishery
Among the resource use problems that occur in real world situation are those
pertaining to fish resource status. The results indicated that fishermen were in general in
agreement on the status of their fishery. Almost all respondents (190 respondents or 98
%) reported that fish resources in the area are declining. Only three respondents
reported that fish stocks are not declining. Many fishermen reported scarcity of certain
demersal species in comparison to availability when they were fishing several years
ago. In an attempt to investigate the situation further, fishermen were asked to rank the
status of the declining fishery from no problem to extreme. Out of the 190 respondents
indicating a declining fishery, two-thirds (66 %) reported that the decline of fish stock
they are encountering is extreme. Those who reported that the decline in their fishery is
moderate constitute around 14 percent, whereas 17 percent reported that the decline is
severe. Therefore, fishermen share a similar view regarding the status of their fishery, in
which the majority (83 %) perceive the problem of declining stock in their fishery as
either severe or extreme, indicating a common dilemma.
The results indicate that fishermen in the three towns have similar views
regarding the status of the fishery by conveying a distressing fact of an overexploited
fishery, at least for the most commercial species, if not the overall status of the fishery.
Sharing similar views about a particular common dilemma by a majority of resource
users may foster the emergence of collective action because it is possible that the
majority of the fishermen will participate in collective action, if initiated, to solve their
common problem.
The presence of the many fish species in this fishery makes generalization of the
status of fish stocks difficult. In order to overcome this, respondents were asked to list
those species in which they had witnessed a sharp decline recently. Among those who
said fish stocks are declining, just over two-thirds (69 %) indicated that they are
witnessing a sharp decline in the landing of kingfish. The remaining respondents listed
other species, for example, 12 percent listed Indian mackerel, 6.5 percent listed
cuttlefish, 3.8 percent listed sardine species and 3 percent listed other fish species. There
was a general agreement among fishermen that the landings of almost all important
demersal species have severely declined over the last few years. In order to validate
these results, fishermen's responses were compared to landing statistics provided by the
Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery and other research (Moore and Don, 1994; Hooker
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and Parsons, 1995 and Marine Science and Fisheries Center, 1995) which indicate that
kingfish is highly overexploited, confirming that respondents were telling the truth. The
validity of the responses was also checked by looking at the results presented in section
8.2 regarding fishing gear, which indicated that a high level of fishing effort was
devoted toward kingfish because of its high commercial prices in the local and
international market6.
As presented in the above discussion, fishermen in the study area are aware of
the deteriorating status of their resources, but the crucial issue that interests us here is
whether they know the factors that cause fish resources to become depleted. For
collective action to emerge, resource users must be faced by a common problem, of
which the causes are known to them and its solution is approachable. If fishermen in the
area have identified these factors and share similar views about these factors, they might
be motivated to achieve an effective form of governing and managing their fish
resources. As argued by Baland and Platteau 'for corporate management of CPRs to be
effective, an essential prerequisite is that resource users correctly perceive the potential
benefits of collective action, which requires that they are well informed not only about
the state of the resource but also about the possible impact of use behaviour on its
stock" (Baland and Platteau, 1996; p. 290).
To elicit information concerning factors that cause overfishing, vessel owners
were asked, "what makes your fish resources decline?" to address these factors. Out of
the 194 respondents included in this study, 187 respondents answered this question.
Among those who answered this question, 154 respondents (82.4 %) indicated that
overfishing depletes their fishery, whereas 33 respondents (17.6 %) reported factors
other than overfishing such as no reason or that decline of fish stocks is caused by God.
The responses of those who indicated overfishing as the likely cause of resource
depletion were grouped into four basic factors: large number of vessels, sardine seine
fishing, encircling nets and industrial trawlers (Table 8.7). Slightly over one-third (70
respondents or 45.5 percent) reported too many vessels in the fishery as the main factor
that causes overfishing. The second important factor was sardine seine fishing, reported
by 50 respondents or 32.5 percent, followed by encircling gear reported by 26
respondents representing 16.8 percent of those who answered this questions. Only eight
6 .Kingfish drift nets were found to be widely used by fishermen, representing 36 percent out of the total
drift nets surveyed in this research.
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respondents (5.2 %) indicated that fish stocks were depleted by the mtrusion of
industrial trawlers into their traditional fishing grounds
Table &7 Frequency and Percentage Distribution of Fishermen's Responses to
Question on the Likely Causes of Stock Depletion
Causes of stock depletion Barka
n = 60
Masn'a
n = 59
Suwaiq
n = 68
CKerall
n = 187
a). Overfishing
1) Large no. of vessels 28 (46.7) 11 (18.6) 24 (35.3) 70 (45.5)
2) Sardine seine fishing 5.0 (8.3) 30 (50.9) 15(220) 50 (32.5)
3) Encircling nets 17 (28.3) 11 (18.6) 5.0 (7.4) 26 (16.8)
4) Trawlers 2.0 (3.3) 1.0 (1.7) 5.0 (7.4) 8.0 (52)
total 52 53 49 154
(86.7) (89.8) (72.1) (82.4)
b).	 Outside	 causes,	 i.e.,
natural reasons or God
8 (13.3) 6 (10.2) 19 (27.9) 33 (17.6)
,
Total 60 59 68 187
(100) (100) (100) (100)
* Figures in parentheses are column percentages
In the past, industrial trawlers used to enter into coastal areas violating
government restrictions7. However, tighter restrictions against trawlers are enforced at
present after many complaints and conflicts with traditional fishermen in the area. In
Suwaiq, for example, a number of fishermen from Al-Qurha village reported that they
had suffered from demersal trawlers operating in their fishing grounds. They had
informed the Ministry of these violations several times. Then the village leader called
for a meeting and almost all fishermen participated and decided to capture the trawlers.
Twenty traditional fishing vessels were involved in this operation and a trawler and its
crew were captured. The trawler was towed to the village. The catch was confiscated
and the captain and the crew (foreigners) were locked in a room in the village leader's
house. The police were involved to free the captain and his crew, but the fishermen
demanded a high representative from the Ministry to come to the village and give them
an assurance that trawlers would not operate in the area again. Fishermen from this
7 Reports indicated that the Goverrnement operated three medium size trawlers of about 60 feet overall
length and 280 horsepower in AI-Batinah for many years during the mid 1970s and mid 1980s. The
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village reported that they have never seen a trawler on their fishing ground since this
incident.
This case shows how collective action emerged as a result of the intrusion of
outsiders and how fishermen in this village had managed to coordinate their effort
against a common threat. As argued by Baland and Platteau (1996; p. 337), "it is much
easier to unite against some external enemy than to establish co-operation among
individuals in the absence of any outside threat".
A few fishermen in another village thought that sometimes trawlers still violate
the rule and operate at night close to their area. They had found trawl nets snagged on
rocks on the bottom of the sea. Two fishermen from Al-Jalil in Suwaiq showed pieces
of trawl net they had found in the fishing ground to the researcher and said they might
take the pieces to the Ministry. They reported that their fishery has declined as a result
of the operation of these trawlers in their area in the past. They reported that the trawl
net catches quantities beyond the capacity of the fishery and it destroys the habitat of
demersal fish by damaging coral reefs.
Responses to the likely factors that cause resource depletion showed somewhat
more variation among the three groups (Table 8.7). Whereas more fishermen in Barka
and Suwaiq had indicated a large number of fishing vessels than other factors as a cause
of resource depletion, one-half of the fishermen in Masn'a had indicated sardine seine
fishing as the main cause of overfishing.
The results indicate that more fishermen in Masn'a (89.8 %) identify overfishing
as the factor that causes the fishery to decline. In Barka, a slightly lower figure was
found (86.7 %), whereas only 72.1 percent of the fishermen in Suwaiq regarded
overfishing as the cause of resource decline (Table 8.7). The near consensus by
fishermen in Masn'a (89.8 %) on this issue may reflect the group's smaller size
compared to Suwaiq's and Barka's. It is anticipated that those who attributed resource
decline to factors other than overfishing (e.g., the 27.9 % in Suwaiq) might show no
interest in participating in collective action, as they believe the problem is caused by
outside factors and the solution is not reachable. Those who do not perceive their
fishing activities as factors affecting the fishery are likely to continue their abuse of the
trawlers were based on Muscat and trawl the Batinah coast frequently, particularly in the summer and
autumn (Mundt, 1980, p. 14).
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resource, waiting the mercy of God or hoping that the natural factors affecting the
fishery will correct themselves. However, because the majority (more than two-thirds)
of the fishermen in the study area do perceive interdependence between their fishing
activities and resource status, the scope for collective action still exists, but perhaps not
without state intervention.
8.6.2 Stock externalities
Fishermen's answers on the status of the fishery were further examined for
indications of stock externalities. Recognition of stock externalities were identified in
fishermen's responses to the decline of the fishery as caused by their harvest activities
leading to increased harvesting costs per unit of output. Two types of fishing gears were
blamed by fishermen for causing resource scarcity: encircling nets known locally as
Tadwerah and sardine seine fishing, known locally as Tahweta.
Among those who stated that their fishery is declining, around one-third (32.5)
indicated that the cause is sardine purse seines (Tahweta). This fishing technique was
introduced recently into the fishery as a result of high demand for this species in Dubai
(UAE). Fish traders with trucks fitted with an isolated fish box were observed by the
researcher near the shore waiting to fill their trucks and then drive to Dubai, a two-to-
three hours journey by road.
A number of key informants interviewed by the researcher listed many problems
that affect their fishery as a result of the use of Tahweta. First, they explained that
sardine stocks have been depleted during the last three years after the introduction of
this net. Almost all fishermen considered sardine as the main food for most of the
pelagic and semi-pelagic fish species they catch. As many fishermen put it, "fish come
to the coastal water of our villages because they are looking for the food (sardine and
other small pelagics) that we used to conserve". They added, "if we don't keep sardine
to be fed on by bigger fish, these fish will migrate to other places, and that is what
happening now". They argued that the Tahweta's smaller mesh size is deployed close to
the shore, where juveniles and undersized fish are present this non-selectivity feature is
responsible for the disappearance of many high-valued pelagic species. In addition,
because the traditional fishing vessels used for Tahweta are relatively small, fishermen
tend to discard part of the catch into the sea when their vessel's capacity is reached. In
the semi-structured interview, some key informants reported that fishermen employing
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Tahweta discard a substantial amount of dead sardine, wasting an important resource
and causing environmental pollution. They added that dead sardine pollute sea water,
causing bad smells and turning other fishes away.
The other fishing gear cited by fishermen as ne gatn elv affecting their fishery
and identified here as a source of stock externality is Tadwerah. This type of fishing
gear is actually a number of gill nets joined together to form a long gill net which is
then used to encircle schools of fish. It was criticized by many fishermen for catching
the entire school of fish at once. In fact, these responses address the appropriation
externality, where excessive harvests have severe effects on fish stocks. Fishermen
using this technique are also accused of damaging others' static and drift nets as well as
artificial reefs as they search for fish schools at night, hence creating technological
externalities. Fishermen argued that these nets catch huge quantities of fish, depleting
the whole stocks and leaving only a few to breed.
The qualitative data collected from interviewing key-informants supported the
above claim. All the 15 key-informants interviewed mentioned that the technique is
quite new to them and harmful to the resources as it catches quantities beyond the
capacity of the fishery. As some fishermen put it, "what the Tadwerah's fishermen earn
in one night is similar to what we earn in several months. We have the ability to use
similar nets but we do not want to harm ourselves and the rest by depleting our
resources". The master of Senat Al-Bahar in Suwaiq in the semi-structured interview
made a similar statement.
During this study, Tahweta and Tadwerah use was a continuous source of
conflict among fishermen in the study area. Whereas the operators of these nets claimed
that these new innovations are within the Ministry policies of developing the fishery,
the majority related stock depletion to the use of such nets.
Many conflicts have erupted between fishermen in the study area. The following
example is a typical case and will be highlighted here to show how tense is the situation.
In 1996, ten fishermen from Al-Sawadi in Barka were sentenced to two years
imprisonment by the juridical court and fined 2000 Omani Rials when they held some
fishermen from another village and confiscated their catch, gear and the vessel. The
incident happened when fishermen from Al-Haradi were trying to challenge a local rule
announced by local fishermen in Barka to ban sardine fishing by Tahweta. Fishermen in
171
the area have had an accord (the product of Senat Al-Bahar, which is an indigenous
institution of fish resource management) to conserve sardine resources for many
generations in the past. They have devised many rules to ensure that sardine resources
would not be depleted. For example, fishermen can only land sardine caught by gill nets
into the market. Night fishing for sardine using any fishing gears is banned as well,
except fishing for bait. The selectivity of gill nets allows smaller sardine to pass through
the meshes to reproduce. Sardines caught by cast nets are normally used as baits for
handlines and traps, but not allowed to be sold in the market (personal communication
with Suliman Al-Mamari, master of Senat Al-Bahar in Suwaiq). Cast nets are known to
have a very small mesh size, which will cause stock depletion if used to land sardine for
sale in the market. In addition, when the sardine seines were introduced in the study
area recently, it caused many conflicts among fishermen in the study area. Therefore,
fishermen used to restrict their take from the sardine fishery by specifying the use of
certain fishing gear to catch sardine for commercial purposes, preventing the
overexploitation of the resource.
Fishermen in Al-Sawadi banned sardine seines (Tahweta) in their village and
they warned other fishermen not to use such techniques in front of their village. As
stated above, a few fishermen from Al-Haradi used Tahweta in front of Al-Sawadi
village to challenge this local rule. Fishermen from Al-Sawadi informed the leader of
the other village in order to resolve the dispute and they informed the local authority
(the Wali). After many violations by fishermen from Al-Haradi, Al-Sawadi's fishermen
decided to capture those fishermen. The violating fishermen were caught fishing by
Tahweta and their vessel was towed to the village. The police as well as the local
authority (the Wali) were involved in freeing the fishermen. The fishermen from Al-
Sawadi released the three fishermen but they refused to free the vessel and the gear. The
local authority failed to resolve the conflict and the case was then raised to the juridical
court. Those fishermen who had tried to control the use of the resource were found
guilty of hijacking three fishermen and were sentenced to two years and paid a fine of
RO 2000.
As shown by the results, the majority of respondents (95 %) do not use this
technique and have attempted several times to ban the use of these nets in their fishery.
The nets have been banned on several occasions, either by fishermen themselves, by the
local authority or sometimes by the Ministry itself. However, because the parties (local
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authority, the Ministry and the local institution of resource management) claiming
responsibility for the management of the resources have conflicting views regarding this
issue, the result is collective failure. For example, an extension officer from the
Ministry sees the Tadwerah and Tahweta as new developments in the traditional fishery
to increase fish landing and as being consistent with the Ministry's effort to increase
fish landing.
8.6.3 Technological externalities
Technological externalities were identified as problems of decreasing ability to
catch fish as a result of obstruction by other fishermen's gear, gear loss and conflicts
between fishermen from the same village and / or town and with fishermen from other
towns. The resulting sub-optimal outcome can be indicated by loss of catch, loss of
fishing gears and the results of conflicts erupting between fishermen in the study area.
These problems may not affect the fish stocks directly, but they create negative
externalities imposed by some fishermen on others. Technological externalities are
expected to be prevalent in a multi-gear fishery as a result of interaction between mobile
and static fishing gear in the absence of an institution (or in the presence of a weak
institution) to govern and coordinate resource use.
A technological externality is created when a fisherman places his gear so close
to another fisherman's gears so as to obstruct the latter's ability to catch fish. Fishermen
using drift gill nets cite this problem. Setting one's drift net across or parallel and close
to another's reduce the catching ability of both fishermen. The study, however, found
that fishermen in the study area have their own rule to overcome or to reduce the
consequences of technological externalities. First, fishermen have a collective rule that
"the first to arrive to the spot has the right to fish". The rule states also that those who
come later should not set their nets in line, either in front of or behind another's net, but
there is no ban on setting either side of it making a straight line and giving everyone an
equal chance of catching fish. The convention was established because if one net is set
in front of another, both lose the catch, one at the flow and the other at the ebb of the
tide. Although fishermen have devised their own conventions to govern placing of nets,
the group rule is relaxed when the fishing ground is congested.
Another technological externality is created by operating drift nets or encircling
nets on fishing grounds used by trap fishermen and in areas of artificial reefs. This
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activity reduces the ability of the static gear to catch fish and raises the incidence of gear
damage and losses, hence increasing fishing cost. Many fishermen have discontinued
their artificial reefs due to activities of mobile fishermen gear whose drift nets and
encircling nets destroy the artificial reefs. Because defending individual artificial reefs
and static gear is costly, many fishermen have substituted static gear with mobile
fishing gear such as drift nets. As one fisherman put it, "if you keep an eye on your
fishing gear, nobody will come close to it". For example, during the survey, trap
fishermen in Al-Maragh (Barka) were engaged in disputes with drift nets and encircling
nets fishermen from a neighbouring village (Al-Haradi), with the hope that their rights
in the fishing ground would be respected. They wanted to ban the use of drift gill nets
and encircling gear near their traps. The fishermen from Al-Haradi do not use traps and
always reply that the "the sea is free or the sea is owned by the state 8". Fishermen
owning artificial reefs also indicated technological externalities. They argued that
despite the damage caused to their reefs, when other fishermen set their traps, or operate
drift and encircling nets close to the reefs these nets catch the fish attracted by the reefs,
thus reducing the reef owner's ability to catch fish and raising his cost.
Setting or operating one's gear close to another's reduces each fisherman's
ability to catch and increases the risk of gear entanglement, which is a symptom of
technological externalities that result in reduced catch, damaged gear and reefs and
direct conflicts among resource users. During the survey, the researcher interviewed a
fisherman (from Badewooh village in Suwaiq) on the shore while he was mending a big
portion of his drift net damaged by another fisherman's vessel passing over the net and
cutting it into pieces. The fisherman indicated that he could not afford to replace the
damaged drift net and he had no other fishing gear; thus, he was forced to stop fishing at
least temporarily, resulting in lost income for his family, an incident he was trying to
avoid. The researcher observed a few fishermen helping their poor colleague and one of
them indicated that he had supported this poor fisherman by giving him a piece of
netting to get him fishing again.
Fishermen were asked about the different methods that they adopted to avoid
gear entanglement problems. Responses to this question for the 194 respondents
included in this study are presented in Table 8.8. Fewer than one-half (48 %) indicated
8 They mean that the traditional rules do not apply nowadays as the fishery is regulated by the
Govenunent.
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that they keep enough distance between their gears and others to avoid conflicts caused
by gear entanglement and reduced catching abilities. Others (6.7 %) indicated that they
respect whoever comes first to the fishing spot and wait for him to set his gear. Another
6.3 percent indicated that they mark their gear with floats on the surface to avoid
damage caused by passing fishing vessels, encircling nets and drift nets. Fishermen
operating traps have also contributed to reduce gear damage. They connect ten traps or
so together and then submerge them into the bottom of the sea, while they identify the
location by land marks, especially mountains 9. Although the technique they have
adopted increases the searching time for traps, it has greatly reduced tensions between
mobile gear operators and trap fishermen.
Table 8.8 Methods Adopted to Avoid Net Entanglement Problems
Methods No. of Respondents Percentage
a). Keep enough distance 93 48
b). Wait until others set their nets 13 6.7
c). Mark my traps and set nets 12 6.3
d). Do nothing 76 39
Total 194 100
From Table 8.8, the results also revealed that among the 194 respondents who
answered this question, 76 respondents (39 %) said they do nothing. This figure
indicates a congestion problem which makes the group rule of avoiding gear
entanglement difficult to implement. Those fishermen are likely to be from villages with
many fishermen fishing in a limited fishing area. An example of this was seen in the
drift net fishery for Indian mackerel, the operation of which took place in coastal waters.
Fishermen reported that because many fishermen operate in a small area, it is very
difficult to keep enough distance between gears. Although net entanglement was not
cited by fishermen in this fishery as a major problem, nevertheless, reduced catching
ability of nets is prevalent.
9	 .Fishermen with long fishing experience of the fishing area use this technique. They identify their
location on the sea by taking a fix of two high mountains on the land. When they come to search for their
traps, they first identify their location in relation to the land-marks, and then they drop a long rope with a
hook (messenger) at the end and weighted by stones to send it to the bottom of the sea. Then they tow the
rope at slow speed until the hook gets caught in the rope that connects the traps. The researcher
participated in an operation to search for traps, which sometimes may take quite a long time, especially
when visibility is poor.
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8.6.4 Conflict resolution
Fishermen's participation in collective effort to resolve conflicts, in a sense, can
be considered as solving the demand-side l ° provision problems (Gardner et al., 1990; p.
344) where fishermen engage collectively in one way or another to alter their fishing
activities in order to avoid degradation of their fish resource. To elicit information on
their behaviour, fishermen were asked if they have united to resolve conflicts in their
village or town_ The results indicated that fishermen's participation in conflict
resolution varies and were identified by the effort the fisherman made toward the group.
Some fishermen took the lead and went to the local Governor's office, "the Wali
office", to report trespassers. Others went further, to the Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries and others gave their support to the group by attending village meeting called
by the head (sheikh) of the village. Among the 194 vessels owners included in the
survey, the majority (75 percent) did participate in their group to resolve a conflict. To
examine the type of conflicts fishermen face in their fishery at the time of the survey,
they were asked to give details about disputes they came across. Four main types of
conflicts were identified from the questionnaire survey (Table 8.9). The most cited one
was conflict between two villages on the sardine seine fishing. Fishermen using
Tahweta search for schools of sardine and sometime they operate in front of other
villages, which may have an accord not to use such gear. This problem was cited by
more than one-half (55.2 percent) of those who participated in conflict resolution.
Another type of conflict cited was between users of mobile and static fishing gear,
which was indicated by 23.4 percent of those who answered the above question. A few
respondents (8.3 %) indicated conflicts on encircling gear (Tadwerah) for kingfish,
while 19 respondents (13.1 %) reported conflict between fishermen from the same
village on sardine seine fishing.
10 
"demand-side" because this represents the demand for collective endeavours to solve problems.
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Table 8.9 Conflict Types
Conflict type No. of Respondents Percentage
a).	 Conflict with other village on
sardine seine fishing
b). Between operators of mobile
80 55.2
and static gear
c). Conflict on encircling nets for
kingfish
d). Conflict within a village on
sardine seine fishing
34
12
19
 23.4
8.3
13.1
Total 145 100
The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, in an attempt to reduce conflict
between mobile and static fishing gear after an endless dispute among fishermen,
proposed a rule to establish fishing zones so that diverse gears were not utilised in the
same area. The rule stated that "drift nets should be operated beyond 30 fathoms depth
only", allocating the shallower water for static fishing gear. The rule has failed because
the Ministry officials have not considered local conditions and fishermen's knowledge
about their coastal fishing area. In an attempt to examine why the zoning regulation had
failed, respondents were asked if they had heard of this rule in the first place. The
majority (93 %) of vessels owners included in this study were aware of the zoning
regulation (Table 8.10). Although most of them were aware of the zoning regulation, 95
percent of the respondents reported that the majority of fishermen in the area do not
obey the rule.
When they were asked if they would inform authorities of fishermen violating
the zoning regulation, just less than two-thirds were reluctant to cooperate in enforcing
the zoning regulation and indicated that they would not inform the authority about those
who violate this rule (Table 8.10). From Table 8.10 it can be seen that the number of
respondents who were willing to inform the authority of violating fishermen represented
35 percent only. Most of them indicated that they would inform the authority only if
asked, showing fears of further questioning by the authority for covering rule breakers.
The results indicated that the rule has little support from fishermen and the chance of its
implementation to reduce conflict is very small.
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Respondents were then asked that if they think this regulation, if enforced,
would reduce conflicts in their fishery. The results indicated that only 29 percent of the
respondents (mostly trap fishermen) thought that this rule would reduce conflict,
whereas, just less than two-thirds (64.9 %) indicated that this regulation would not
reduce conflicts among fishermen (Table 8.10). The remaining 5.7 percent were not
sure about their answers.
Table 8.10 Respondents' Responses to the Zoning Regulation
Statements Yes Not sure No Total
a).	 Have you heard about the 181 (93.3) 0 13 (6.7) 194
zoning regulations?
b). Did fishermen obey this rule? 7.0 (3.6) 1.0 (0.5) 185 (95.9) 194
c).	 Are you willing to inform
authority	 about
	 those	 who 68 (35.1) 5.0 (2.6) 121 (62.4) 194
violate this rule?
d). Do you	 think the rule will 57 (29.4) 11(5.7) 126 (64.9) 194
reduce conflicts?
* Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total
When fishermen were asked for the reasons behind their answers, those who
thought the regulation would reduce conflict indicated that it would reduce damage to
traps and static gear caused by mobile fishing gears. However, those who opposed the
zoning regulation (126 respondents) listed three reasons presented in Table 8.11. The
results show that 84 respondents (66.7 %) viewed the regulation as unfair to drift net
fishermen, because most of the species they target are found in the shallow water at
depths between 8 and 14 fathoms. Others (35 respondents or 27.8 %) indicated that it is
very risky to go to the open ocean with their small fishing vessels, especially in winter.
The remaining 7 respondents (5.50 %) based their opposition to this regulation on the
fact that the regulation was designed for those who operate tuna drift nets, and they
indicated that there are no fish for them in the open ocean.
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Table 8.11 Reasons for the Failure of the Zoning Regulation
Reason No. of fishermen percentage
1. Most	 species found at depths 8-14
fathoms
84 66.7
2. Rough weather in winter 35 27.8
3. The regulation was designed for tuna
fishermen
7 5.55
Total 126 100
8.7 Indigenous Management Institutions
For as long as people have engaged in fishing, harvesting of fish and its related
activities has been at least a partially collective business. Fishermen have worked
together on a host of activities such as resource management, labour sharing and
marketing of fish products. It would be too costly, sometimes impossible, to undertake
some of these activities individually. The case of resource management, which needs a
collective effort if the fishery is to be sustainable, is obvious. Therefore, indigenous
institutions have long been important for communities sharing a common resource to
avoid the adverse outcomes of independent actions, the results of which are sub-
optimal, not only for the users themselves, but also for the whole society.
For example the manorial system of medieval Britain, a classic example of
integrated farming, was sustained for some 700 years by a high degree of cooperation
between farmers (Pretty, 1995; p. 133). There are many cases from around the world
where local groups established detailed management measures for sustainable use of
village resources. These local groups provide support and mutual help through sharing
arrangements while they took communal decisions to punish individuals who attempted
to violate the group rules by overconsuming or under-investing in common resources
(for detailed cases see: Baland and Platteau, 1996; Berkes, 1989 and Ostrom, 1990).
The central question here is how resource users have succeeded to form such
institutions and make them effective and sustainable, at least for a period of time, when
they all have the opportunity to free ride and shirk? As important as the first question is
why some of these institutions have survived while others have collapsed. In the present
section, the researcher wants to look at the indigenous institution that governed Al-
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Batinah fishery for many years and investigate the factors that made such institution
incapable of withstanding the current changes.
The literature abounds with examples of indigenous institutions organized by
rural communities to coordinate resource use. Many of these institutions have been
effective and sustainable over periods of hundreds to thousands of years in many
cultures and ecosystems. A few of these include, for example, mountain grazing and
forest CPRs in Switzerland and Japan, irrigation systems in Spain and the Philippine
islands and a self-governing institution to manage fish resource in Turkey (Berkes,
1989; Baland and Platteau, 1996; chap. 12 and Ostrom, 1990; p. 58). Many others may
not yet have been documented, which may include both successful institutions and
failed ones.
The success of a sustainable fishery depends neither on skills and knowledge of
individual fishermen nor on economic incentives alone, but on action taken by the
community as a whole within the framework of an institution to govern its member
activities. This is regarded as the biggest challenge facing world fisheries at present
especially those in developing countries. For example, in the absence of an institution,
aimless unilateral effort to reduce fishing effort in an overexploited fishery will not
achieve socially optimal results, as the situation raises the temptation of many to free
ride on the effort of others.
Let us describe briefly the institution that governs the usage of fish resources in
South Al-Batinah. Fishermen in Al-Batinah are not free to engage in catching fish in
any manner. They are governed by an institution named Senat Al-Bahar in local
parlance; where "Senat" means code and "Al-Bahar" means the sea; thus, "code of the
sea". The institution directly addresses technological externalities and assignment
problems, and in some cases the amount of fish harvested. Although Senat Al-Bahar
seems incapable of withstanding current changes, some of its rules are still followed and
supported by the legal system in the country. A charismatic local leader who is an
experienced fisherman and a former captain normally chairs the institution. The leader's
prestige and the trust he evokes impart a great deal of legitimacy to his decisions.
Because access rules to the fishery are quite strict (in some cases) and conservation
mechanisms are adopted, the local institution (Senat Al-Bahar) is similar to "type III
societies" as described by Baland and Platteau (1996; p. 217) in their typology of local
institution of resources management. Although the institution does not have a special
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monitoring device to monitor the activities and behaviour of fishermen at sea, fishermen
themselves enforce some of the rules. In addition, moral norms play a central part in the
success of Senat Al-Bahar and serve as a substitute for monitoring devices.
In south Al-Batinah as well as all around the Omani traditional fisheries the
people have inherited a system of regulation called Senat Al-Bahar to address the
problems associated with their activities in fishing and to govern the use of the fish
resources. A number of rules were devised at different times to address common
problems faced by fishermen. Some of these rules, as we shall see later, are still in use.
According to the master of  Senat Al-Bahar in Suwaiq, "specific rules were devised for
all types of fishing gear and for different fish species when needed". Among the rules
that were used to limit harvest activities in some spots and limit the types of
technologies that can be used is the rule that bans all fishing gears from being used on
sea-mounts, except for handlines. For instance, in Suwaiq there are three well-known
sea-mounts which are very productive. This rule is used, in part, as a method of
minimizing technological externalities, as the area of the sea-mounts is too small for the
operation of gill nets, for example. Second, the non-selectivity characteristics of gill
nets will threaten the productivity of the spot. The same rule is also applied to fishing
grounds around islands, as these places are reserved for fishing with handlines.
Fishermen in Barka have a local accord to band drift net fishing in areas less
than 20 fathoms depth around islands. The shallower areas around islands in Barka are
restricted as there are plenty of coral reef grounds and because the area is a nursery
ground for juvenile fishes (personal communication with Sheikh Ahmed Al-Hamdani
from Al-Sawadi, Barka). Therefore, to avoid technological externalities and to restrict
the amount of fish harvested, local accords were devised to govern the activities of
fishermen on these scarce fishing spots. All these rules are documented in the Wali
office and when a dispute erupted fishermen and local authority refer to this
documentation.
The most often used rule is the one that concerns the assignment of fishing
spots. The rule states that "the first to arrive has the right to fish" in the spot This rule
applies to all fishing gears operated in the area. The exception to this rule is found
where fishermen have built artificial reefs on the floor of the sea (called locally "shad"
or "shadood" in the plural) to enhance the productivity of these spots because they
provide habitats and "refuge sites" for fish. Such fishing spots belong to those who
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constructed them or inherited them from their fathers. Interestingly the ownership of
these spots is transferable but the price is relatively high, especially for the well
maintained reefs, reflecting their high productivity. Owners' rights over these spots are
well respected by all fishermen and backed up by the legal system. Other fishermen
wishing to fish in the area should watch the distance rule. The distance at which one can
place fixed nets or traps near artificial reefs belong to others is approximately 100
metres in all directions, except to the seaward of the reef, where it should be doubled
because normally shadood attract fish or provide shelter for fish coming from offshore.
Most fishermen stated that they have to be at a distance from others' gears, whether this
was artificial reefs or any other fishing gear. Although they did not specify any distance,
nevertheless they knew that they had to give enough distance so as not to reduce others'
gear catching ability. Mobile fishing gear used to be relegated to areas outside the
location of these spots, as well as areas of static gear, in order to minimize conflicts
erupting through the use of diverse fishing gear in the same area. As one respondent put
it, "fishermen in the area used to respect each other's gear and territories, but now
trespassers are many".
Constructing a new artificial reef required the permission of the owner of the
closest artificial reef to the spot preferred. The owner of the established reef will
indicate how far from his reef the new reef should be constructed and in which
direction. In most cases the master of Senat Al-Bahar will mark the place for the new
reef to be constructed. Fishermen are not allowed to build shadood in front of another
village. All these rules are devised in order to avoid placing one's reefs close to
another's, hence reducing his catching ability.
In the beach seine fishery for sardine, competitive encounters may easily arise if
several vessels are running after a sizeable school. To cope with this kind of assignment
problems, specific rules have been devised and interestingly are still followed by
fishermen. As sardine schools migrate across the coast from west to east or from east to
west, net bosses established a collective procedure to establish the sequence of net
shooting rights. For example, if a fisherman spots a school of sardine, he is allowed to
follow the school even if it passes his neighbours' location, but he is allowed to cast his
net once only and if he fails to encircle the school (or catch part of it), the turn transfers
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to his neighbour and so on for all net bosses waiting to catch the sardine school".
Similar fishing turns are adopted by beach seine fishermen in Bahia (Brazil), but a lot-
drawing procedure decides who will cast first (Cordell and Mckean, 1986, cited in
Baland and Platteau, 1996; p. 208).
Because fishermen using cast nets can catch sardine from the shore, the rules of
Senat Al-Bahar do not allow them to sell their catch in the market 12. Sardines caught by
cast nets are normally used as baits for handlines and traps (personal communication
with Suliman Al-Mamari, master of Senat Al-Bahar in Suwaiq). For example,
fishermen can only land sardine caught by gill nets (minimum mesh size enforced) into
the market. Night fishing for sardine using any fishing gears is banned as well, except
fishing for bait. The selectivity of gill nets allows smaller sardine to pass through the
meshes to reproduce.
The discussion above suggests that traditional fishermen in the study area may
possibly fail to adopt rules other than those that address technological externalities and
assignment problems, even when an important fish species is threatened with depletion.
However, there are some evidences that these communities, at least in the past, did take
steps to conserve important fishery from depletion. These evidences are reported by
many fishermen and masters of Senat Al-Bahar interviewed by the researcher, as they
remembered the time of their fathers and grandfathers when they devised rules to
conserve the sardine fishery. The sardine fishery was an important fishery in Al-Batinah
in the past and continues to be so at present. In his description of the fishery of Oman in
1948, Bertram indicated that landing of sardine predominated other fish species and was
an important resource in Al-Batinah (Bertram, 1948; p. 6). Because of its importance,
we found that the take from the sardine fishery was restrained by limiting the time of
harvest every day. A few old fishermen (in Al-Qurha village, Suwaiq) remembered a
time during which sardine became scarce, and therefore fishing orders were only given
by the master of the Senat Al-Bahar. Sardine appear in the coastal waters in small
schools at the beginning of the season. The master of the Senat Al-Bahar asked
fishermen not to catch sardine for at least two weeks from the start of the season. He
justified this on the basis that the sardine were small and should be kept to grow and lay
11 The researcher has observed the operation of beach seine and how the rule of fishing order was
followed by two neighbours. Two net bosses explained the order of casting beach seine nets.
12 Cast nets are known to have a very small mesh size, which will cause stock depletion if used to land
sardine for sale in the market.
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their eggs; as well as to avoid frightening the fish as they approach coastal villages.
When the fishing season started, the fishermen were not free to catch sardine as they
desired_ They were only allowed to start fishing in the afternoon, specifically after they
finished the afternoon prayer (around 3.30 p.m.) until sunset (around 6.00 p.m.). The
start of fishing on any day was marked by a white flag raised by the master of the Senat
Al-Bahar permitting fishermen to go to sea to catch sardine. An old fisherman added,
"restricting fishing time to a few hours in the afternoon allowed plenty of time for fish
to breed and feed, which resulted in plenty of sardine for all fishermen in that season
and the seasons that followed".
At present, many rules concerning sardine fishing are still applied and enforced.
For example, sardine fishing is still banned at night except in few situations where baits
are needed by fishermen to catch other species, but in any case sardine caught at night
can not be sold in the market. Another rule, devised to conserve the small pelagic
stocks, like sardine and Indian mackerel, prohibits fishing at depths between one fathom
and three fathoms as these areas are known as hatching grounds for fish to lay their
eggs13. Fishing outside the restricted area was also restricted to the morning only. In
Seeb (a neighbouring town to Barka but not included in the survey) fishing time for
small pelagics has been further limited to take place between 6 o'clock in the morning
and 12 o'clock noon only, since 1994. This recent rule is a direct response of fishermen
to the threat of degradation of their fishery caused by intensive fishing.
The above description gives a general picture of the type of institution governing
fishermen's activities at sea in Al-Batinah. Rules vary from one town to another
according to the situation in each town and to the type of leader chairing the Senat Al-
Bahar, but the above description highlights common rules devised by fishermen in the
three towns studied in this research.
Although some of these rules are still followed, the Senat Al-Bahar seems
incapable of withstanding current changes. One can think of a host of factors that might
undermine the capabilities of villages' collective action as described by many scholars.
Technological change, population growth and market links are all crucial factors but not
the only ones. Baland and Platteau, in their analysis of failure of many natural resource
management institutions around the world, found a centralised approach to resource
13 The rule was announced in 16 August 1993 in the Wali office after a long debate among fishermen to
conserve the sardine fishery. The Wali indicated that any violation of the rule would be punished.
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management by the state as the main factor that undermines the capabilities of
collective action (Baland and Platteau, 1996; P. 279; see also Ostrom, 1990). The case
of south Al-Batinah fishery has some similarities to many cases described by the above
authors. Before 1970, the fisheries management in Oman was the responsibility of the
Senat Al-Bahar which was supported by the local authority in each town, normally the
Wall (governor) and the "khadi 14". The local authority in each town provided an
environment that is supportive of fishermen devising rules to manage the fish resources.
The rules of the Senat Al-Bahar, as well as agreements made among fishermen were
recognized, documented and enforced by the local authority (the Wali). In the case of a
fishing dispute between fishermen in the same village or from two villages, the sheikhs
(village leaders) would try to solve the dispute peacefully. If the sheikhs were unable to
resolve the conflict, the case would be raised to the Wali who would ask the master (s)
of the Senat Al-Bahar and other old fishermen in the town to state the rules of the Senat
Al-Bahar applicable to the case.
The same procedures are applied at present, but because the Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries claims sole responsibility for managing the fishery, as will be
discussed below, there are conflicting views between the Senat Al-Bahar and the
Ministry staff regarding the fishery. For example when local authority and fishermen
decided to ban the use of Tahweta to catch sardine, users of these gears went to the
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and obtained permission to use the same gear
undermining the collective arrangement devised by the Senat Al-Bahar.
The modernisation process that has taken place in Oman during the last thirty
years tends to make village based institutions for resource management increasingly
difficult. The political legitimacy of local management authorities has been reduced by
political and technological changes. The same findings were noticed by Lawry, 1989
(cited in Baland and Platteau, 1996; p. 284) and Wade (1988; p. 216) who concluded
that the modernisation process has reduced incentives for individuals to participate in
localised collective arrangements.
As part of its national development strategy, during the early 1970s, the
government introduced a new system of fisheries management, the implementation of
which was assigned to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. As a result, the Senat
14 Judge of the "Sharia" court where judicial system is based upon Islamic laws "Sharia".
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Al-Bahar lost a great deal of its autonomy and its masters or leaders, virtually stripped
of their control of the resources, now have to come in terms with the new management
plans which are new to traditional fishermen. Despite the intention of the government to
improve the local level management of fish resources, the power and control have
remained considerably centralised and the input of local fishermen and masters of the
Senat Al-Bahar has been minimal.
Therefore, at present, the erstwhile legitimacy and control of the Senat Al-Bahar
has been hampered and its function has been usurped by government administration.
The process of transformation has created some confusion at local level, as it is not clear
who should be responsible for the management of the resource. The same effect of
weakened local institutions as a result of transferring power and control from the local
level to government officials is found in many developing countries. A similar situation
to the one described above is found in Kordofan (Sudan) where the traditional system of
forest management has failed in recent decades because the power of village sheikhs to
control tree-cutting has been replaced by government legislation (Bruce and Fortmann,
1989, cited in Baland and Platteau, 1996; p. 275). Another situation was also observed
in India after the panchayat system replaced the traditional system of forest
management (Baland and Platteau, 1996).
The new system of fisheries management made access to the fishery simple and
encouraged non fishermen to enter into the fishery. The process of obtaining a licence is
very simple, any national Omani can obtain a licence regardless of his occupational
background. The Ministry requires a signature of a coastal villages' sheikh  in order to
issue the licence. People tend to bribe the sheikh in order to obtain his signature and as a
result many non-fishermen and even some rich elite obtained fishing licences and
entered the fishery either themselves or by hiring fishing labour. Many use the licence
to apply for government free interest fishing loans and subsidies to acquire vessels,
engine and fishing gear and then sold them to fishermen. Entry of people who have no
background in the practice of fishing has eroded local collective arrangement the result
of that is illegal-fishing practices and the dependence of the Senat Al-Bahar on moral
norms to preclude certain activities was hampered.
Fishermen find themselves in difficult position to form collective action and to
adhere to moral norms to preclude certain activities of resources appropriation because
new entrants do not obey tradition rules of the Senat Al-Bahar.
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New entrants into the fishery are less likely to be involved in the local
management of the fishery. Therefore, they tend to break the rules devised by the Senat
Al-Bahar (use prohibited gears, fish in restricted areas, increase fishing time, etc.,) not
because they try to maximise their profits, but because they felt no moral
responsibilities toward the institution. The current situation tends to allow the
population of access rights-holders to grow so that individual incomes extracted from
the fishery fall below the subsistence level. Even local fishermen, in their struggle for
survival, are tempted to violate rules devised by the Senat Al-Bahar and free riding
behaviour (stealing others catch, fishing in prohibited areas, using smaller mesh size,
etc.,) appears to be the natural way of subsidising individual income, hence raising the
discount rate of appropriation beyond what is desirable for the society. However, what
is still observed is that in places where the local institution is legitimate, fishermen's
adherence to moral norms precludes certain activities of resource appropriation.
8.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, the characteristics of the traditional fishery of South Al-Batinah
were presented. The study found that fishermen used a variety of fishing gear in order to
diversify their income from fishing. The results proved that more fishing effort has been
added into the fishery.
Fishermen in the area own more or less similar fishing vessels in terms of size,
hull construction and engine horsepower. Fishermen, therefore, can be considered as a
homogenous group with respect to their fishing fleet. Therefore, the fishing fleet could
not be an obstacle to achieve collective action as agreements to restrain the take from
the fishery become easier as the difference in the characteristics of the fishing vessels
among owners is negligible.
The above findings strongly suggest that fishermen were in general in agreement
on the status of the fishery. They perceived the problem of declining stocks in their
fishery as either sever or extreme, indicating a common dilemma. Sharing similar views
about a particular common dilemma by a majority of resource users may foster the
emergence of collective action because it is possible that the majority of the fishermen
will participate in collective action, if initiated, to solve their common problem.
Fishermen were also aware of the factors that cause their fishery to be depleted. High
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awareness of the resource exploitation problems and the factors responsible for these
problems can induce fishermen in the area to work collectively to avoid the tragedy of
their fishery.
The chapter also highlighted the management institution that governed the
fishing activities of the fishermen in the study area. The results suggest that the
fishermen in the study area are not free to engage in catching fish in any manner.
Fishermen have inherited an indigenous management institution, which address the
problems associated with their activities in fishing and to govern the use of the fishery.
Many local accords were devised by the local institution to address common problems
faced by fishermen, of which many are still in use. Although the local institution at its
current form seems to address technological externalities and assignment problems,
there are some evidences that fishermen in the area, at least in the past, had devised
rules to conserve important fishery from depletion.
The study findings indicate that the capabilities of the local institution have been
undermined as the result of the centralised approach to resource management by the
state. The modernisation process that has been taken place in the country during the last
thirty years tends to make collective action at village level to manage the fishery
increasingly difficult. The erstwhile legitimacy and control of the local institution has
been hampered and its function has been usurped by government administration.
The new system of fisheries management, by implementation of a licensing
scheme, has made access to the fishery simple, and encouraged transforming the fishery
from a common property to an open access. Entry of people from outside the fishing
village has eroded local collective arrangements and the dependence of the local
institution on social ostracism and moral norms to preclude certain activities was
hampered.
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CHAPTER NINE
ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE
EMERGENCE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
9.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to identify and quantify factors or attributes that
are influential in fishermen's decision to adopt a cooperative strategy toward the
management of the coastal fish resources in South Al-Batinah, Oman. The identification
and quantification of these factors will allow an increased understanding of the process
of emerging collective action and will help provide policy guidance to promote
collective action at the village level. The results presented in this chapter are very
important when trying to assess the collective choice of the traditional fishermen in the
study area. After identifying the factors influencing the fishermen's tendency to
cooperate or defect, these factors will be included in a regression model to determine
what can be regarded as the main predictors of the success and failure of collective
action.
The chapter begins by constructing a number of composite variables that will be
used later in hypotheses testing and which are considered here as the independent
variables. The dependent variable, "attitude toward cooperation", is also a composite
variable which is an index composed of eleven statements measuring different aspects
of fishermen's participation in collective action. The chapter then describes hypotheses
testing to determine the factors that influence the emergence of collective action. As the
main theme of this thesis is to evaluate the scope for collective action among fishermen
in South Al-Batinah, this chapter tests a number of hypotheses which were advanced for
this purpose and which were derived directly from the literature review presented in
Chapter Three. General discussions and comparison with the findings of other studies
are highlighted at the end of each section.
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9.2 Awareness of Resource Exploitation Problems
The purpose of this section is devoted to evaluate fishermen's awareness of the
overall status of the fishery, the causes of overfishing and its consequences and the
awareness of the problem of externality created by their harvesting activities. As the
main theme of this thesis is to evaluate the scope for collective action, the section
investigates whether fishermen in the three towns under review have similar views
regarding their use of the resource. Sharing similar awareness and perceptions about
harvesting activities by some users may create the necessary consensus to drive enough
resource users to adopt a cooperative behaviour. The following subsections present the
procedures followed to calculate the composite variable score value for the multi-item
Likert scale to determine the four composite variables that test fishermen's perceptions
and awareness towards the resource exploitation problems which will be used later for
hypotheses testing. They also present the univariate analysis of fishermen's responses to
the four issues of resources exploitation problems.
9.2.1 Awareness of resource status
To assess fishermen's awareness of the status of the fish resource the researcher
used five statements and presented them to the interviewed fishermen. These statements
are designed to assess different aspect of resource status (Table 9.1). Responses to the
statements were measured on a Likert scale where fishermen had to choose between
"Agree", "Indifference" and "Disagree" to represent the most appropriate answer to their
views. The three responses were assigned numerical scores of three, two and one
respectively. The results indicated that there is a consensus of responses indicating an
overexploited fishery as indicated by the responses of the sampled fishermen. This can
be seen in Table 9.1 where around 94 percent of the respondents agreed with the first
two statements (E19 and E20) in Table 9.1. Fishermen who agreed with the third (E21)
and fourth (E22) were 166 (85.5 %) and 174 (89.7 %) respectively. Lack of consensus
is seen with regard to the last statement (E23) in Table 9.1 with regard to the presence
of trash fish. Fishermen's opinions were divided here; half of them agreed with the
statement, whereas the other half were either not sure about their answer (22.1 %) or
completely disagreed with it (27.8 %). The lack of agreed responses to the last statement
was anticipated, because in a multi-species fishery, like the one in South Al-Batinah, the
problem of trash fish predominates in the trap fishery more than in the drift net fishery.
The presence of catfish (Arius thalassinus) and other non-marketable demersal species
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in the catch of fishermen is more often cited by trap fishermen, whereas most of the
pelagic species caught by drift net are marketable.
Rather than treat the items in Table 9.1 as separate measures, it is preferable and
reasonable to combine them into one index or scale which is defined as a composite
variable (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996; Bryman and Cramer 1997; Oppenheim,
1992). To do this, the score of individual responses are aggregated and then the total
score is divide by the number of statements in the scale to obtain the mean score value
for that particular scale. The new composite variable computed from Table 9.1 is
referred to here as "Awareness of Resource Status" and has a scale similar to that of
individual statements ranging from a score of three (perfect agreement) to a score of one
(perfect disagreement).
It is clear that the measure of individual items in Table 9.1 is an ordinal
measure. This poses problems for researchers since the inability to treat such a variable
as an interval measure means that methods such as correlation and regression which are
powerful and popular cannot be used (Bryman and Cramer, 1997; P. 57). However,
multi-item scales or the composite measures like the one computed from Table 9.1 have
the advantage of having the quality of interval variables because they permit a large
number of categories to be stipulated (ibid.). The multi-item scale that measures
"Awareness of Resources Status" is then treated here as an interval variable and this
permits correlation and regression to be used. Furthermore, the desirability of composite
variables lies in the fact that a single statement for measuring attitudes not only yields
insufficient information, but also is subject to random response error. If only one
statement is used to measure an attitude, there is a chance that it will yield an inaccurate
reflection of the subject's response. However, if many statements are used, the effect of
some kind of error in responding to one statement will have less effect on the accuracy
of the total attitude score.
The same procedure described above to calculate a composite variable score
value for a multi-item scale will be followed to determine the other three composite
variables that test fishermen's perceptions and awareness towards: the factors that cause
overfishing, the consequences of overfishing and externality in coastal fisheries.
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Table 9.1 Awareness of Resources Status (N=194)
The items
Responses
Agree Indifference Disagree
El 9	 Your fish catch per trip declines 183 2 9
94.4% 1% 4.6%
E20	 Your target	 species is difficult to 182 3 9
catch 93.8% 1.6% 4.6%
E21	 The large fish are difficult to find or 166 9 19
catch 85.6% 4.6% 9.8%
E22	 We	 need to spend longer hours 174 3 17
looking for fish then we used to 89.7 % 1.5 % 8.8 %
E23	 The percentage of trash fish in your 97 43 54
daily catch has increased 50 % 22.2 % 27.8 %
Following the procedure discussed in the above section, a new variable
"Awareness of Resource Status" is calculated. The mean score for this variable is 2.72
with a standard deviation of 0.43. The score is closer to perfect agreement (score three)
than to disagreement (score one). The above figure reflects the consensus of views
which enables us to conclude here that fishermen in the area are aware of the ongoing
processes of resource depletion and of the extent of damage done. Possession of such
information about the status of the resource is vital for the emergence of collective
action, as this will reduce the transaction cost of allowing agreements of cooperative
behaviour to take place. It is argued here that when fishermen are aware of the resources
problem, they will be interested in participating in local conservation efforts.
Before proceeding to use the scale in correlation and regression analysis, it was
evaluated for reliability by calculating Cronbach's alpha. The results presented in
Chapter Six (Section 6.8.1) indicate that alpha of 0.76 is achieved by the scale
suggesting that the scale is reliable, based on the recommendation of Nachmias and
Nachmias (1996), Bryman and Cramer (1997) and Bagozzi (1994) that an alpha of 0.70
is a reasonable standard for reliability.
9.2.2 Awareness of the causes of overfishing
Factors that are thought to be responsible for causing resource depletion, as seen
by fishermen in the area, were investigated in Chapter Eight using an open-ended
question. The majority of fishermen (82.4 %) reported overfishing as the main factor
causing the fishery to deplete, while the remaining fishermen (17.6 %) indicated citirtes,
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other than overfishing. In this section the analysis will focus on fishermen's awareness
of the causes of overfishing.
In order to assess fishermen awareness of the causes of overfishing, the
researcher devised a multi-item scale and administered it to the sampled fishermen.
These items were devised to measure fishing effort from different dimensions so they
can be safely aggregated to form a composite variable instead of treating each item
individually. Fishermen's responses to individual statements are presented in Table 9.2
which shows that the majority of fishermen agreed that large numbers of vessels, large
numbers of units of fishing gear, new technology and increased fishing time per trip are
causing their fishery to be depleted. Many excluded two factors, vessel size and high
horse-powered engines as causing fish resources to decline. For example, only 45.4
percent and 21.1 percent were agreed that larger vessels and high horse-powered
engines respectively would cause the resource to decline. It was made clear to the
respondents that the meaning of larger vessels in statement F25 is not industrial trawlers
or bigger vessels, but rather larger vessels of the same type used by the traditional
fishermen in the study area. Regarding engine horse-power, fishermen indicated that in
their fishery, engine horse-power does not influence the amount of catch directly,
simply because fishing is carried out while the engine is off.
Following the procedure discussed in Section 9.2.1, a new variable, "Awareness
of the Causes of Overfishing", is calculated. The mean score for this variable is 2.4 with
a standard deviation of 0.53. The score is closer to 3 (agree) than to 1 (disagree). This
suggests that fishermen in the study area are aware of their harvesting activities and can
determine those components of their harvesting effort that are directly responsible for
the degradation of the resources. They formed a correct idea about their own
responsibilities for a decline of fish catches. The results presented in Chapter Six
(Section 6.8.1) yield a Cronbach's alpha of 0.76. This shows that the scale is reliable,
based on the recommendation of Naclunias and Nachmias (1996), Bryman and Cramer
(1997) and Bagozzi (1994).
193
Table 9.2 Awareness of the Causes of Overfishing (N=194)
Responses
The items Agree Indifference Disagree
F24 Fish resources decline if too many 154 6 34
vessels are operating in the same
area
79.4 % 3.1 % 17.5 %
F25 Fish resources decline if all vessels 88 20 86
are large in size 45.4% 10.3% 44.3%
F26 Fish resources decline if all vessels 41 48 105
use high horse-powered engines 21.1 % 24.8 54.1 %
F27 Fish resources decline if all vessels 169 4 21
employ large no. of nets 87.1 % 2.1 % 10.8 %
F28 Fish resources decline if fishermen 166 3 25
use encircling gear 87.1 % 1.5 % 12.9 %
E29 Fish resources decline if fishermen 141 7 46
	
 increase their fishing time per trip 72.7 % 3.6 % 23.7 %
9.2.3 Fishermen's perception of the consequences of overfishing
In the previous sections it was found that fishermen in the study are aware of the
current status of their fishery and of the factors that led to this deteriorating situation. In
this section, fishermen's perception of the consequences of having a depleted fishery are
discussed. To test their perception, a multi-item scale of six statements was
administered to them and the responses are presented in Table 9.3. In general, a direct
result of having a depleted fishery is a declining catch and an increase in fishing costs
(Alessi, 1997). The statements in Table 9.3 were devised to measure these consequences
from different dimensions.
The results indicated that 84 percent of the sampled fishermen agreed that they
have to search for fishing grounds away from their villages and 85 percent agreed that
because of declining state of their fishery they have to extend their fishing hours to
catch the same amount (Table 9.3). Almost 96 percent agreed that their fuel
consumption has increased and they have to use more fishing nets to catch a profitable
amount. Those who indicated that many fishing areas close to their villages are barren
due to overfishing represent 89 percent of the sampled fishermen. The majority of
respondents (97 percent) said that because of overfishing, income has declined. The
mean score for the composite variable "The Consequences of Overfishing" is 2.8 with a
standard deviation of 0.35. The mean scale value is just below 3 (perfect agreement)
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which suggests that fishermen in the area are aware of the consequences of their
harvesting activities on their fishery. Cronbach's alpha which tests the reliability of the
scale was 0.79, highly reliable for most purposes (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996,
Bryman and Cramer, 1997 and Bagozzi, 1994).
Table 9.3 The Consequences of Overfishing (N=194)
The items
Responses
Agree Indifference Disagree
G30	 Your fishing area becomes further 163 4 27
away from your village 84 % 2.1 % 13.9 %
G31	 Your fishing hours become longer 165 8 21
85.1% 4.1% 10.8%
G32	 Your fuel consumption increases 186 1 7
95.9 % 0.5 % 3.6 %
G33	 Many fishing areas are barren 173 8 13
89.2% 4.1% 6.7%
G34	 You have to use more fishing gears 186 3 5
to catch fish 95.9% 1.5 % 2.6 %
G35	 Your income declines 188 1 5
	 	 96.9 % 0.5 % 2.6 %
9.2.4 Externalities in coastal fisheries
To elicit information about fishermen's awareness of the presence of negative
externalities in their fishery, they were asked to choose the answers that best represent
their views of five statements included in Table 9.4. The resulting outcome can be
indicated by loss of catch, loss of fishing gears and the results of conflicts erupting
between fishermen in the fishing grounds. To test fishermen's attitude towards these
sup-optimal outcomes, five statements were presented to them; their responses are
shown in Table 9.4. The majority of fishermen agreed with the statement concerning
congestion externalities, such as facing difficulties in fishing if too many vessels operate
in a small area (80 percent), the problem of net entanglement (81.9 percent) and the
problems of increased violence between fishermen at sea (87.6 percent). The majority
(94.3 percent) also agreed that they lost catch when fishing in areas recently fished by
others. Out of the five statements presented in Table 9.4, a composite variable was
calculated following the procedure discussed in Section 9.2.1. The mean scale value is
2.8 with a standard deviation of 0.45. The results indicate fishermen have a consensus
agreement about the negative externalities as caused by their misuse of the fishery.
Cronbach's alpha for this scale was 0.77 which indicates that the scale has high internal
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consistency (Nachtnias and Nachmias, 1996, Bryman and Cramer, 1997 and Bagozzi,
1994).
Table 9.4 Externalities in Coastal Fisheries (N=194)
The items Responses
Agree Indifference Disagree
H36	 You may face some difficulty in 155 3 36
fishing if too many vessels operate in
a small area
79.9 % 1.5 % 18.6 %
H37	 Net	 entanglement problems often 159 4 31
occur if too many vessels operate in
the same area
81.9 % 2.1 % 16 %
H38	 You cannot fish in the area where 181 4 9
many colleagues are fishing 93.3 % 2.1 % 4.6 %
1139	 Less catch is expected if you operate 183 1 10
in the area which has just been fished
by many colleagues
94.3 % 0.5 % 5.2 %
H40	 Conflicts among fishermen at sea are 170 2 22
risin_ 87.6% 1% 11 4 %
9.3 Attitude Toward Cooperation
The dependent variable for this study, willingness to cooperate to manage fish
resources, was measured as an index. Cooperation was operationalised as fishermen's
obeying the group rules and participating in collective efforts to manage the resources.
Ideally, cooperation should be measured as fishermen's self restraint in harvesting the
resources when it is depleted, but measuring such a concept, either directly or indirectly,
proved difficult. Therefore, the researcher measured fishermen's willingness to
cooperate from different dimensions. Although the index contains items describing
activities not related explicitly to harvesting behaviour (or resource use), the researcher
decided to include all because each item could be viewed as a demonstration of
cooperation to manage the fishery and to support the local management institution
(Senat Al-Bahar).
The index contains 11 statements, which were administered to the respondents.
Respondents were asked to choose the answer that best represented their feeling about
each statement. They could either choose "yes" which had a score value of one or "no"
which had a score value of zero. Fishermen's responses to the 11 items in the index are
presented in Table 9.5. Then the scores of individual responses for the statements were
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aggregated to find the total score value for the index. The Cronbach's alpha coefficient
for the eleven items is 0.80, suggesting high internal consistency for the index
(Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996; Bryman and Cramer, 1997 and Bagozzi, 1994).
Table 9.5 Index of Fishermen's Cooperation
The items Responses
Yes No
N88	 You returned	 under-sized fish into the sea when 177 17
caught in your net 91.2% 8.8%
N89	 Set your nets at a distance from other fishermen gears 178 16
91.8% 8.2%
N90	 Inform on colleague who break the fishing rules 90 104
46.4% 53.6%
N91	 Attend workshops arranged by the Ministry of 79 115
Agriculture and Fisheries 40.7 % 59.3 %
N92	 Renew your fishing licence and boat licence 136 58
70.1% 29.9%
N93	 Speak to the head of the tribe about the problem of 131 63
your fishery 67.5% 32.5%
N94	 Discuss fishing problems frequently with more than 164 30
one fisherman 84.5% 15.5%
N95	 Participate in a group to resolve conflicts in fishing 90 104
46.4% 53.6%
N96	 Persuades others to follow fishing rules 125 69
64.4% 35.6%
N97	 Visit the Governor office to raise a case against rules 68 126
violators 35.1% 64.9%
N98	 Oppose catching sardine with purse seine nets 157 37
	 	 80.9% 19.1%
The univariate statistics of the index of the dependent variable "cooperation"
indicated that the mean level of cooperation was 7.19 with a standard deviation of 2.75
and a range of 0 to 11. The index was an interval measure ranged between a score of 0
(no cooperation) to a score of 11 (maximum cooperation). Because the multi-item index
that measures "cooperation" is treated here as an interval variable, analysis such as
correlation and regression can be used (Bryman and Cramer, 1997; p. 57). Visual
inspection of the shape of the distribution for this index indicated that responses are
close to being normally distributed and, therefore, it is safe to apply parametric tests
such as Pearson's r, t-test, analysis of variance (ANOVA) and regression which assume
that the population scores are normally distributed (Bryman and Cramer, 1997; p. 117).
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9.4 Treatment of Hypotheses
The following sections examine factors that are hypothesised to be influential in
fishermen's decisions to adopt cooperative behaviour. The dependent variable for the
analysis is fishermen's cooperation, which is tested against a number of independent
variables. Results of hypotheses are presented here and those factors which are
influential in fishermen decision to cooperate are identified.
9.4.1. Economic dependence on the fishery
In the study of collective action, the notion that economic dependence on a
common pool natural resource as a source of livelihood promotes the emergence of
collective action has received considerable support in the literature. Many researchers
argue that the more the user group depends on the resource as a source of livelihood the
more likely they will achieve endogenous solutions to the commons problems (Runge,
1986; Wade, 1987). Consequently, economic dependence on fishing is hypothesised to
have positive influence on cooperation (Table 9.6). The independent variable "economic
dependence" was operationalised as the relative importance of respondent's income
from fishing to the overall household income. For the purpose of this study, net income
earned directly from fish sales by individual vessel owners was only counted as fishing
income. Therefore, "household dependence on respondent's fishing income" (RED) was
calculated as the respondent's annual income from fishing divided by total household
income (fishing and non-fishing income earned by the respondent and other members of
the household).
RED —  respondent's annual income from fishing
total household income
Another factor, which is hypothesised to be inversely related to fishermen's
decision to cooperate in the commons, is the respondent's economic dependence on
non-fishing income. The study anticipated that those who are less dependent on their
fishery would show less inclination toward cooperation. Therefore, the concept
"economic independence" was operationalised as the relative importance of
respondent's non-fishing income to the overall household income. The variable
"respondent's economic independence" (REI) was therefore calculated as the
respondent's annual non-fishing income divided by total household income (fishing and
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non-fishing income earned by the respondent and other members of the household) as
shown in the following equation.
respondent's non - fishing income
REI —
total household income
Visual inspection of the scatter diagram shows that the relationship between the
dependent variables and "respondent's economic independence" (REI) is more likely to
be curvilinear than linear which makes the use of the Pearson's r correlation irrelevant.
Therefore, the variable was collapsed into two groups and the t-test technique was used
instead.
Table 9.6 Operationalization and Measurement of Association for Economic
Dependence with Attitude Toward Cooperation.
Dependent variable
(Interval variable)
Independent variables Test
Indicators Type
Cooperation
RED1
REI2
Ratio
Nominal
Pearson's r
t-test
The univariate statistics of the variable "respondent's economic dependence on
fishing" indicated the mean dependent on income from fishing was 51.6 percent with a
standard deviation of 35 percent and the median of 41.8 percent. It was found that at
least 30 percent of the respondents were 100 percent economically dependent on fishing
and 22 percent were dependent on fishing for 40 to 80 percent of their income. Only 8
percent of the respondents were dependent on fishing for less than 10 percent of their
total income. These results suggested that fishermen's households in the three towns are
still highly dependent on income from fishing. To investigate if there is a relationship
between respondent's economic dependence on the fishery and their attitude toward
cooperation, the two variables were correlated to test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis one: There is a statistically significant correlation between
fishermen's economic dependence on the fishery and their attitude toward cooperation.
1 RED means household dependence on respondent's income from fishing
2 REI means household dependence on non-fishing income
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A null hypothesis of no relationship between the two variables was therefore
derived from hypothesis one. The null hypothesis will be rejected if the p-value
(probability distribution) of the Pearson's r is less than 0.05.
Testing the above null hypothesis shows that there is a significant correlation
between fishermen's economic dependence on the fishery and their willingness to
cooperate. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no correlation was rejected based on a
Pearson's r-value of 0.23, which was significant at the 0.001 level (Table 9.7).
Therefore, the result of this test provides support for hypothesis one.
Table 9.7 Pearson Correlation between Respondents' Economic
Dependence on Fishing and their Attitude Toward Cooperation (N=194)
Test r-value Decision
0.23
Pearson's r P <0.001 Reject Ho
Although the correlation is somewhat weak, it provides support for earlier
findings by Runge (1986) and Wade (1987) of a positive relationship between economic
dependence on the common property resources and individual decisions to cooperate in
managing the commons. In the same vein, Baland and Platteau have stated: "the more
vital the resource for survival the greater the chances of successful collective action"
(Baland and Platteau, 1996; p. 287). Therefore, the positive relationship between
economic dependence and cooperation was expected, and confirmed the findings of the
above authors from which hypothesis one was derived. MacDonald (1993) also
achieved similar results when studying the 'economic dependence on fishing of
fishermen in Lake Chapala, Mexico. Her results also produced a small positive
correlation (r = 0.32) between economic dependence on fishing and fishermen's
cooperation in the management of their fishery. This low correlation reflects
appropriately the correlation value of 0.23 calculated in this study for economic
dependence on the fishery.
Overall, the results suggest that economic dependence on the resource has a
positive effect on cooperation as demonstrated by the correlation discussed above.
Therefore, it can be stated here that those fishermen who are more economically
dependent on fishing show more willingness to cooperate in solving their common
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problem. Fishermen not dependent on the fishery become detached from the village,
since they are no longer bound by the condition of mutual vulnerability now because
they have alternative sources of income. To some extent it can be said that for those
who are less dependent on the fishery for their income, loss of reputation (when caught
catching immature fish, for example) is not a threatening factor to deter them from
doing so.
In contrast to economic dependence on the fishery, it is interesting to examine
the difference between cooperation mean scores for those fishermen who are
economically dependent on non-fishing income and those who are less dependent on
non-fishing income. Table 9.8 indicates that the t-test value (2.57; p < 0.05) which
shows that the difference in means between those who are dependent on non-fishing
income and those who are less dependent on non-fishing income is statistically
significant. Based on the result presented in Table 9.8, the null hypothesis was also
rejected. From Table 9.8 it can be seen that those who are dependent on non-fishing
income had a lower cooperation mean (5.42) compared to that of those who are less
dependent on non-fishing income (6.39). The inverse relationship, therefore, confirms
our earlier suggestion that the more the fishermen depend on non-fishing income, the
less effort they will exert toward its maintenance. These results provide more support
for the economic dependence hypothesis (H1)-
Table 9.8 Unrelated t-test Comparing Attitude Toward Cooperation of
those who are Dependent on Non-fishing Income and those who are Not
Dependent on Non-fishing Income (N=194)
Groups N Mean SD Df t- value3
Dependence on non-
fishing income
62 5.42 2.30
192 2.57; P < 0.05
,
Not dependence on
, non-fishing income 
132 6.39 2.53
9.4.2. Social identity as a fisherman
Another basic hypothesis is that fishermen who have strong social identity as
fishermen will pursue cooperative behaviour more than those who have weak social
identity as fishermen (H2). Three indicators: fisherman's family involvement in fishing,
3 The variances of the both groups are not statistically different since the p-value of the Levene's test is
0.69. Consequently, at-value based on an equal variances estimate is employed for this test.
201
his principal work, and his experience in fishing were devised to measure social identity
of individual fisherman (Table 9.9).
The first indicator of social identity was operationalized in terms of family
involvement in fishing. It is assumed here that fishermen with more family involvement
in fishing have a strong social identity as fishermen. Fishermen were asked if any of the
five kin relations included in the questionnaire were engaged in fishing. To measure this
variable a value of one was given for each kin relation involved in fishing. The measure
ranged from weak social identity, a value of zero where no other member of his family
is involved in fishing, to strong social identity, a value of five, where the respondent's
father, brothers, sons, uncles and cousins were identified as fishermen. Cousins and
uncles were included in the index because the extended family is characteristic of the
Omani culture.
The second indicator of social identity is operationalized as the number of years
the respondent has spent working as a fisherman (fishing experience)4. The more years
the respondent has spent in fishing the stronger might his social identity be. The
researcher anticipated a positive relationship between the number of years the
respondent has spent in fishing and his willingness to cooperate.
The third indicator of social identity was the respondent's principal work. A
value of one is given to a fisherman citing only fishing as the main occupation.
Fishermen reporting non-fishing occupations as their main occupations were given a
value of zero. This was based on the assumption that a fisherman engaged in other
occupation besides fishing has lower social identity as a fisherman, whereas those who
stick to their occupation has high social identity. The analysis will treat the three
indicators separately; Pearson's r correlation is used to find a correlation between the
first two indicators and the dependent variable "attitude toward cooperation", and a t-
test is used to determine if the mean scores of fishermen with different principal work is
significantly different (Table 9.9).
4 Childhood fishing (the first 14 years of adult life) was excluded because it was found that respondents
included their childhood fishing in their responses. In the study area, it was observed that children at the
age of ten go fishing with their fathers.
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Table 9.9 Operationalization and Measurement of Association for Social Identity
with Attitude Toward Cooperation.
Dependent
variable
Independent variables Test
(Interval
variable)
Indicators Type
Social identity
Interval
Interval
Nominal
Pearson's r
Pearson's r
t-test
Cooperation 0-	 a. Family involvement
b. Experience
c. Principal work
As described above, three indicators were used to measure social identity
(family involvement in fishing, number of years spend in fishing and principal work).
Family involvement in fishing is the first indicator of social identity, which had a mean
value of 3.4 members with a standard deviation of 1.4 members and a range between 0
and 5. The results indicate that most respondents have a strong social identity; more
than two-thirds (67 percent) of the respondents have 3 or more members of their family
engaged in fishing.
When social identity as a fisherman was measured using fishermen's experience
in fishing (number of years spent fishing), the univariate statistics indicated that the
mean number of years spent fishing by fishermen was 27.90 years with a standard
deviation of 9.95 years. The minimum number of years a fisherman was engaged in
fishing was 4 years and the maximum was 55 years.
The third indicator of social identity was fishermen's principal work, which
separates the group into those who reported fishing as their principal work and those
who reported another occupation as their principal work. The imivariate statistics
indicated that most respondents have strong social identities as fishermen when
reporting their principal work More than two-thirds (69.6 percent) reported fishing as
their principal work_ The remaining 30.4 percent of the respondents reported something
other than fishing as their principal work
Hypothesis tests were conducted by measure of association, namely rPearson's
e when both variables are interval or ratio measures and Hest when the independent
variables are nominal as shown in Table 9.9_ The aim here is to determine the influence
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of social identity on fishermen's individual decision to participate in collective action.
Therefore, these tests were selected to explore the extent and direction of the
relationships between the dependent variable "attitude towards cooperation" and the
independent variables. The following hypothesis was tested.
Hypothesis two: there is a statistically significant correlation between
respondents' social identity as fishermen and their attitude toward cooperation to
manage their fishery.
To test hypothesis two, a null hypothesis of no relationship was tested. The
result of testing the null hypothesis for the three indicators of social identity and attitude
toward cooperation supported the hypothesis that those respondents who identify
themselves more strongly as fishermen will cooperate more in the commons than those
who do not identify themselves strongly as fishermen. Table 9.10 shows the
measurement of association (Pearson's r), which indicates a fair degree of support for
this hypothesis using number of years spent fishing, but lack of support using family
involvement.
Table 9.10 Pearson Correlation between Family Involvement and Number of
Years Fishing and the Dependent Variable Attitude Toward Cooperation (N=194)
Test Family
involvement
Years fishing
Pearson's r 0.08
P > .05
0.17*
P < 0.05
,  Decision Accept Ho Reject Ho
(*) Indicate significant correlation at the 0.05 level
To test the third indicator of social identity (principal work), the t-test technique
was used to determine the influence of fishermen's principal work on their attitude
toward cooperation in the commons. Table 9.11 indicates that the t-test value of
fishermen's cooperation (-2.46; P < 0.05) is statistically significant, and there is a
significant difference between fishermen's willingness to cooperate, according to their
principal work. Table 9.11 indicated that fishermen who reported fishing as their main
occupation had a higher cooperation mean (6.37) than that of those who combined
fishing and another occupation (5.42). Therefore, the significant difference between the
mean scores of the two groups indicate that fishermen who reported fishing as their
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main occupation had more positive willingness to cooperate in the commons than those
who reported non-fishing occupations. The results presented in Table 9.11 give more
support for our hypothesis (H2) that those respondents who identify themselves more
strongly as fishermen will cooperate more in the commons than those who do not
identify themselves strongly as fishermen
Table 9.11 Independent Sample West Comparing Attitude Toward
Cooperation according to fishermen's principal work (N=194).
Principal work N Mean SD DF t-value5
Fishing 135 6.37 2.52
192 - 2.46; P < 0.05
Non-fishing 59 5.42 2.34
Therefore, Hypothesis two was supported when social identity as a fisherman
was operationalised as principal work and number of years spent fishing, but was not
supported when family involvement was correlated with attitude toward cooperation. As
shown by the results in Table 9.10, a statistically significant correlation between
number of years a fisherman spent fishing and the dependent variable attitude toward
cooperation was discovered. Although the correlation was somewhat weak (r = 0.17),
nevertheless it was positive and significant (p < 0.05) which means that there is a
tendency for fishermen who have more fishing experience to show more willingness to
cooperate to manage their fishery.
9.43 Perception of resource exploitation problems
Also tested was the relationship between attitude toward cooperation and the
fishermen's awareness of resource exploitation problems. A number of hypotheses were
devised for this purpose and Pearson's r was used again to carry out the test, the results
of which are presented in Table 9.12. Visual inspection of the scatter diagram shows
that the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables
appears to be approximately linear. Therefore, it is safe to use the Pearson's r correlation
to test the strength and direction of the relationship between the above variables
(Cramer and Bryman, 1997; p. 177).
5 The variances of the both groups are not statistically different since the p-value of the Levenes test is
0.84. Consequently, at-value based on equal variances estimate is employed for this test
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Hypothesis three: there is a statistically significant correlation between the
attitude toward cooperation and fishermen's perception of the status of the resource.
The null hypothesis is that there is no significant correlation between attitude
toward cooperation and fishermen's perception of the status of the resource. The results
of testing this hypothesis indicate that there is a significant correlation between attitude
toward cooperation and fishermen's perception of the status of the resources. This
means that the higher the perception of resource users about the status of their
resources, the higher would be their attitude to cooperate in solving its problems. The
Pearson's r value for this test was 0.2 (P <0.05) which allows us to reject the above null
hypothesis (Table 9.12).
Hypothesis four: there is a statistically significant correlation between the
attitude toward cooperation and fishermen's awareness of the causes of overfishing.
Table 9.12 shows that there is a positive statistically significant correlation
between attitude toward cooperation and fishermen's awareness of the causes of
overfishing. The Pearson's r resulting from this test was 0.32, which is significant at the
0.05 level, allowing the rejection of the null hypothesis and providoing support for
hypothesis four. This moderate correlation suggested that those fishermen who have
high awareness of the likely factors that cause the resource to deplete show more
willingness to cooperate to avoid further damage to their fishery.
Hypothesis five: there is a statistically significant correlation between the
attitude toward cooperation and fishermen's awareness of the consequence of
ovelfishing.
The test of hypothesis five revealed a statistically significant correlation between
attitude toward cooperation and fishermen's awareness of the consequences of
overfishing. This is clearly shown in Table 9.12 by the Pearson's r-value of 0.15 which
was significant at the 0.05 level. The null hypothesis of no significant relationship is
therefore rejected. Hence, fishermen who are aware of the consequences of overfishing
shows more willingness to cooperate.
Hypothesis six: there is a statistically significant correlation between the
attitude toward cooperation and fishermen's awareness of externality in coastal
fisheries.
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Among hypotheses concerning the resource exploitation problems, the test failed
to reject the null hypothesis which was derived from hypothesis six. The correlation
between attitude toward cooperation and fishermen's awareness of externalities in their
coastal fishery was non-significant. The calculated r coefficient was 0.12 and the P-
value was greater than the 0.05 significance level. Therefore, the test has failed to reject
the null hypothesis (Table 9.12).
Table 9.12 Pearson's Correlation between Fishermen's Perception of Resource
Exploitation Problems and their Attitude Toward Cooperation (N = 194)
Hypothesis Technique used The results
Value Decision
H3 Pearson's r 0.2; P < 0.05 reject Ho
H4 Pearson's r 0.32; P < 0.05 reject Ho
H5 Pearson's r 0.15; P < 0.05 reject Ho
H6 Pearson's r 0.12; P> 0.05 accept Ho
The results presented above show that three of the four indicators of the
fishermen's awareness of their resource exploitation problems were correlated
significantly with the dependent variable "attitude toward cooperation". The strongest
correlation was found between awareness of the causes of overfishing and cooperation
and indicates that the more the fishermen are aware of the impact of their harvesting
activities, the more they will cooperate to manage the fishery. As anticipated in Section
9.2, possession of information about the status of the resource is vital for the emergence
of collective action, as this will reduce the transaction cost of allowing agreements of
cooperative behaviour to take place. It is proved here that when fishermen are aware of
the resource problem, they will be interested in participating in local conservation
efforts.
The findings in this study suggested that resource scarcity supplies an incentive
for cooperation. We are reminded by Baland and Platteau that awareness of resource
depletion will be more detectable when the impact of overexpolitation on the resource
stock is more visible and when the connection between user behaviour and the level of
this stock is more evident and predictable (Baland and Platteau, 1996; p. 228).
However, there may be some optimal degree of resource depletion that will give the
right incentive for fishermen to cooperate to restrict their take from the fishery. An
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abundant fish resource obviates the need to conserve, while an exhausted one makes it
useless to do so, but a middling scarcity offers enough to reward conservation efforts
(Arnold and Campbell, 1986: cited from Blair, 1996; P. 493). We have seen from
fishermen's income that the fishery is still generating some net income which suggests
that the fishery is not exhausted. This level of scarcity seems to give the right incentive
to cooperate as suggested by Arnold and Campbell. This was proved by the positive
correlations between the three indicators of the resource exploitation problems and
cooperation, which were statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Similarly, Baland and
Platteau (1996) emphasized that for corporate management of CPRs to be effective, an
essential prerequisite is that resource users correctly perceive the benefits of collective
action, which requires that they are well informed not only about the status of the
resource but also about the possible impact of use behaviour on stocks (p. 290).
In an attempt to investigate the combined affect of the four indicators together,
the researcher developed a composite variable, "awareness of resource exploitation
problems". The four indicators were combined into one index (Nachmias and Nachmias,
1996; Bryman and Cramer 1997; Oppenheim, 1992). The resource exploitation
indicator equalled the sum of the four indicators divided by four (the number of
indicators) to form an interval variable. The Cronbach's alpha for the indicator was
0.70, which indicates high reliability (Naclunias and Nachmias, 1996). When this
indicator was correlated with the dependent variable "cooperation", the resulting
Pearson's r (0.30; p = 000) indicated a positive correlation which was statistically
significant at the 0.001 level. This means that the more the fishermen are aware of the
resource exploitation problems, the higher would be their willingness to cooperate.
9.4.4 Social and demographic variables.
In the study of collective action, the notion that resource user's profile (for
example, age, education, household size, etc.,) promotes or hamper the emergence of
collective action has not received enough attention in the literature. Although
demographic variables may not have a crucial deterministic effect on the success or
failure of collective action, some of these variables such as age, education and
household size are expected to have some influence on fishermen's decision to
participate on collective action. Due to the long-run nature of productivity benefits from
resource conservation, long planning horizons are expected to influence positively
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fishermen's decision to participate in managing their resources (Kalaitzandonakes and
Monson, 1993; P. 202). Younger fishermen are thus more likely to participate in
collective effort than older fishermen. Similarly, fishermen with higher education are
expected to devote greater participation to conserve their fishery. This is because higher
education is associated with grater information on the productivity implications of
overfishing and the benefits of various collective conservation efforts. Therefore, it is
hypothesised here that there is significant correlation between fishermen's demographic
variables and their willingness to cooperate in the commons.
In this section the investigation will proceed to determine whether fishermen's
profiles have an influence on the level of cooperation or effort they will put to manage
their coastal fishery. Because both variables (dependent and independent) were
measured on the interval scale, Pearson's r correlation appears to be very appropriate to
determine if a significant correlation does exist between fishermen's profiles and the
dependent variable attitude toward cooperation.
Hypothesis seven: there is a statistically significant correlation between
fishermen's profiles and their willingness to cooperate in the commons.
The test will be used to reject the null hypothesis of no significant correlation
between the dependent variable and the three independent variables. The null hypothesis
will be rejected if the p-value (probability distribution) of the Pearson's r is less than
0.05.
It was found that there is no statistical significant correlation between
respondent's age and household size and their willingness to cooperate. The p-values for
these variables are greater than 0.05. Hence, the null hypothesis should be accepted
(Table 9.13). The only statistical significant correlation was found between education
attainment and the dependent variable attitude toward cooperation. The calculated
Pearson's coefficient was -0.144 with a p-value of less than 0.05, which indicates that
the null hypothesis in this case only should be rejected.
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Table 9.13 Pearson's Correlation between Fishermen's Profiles and
their Attitude Toward Cooperation (N=194)
Variables The results
Value Decision
Age 0.138; p > 0.05 Accept Ho
Family size -0.025; P> 0.05 Accept Ho
Education
attainment
, 	
-0.144; P < 0.05 Reject Ho
As it can be seen from the negative value of the Pearson's r, fishermen's
education is inversely related to attitude toward cooperation. Surprisingly, this means
that those fishermen who have high education seem to cooperate less to manage their
fishery. One would expect that educated fishermen would take the lead to initiate
collective action to manage their coastal fishery. But this study has proved the opposite.
There must be an explanation for this finding. It is interesting to find that the more
educated the fisherman, the better his chances of finding a job in the civil services. To
prove this, an independent t-test was carried out to determine whether or not there is any
significant difference between the mean values of education attainment of those who
have jobs in the civil services and those who do not. The results shown in Table 9.14
indicated that the t-value of this test (3.45; p <0.05) is statistically significant, and there
is a difference in educational attainment between those who are employed and those
who do not have alternative work opportunities. As can be seen from Table 9.14 the
mean education attainment for working fishermen (mean education attainment = 2.24)
is higher than for pure fishermen (mean educational attainment = 0.60).
Table 9.14 Independent West Comparing Education Attainment and
Working Status (N=194).
Groups N Mean SD df t- value6
Fishermen	 with
another job
59 2.24 3.42
192 3.45; P < 0.05
Fishermen	 without
another job 135 0.60 1.93
6 The variances of the both groups are statistically different since the p-value of the Levene's test is less
than 0.05. Consequently, at-value based on unequal variances estimate is employed for this test.
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In Chapter Seven, the findings indicated a significant association between
respondent's age, education and working in non-fishing occupations. Because the high
educational attainment a fisherman has the better his chance to find a job outside the
fishing sector, this can explain why fishermen's education attainment is inversely related
to their willingness to cooperate in managing their fishery. Furthermore, it was found in
Chapter Seven that work opportunities outside the fishing sector are likely to attract
younger fishermen. Beside their exit opportunities, it is expected that those young
respondents have less knowledge about the problems associated with the fishery
compared to the older fishermen.
The results obtained here provide more support for the hypothesis that resource
management is most effective among homogenous groups of people (Scott, 1993;
Taylor, and Singleton, 1993; Johnson and Libecap, 1982). As in many real-world
setting, groups may not be homogeneous in all respects. In this case the group is not
homogeneous in terms of their dependence on the fishery. We have observed from the
above discussion that the fishermen behave differently because they do not all value
similarly the benefit they receive from a healthy fishery. Those who have secured jobs
outside the fishery sector are better off and their subjection toward discount rate might
be different (higher in this case) than that of those who depend on the fishery for their
livelihood. Therefore, their low level of cooperation to manage the coastal fishery is
expected based on the above findings. In game-theoretic terms, it can be said that
players are heterogeneous where different type of players have to deal with each other.
Such a situation is one where players with the payoff characteristic of the assurance
game face players with the payoff structure characteristic of the prisoner's dilemma
(Baland and Platteau, 1996; p. 88).
Therefore, the above findings indicate that demographic variables do not have
crucial deterministic effect on the success or failure of collective action. The hypothesis
of significant relationships between demographic variables and fishermen's decision to
participate in collective action was not supported using age and household size. The
findings indicate that the hypothesis was supported using education as an independent
variable, though the relationship was negative.
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9.4.5. Vessel characteristics
It is interesting to examine the difference in fishermen's attitude to management
of the fishery between fishermen of different technology. One would expect that the
characteristics of the vessels would have some influence on the respondents' decision to
cooperate or defect. Among vessel characteristics, vessel size and engine horsepower
were chosen in this study to examine the influence of vessel characteristics on
fishermen's level of cooperation. The emergence of collective action is seriously
hampered by the existence of different interests, notably between users of different
technology, for example the conflicts between fishermen operating bigger vessels
equipped with bigger engines and fishermen with smaller vessels equipped with smaller
engines. The former can exploit new fishing grounds outside the continental shelf, and
so increase their profits. Therefore, they may be less concerned about conservation of
fish resources in the coastal areas than those who are constrained by the low level of the
technology they own whose subsistence depends on the state of the resource in the
vicinity of their village owing to the lack of alternative income opportunities. For
example, Johnson and Libecap found that fishermen's willingness to organise with
others was made difficult because they are equipped with different fishing techniques
(Johnson and Libecap, 1982). The following hypothesis will be tested:
Hypothesis eight: there is a statistically significant correlation between vessel
characteristics and attitude toward cooperation.
The null hypothesis to be tested here is that there is no relationship between
vessel characteristics and fishermen's attitude toward cooperation. Pearson's r was used
again to test the strength and direction of the above relationship. The null hypothesis
will be rejected if the p-value (probability distribution) of the Pearson's r is less than
0.05. The results presented in Table 9.15 indicate that there is no statistically significant
correlation between vessel size and attitude toward cooperation. When the correlation
was tested for engine horsepower, the results indicated that the correlation was not
statistically significant as well (Table 9.15). Therefore, the null hypothesis of no
statistical significant correlation between vessels characteristics and fishermen's attitude
toward cooperation was accepted. The result of the above test was anticipated because
in Chapter Seven it was found that fishermen in the study area are using vessels of more
or less similar characteristics in terms of hull type (fibreglass), size and engine
horsepower. Similar results were found by Salim (1996).
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Table 9.15 Pearson's Correlation between Vessels Characteristics and
Fishermen's Attitude Toward Cooperation (N=194)
Test Vessel characteristics
Vessels size Engine horsepower
0.06
P > 0.05
Pearson's r 0.05
P > 0.05
Decision Accept Ho Accept I-To
9.4.6 Risk perceptions
In game theory, high risk and uncertainty play a crucial role in a player's
decision to take a particular strategy. Many researchers argue that the perception of
increased risk inhibits cooperation (Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 1994). In general, when a
fisherman faces a situation of high risk and uncertainty, cooperation becomes a decision
problem. Risk is believed to be particularly critical in the decision for individual
fishermen to cooperate in managing their fishery because of the danger of subsequent
loss due to free riders and their becoming suckers if a cooperative strategy is followed.
As presented in Chapter Five (section 5.2.1.2), in this study risk aversion is
expected to be positively associated with higher willingness to participate in collective
action. To operationalize the concept of risk perceptions, the study considered two
factors generally associated with fishermen's risk attitudes. The first is debt to asset ratio
(D/A) which measures financial risk. Fishermen with a high D/A ratio are likely to be
less risk-averse (or they have a greater willingness to accept some risk). Therefore,
fishermen with a large D/A ratio may be willing to accept greater business risks, and
therefore they may be less willing to cooperate in managing their fishery.
The second indicator used to measure perception of risk is the total number of
fishing gear types owned by vessel owners. This indicator is used as a proxy for a
fisherman's willingness to take risk. When fishermen own many types of fishing gears,
they are willing to accept some risk. Thus, fishermen who own more types of fishing
gears have a less risk-averse attitude and they are less likely to show a high level of
cooperation in commons (see section 5.2.1.2).
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Hypothesis nine: there is a positive statistically significant relationship between
risk aversion and attitudes toward cooperation.
A null hypothesis of no positive statistical significant relationship was derived
from hypothesis nine. Pearson's r was used again to test the strength and direction of the
above relationship. The null hypothesis will be rejected if the p-value (probability
distribution) of the Pearson's r is less than 0.05.
The results presented in Table 9.16 indicate that among the factors related to
risk, the correlation between debt to asset ratio and cooperation was statistically
significant and negative only in Suwaiq. The calculated Pearson's coefficient was -
0.330 with a p-value (0.004) of less than 0.05, which indicates that the null hypothesis
should be rejected, at least in Suwaiq. Therefore, the higher the DCA ratio (less risk
averse), the lower the fishermen's willingness to cooperate. This can be observed in the
situation of an open access fishery or when the institution that governs the users'
harvesting activities is weakened, for example, by government intervention, as in the
case of the fishery described in this study. In such situations, a fisherman with a high
debt to asset ratio will not take the offer of a cooperating game, as there is no guarantee
that others will not defect and make him a "sucker". When the correlation was tested for
the three towns, the null hypothesis was accepted, as there was no statistically
significant correlation at the five-percent level (P > 0.05). The results for Barka and
Masn'a may be due to the fact that this variable is influenced by other factors; for
example the availability of alternative job opportunities outside the fishery sector,
especially in Barka, which gives fishermen access to creditors to obtain loans for
purposes other than fishing.
The second indicator used to measure the perception of risk is the number of
fishing gear types owned by the individual vessel owner. The Pearson's r coefficient is
negative and statistically significant in all three towns. As presented in Table 9.16, there
is a moderate negative correlation between perception of risk and the attitude toward
cooperation (- 0.30) which is statistically significant with a p-value (0.000) of less than
0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis of no significant correlation should be rejected. In any
case, considering the overall effect of the two indicators of risk aversion, the hypothesis
that risk preferences have no influence on a fisherman's attitude toward cooperation is
rejected.
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Risk preferencesTest
D A ratio7 No. of fishing
gears owned
- 0.330*
P <0.05
.0.300*
P<0.05
Pearson's r
Decision Reject Ho Reject Ho
Table 9.16 Pearson's Correlation between Fishermen's Risk Preference
and their Attitude TONN ard Cooperation (N=194)
(*) Indicate significant correlation at the 0.05 level
9.4.7 Group size
In the study of collective action, the relationship between group size and the
success of collective action has received considerable attention in both the theoretical
and experimental literatures. Based on the literature review, it is hypothesised in this
study that group size has no effect on the resource users' level of participation on
collective action (Sandler, 1992; Barry and Hardin, 1982; Chamberlin, 1974; Wade,
1988 andl3aland and Platteau, 1996).
The first stage of the analysis will be to take the three towns (Barka, Masnla and
Suwaiq) separately. The purpose here is to determine if there is a difference in
fishermen's attitude toward cooperation among fishermen from the three towns included
in this study. In fact, the total number of fishermen inhabiting each town is different;
there are 343 fishermen in Barka, 236 in Masn'a and 383 fishermen in Suwaiq.
Hypothesis ten: there is a statistically significant difference amongfishermen f
the three towns in attitude toward cooperation.
To compare the attitude toward cooperation of the respondents from the three
towns, one-way analysis of variance was used to test the null hypothesis of no
significant difference in the mean scores of the three groups. The result of this test is
displayed in Table 9.17. The F-ratio, which is the between-group means divided by the
within-groups one (3.709/7.584 = 0.489), is non-significant. Consequently, there is no
significant difference in attitude toward cooperation between respondents from the three
7 The result (Pearson's r) shown here is for Suwaiq only, The resulted Pearson s r was no statistical
significant for Barka and Masn'a.
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towns. The result of the test has failed to reject the null hypothesis. Hence, it can be
concluded that fishermen in the study area have a similar attitude toward cooperation.
Table 9.17. A One-way Analysis of Variance of Attitude Toward
Cooperation (N=194)
DF Sum of
Squares
Mean
Square
F-ratio
Between groups 2 7.42 3.71
0,489; P > 0.05Within groups 191 1448.53 7.60
Total 193 1455.94
The second stage is to take the total number of fishermen in each village as the
independent variable. The independent variable "group size" was therefore
operationalized as the total number of fishermen in each village. In this study, fishermen
from 27 villages were included in the sample. The group sizes of these villages vary; the
smallest has only 10 fishermen, whereas the largest has a total of 160 fishermen living
together. It is interesting to examine the difference between fishermen's cooperation
mean scores for those who live in villages of small user groups and that of large user
groups. For the purpose of the analysis, the 27 villages included in the survey were
divided into two groups: small and large. The small group includes villages inhabited by
40 fishermen or less and the large group includes villages with more than 40 fishermen
living in them. A t-test technique was used to determine the influence of group size on
fishermen's attitude to cooperate in the commons. The results presented in Table 9.18
indicates that the t-test value of fishermen's cooperation (1.01; P > 0.05) is not
statistically significant. Hence, there is no significant difference between fishermen's
willingness to cooperate according to their group size, i.e., fishermen inhabiting villages
of large group size or small group size.
It can be seen from Table 9.18 that fishermen's cooperation mean scores for
those who come from small villages (6.28) is slightly higher than the mean scores for
those who come from large villages (5.91), though the difference is not statistically
significant. Again, the results of the test failed to reject the null hypothesis of no
statistical significant relationship between group size and fishermen willingness to
cooperate.
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Table 9.18 Independent Sample t-test Comparing Attitude Toward
Cooperation of Fishermen Living in Small and Large Village Size (N=194).
Group size N Mean SD DF t- value8
Small group 90 6.28 2.15
192 1.01; P > 0.05
Large group 104 5.91 2.77
It is true that in some cases, members of a small group have better chances to
organise and form collective action than those of a large group. The reason for this is
that because when groups are small, members tend to have more personalised
encounters in the village and they therefore have a strong incentive to consider the
future consequences of their strategies instead of paying attention to immediate costs
and benefits. But small groups have disadvantages as well. For example, during the
field survey, the researcher was told by a group of fishermen from a small village that
they could do nothing to stop fishermen from a neighbouring village using certain gears
such as the Tadwerah and Tahweta which are responsible for resource depletion. They
stated that the members of their village are too few to face the large numbers of
fishermen from the neighbouring village. They added that they could not even lobby the
local authority to make fishermen from other villages obey the local fishing rules (Senat
Al-Bahar) when fishing in front of their village. In fact, as will be shown below, large
groups become like small groups when their members share common norms
(homogenous group). In another small village (Al-Break in Masn'a) in which ten
fishermen are living, the researcher found that the mean scores for cooperation was only
one (the mean for the whole sample is 7.19). The researcher observed that 50 percent of
the fishermen in this village were using gears such as Tadwerah and Tahweta. The other
fishermen in the village stated that they could not oppose the action of their colleagues
because of the size of their group.
We have seen that the group of fishermen surveyed in the present study is
homogenous in term of their ethnic origin, culture and language, whereas groups of
similar size studied by Salim (1996) in Malaysia were not homogenous because group
members had different ethnic origins, languages and cultures (Chinese and Malay).
Therefore, having a small user group does not eliminate cultural, ethnical and other
8 The variances of the two groups are not statistically different since the p-value of the Levene's test is
0.84. Consequently, a t-value based on equal variances estimate is employed for this test.
217
differences among group members, and so it does not guarantee the homogeneity of the
group.
It is true that for many authors one of the conditions for successful collective
action is that user groups are small in size. This notion goes back to 1965 when Mancur
Olson in his book "The logic of collective action" argued that "provision of public
goods depends largely on group size" (Olson, 1965). Olson suggested that small groups
would provide public goods; as the size of the group increases, individuals will not
provide themselves with the public good required (ibid.). However, there are many
others who expressed strong disagreement with Olson's view with respect to the
connection between user groups size and participation in collective action. For example,
Barry and Hardin stated that Olson's logic can only concern whether groups are
privileged or latent, not whether they are large or small (Barry and Hardin, 1982).
Sandler (1992) has also ruled out the direct effect of group size as the main predictor of
the success or failure of collective action. In Chamberlin's view, the relationship
between group size and the provision of collective goods is more complex than Olson
asserts and, in many cases, it is the opposite of that suggested by Olson (Chamberlin,
1974; p. 707).
Another example from a real world setting is the findings of Wade in Andra
Pradesh (India) when he stated that small size is not a necessary condition of success in
collective action (Wade, 1988; p. 213-14). Similar to Wade's conclusion is the finding
of Baland and Platteau after they had reviewed many cases of collective action from
communities of different group sizes. They reached the following conclusion: "The
lesson from these examples seems to be that there is some sense in saying that large
groups are made more like small groups when their members share common norms
possibly enforced by a well-recognized authority" (Baland and Platteau, 1996; p. 300).
Therefore, the finding of this study, which ruled out the direct effect of group size on
the success or failure of collective action, is consistent with the findings of Baland and
Platteau (1996); Wade (1988); Chamberlin (1974); Barry and Hardin (1982); Salim
(1996) and Sandler (1992).
9.4.8 Group heterogeneity
Of fundamental relevance to the study of collective action is the relationship
between group heterogeneity and the success of collective action. Based on the
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literature review, three sources of heterogeneity that hamper the capacity of resource
users to participate in collective action were identified. These sources are originated
from the following: (a) ethnic, racial, or other kinds of cultural divisions; (b) differences
in the nature of interests various individuals may have in a particular collective action
and (c) inter-individual variations in some critical endowments, that are reflected in
varying intensities of interest (Baland and Plateau 1996; P. 302). Baland and Platteau
(1996, 1997a and 1997b) further asserted that while the first two are considered as
causing a strong obstruction to collective action, the same cannot be said of the third
case.
Regarding the first source of heterogeneity, ethnical, social and other cultural
difference may have a negative impact on the ability of resource users to form collective
action. As presented in Chapter Seven, fishermen in the study area were found to have a
common language, share the same religious belief and originate from the same race.
Therefore, the first source of heterogeneity (ethnic, racial, or other kinds of cultural
divisions) was not used as an explanatory socioeconomic variable. Because the group is
homogenous with respect to the first source of heterogeneity, fishermen seem likely to
establish or maintain institutions to manage fish resources at low cost. Homogeneity
coupled with high interdependence among the fishermen makes social ostracism strong
enough to induce compliance with institutional rules.
When these ethnic, racial and cultural differences are minimized, they tend to
eliminate the difference in interpreting the rules of the game as well as the social
conventions and norms that support cooperation. However, ethnic and racial differences
should not be assumed to be the cause of every collective failure. For example, Salim
(1996) in his study of the coastal trawl fishery of Malaysia found that Chinese and
Malay fishermen organized collective action to reduce overfishing in their fishery.
Thus, their ethnic differences were no impediment to collective action.
The second source of heterogeneity (heterogeneity of interests or objectives) is a
strong impediment to collective action as argued by Baland and Platteau (1996). To
elicit information about the second source of heterogeneity, the fishermen were asked to
report their fishing status, i.e., full-time or part-time. Part-time fisherman are those who
are working full-time outside the fishing sector, and so have alternative income-earning
opportunities. Based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis was tested:
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Hypothesis eleven: there is a statistically significant difference in willingness to
cooperate between fishermen with different objectives concerning the use of the fishery.
To compare the willingness to cooperate to manage the fishery of fishermen
with different objectives or interest (fishing status as the explanatory variable), a t-test
was used to test the null hypothesis of no significant difference. The results of this test
are presented in Table 9.19. It is interesting to examine the difference between
fishermen's cooperation mean scores for those who are full-time and that of part-time
fishermen. The results presented in Table 9.19 indicate that the t-test value of
fishermen's cooperation (- 2.85; p < 0.05) is statistically significant, and therefore, there
is a statistical difference between fishermen's willingness to cooperate according to their
fishing status, i.e., full-time and part-time.
Table 9.19 Independent Sample t-test Comparing Willingness to
Cooperate of Full-time and Part-time Fishermen (N = 194)
Fishing status N Mean SD9 DF10 t-value"
Part-time 59 6.36 2.68
192 - 2.85; p < 0.05
Full-time 135 7.56 2.70
Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected based on the results presented in
Table 9.19. The result of the test clearly shows that full-time fishermen have a higher
willingness to cooperate mean score (7.56) than part-time fishermen (6.36). This
indicates that full-time fishermen have a more positive willingness to cooperate to
manage their resources, owing to their high interest in the resources, than part-time
fishermen.
In the context of coastal fisheries, for example, collective action is threatened
when some fishermen have alternative income-earning opportunities. Resources
management is undermined by the existence of different interests, most notably between
full-time and part-time fishermen. In the case of fishing status, part-time fishermen
having secured another source of income feel much less concerned about conservation
9SD = Standard Deviation.10DF = Degree of Freedom.
11 The variances of both groups are not statistically different since the p-value of the Levenes test is
0.84. Consequently, a t-value based on equal variances estimate is employed for this test.
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of fish resources, than full-time fishermen whom subsistence crucially depends upon the
state of these resources, owing to lack of alternative income opportunities (Platteau,
1989b; p. 645).
The intuition behind this hypothesis is that when two groups with different
objectives appropriate the resource, the management of the resource is threatened. In
such a situation, the first group (full-time fishermen) use the resource with a long-term
objective; thus they will be much more concerned about its sustainability. The other
group (part-time fishermen), owing to their alternative sources of income, will
appropriate the resource with a short-term objective (higher subjective discount rate);
thus they are much less concerned about resource management and will free ride on the
efforts of the other groups. It has been suggested that heterogeneity of preferences
amounts to transaction costs, and thereby impedes cooperation as cooperation requires
shared values (Dasgupta, 1996; p. 403). The same can be said about industrial fishing
where there are sometimes many exit possibilities, because fishermen can move their
fleets to other fishing grounds (Platteau, 1989b; p. 645). Cases of this type are found in
developing countries, where industrial fishing has been given concessions to exploit fish
resources (Lim et al., 1995; Baland and Platteau, 1996 and Ostrom, 1990), thus
expanding the options open to skippers.
Based on the literature review presented in Chapter Three, the third cause of
heterogeneity originates from differences in skills, assets, income and access to credit
markets. Olson (1965) advanced the exploitation hypothesis in which he argued that
agents with high stakes in a public good are more willing to bear a large share of the
costs of its production (see also Guttman, 1978; p. 254). Some evidence from CPRs
supports Olson's argument where the costs of regulation are often born by the economic
elite (Wade, 1988; p. 190 and Ostrom and Gardner, 1993; p. 105). In an example
provided by Baland and Platteau (1997a; p. 461) it was found also that rural
cooperatives in the Netherlands were often created by better-off farmers who took the
initiatives to start the cooperatives and contributed the bulk of the initial share capital.
Another successful example was the case of Saudi Arabia which for many years
produced less than its quota of oil to subsidize OPEC in its effort to reduce excess
production by other members (1-leckathorn, 1993, cited in Baland and Platteau, 1997b;
p. 3). This pattern conforms well to the exploitation hypothesis advanced by Olson
(1965) that the large is exploited by the small. Based on the literature review, the study
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will test Olson's (1965) exploitation hypothesis. Thus, it is hypothesised here that higher
income inequality will lead to optimal provision of the collective goods as asserted by
Olson (1965). The following hypothesis will be tested:
Hypothesis twelve: there is a statistically significant relationship between
income inequality and individual fishermen's willingness to cooperate.
Therefore, the third indicator of heterogeneity was income inequality. A
frequently used measure of the distribution of income is the Gini Coefficient, which was
estimated for the three towns in Section7.8. The aim here is to determine the effect of
income inequality on fishermen's individual decision to participate in collective action.
Table 9.20 presents the Gini coefficients, and mean score for willingness to cooperate
for the three towns included in this study.
Table 9.20 Gini Coefficient and Towns Mean Score of Cooperation.
Towns Gini coefficient Mean willingness to cooperate
Barka 0.34 7.48
Masn'a 0.37 7.02
Suwaiq 0.40 7.10
Average 0.39 7.19
From Table 9.20, it can be seen that Barka has the lowest income inequality
(0.34) and the highest mean score for individual willingness to cooperate (7.48), while
Suwaiq has the highest income inequality (0.40) and its mean level of cooperation was
lower than that for Barka (7.10). The figures in Table 9.20 seem not to support Olson's
exploitation hypothesis. To test the null hypothesis statistically, one-way analysis of
variance was used, the results of which are presented in Table 9.21. Although variation
in income inequality was observed between the three towns, statistical analysis does not
show a statistically significant difference in the mean score of cooperation for the three
towns (Table 9.21). The F-ratio is very small (F = 0.489 and P > 0.05); thus, it is non-
significant. The results of the test failed to reject our null hypothesis that "there is no
relationship between income inequality and individual fishermen's willingness to
cooperate". Therefore, the findings of this study give no support for the exploitation
hypothesis advanced by Olson (1965).
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Table 9.21 A One-way Analysis of Variance of Attitude Toward
Cooperation (N=194)
DF Sum of
Squares
Mean
Square
F-ratio
Between groups 2 7.42 3.71
0.489; P > 0.05Within groups 191 1448.53 7.60
Total 193 1455.94
In an attempt to investigate further the influence of income inequality on
individual willingness to cooperate, Gini coefficients were calculated for each village.
In the three towns selected for this study, there are 27 fishing villages. These villages
are used here as the unit of analysis and comparison was made between Gini
coefficients in each village and its mean score for cooperation. Therefore, the study
tested the relationship between income inequality and the level of cooperation in the 27
villages. Pearson's r was used to test the strength and direction of the above relationship
(Table 9.22). The results presented in Table 9.22 indicate that there is no statistically
significant correlation between income inequality and mean level of cooperation.
Table 9.22 Pearson Correlation between Income Inequality in each
Village and its Mean Level of Cooperation (N = 27 villages)
Test r-value Decision
Pearson's r 0.059
P > 0.05 Accept Ho
The results of the correlation test have failed to reject the null hypothesis, and
therefore Olson's exploitation hypothesis is rejected based on the results presented in
Table 9.21 and 9.22. The findings of this study ruled out the effect of income inequality
on the fishermen's ability to participate in collective action, similar to the findings of
Baland and Platteau (1997a; p. 461 and 1997b; p. 3).
As argued by Baland and Platteau (1997a; p. 461 and 1997b; p. 3), the
exploitation hypothesis should not be taken to mean that if the distribution of wealth
were made more egalitarian, individual contribution would fall. In the case of OPEC, it
just happened that the wealth of Saudi Arabia was overwhelmingly greater than that of
other members of OPEC; thus, it attached a higher value to any improvement in oil
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prices, which made it rich enough to bear the greater share of the reduction of excess
production. Further, Comes and Sandler (1985; p. 113) argue that the optimal provision
of a public good in a community of a given size is independent of income distribution
(see also Comes, 1993; p. 265). In communities where wealth is made more equal, the
cost of initiating regulatory tasks would be shared more equally among agents, whereas
greater inequality makes some agents big enough to bear a greater share of the costs on
a voluntary basis, while others are too small or attach too little value to their resource
endowments (Baland and Platteau, 1997b; p. 3).
In many instances from marine fisheries, wealth is associated with better
availability of outside economic opportunities. Thus, a large elite, even though they
attach greater value to their resource endowment, chooses to sacrifice conservation
effort in order to derive quick gains in the present. In the context of coastal fisheries, for
example, conservation effort may be seriously undermined by the presence of more
endowed members. As their assets increase, they start to acquire bigger vessels and
stronger engines, which allow them to exploit new fishing grounds away from their base
village. Owing to this exit opportunity, they feel less concerned about conservation of
local fish resources. Therefore, more inequality does not necessary lead to more
efficient use of natural resources (Baland and Platteau, 1996; chap. 12; 1997a; p. 461
and 19971; p. 3); thus, Olson's (1965) conjecture (the equilibrium in public-goods game
often has small members free-riding more than large members) might not hold true in
the case of CPRs.
To conclude this section, the study findings indicated that while the first two
sources of heterogeneity (ethical and difference in objectives and interests) are
considered as causing an obstruction to collective action, the same cannot be said about
the difference in the distribution of income. More inequality does not necessarily lead to
more efficient use of natural resources
9.5 Regression Analysis
In the above sections, fishermen's willingness to cooperate was found to be
explained by a number of independent variables. The remainder of this chapter is
devoted to illustrate the use of regression analysis to build a linear regression model to
test these relationships further and to enable us to make prediction of the likely value of
the dependent variable, "cooperation".
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Regression analysis, in the form of multiple regression, is regarded as the most
widely used and powerful tools for summarizing the relationship between variables and
for prediction of the dependent variable (Bryman and Cramer, 1997; p. 256). The main
theme of this section is to examine the possible contributions of the independent
variables to fishermen's willingness to cooperate. The relative importance of the
independent variables to the dependent variables is measured by R2 (the coefficient of
determination), which represents the proportion of the variation in the dependent
variable accounted for by the variation of the independent variables (Kennedy, 1998; p.
13). It is often used as an indication of how well the model implied by the regression
equation fits the data. For example, if R2 of the regression model is 0.49, it can be said
that the independent variables entered into the regression equation are providing an
explanation of 49 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. The linear
regression model chosen to test the relationship was:
y = constant + fliXt + f32X2+ )83)(3+ /34X4 +13
Where: f3 i to fin are the regression coefficients
X1 to Xn
 are the independent variables entered into the regression
equation.
In the computation of the multiple-regression equation, the researcher employed
a stepwise procedure to decide the sequence of the entry of variables into the equation.
The stepwise selection of independent variables is the most commonly used method in
testing regression (Norusis, 1993; p. 350, Bryman and Cramer, 1997; p. 267). It is a
combination of forward and backward selection. With this procedure, variables are
entered in steps, with the variable that exhibits the highest correlation with the
dependent variable being entered at the first step, followed by the variable that exhibits
the next highest correlation with the dependent variable; and so on, until the regression
procedure terminates. The procedure terminates when independent variables fail to
conform to the criteria for inclusion12
 operated by the stepwise procedure (Bryman and
Cramer, 1997).
Before considering the results of the regression model, the F-ratio test should be
inspected first. This test is used to examine the null hypothesis that the multiple
12	 .	 .Cntena for entry is set at P = 0.05. Therefore, any variable with p-value greater than 0.05 will be
excluded from the regression equation.
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correlation is ::ero in the population from which the sample was drawn 13. The multiple
regression analysis demonstrates that the correlation between the dependent variable
"cooperation" and all the independent variables (awareness of resource problems,
perception of risk, economic dependence on fishing and social identity) are significant
in all the four steps of model building, as shown by the F-values in Table 9.23.
Therefore, it is improbable that R in the population is zero; thus, the above null
hypothesis is rejected.
Table 9.23 Steps of the Multiple Regression Results (N=194)
Predictors Steps R R2 F
Awareness	 of resources 1 0.31 0.09 19.77
exploitation problems P<0.05
Perception of Risk 2 0.39 0.14 16.76
P<0.05
Economic dependence on 3 0.46 0.21 16.92
fishing P<0.05
Social identity 4 0.48 0.24 14.48
, 
P<0.05
Table 9.23 provides information about what happens as each variable is entered
in the equation which is demonstrated by the steps from 1 to 4. As it can be seen, the
multiple R (R2) was 0.09 when only awareness of resources problems was included in
the regression equation. When perception of risk was entered, the R 2 became 0.14,
suggesting that this variable added 0.05 (0.14-0.09) to R2. The variable economic
dependence on fishing added another 0.07 (0.21-0.14) to R 2, and the variable social
identity added a further 0.03 (0.24 -0.21) to R 2. The procedure was terminated after step
4. Step 4 provides the final figures for the equation as a whole. This shows, for
example, that R2 once awareness of resource problems, perception of risk, economic
dependence on fishing and social identity are entered into the equation is 0.24,
suggesting that around one quarter (24 %) of the variance in cooperation is explained by
these four variables alone. Independent variables such as respondent's age, education
and many others did not enter the regression equation because they failed to conform to
the criteria for inclusion set by the stepwise procedure. Although these variables were
statistically significantly associated with the dependent variable "cooperation", when the
four variables (awareness of resource problems, perception of risk, economic
13 This means that the multiple R (correlation between the dependent variable and the independent
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dependence on fishing and social identity) are controlled, they do not have enough
impact on cooperation to escape the program's exclusion criteria. In any case, if these
variables were forced into the equation, their contribution to explain the dependent
variable "cooperation" would be close to zero (Thyman and Cramer, 1997).
Another important statistical test that should be consulted in regression analysis
is the t-value produced in Table 9.24, which indicates the statistical significance of
individual regression coefficients (Beta). As can be seen from Table 9.24, the
coefficients of the four independent variables in the model were statistically significant
(P-values less than 0.05). This suggests that the calculated coefficients (Beta) for each
of the four independent variables are unlikely to be zero in the population.
Table 9.24 Stepwise Multiple Regression Results at the Last Step (N=194)
Predictors /3 Beta* T tolerance
Awareness of resources problems 0.243 0.281 4.37 0.979
P<0.05
Perception of Risk -0.731 -0.257 -3.99 0.978
P<0.05
Economic dependence on fishing 0.014 0.181 2.60 0.836
P<0.05
Social identity 2.37 0.169 2.42 0.835
P<0.05
(Constant) 2.94 - 2.43 -
P<0.05
* Standardised Beta coefficients
The last column (tolerance) in Table 9.24 provides information about
multicollinearity, which refers to the situation in which there is a high multiple
correlation when one independent variables is regressed on the others (intercorrelation
among independent variables) (Kennedy, 1998 and Norusis, 1993). If two independent
variables are intercorrelated, they provide very similar information, and it is difficult to
determine the contributions of each variable on the dependent variable. The tolerance of
a variable is a commonly used measure of multicollinearity (Norusis, 1993; p. 355).
When the tolerance is low (close to zero), the multiple correlation is high and there is
the possibility of multicollinearity which renders the results untrustworthy (Bryman and
Cramer, 1997; Norusis, 1993). The tolerance for the four independent variables included
variables produced by the regression analysis) is equal to zero.
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in the model of this study is high (close to one), ranging from 0.84 to 0.98, suggesting
that multicollinearity is unlikely and the results are trustworthy.
Because the variables in the regression equation are derived from different units
of measurement which makes the derived betas (fl) non-comparable, standardised
regression coefficients (Beta) should be used when interpreting the results to obtain the
relative importance of each independent variable to the dependent variable (Kinnear and
Gray, 1995; p. 183). Table 9.24 provides the final figures for the equation as a whole.
The multiple regression equation estimated in Table 9.24 suggests several
findings. Fishermen's awareness of resource exploitation problems appears to be the
best predictor of cooperation (standardised Beta = 0.281). Perception of risk also
appears to be important (Beta = -0.257). Less risk averse fishermen show less
cooperation, since the sign of the coefficient is negative. Economic dependence on
fishing (Beta = 0.181) came in third place, followed by social identity (Beta = 0.169) as
fishermen; the sign of both these coefficients is positive. Thus, the standarised beta for
perception of resource problems means that for each one unit change of perception of
resource problems, there is a standard deviation change in cooperation of 0.281, with
the effect of the other three variables in the equation controlled. The final linear
regression model obtained in this study to predict the dependent variable "cooperation"
is as follows:
Cooperation = 2.94 + 0.24 x awareness of resources problems -
0.73 x perception of risk + 0.014 x economic dependence on fishing
+ 2.4 x social identity
9.6 Conclusion
The results of this chapter provide some insight into the factors that influence
the emergence of collective action to manage coastal fisheries. The factors highlighted
in this chapter can be generalised to predict the success and failure of collective action
in similar fishing communities. In particular, the analysis indicates that there is a
positive relationship between economic dependence on the common property resources
and individual decisions to adopt a cooperative strategy. The higher the economic
dependence on the fishery, the higher the effort one would provide to manage the
fishery. The negative influence of outside income may be related to the ability to
mitigate risk of community punishment because fishermen not dependent on the fishery
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become detached from the village, since they are no lon ger bound by the condition of
mutual vulnerability, because they have alternative sources of income.
Social identity as a fisherman appears to predict fishermen's willingness to
cooperate to manage their fishery. Family involvement in fishing did not appear to be
related to the fishermen's cooperation, but cooperation was associated with fishermen's
experience (number of years fishing) and principal work. These results suggested that
those who migrate to the fishing communities to start fishing would show a relatively
lower level of cooperation to manage the fishery.
The findings in this study suggest that resource scarcity gives an incentiv e for
cooperation. Possession of information about the status of the resource is vital for the
emergence of collective action. The results indicate that three of the four indicators of
the fishermen's awareness of their resource exploitation problems were correlated
significantly with the dependent variable "attitude toward cooperation". The strongest
correlation was found between awareness of the causes of overfishing and cooperation,
suggesting that when fishermen are aware of a resource problem, they will be interested
in participating in local conservation efforts.
Fishermen's profiles did not appear to influence their choice to cooperate or to
defect. Only educational attainment was found to be significantly correlated with the
individual's willingness to cooperate, though the correlation was negative. The negative
relationship was explained by the high correlation between education attainment and
fishermen's ability to find work outside the fishing sector. At the same time, vessel
characteristics do not appear to influence fishermen's decision to manage the fishery.
This can be explained by the fact that fishermen in the area are using more or less
similar technology.
The results indicated that there is a significant negative relationship between
perception of risk and fishermen's adoption of a cooperative strategy. When debt to
asset ratio was used to predict perception of risk, the relationship was statistically
significant in Suwaiq only. The non-significant correlation for Barka and Masn'a may
be due to the interference of other variables. The result of the hypothesis test using the
second indicator of risk perception (the number of fishing gear types owned) indicated
that there is a significant negative relationship between perception of risk and
fishermen's attitude toward cooperation.
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Regarding group size, it is true that for many authors, one of the conditions for
successful collective action is that user groups have a small size. The results presented
in this chapter oppose this hypothesis. The results strongly suggest that group size does
not have any significant influence on fishermen willingness to cooperate to manage
their fishery. Indeed, a large group is made like a small group when the users share
common norms. Therefore, the finding of this study ruled out the direct effect of group
size on the success or failure of collective action, which is consistent with the findings
of Baland and Platteau (1996), Wade (1988), Chamberlin (1974), Barry and Hardin
(1982), Salim (1996) and Sandler (1992).
The study also considers the relationship between group heterogeneity and the
success of collective action. Three indicators of group heterogeneity were included in
hypothesis testing (ethnic, racial, or other kinds of cultural divisions; differences in the
nature of interests various individuals may have in a particular collective action and
inter-individual variations in some critical attributes, that are reflected in varying
intensities of interest). The study findings indicated that while the first two sources of
heterogeneity (cultural division and difference in objectives and interests) are
considered as causing a strong obstruction to collective action, the same cannot be said
about the difference in the distribution of income. More inequality does not necessarily
lead to more efficient use of natural resources. Thus, Olson's (1965) exploitation
hypothesis was ruled out.
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CHAPTER TEN
ANALYSIS OF FISHERMEN'S DECISION CHOICE USING
GAME THEORY
10.1 Introduction
This chapter uses game theory to analyse the decision choice of the fishermen
included in this study. The chapter will provide an understanding of why fishermen in
South Al-Batinah have succeeded in initiating collective action to solve some of their
common problems but failed in others. In Chapter Nine, fishermen's willingness to
cooperate was explained and shown to be determined by a number of factors. Some of
these factors seem responsible for influencing the incentives facing individuals in a
game, which in turn determine the game outcome. In this chapter, therefore, these
factors are used to support the analysis of fishermen's behaviour using game theory. The
chapter begins by illustrating different forms of game theory and its application to the
analysis of coastal fisheries. Then it explores a number of provision problems facing
fishermen in South Al-Batinah. Important appropriation problems facing the traditional
fishermen in their use of the fishery are also explored. The section before the last
explores the overall level of cooperation in the study area, while the chapter conclusion
is presented in the last section.
10.2 Game Theory
Individual decision choice when concerned with the management of common
property resources can be analysed using game theory (Palfreman, 1999; p. 41). As
argued by Child and Faulkner (1998; p. 26) "Game theory is concerned with the
strategies adopted by the players to a game and the effects these have on the game's
outcome". Similarly, Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1996; p. 40) argue that "game theory
provides a systematic way to develop strategies when one person's fate depends on what
other people do".
There are different forms of game. These differences arise from the difference
in: the number of players (two-person vs. n-person), interest of the players (conflict or
coincide), knowledge about the other party's decision (perfect vs. incomplete), number
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of times the game is played and communication (ibid..). Furthermore, games ma y be
cooperative or non-cooperative. As argued by Comes and Sandler (1996, p 18),
cooperative games refers to the formation of coalitions in 141iich participants wiwk
together to maximize a payoff, which will later be divided among members Some
examples of cooperating games are the privileged game, the game of Chicken and the
Assurance game. On the other hand, non-cooperative games refer to situations where
competition prevails among players who are seeking to maximise their own benefits and
ignore the side effects they create on each other and ignore the benefits they will receive
had they cooperated_ A classic case of a non-cooperative game is the so-called
Prisoner's Dilemma' (PD) which is a simple game in which the ultimate outcomes will
be disastrous for all participants if no intervention from outside the group occurs; thus,
the equilibrium is Pareto- inferior to the mutual cooperation outcome.
Unfortunately non-cooperative game theory has been widely used by many
scholars to explain situations facing users of common property resources, thus
implicitly prejudging the outcomes (Hardin, 1968 and Wade, 1987)_ The conclusion
reached is that when people are in a situation where they could mutually benefit if of
them restrained their use of a common-pool resource, they will not do so unless an
external agency enforces a suitable rule. Accordingly, common property resources can
only be managed through centralized coordination and control (see for example Hardin,
1968 and Wade, 1987). On the contrary many authors (Baland and Platteau, 1996,
Baticados et al., 1998; Dasgupta and Maier, 1994; Ostrom, 1990; and Runge, 1986
argue that the above claim does not hold true for many common property resources
surveyed by the above authors. Also, the findings of this thesis su ggest that situations of
common property use should not be represented as a non-cooperative game such as the
PD game. In their reply to the findings of Wade (1987) who concluded that common
property resources can only be managed through centralized coordination and control,
Dasgupta and Maler (1994; p. 330) argued that "the theory alga/nes has unraveled the
variety of institutional mechanisms (rangingfrom taxes to quantify controls which can
in principle support desirable allocations of common property resources.. The theory
makes clear, and has made clear for quite some time, that arforcement of the agreed-
upon allocation can be carried out by the users themselves. In many cases this may weil
be the most desirable option".
1 A
 
game is non-cooperative if it is impossible for players to commtnucate or coUlaborace m amy %my
(Nash, 1953, p 35)
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The findings of Chapters Eight and Nine suggest that modelling the fishermen's
behaviour in South Al-Batinah using the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game seems
unrealistic as this game poses an obvious problem. This problem arises because the
stable outcome of the PD game in such situations is non-cooperation, which contradicts
the findings of this thesis. Let us imagine for a moment that the fishing practices in
South Al-Batinah are devoid of collective action and that the situation can be
represented by a PD game. In this case, the invasion of industrial fishing fleet into the
traditional fishing zone of the Al-Batinah coast would have remained unchallenged,
ruining the livelihood of thousand of fishermen in the area 2. Furthermore, the
indigenous management institution (Senat Al-Bahar) would not have been evolved to
manage and restrain the take of fish from the resource and to control the activities of
fishermen on land and at sea. It would also be possible for fishermen to use destructive
technology to catch fish such as dynamite and we would have seen new fishing gears
that might deplete the resource entering the area without obstruction 3. However, field
observation and the results found in this study indicated that collective action has
evolved to overcome some (but not all) of the problems mentioned above.
To take a few examples of successful collective action from the study area, let us
consider the case of the fishermen in Al-Qurha village (Suwaiq). Fishermen in this
village successfully organized and forced industrial trawlers out of their fishing grounds
(full description of the case can be found in Chapter Eight). The collective action in this
case is when fishermen collectively participated and won the battle against a common
enemy, an activity which improves their collective well-being. In this case the payoff
structure of the gains from the fishermen's action in the above village does not look like
the payoff structure of the PD game. Therefore, if the situation in South Al-Batinah
fishing cannot be appropriately represented by the PD game, then other game forms that
may be more relevant in this respect should be discussed. The results presented in
Chapter Eight strongly suggest that fishermen in the study area initiated collective
action on numerous occasions. We have seen strong opposition by fishermen in the area
to the use of more destructive fishing gears such as Monofilament gill nets, Tadwerah
and Tahweta which are seen by them as causing resource depletion. Many of them
successfully organized to lobby the local authority and the Ministry of Agriculture and
2	 . .This is a provisional problem analysed in Section 10.3
3	 . .This is an appropriation problem analysed in Section 10.5
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Fisheries to stop such innovations and to penalize those using them. In the following
sections the thesis analyses fishermen's behaviour using the theory of games.
10.3 Provision Problems
To illustrate cases of successful collective action in the study area, let us first
consider the case of the fishermen's decision problem in Al-Qurha (Suwaiq) when
industrial trawlers invaded their fishing grounds. This is a typical provision problem,
which can be represented, for simplicity, by a two-fisherman game whose fishing
grounds are invaded by a demersal trawler. Let us assume that the catches of each
individual fisherman presently are 10 kilograms per day. However, to maintain present
catches, they need to stop the trawler invading their fishing ground. Let us also assume
that they can collectively pay a number of villagers to go with them to the sea to destroy
the gear of the trawler or to catch the captain and his crew (which is the public good to
be provided). Further, assume that the total cost of producing the public good amounts
to the value of 4 kilograms of fish catch. If both fishermen cooperate, i.e., they both
agree to share the cost of paying the villagers to force the trawler out of their area, their
individual net catch will be 8 kilograms (10 kilograms minus 2 kilograms). However, if
both defect, i.e., neither of them challenges the trawler, then the outcome is disastrous
as their fishery will be overexploited and their individual catch will soon come down to
3 kilograms (not enough catch to justify the effort involved). If, however, one fisherman
contributes, the non-contributor (the free-rider) receives the benefits of catching 10
kilograms (without any cost), while the contributor (the active fisherman or the
"sucker") receives a net catch of 6 kilograms only after the cost of hiring the villagers (4
kilograms) is deducted.
As illustrated in Figure 10.1, forcing the trawler out of the fishing ground is so
rewarding that one fisherman can bear the entire cost himself and still retain a net catch
of 6 kilograms. The best payoff results for the fisherman who escaped the participation
in the collective action, while forcing the other fishermen to take full responsibility (i.e.,
being the sucker). The interesting feature of this game structure is that mutual
cooperation (8 , 8) yields a benefit below the best payoff (10 kg.) but above that
associated with taking full responsibility alone (6 kg.).
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Fisherman A
Fisherman B
Strategy Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 8,8 6,10
Defect 10,6 3,3
Figure 10.1 The Payoff Structure of the Collective Choice of
Defending a Common Fishing Ground Against an Industrial
Trawler.
In the above game, both fishermen have no dominant strategies in this game.
However, as can be seen from Figure 10.1, there are two Nash4 equilibria in pure
strategy, in which one fisherman takes full responsibility to challenge the trawler
(cooperate) while the other free-rides (defects) (Sandler, 1992; p. 40; Baland and
Platteau, 1996; p. 80) 5 . The averting of the encroachments of an industrial trawler into a
traditional fishing-zone corresponds to the game of Chicken, since the status quo of no
action will result in significant consequences. The action of fisherman A depends on
what he thinks fisherman B will do. Looking at the payoff structure of Figure 10.1, it
can be clearly seen that each fisherman prefers the other to bear the cost of providing
the collective good while he refrains from contributing, since he will receive the highest
payoff. Contrary to the PD game, in this game at least one fisherman must undertake
full responsibility to challenge the trawler if both are to avoid the disastrous outcome
(depleted fishery). To further his own interests, if not to protect himself as in the PD,
each fisherman has a sufficient reason to provide the collective good alone, whatever
the other does. In such a situation, possession of information about the status of the fish
resource is vital for the emergence of collective action. Awareness of the causes of
overfishing, coupled with lack of alternative fishing grounds, are the main factors that
induce fishermen in the case of the above village to initiate the collective action. As
4 Nash equilibrium results when an agent chooses his or her best or optimizing choice for one (or more)
variables, given that the other players have chosen their optimizing or best responses for this (or these)
variables. However, it should be noted here that when the public good is impure (exclusion is possible for
example as in club goods), Nash behaviour need not imply sub-optimality (Sandler, 1992; p. 16).
5
There is also a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which each fisherman randomizes his strategy. In this
Nash equilibrium each fisherman chooses his probability based on the best probability choice of the other
fishermen (Sandler, 1992; p. 41; Baland and Platteau, 1996; p. 81 and Corms and Sandler, 1996; p. 308).
For Figure 10.1, each fishermen cooperate with probability 3/5 and defects with probability 2/5.The
expected utility for each is therefore equal to 3/5(3/5*8+2/5*6) + 2/5(3/5*10+2/5*3) =7.2. In this thesis
the discussions only focus on pure strategies.
235
shown in Chapter Nine, there is a statistically significant correlation between awareness
of the causes of overfishing and the provision of collectiN e good (cooperation)_
There is one obvious problem with the above game in the long rim. It is true that
either of the fishermen would undertake the provision of public good if the other did not
(it is better to be a 'sucker' and get 6 kg of fish catch than not be a 'sucker' and get only 3
kg). However, one would not like to undertake the full responsibility (being a 'sucker')
forever, while the other fisherman free rides on his effort. A plan of action v, hich must
be agreed upon by both fishermen and self-enforcing (Baland and Platteau, 1996; p. 81)
is needed if the collective action is to be sustained. This is because encroachments of
industrial trawlers into the traditional fishing-zone can occur in the future; thus, once
more the public good needs to be provided. Both fishermen, therefore, can benefit from
sitting together to coordinate their actions in the sense that one of them might choose to
cooperate in the first round and defect in the next round 6 (this plan is known in game
theory as a correlated equilibrium). As argued by Baland and Platteau "under a
correlated equilibrium, agents endogenously and non-cooperatively generate a
coordinated solution which gives them the assurance that collective action will take
place: one of them will have to undertake it, but under a scenario agreed on by
everybody" (Baland and Platteau, 1996; p. 81).
To coordinate their action, fishermen in Al-Qurha village asked the master of the
Senat Al-Bahar to call all fishermen in the village for a meeting. In the meeting, twenty
fishermen voluntarily decided to bear the cost of challenging the trawler on the fishing
ground. The fishermen in this village successfully initiated collective action and the
trawler was forced out of the fishing grounds. As can be seen from the payoff structure
illustrated in Figure 10.1, the collective action in this case is self-enforcing where
fishermen collectively participated and won the battle against a common enemy, an
activity which improves their collective well-being. Forcing the trawler out of the
fishing ground is so rewarding that a few fisherman can bear the entire cost themselves
and still retain a profit. This case clearly demonstrates that the payoff structure of the
gains to the fishermen's action in the above village looks like the payoff structure of the
Chicken game. It is the role of the institution (Senat Al-Bahar) that makes fishermen
sufficiently well organised to initiate collective action. Therefore, the institutional rule
6 A systematic procedure can be implemented in this case to determine the sequence of individual action_
Tossing a coin or drawing a lottery are examples of such systematic procedures
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has changed the payoff structure of the game from a PD to a cooperath e game. High
awareness about the status of the fishery coupled with high economic dependence on
fishing induced fishermen to work collectively to further their well-being. It can be
concluded here that the indigenous management institution (Senat Al-Bahar) provides
incentives, tipping the scales in favour of cooperation.
10.4. Appropriation Problems
The provision problem described above was conceptualised as a game of
Chicken. Chicken games can also be used to model a number of appropriation problems
in the study area. First, let us consider the assignment of rights to fishing spots when
fishermen compete for limited fishing spots; the case of the beach seine fishery will be
considered later to highlight another example of an appropriation problem in coastal
fisheries. In the trap fishery, for example, there are many situations where the number of
fishermen exceeds the number of productive fishing spots. If two fishermen locate their
traps in a single fishing spot, the share of the catch of each individual fisherman will be
too small to cover the cost of the fishing trip. In order to avoid conflicts among
fishermen in such communities, fishing rules must be implemented. In South Al-
Batinah, the fishing communities solved such problems by implementing the rule "the
first to arrive has the right to fish" in the spot. To analyse such a situation using game
theory let us consider a single fishing spot which is fished by two fishermen. Assume
that when one fisherman fishes in the spot he can produce 20 kilograms of fish every
day. If both fishermen fish in the same spot simultaneously, conflicts will arise leading
to a disastrous outcome (-1, -1). However, if one fisherman arrives first in the spot (his
right to fish is recognized), he will catch the whole 20 kilograms while the other
fisherman gets nothing (Figure 10.2).
Fisherman A
Fisherman B
Strategy Enter Wait
Enter -1,-1 20,0
Wait 0,20 0,0
Figure 10.2 The Payoff Structure of the Collective Choice of
Assigning Fishing Spots Between two Fishermen.
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It is clearly shown in Figure 10.2 that both fishermen have no dominant strategy,
but there are two Nash equilibria in pure strategy, in which one fisherman waits ashore,
goes to a less productive fishing spot or use different fishing gear such as handline and
catches pelagic species, for example (cooperates), whilst the other goes to the fishing
spot. The payoff structure depicted is that each fisherman prefers the other to stay on
shore while he goes fishing alone and gets the maximum payoff. At the same time, both
avoid being on the fishing spot at the same time in order to avoid incurring a loss, which
is the worst payoff in this case. If they can communicate with each other they can
coordinate their actions, for example, by implementing the rule devised by Senat Al-
Bahar: "first entrant into the fishing spot has the right to fish". If fisherman A notices
that fisherman B has gone to the spot, he should avoid going to the same spot on that
particular day to avoid the worst outcome (conflicts and loss of catch).
One might argue that the above situation might induce a fisherman to get up
earlier and earlier to be in the fishing spot before his neighbour. However, it should be
remembered that fishermen's decision to cooperate is influenced by the physical
attributes of the fishery. As was observed by the researcher, fishermen in the area help
each other to beach their fishing vessels. For example, a fisherman needs the help of at
least four others to beach his fishing vessel at the beginning and end of any fishing
operation. In the above case of assigning fishing spots to fishermen, if one fisherman
acts self-interestedly by going to the productive spot every day (without coordination
with his neighbour), he will lose the cooperation of his neighbours to help him with
beaching his fishing vessel. In small villages like the one described here, examples of
individuals' cooperation in their daily activities on land are legion. Therefore,
fishermen's fear of lose of cooperation of other members in the village induces
fishermen to cooperate with each other. The cost imposed on those who breach the rules
laid down by the group may not be offset by the possible benefits gained from free
riding. Furthermore, the interdependent nature of the activities in the fishing village is
all necessary in the fishermen's daily activities. One might gain more benefits in the
fishing grounds by breaching the rules, but he is likely to lose a good deal in the village.
In some communities, assignments of fishing rights to fishermen when the
number of fishermen exceeds the number of productive fishing spots are carried out
using a lottery (e.g., Alanya fishery in Turkey; for more details see: Ostrom, 1990; pp.
18 - 20). In communities where the users of a common resource design institutional
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rules to coordinate their fishing activities, these rules are seen to provide the proper
incentives, thereby tipping the scales in favour of cooperation (Sandler, 1992; p. 47). In
this example, the discussion demonstrates how the institutional rules have changed the
payoff structure from a non-cooperative game (PD) to a game of Chicken and the
resource users have coordinated their actions.
To take another appropriation problem, let us consider the beach seine fishery.
In this case, problems arise as who should cast his net first. Let us assume first that there
are two fishermen in a fishing village using beach seines to catch sardine. As the school
of sardine approaches the village, if both encircle the school of sardine at the same time,
the nets will get entangled, leading to a disastrous outcome (-x,-x) 7. Similarly, if both do
not encircle the sardine, both will receive nothing and the school of sardine will be
caught in the next village. It can be seen from Figure 10.3 that the best outcome in this
case is for one fisherman to cast his net and catch the sardine (receiving the maximum
benefit of 100 sacks), while the others waits (being the "chicken" and receiving 0) until
another school of sardine approaches the village. Unlike the PD game, in this game at
least one fisherman must wait until his colleague has completed casting his beach seine
if both are to avoid the disastrous outcome (entangled beach seines).
To understand how beach seine fishermen have avoided the worst outcome, the
researcher interviewed a number of beach seine operators. It was found that owners of
beach seines coordinated their action to avoid their nets being entangled. The plan of
action is as follows: as the school of sardine moves across the coast from east to west or
vice versa, a fisherman can cast his beach seine only when the school of sardine has just
approached his location8. If fisherman A fails to encircle the net (the school of sardine
dives under his net or they are faster than his boat), he has to pull his net out of the sea
and dry it before he can start the next fishing operation, which may take him half a day.
In this case the right to catch the sardine is transferred now to fisherman B. If fisherman
B observes that fisherman A has failed to encircle the school of sardine, he can enter the
sea and cast his beach seine. This plan of action (known as a correlated equilibrium in
game theory) is in fact the product of the indigenous management institution (Senat Al-
Bahar). The plan has been agreed upon by all concerned fishermen to coordinate the
sequence of beach seine fishing; thus, it is self-enforcing. The aim of this plan is to give
-7 The cost of a beach seine is approximately RO 3000 ($ 7812.5). $ 1 = RO 0.384.
8 Each individual beach seine owner has a typical location, which is normally in front of his house. The
casting of the net starts from this point.
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every beach seine operator equal chances in terms of access to the sea as well as income
opportunities. Off course the rule of Senat Al-Bahar is sustained by the feelings of
embarrassment, anxiety, guilt and shame that a person suffers at prospect of violating
them. In Weligalle (South Sri Lanka), a more or less similar arrangement to coordinate
the operation of beach seine nets, known as Net Sequences, is employed by fishermen
to maximize their overall benefits (Amarasinghe, 1989; p. 704).
It can be clearly observed in this game, that both fishermen have no dominant
strategies, but there are two Nash equilibria in pure strategy and in each of these one
fisherman cooperates (waits) while the other defects (encircles the school of sardine). At
any of the two Nash equilibria, neither fisherman would unilaterally change his strategy.
By changing strategy, fisherman A's payoff would drop from zero to -x (his beach seine
may be damaged), while fisherman B's payoff would drop from 100 sacks to zero.
Therefore, the payoff structure that results from solving the above problem is
corresponding to the payoff structure of a Chicken game as illustrated in Figure 10.3.
Fisherman A
Fisherman B
Strategy Enter Wait
Enter -x,-x 100,0
Wait 0,100 0,0
Figure 10.3 The Payoff Structure of the Collective Choice of Assigning
the Right of Fishing to Beach Seine Fishermen.
It can be clearly seen in the above game that institutional rules have changed the
payoff structure from universal defection (PD game) to a coordinated equilibrium
(privileged group) in which the collective action has been initiated to avoid the worst
outcome. As argued by Sandler, "Nature-imposed sanctions attached to the status quo
can assist groups to Pareto-optimal outcomes" (Sandler, 1992; p.44). In natural world
settings, at least some collective goods might be provided with some form of
coordination among participants. The institutional setting in place plays a crucial role in
avoiding the worst outcome.
Generalizing the above Chicken games to N-fishermen situations is
straightforward. Let us return to the beach seine fishery, but now assume that, instead of
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two fishermen, there are 10 fishermen in this village and all own beach seine nets. The
right to cast first is determined by the institutional rule devised by Senat Al-Bahar, by
which all the ten fishermen have agreed on to coordinate their action. Assume that the
school of sardine approaches the village from the east. When the school of fish
approaches the location of the first fisherman, he casts his beach seine, while the others
wait until he completes the operation. If the school passes the first fisherman, the right
to cast is transferred directly to the fisherman next to him, while other fishermen must
wait, and so on. Normally, schools of sardine are very large and move in small patches
so that one beach seine cannot take the whole school; thus, everyone in the village gets
a share of the catch if they follow what they had agreed upon (the coordinated
equilibrium). In any case, the fisherman who casts his net, whether or not he is
successful, needs several hours to pull his net out of the sea and dry it (for half a day)
before he can cast again. Another constraining factor of consideration is the availability
of drying grounds. The catch of beach seines is dried under the sun and then packed in
sacks, a process which may take from seven to ten days. Therefore, if a fisherman
catches a big school of sardine in a particular day, he is unlikely to fish again for several
days, even if more schools of sardine approach the village, if his drying ground is full.
There is no dominant strategy in this game, but there are ten Nash equilibria in
pure strategy; in each of them, a single fisherman casts his beach seine net while the
others wait their turn. Since the operators of beach seines in this case maximize their
benefits in the above game as they coordinate their action, the group should be
privileged, regardless of the number of fishermen (Sandler, 1992; p. 40).
10.5 Modelling Cases where Assurance is Needed
The above account gives a few examples of both provision and appropriation
problems that fishermen in the study area are encountering. However, there are many
other appropriation problems in which participation of a few fishermen will not lead to
the provision of the public good; thus, efforts of all fishermen are needed for any benefit
to be obtained. For instance, the use of monfilament gill nets and efficient fishing gears
such as Tadwerah and Tahweta which are operated by encircling the fish are all
technical options, which are available to fishermen to receive an immediate gain. These
techniques are employed in inshore waters to harvest large quantities of fish, including
immature fish. Whether the fish resource is depleted or not hinges upon the number of
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fishermen who are willing to refrain from using such fishing gear. If only a few of them
abstain, the beneficial impact of their action is likely to be insignificant. It is obvious
that the cooperation of everybody is needed to eliminate such techniques from the
fishery in order to avoid resource depletion. As a matter of fact, conflicts arise
occasionally between fishermen of coastal villages in the study area regarding the
techniques mentioned above. Some villages have adopted a conservative approached by
forbidding the use of such techniques among their members, whilst other villages make
no such restriction. First, the section will present the payoff structure facing individual
fishermen in a fishing village when they have the option of using the Tahweta (sardine
encircling nets) to make immediate gains. Then the section will analyse a game where
two neighbouring fishing villages have banned such gear.
To illustrate cases of successful collective action in the study area, let us first
consider the case of the fishermen's decision problem in Al-Greem (Masn'a) when the
new fishing gear (Tahweta) appeared in their fishery to catch sardine. According to the
norm of Senat Al-Bahar, sardine caught by cast nets is used as bait, and the catches of
beach seines are dried and fed to live stocks, whereas, only the catch from gill nets can
be sold in the market. This seems logical as a conservation measure to protect the
sardine fishery. The cast net can be used from the shore and also has very small meshes;
thus, if its catch were to go to the market, sardine resources in the vicinity of these
coastal villages might be depleted. Beach seines, on the other hand, are restricted to
their location and operated close to the shore; thus, they only catch schools of sardine
close to the shore. Gill nets9, owing to their selectivity characteristics (if an appropriate
mesh size is used) allow small sardine to pass through to grow and breed. However, the
new gear (Tahweta) can be operated at any depth with the use of two fishing vessels,
thus catching big quantities of sardine and those who use it can make big profits
compared to those who use gill nets. Owning Tahwetas is extremely expensive
compared to other fishing gears. Thus, only the big elite can afford to buy them.
In Al-Greem village, two fishermen received an offer to operate a sardine seine
net (Tahweta) owned by a rich trader from Barka who deals with fishing gears and
accessories. The owner of the net would receive half of the profits as part of his capital
9 The rules of Senat Al-Bahar only allow fishermen to use gill nets of a certain mesh size to catch
sardine.
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cost, whilst the two fishermen would share the other half. The two fishermen had two
options; either to accept the offer or reject it.
Now consider the case of any individual fishermen in the above village who has
one of two options. The first option is to cooperate by rejecting the rich man's offer to
use Tahweta and stick to his gill net, a strategy, which is advantageous to all fishermen
in the village, thus protecting the fishery. Alternatively the fisherman may accept the
offer (defect) and start operating Tahweta, an option which, while advantageous to him,
harms all the fishermen in the village by causing overfishing. To illustrate the situation
facing a fisherman in this village, a two fishermen game is presented below to analyse
the incentives each individual faces in this game. Let us assume that their payoffs for
the various possible outcomes are as given in Figure 10.4.
Fisherman A
Fisherman B
Strategy Reject the offer Accept the offer
Reject the offer 4, 4 - 2, 6
Accept the offer 6, - 2 0, 0
Figure 10.4 The Payoff Structure of the Collective Choice of
Avoiding a Public Bad.
The important point to note from Figure 10.4 is that the net payoff accruing to a
fisherman when he accepts the offer (6 units) is higher than the payoff he would receive
by rejecting the offer (4 units). If, say, both fishermen reject the offer and stick to their
gill net, then each fisherman receives a net profit of 4 units. Looking at the matrix of
this game it appears that the payoff structure encourages defection, because one is
always better off (with a gain of 6 or 0) defecting, regardless of the strategy of the other
fisherman. Although if both fishermen reject the offer, the highest (4 + 4 = 8) aggregate
payoff is achieved, because the game is played only once, there is always a risk of the
fisherman who rejects the offer receiving the lowest payoff (-2 or being a "sucker") if
the other defects. The resulting game is a Prisoner's Dilemma, because the dominant
strategy is to defect; hence, the group remains latent unless other considerations (local
accords or norms) are included (Sandler, 1992; pp. 38 -40 and Comes and Sandler,
1996; p. 310).
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Returning to the case of the above village, speaking to the two fishermen who
operate the Tahweta, they state that they only used the gear twice. Other fishermen in
the villages threatened them to burn their gear if they continued to use such gear to
catch sardine, as their action was seen by the others as violating the rules and norms of
Senat M-Bahar (the local management institution).
Now let us see what will happen to the structure of the game after the
community threatens the violating fishermen. In such a situation the violating fishermen
not only lose their gear, but also they feel embarrassment, anxiety, guilt and shame for
their action. Taking the same game presented above, but this time with a cost imposed
on the fisherman who accepts the rich trader's offer to operate the banned gear (the
defector), let us assume that if the community carries out its threat against the defector,
he will lose his gear, as a result of which he is assumed to incur a cost of 8 units of
benefits. The payoff structure is presented in Figure 10.5.
Fisherman A
Fisherman B
Strategy Reject the offer Accept the offer
Reject the offer 4,4 - 2, (6 - 8 = - 2)
Accept the offer (6 - 8 = - 2), - 2 0,0
Figure 10.5 The Payoff Structure of the Collective Choice of Avoiding a
Collective Bad.
From Figure 10.5, it is clearly shown that the resulting payoffs encourage
cooperation. Both fishermen are better off cooperating as this strategy yields them the
highest payoff possible. Therefore, the resulting game is fully privileged, because
universal cooperation is the most preferred outcome. In fact, speaking to the researcher
during the field work, the two fishermen who accepted the offer of the trader to operate
Tahweta in Al-Greem subsequently complied with the group rules and abandoned their
new gear. Thus, this village represents a privileged group where the number of
fishermen in the village has no effect whatsoever on the final outcome, as argued by
Sandler (1992; p. 40). The local management institution in the study area (Senat Al-
Bahar) plays a crucial rule to coordinate individuals' expectations so as to enable them
to avoid the public bad.
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Now fishermen in Al-Greem have complied with the local accords, but they
complain about fishermen from a neighbouring village who use Tahweta and Tadwerah,
thus generating immediate gains and causing the fishery to deplete. In this case, it is
appropriate to use a two-village game for analysing the decision problem in such a
situation. Assume, for instance, that the heads of the tribe in each village can persuade
fishermen in their communities to abandon such fishing gear. In order to achieve the
preferred results, the efforts of all fishermen are needed to aid the heads of their tribes to
fulfil their obligation.
Catches of villages A and B before introduction of the new techniques are 10
tonnes each. It is assumed that fishermen in the two villages can succeed in banning the
use of the destructive fishing gears from their fishery, provided that they help the head
of the tribe to persuade those who use such fishing gear to abandon these gears (the
public good to be provided). The cost involved in banning the Tadwerah and Tahweta
by each village is equivalent to the value of 2 tonnes of fish assigned to the provider. If
the use of Tadwerah and Tahweta continues in the fishery (even by a few fishermen
from one village), the fishery will not recover and the effects of such gear will soon
bring landings in each village down to a mere 2 tonnes. Therefore, both villages must
contribute to receive any benefits from their own action.
The decision problem of both villages is analysed using a two-village game as
shown in Figure 10.6. If the destructive fishing gears are eliminated completely from
the fishery (mutual cooperation), landings will return to their previous normal level of
10 tonnes each. Therefore, mutual cooperation will yield net benefits of 8 tonnes (20
tonnes of catch minus 4 tonnes of cost) for each village. If only one village provides the
public good (the head of the tribe in one village fails to persuade owners of the
destructive gear in his village), then the fishery will not recover (status quo landings are
2 tonnes each). In this case the provider will bear the cost of his provision (his payoff is
0 tonnes), (which is 2 tonnes catch minus 2 tonnes of provision cost), while the free-
rider catches the 2 tonnes (no provision cost). If neither of them contribute, the status
quo will remain and each village will catch 2 tonnes. Therefore, the payoff structure
here is similar to that of the assurance game.
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Village A
Village B
Strategy Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 8,8 0,2
Defect 2,0 2,2
Figure 10.6 The Payoff Structure of the Decision Problem of two
Villages to Ban Destructive Fishing Gears.
As it can be seen from Figure 10.6, both villages have no dominant strategy, but
there are three possible equilibria, two in pure strategies (mutual cooperation or
universal defection) and one in mixed strategy 10. The mutual cooperation equilibrium
Pareto dominates the universal equilibrium, but may not be the outcome unless the
players can rely on one another (Sandler, 1992; p. 42). In this case, contrary to the PD,
the net payoff received by a village when it free-rides on the provision of the other
village (2 tonnes) is smaller than the net payoff the village would receive by cooperating
(8 tonnes). Figure 10.6 also depicts that mismatch of actions is the least preferred by
both villages taken together. The mixed strategy is the third Nash equilibrium in which
the fishermen randomize over their strategies. In this equilibrium, each fisherman
chooses his strategy with a certain predetermined probability (Baland and Platteau,
1996; p. 81 and Conies and Sandler, 1996; p. 308). The way the mixed strategy payoff
is obtained was presented in footnote 5.
In assurance situations, if village A fulfils a promise to enforce the common
rule, the contract is self-enforcing, since village B has strong incentives to enforce the
rule. If it did otherwise, village B would receive 2 tonnes of catch instead of 8 tonnes.
As argued by Sandler, "even without an enforcement mechanism, contracting can
overcome collective failure in an assurance situation" (Sandler, 1992; p. 42). Therefore,
the best strategy for village A depends on its expectations of village B. In fact, the best
choice for village A, for example, is to enforce the common rule if the probability that
village B will do the same is assessed by village A to be more than 1/4, and its optimal
choice is not to enforce the common rule if this probability is less than 1/4. If we denote
p to be the probability that the other village enforces the rule, the value ofp (which is
10 See footnote 5.
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1/4 as shown above) is obtained for Figure 10.6 from the following equation which is
provided by Baland and Platteau (1996; p. 91):
8p + 0(1-p) = 2p + 2(1-p)
Solving the above equation forp, it was found that the equilibrium in mixed strategy is
obtained when each village enforces the rule with a probability 1/4 and does not enforce
the rule with probability of 3/4.
Although there is no guarantee that the game will equilibrate at the more
preferred points of the three Nash equilibrium because the concerned villages might not
trust each other, in real world settings cooperation can be achieved. This is because in
situations of two neighbouring villages, the heads of the tribes as well as fishermen
from both villages are interacting with each other continuously (cheap talk allowed),
thus signals sent regarding one's intention to cooperate are interpretable in an
unambiguous way. In this case, as argued by Baland and Platteau (1996), cooperation is
much more likely to arise because all concerned parties (heads of the tribes in both
villages) can reassure each other and form optimistic expectations about their mutual
behaviours. The local management institution in the study area (Senat Al-Bahar) plays a
crucial rule to coordinate individuals expectations so as to enable them to cooperate.
When the two villages have agreed on rules to improve their well-being, the rule must
be sustained by the feelings of embarrassment, anxiety, guilt and shame that a person
suffers if he violates these rules. It is the responsibility of the master of  Senat Al-Bahar
to ensure that the agreed upon rules are enforced and those who violate them must be
sanctioned. As argued by Runge (1986; p. 630), "it is precisely the role of village level
conventions, including common property institutions, to reinforce expectations of
collective behaviour leading a critical mass of individuals to adopt such a solution as a
cooperative strategy".
The assurance game used above to analyse the decision problem of two
neighbouring villages can be expanded to model a situation where many villages (N-
villages game) is involved. Similarly, there will be no dominant strategy in this multi-
village game, but there will be a number of Nash equlibria (the number of equilibria
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equals the number of village involved) in pure strategy and one in mixed strategy".
Again, a critical mass of cooperating villages are needed if the cooperation equilibrium
is to hold. For example, the gain from cooperation for each village depends on the
proportion of villages that actually adopt a cooperative strategy in the entire group. As
the proportion of cooperating villages increases, the problem of free riding becomes
easier to overcome. This is because if the number of cooperating villages is large, the
free riding village "feels bad" about defecting (Baland and Platteau, 1996; p. 109).
However, for cooperation to prevail in this situation, the majority of villages who wants
to cooperate must feel confident that their willingness to cooperate is shared by many
others as well (Runge, 1986). Local management institutions (Senat Al-Bahar) in the
study area, if functioning optimally, can provide the assurance that a critical mass
(Runge, 1986) of others will obey the rule (free riders might be sanctioned); thus,
everyone has an interest to do likewise, since this outcome is preferred. This holds even
more true when the groups are culturally homogenous, a characteristic of the study
population as identified in previous chapters.
10.6 The Overall Level of Cooperation
Up until now, the collective action decisions of a number of selected cases were
conceptualized using game theory. Collective action decisions have been treated as a
discrete variable; either cooperate or defect. In what follows, the fishermen's overall
level of cooperation will be considered as a multi-person game to illustrate the type of
game played by fishermen in the study area. Information gathered through
questionnaire, personal interview and observation were used to analyse the decision
problems facing fishermen in the study area.
As presented in Chapter Nine, the dependent variable "cooperation" was
measured using an index containing 11 statements. The statements were then aggregated
to construct a composite variable in order to determine the level of cooperation for
individual fishermen. Therefore, the level of cooperation is a continuous variable
ranging from zero (no cooperation) to 11 (maximum cooperation). The results for the
194 fishermen included in the study indicated that the average level of cooperation was
7.19 with a standard deviation of 2.71; thus, a relatively high level of cooperation has
11 There is also a mixed strategy Nash equilibria in which the fishermen randomize over their strategies.
In each of these equilibria each fisherman choose his strategies with a certain predetermined probability
(see footnote 5 above) (Baland and Platteau, 1996; P. 81 and Comes and Sandler, 1996; p. 308)
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been achieved_ For the purpose of the following discussion, the cooperation scale is
converted into a proportion. Thus, the scale ranges now from zero to 100 percent. In this
case the mean level of cooperation achieved is 65.4 percent. Therefore, the collective
good is continuous and a summation technology characterises public supply; thus, the
choice of a level of contribution is permitted. This means that individual effort to
conserve the fishery is aggregated to find the total amount of collective good provided.
What is striking in the above findings is that the dominant free riding of the PD
seems to be implausible in the case of the fishermen included in this study (average
cooperation = 65.4 percent). Therefore, if the situation in South Al-Batinah fishery
cannot be appropriately represented by the PD game, then other game forms that may be
more relevant in this respect should be discussed. Several authors have argued that
situations of common property resources in developing economies can best be
represented by an assurance game (see Baland and Platteau, 1996; p. 90 and also Runge,
1986; P. 628). One of the characteristics of the assurance game is the absence of
dominant strategies (neither cooperation nor defection represents a strictly dominant
strategy) (Cortazar, 1997; p. 46). This seems to fit most closely the situation of the
fishermen's decision problems to manage their fishery in the study area because, as
appeared from the univariate analysis of the dependent variable (cooperation), a
relatively high level of cooperation has been achieved in the group. In cases where there
are no dominant strategies in the decision making, alternative outcomes that depend on
optimistic expectations about mutual behaviours of everyone in the group are possible.
Therefore, the decision to conserve or deplete the fishery depends on the expected
decision of others. For example, if a fisherman expects others in the group to cooperate,
he will do likewise to achieve the preferred outcome because his payoffs when he
cooperates with the rest of the fishermen would be higher than if he defects while many
cooperate. In many common property resource settings and particularly in the case of
the fishery in South Al-Batinah, what makes fishermen hold optimistic expectations
about the behaviours of others is the presence of a local management institution by
which individual fishermen's decision making are coordinated.
In an assurance game, each member of the group is, objectively, an essential
contributor, in the sense that without his contribution the collective good cannot be
provided (Cortazar, 1997; p. 46). To illustrate the structure of payoffs facing individual
fisherman in this case, let us assume that the utility of fisherman "i" is Fl (x, z), where
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"z" corresponds to the strategy of the rest of the members. In such a situation Fi (C, C) >
Fi (D, C) because the contribution of fisherman "i" is essential for the provision of the
collective goods. Similarly, Fi (D, D) > (C, D), because since the rest do not contribute,
the collective good is not produced, and fisherman "i" bears the cost of his contribution.
Therefore, the two Nash equilibria of this game are (C, C) and (D, D), bearing in mind
that there is no dominant strategy. In this case, if a fisherman believes that his
contribution toward the collective good is necessary, a rational strategy for him is to
participate in the collective good, though his best choice is contingent on the choice of
the rest of the fishermen.
As indicated above, a game with multiple equilibria and the absence of dominant
strategies can better approximate the actual decision problems of the fishermen in the
study area. To carry out the analysis it is necessary to produce an appropriate graphical
representation of the situation facing the fishermen to provide a way of visualising the
changes of the payoffs as the number of those who decide to cooperate in the group
increases or decreases. Figure 10.7 is a graphical representation (adopted from Runge,
1986 with modification) in which two linear payoff curves are drawn to represent the
benefits of cooperation and defection for the fishermen in the study area. "D" denotes
the dominant defection curve, while "C" denotes the dominant cooperation curve. Both
curves begin at the left end at the point of open access where rent from the fishery is
driven to zero, and then both curves rise to the right as the proportion of fishermen
deciding to cooperate increases.
As can be seen from Figure 10.7, there is no dominant strategy. However, there
are two Nash equilibria in pure strategy; one is universal defection represented by point
"o" in which no fishermen cooperate (open access equilibrium) and the other is
universal cooperation at point "q" where the Nash equilibrium is Pareto-superior. The
proportion of fishermen deciding to cooperate to manage the fishery varies from 0 to
100 percent as represented by the horizontal axis, whereas the benefit (payoff) accruing
to individual fishermen is denoted by the vertical axis.
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Figure 10.7 Payoffs to a Fisherman in an Assurance Game According to the
Proportion of Cooperators in the Group.
Starting at point "o", the defection curve dominates the cooperation curve until
point "a", after which the cooperation curve dominates the defection curve as the
number of fishermen who decide to cooperate increases. It is clearly shown that the
gains from cooperation for individual fishermen depend on the proportion of
cooperating fishermen in the group. To achieve the Pareto-superior equilibrium at point
q, a "critical mass" of other fishermen must send clear messages to everybody regarding
their intention to conserve the fish resources. Similarly, signals sent to others in the
group must be interpreted in an unambiguous way. This is not difficult to achieve,
especially when fishermen in their daily activities are interacting with each other and
depending on each other continuously. Hence, it can be argued here that the long-term
interaction that characterises much of the daily life in any fishing village gives rise to
the possibility of voluntary participation because it change the payoff structure of the
PD into an assurance game. It is immediately apparent from Figure 10.7 that individual
fishermen's strategies will obviously depend on their expectations of the behaviour of
the other fishermen in the area (Cortazar, 1997; p. 46).
251
The coordination game described by the Assurance Problem (AP) described
above suggests that there are incentives to develop and maintain institutions
characterized by rules which make voluntary contribution to public goods a utility-
maximizing strategy (Runge, 1984; p. 155). When institutions exist to facilitate the
coordination of behaviours by providing information regarding the expectations of
others, they provide assurance, which makes cooperation to the group actions more
attractive than free riding.
As illustrated by Figure 10.7, the cooperation curve crosses the defection curve
at point "a" where the proportion of fishermen who decide to cooperate equals 60
percent of all fishermen (the critical mass is reached according to Runge). After the
switch point "a" (i.e., enough fishermen in the group decide to cooperate), cooperation
will dominate leading to the superior equilibrium at q. As argued by Baland and
Platteau (1996; p. 110) "agents will choose to cooperate if they expect more than 60
percent of the group members to cooperate, otherwise they will defect". In fact, for the
case of the present study, the level of cooperation achieved was 65.4 percent; thus, a
critical mass of fishermen in the study area are willing to cooperate to conserve their
fishery which should, if the theory is correct, induce the rest to cooperate as well. In this
coordination game there exists a threshold level for the number of fishermen willing to
cooperate to manage the resource beyond which it is profitable for all fishermen to
cooperate, and below which no individual fishermen has an interest in doing so (Baland
and Platteau, 1997c; p. 204).
For the Pareto-superior equilibrium point (q) to hold, the cooperation of the
significant majority of fishermen (60 percent or more) alone is not enough, but it must
be the case that these people have assurance that their willingness to cooperate is shared
by many others. The kind of assurance needed here which will make everyone in the
group feel that their expectation about others willingness to cooperate is unmistakable
can only be found in a situation where fishermen have devised a local institution to
coordinate their actions. As quoted above, Runge has stated that "it is precisely the role
of village level conventions, including common property institutions, to reinforce
expectations of collective behaviour leading a critical mass of individual to adopt such
a solution as a cooperative strategy" (Runge, 1986; p. 630).
To provide further insights on the graphic representation used above to describe
how fishermen's collective choice to avoid the public bad might be achieved in a two-
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fishermen assurance game, an alternative cardinal representation is presented in Figure
10.8. In the context of the study area, assume that if one unit of cooperation yields 6
units to each and every fishermen provided that the other fisherman contributed as well.
Further assume that the cost of individual provision (obeying the rule of the local
institution or restrain his take from the fishery) amounts to 8 units. This is because in
the assurance game both fishermen must contribute a unit of the public good for them to
receive any benefits (unilateral action yields insignificant results). If both fishermen
provide a unit, then each receives a net benefit of 4 units. This is equal to the difference
between the total benefits of 24 units (2 x 12 = 24) and the total cost of 16 units. If,
however, only one fisherman contributes, then he will incur a loss of his provision cost
(- 8) but receive nothing, as for any benefits to be gained both fishermen must cooperate
(Figure 10.8).
Fisherman A
Fisherman B
Strategy Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 4, 4 - 8, 0
Defect 0, - 8 0, 0
Figure 10.8 The payoff Structure of Analysing the Overall Level of
Cooperation.
From Figure 10.8, it is clear that the game has no dominant strategy, but
possesses two pure-strategy Nash equilibria, in which no one contributes or both
fishermen contribute. In cases where there are no dominant strategies in the decision
making, alternative outcomes that depend on optimistic expectations about mutual
behaviours of everyone in the group are possible. Therefore, the decision to conserve
the fishery depends on the expected decision of others. For example, if a fisherman
expects others in the group to cooperate, he will do likewise to achieve the preferred
outcome because his payoffs when he cooperates with the rest of the fishermen will be
higher than if he defects while many cooperate, as shown by the payoff structure
presented in Figure 10.8. As argued above by Baland and Platteau (1996) and Runge
(1986), cooperation of the majority of resource users the "critical mass", will induce
others in the group to do likewise.
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Returning to the case of the South Al-Batinah fishery, as was illustrated in
Chapter Eight, fishermen's actions are coordinated by a local management institution
known locally as Senat Al-Bahar. The institution devised rules to coordinate the use of
the fishery; thus, it provides the enforcement mechanism needed to organize a change in
fishermen's behaviour. If Senat Al-Bahar functions optimally, it can reinforce
expectations of collective behaviour which is the incentive required for a critical mass
of fishermen to adopt cooperation as the dominant strategy. Other researcher have
argued that the strategy Tit-for-Tat may be seen as an adequate mechanism of
coordination to attain the Pareto superior Nash equilibrium of the assurance game
(Cortazar, 1997; p. 47).
In the context of a small fishing village, for example, if all fishermen are far-
sighted, a credible threat by others that they will impose sanctions on those who break
the rules will be sufficient to achieve compliance. Tit-for-tat appears to be a robust
strategy which resists challenge from other strategies where a player cooperate unless
another defect. However, the trouble with Tit-for-Tat is that in the real world the first
defection often leads to breakdown (Child and Faulkner, 1998; p. 29). Ridley (1996;
cited in Child and Faulkner, 1998) suggests two alternative strategies that have been
found to be more effective than Tit-for-Tat. They are Pavlov and Firm-but-Fair. In
Pavlov, players stick to their strategy if they win on that strategy and if they lose try
another strategy. Ridley claims this to be the basis of both dog-training and child-
rearing. In this context, individuals are trained to do things that are rewarded and stop
doing things that are punished. The strategy of Firm-but-Fair seems more effective than
Tit-for-Tat and Pavlov. According to Child and Faulkner (1998; p. 29) "in the firm-but
fair, players act successively and can communicate (unlike the PD game) which leads
them to cooperate with cooperators, return to cooperation after mutual defection, and
punish defectors by further defection, but assumes that they continue to cooperate after
being a sucker in the previous round".
In the case of the fishery under study, the lack of a dominant strategy for each
fisherman means that the final outcome also depends on many other factors beside the
advantage of having a coordination mechanism (the local institution). The results
presented in Chapter Nine revealed that fishermen's willingness to cooperate was
explained by a number of independent variables. Furthermore, the regression analysis
shows that four factors (awareness of resources problems, perception of risk, economic
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dependence on fishing and social identity) explain around one quarter (24 percent) of
the variance in cooperation. Therefore, the unexplained variance in this case is 76
percent, which can be attributed to other factors. It can be argued here that part of the
unexplained variance in cooperation in the regression analysis can be attributed to the
presence of Senat Al-Bahar which provides security of expectation for all fishermen,
thus encouraging them to adopt a cooperative attitude.
To highlight the importance of local level institutions in promoting collective
action let us return to the findings presented in Chapter Four. We have seen that small
changes brought about by institutions can change the incentive structure facing
individual fishermen. It was shown that changing the way the catch is shared among
resource users has resulted in a more efficient exploitation of the commons. It was
found that the proportional-sharing rule leads to higher effort, which is higher than the
level required for efficient exploitation of the commons. However, when the output is
shared equally among participants (equal-sharing rules applied) the dominant strategy of
individual fishermen changes to universal cooperation, thus a more efficient
exploitation of the commons has been achieved. This is similar to changing the rules of
the game in which the Prisoners' Dilemma is transformed into a fully privileged game
by changing the way the game is played (see Sandler, 1992). The results obtained from
equal shares rule reverse the overexploitation of the fishery commonly found under the
proportional-sharing rule. An application of such an arrangement was found in the
informal lobster territories in Maine (Acheson, 1989). One of the interesting features of
the Maine lobster case is that gang members have instituted an equal sharing rule by
limiting the number of traps individual fishermen may use. The outcome achieved by
this sharing rule is a more efficient exploitation of the lobster resource in Maine. This
leads us to conclude that small changes brought about by institutions can change the
incentive structure facing individual fishermen. Therefore, the presence of a local
management institution is vital to reinforce expectations of collective behaviour,
inducing fishermen to adopt a cooperative strategy.
In her analysis of long term and successful collective action institutions, Ostrom
(1990) states that the success of these institutions depends also on credible sanctions.
Fishermen must believe that their misuse of the fishery will be caught and punished.
Such disincentives induce fishermen to participate in collective action to manage the
fishery, thus providing the needed assurance, especially for those who have already
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decided to participate in collective action (the critical mass) that their willingness to
cooperate will be followed by the rest of the fishermen. In the study area and
particularly at the village level multiple, sanctions are an effective device to foster
participation in collective action. Fishermen's fear of the retribution from the sea, loss of
reputation in the market (especially the credit market) and lose of cooperation of other
members in the village are all necessary in their daily activities. For example, a
fisherman needs the help of at least four others to beach his fishing vessel at the
beginning and end of any fishing operation; more help is needed, of course, at low tides.
It appears that the cost imposed on those who breach the rules laid down by Senat Al-
Bahar might not be offset by the possible benefits gained from free riding.
10.7 Conclusion
The above account shows that conceptualizing the fishery in South Al-Batinah
using the theory of games produces an outcome opposite to that characterized by Hardin
(1968) as the tragedy of the commons. In contrast to the results of the PD, free riding is
no longer the strictly dominant strategy.
The findings of this study strongly suggested that fishermen in South Al-Batinah
have been initiating collective action to overcome some of the problems they face in
their fishery. For example, strong opposition by fishermen in the area was observed to
the use of the more destructive fishing gears.
To illustrate cases of successful collective action in the study area, many
provisional and appropriation problems were conceptualised using game theory. The
results of analysing two fishermen games strongly suggested that free riding is no
longer the strictly dominant strategy. There was no dominant strategy in these games,
but there were two Nash equilibria (for each game) in pure strategy in which one
fisherman cooperates while the other defects. The payoff structure (similar to that of a
Chicken game) is such that each fisherman prefers the other to cooperate while he
defects. At the same time, at least one fisherman must take full responsibility to provide
the public good if both are to avoid the disastrous outcome. Therefore, both maximize
their benefit by coordinating their actions. To maximize their benefits and to avoid the
worst outcome, fishermen were seen to depend heavily on the rules devised by the local
institution (Senat Al-Bahar). Rules such as "first entrant into the fishing spot has the
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right to fish" and the "distance rule" were amply used to coordinate fishermen's actions
to solve common dilemmas. The findings of this study strongly suggest that the
presence of a local management institution to coordinate the fishermen's activities in the
study area is the key factor in avoiding the worst outcome (universal defection). The
game structure has been changed from a Prisoner's Dilemma to a Privileged game or a
game of Chicken where the benefits from cooperation are maximized.
The study also found that high awareness of resource exploitation and the
potential benefits of cooperation, coupled with high dependence on fishing, induced
fishermen to work collectively to further their well-being. As rational individuals,
fishermen will not choose a mutual defection strategy that may lower their individuals,
and collective benefits.
The discussion clearly demonstrates how institutional rules have changed the
payoff structure from a Prisoner's Dilemma to a game of Chicken or an Assurance game
and the fishermen have coordinated their actions.
The study found that in some cases, participation of a few fishermen does not
yield the public good needed. In such a case, a critical mass of other individuals is
needed to participate in collective action for the cooperation equilibrium to hold (this is
a typical assurance game). However, those who what to cooperate must feel that their
willingness to cooperate is shared by many others. It was found that the local
management institution provides the necessary assurance for those who want to
cooperate that others will obey the rules (free riders might be sanctioned), encouraging
everybody to participate in local collective action since the outcome is preferred.
Therefore, individual fishermen's strategies depend on their expectations of the
behaviour of other fishermen in the area.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS
AND FURTHER RESEARCH ARISING FROM THE STUDY
11.1 Introduction
This chapter is devoted to summarizing the study and to highlighting its findings
and implications for the Omani fishery. The chapter begins by presenting the important
findings of this research. The chapter will proceed then to present the implications of
the study. Finally, the chapter evaluates the limitation of this study and presents
guidance for future research..
11.2 Background Summary
The coastal fisheries of the Sultanate of Oman are a vital part of the livelihoods
of large sections of the population in the country, and the issue of how to prevent their
over-exploitation as demand for fish grows is of great importance for development
policy in Oman. The inshore fisheries resources have witnessed the symptoms of
overfishing especially the high value commercial species. Overexploitation of fish
resources in South Al-Batinah results from unrestrained access to the fishery leading to
a steady increase in the number of fishermen and fishing vessels over the years. This has
been coupled with a relatively lower input prices for fishing vessels and gear which are
available secondhand, making access to the fishery simple. On the other hand,
traditional conventions and informal social sanctions relating to the use of fish resources
have been replaced by unenforceable legal and administrative measures. This has
marginalized the fishermen's initiatives to coordinate their usage pattern and to exclude
outsiders from entering their communities.
Overexploitation of fish resources in Oman and particularly in South Al-Batinah
result from a number of reasons. One reason is the rapid change in the institutional
setting in Oman. The traditional fisheries laws (Senat Al-Bahar or the local fisheries
management institution) which were governed by Islamic rules as well as customary
rules (established practices) have been changed. Historically, the laws of  Senat Al-
Bahar were used to govern the fish resources in the country. The objective is always to
258
define responsibilities, conserve the fishery and limiting personal and communal
disputes. With modern fisheries management, the government has declared all fish
resources to be a national resource and thus it empowers the relevant governmental
agencies to develop and protect these resources according to laws declared by Royal
Decree. The result of the new fisheries management institutions has been a need for
more coordination of policies between the various governmental agencies involved with
fisheries management. Each agency currently designs and implements policies aimed at
achieving each agency's objectives. Different of interest and some duplication of effort
has occurred.
The fisheries sector, particularly the traditional sector, is a significant sector in
the Omani economy. It provides substantial employment opportunities for coastal
inhabitants in addition to its contribution to the national GDP, foreign exchange and the
provision of an important source of animal protein. The traditional fishery constitutes
the most important sub-sector, accounting for around 80 percent of the total fish
landings during the last twenty years. However, as indicated in the Chapter Two, the
landings of the traditional fishery have showed declining trends for several years since
1980s. The decline in the landings of this sub-sector can be attributed to overfishing in
inshore waters.
Given the failures of the current state management institution to address the
problem of overfishing and to protect the livelihoods of the fishermen, it is important to
search for an alternative solution. Cooperation among resource users to manage their
resources has been regarded as an alternative to the expensive and often inappropriate
management by the state. It is the aim of the present study to examine the factors that
influence fishermen's decisions to participate in collective action.
A theoretical framework was developed for this study based on the theory of
common property resources, concepts of institutional analysis, the theory of public
goods and game theory. The framework was essential for examining how institutions
and individuals and other physical and village attributes account for the failure or
success of collective action among fishermen to manage their fishery. Data collected
from a cross-sectional survey on 194 vessels' owners in South Al-Batinah (Sultanate of
Oman) were used to examine the propositions and hypotheses derived from the
literature review.
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11.3 Summary of Results by Objective
The four objectives presented in Chapter One provide the foundation for the
study of collective action among fishermen in South Al-Batinah. These objectives
covers: (a) the assessment of the structure, standard of living and other activities of
fishermen in the study area, and to assess fishermen's awareness of the status of the
resources; (b) investigation of institutional characteristics which may enhance
fishermen's effort to participate in collective action to coordinate resource use; (c)
investigation of the factors which are influential on individual fishermen's decisions to
cooperate and (d) investigation of the influence of group size and group homogeneity on
individual fishermen's collective decisions to manage their fishery. Results related to
these objectives are presented here.
(a) Objective One
Fishermen in the study area were found to have a common language, to share the
same religious belief and originate from the same race; thus, they are more or less
homogeneous with respect to the above factors. In such groups, rules are easier to
formulate and enforce because fishermen's behaviour tends to be more predictable, thus
it seems likely that they will be able to establish institutions to manage the resources at
low cost. Homogeneity coupled with high interdependence between fishermen in their
daily lives in those small villages makes social ostracism enough to induce compliance
with the rules.
The fishermen's average age was 44.4 years, and they have a relatively low level
of educational attainment. The low level of education coupled with lack of skills make
them highly dependent on the fishery. Regarding family size, the results indicate that
the household size is relatively large resulting from a relatively high population growth
in the country (3.5 percent in 1993). Large household size coupled with a shortage of
employment opportunities in South Al-Batinah at present could accelerate the pressure
on fish resources in coastal areas.
To diversify the household income, fishermen in the study area are undertaking
supplementary occupations beside their fishing occupation. It was found that 29 percent
of the sampled fishermen have jobs that provide a secure and sustainable source of
income; thus, 71 percent of the sampled vessel owners are economically dependent on
incomes derived from fishing. Furthermore, income from fishing accounts for a
260
substantial amount of the total individual vessel owner's income, indicating a high
economic dependence on the fish resources. It was found that income from fishing
accounted for 74 percent of the total vessel owner's income, while non-fishing income
represent 26 percent only. The extent of the coastal fishery as a proportion of the total
household income was also examined. The findings of this study indicate that fish
resources are very prominent to the livelihoods of coastal inhabitance. Among the
households included in this study, the proportion of income based directly on the fishery
was 40 percent, representing significant contributions.
The results indicate that the average income of boat owners from fishing is
higher than the national minimum wage but slightly lower than the national GDP per
capita and the fisheries GDP per capita. The analysis of income distribution using the
Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient indicate that there is a great disparity in income
distribution between fishermen. It was found that the income of the top 20 percent is
around nine times higher than the incomes of the bottom 20 percent. The results of the
Gini coefficient analysis show that the highest income inequality is in Suwaiq, while the
lowest is in Barka.
The study found that fishermen use a variety of fishing gear in order to diversify
their income from fishing. The results prove that more fishing effort has been added into
the fishery. Fishermen in the area own more or less similar fishing vessels in terms of
size, hull construction and engine horsepower. Fishermen, therefore, can be considered
as a homogenous group with respect to the characteristics of the fishing fleet. Therefore,
obstacles to achieve collective action are unlikely to occur as agreements to restrain the
take from the fishery become easier as the difference in the characteristics of the fishing
vessels among owners is negligible (Johnson and Libecap, 1982).
The study suggests that fishermen in the study area are more or less homogenous
in many respects. However, the higher income inequality could be an obstacle to
collective action as agreements to restrain the take from the fishery become more
difficult as the difference in endowments among agents increases. As argued by Libecap
(1994), "in many common pool settings where user groups are heterogeneous, change
in property institutions involve the risk of being made worse off for some group
members, especially those who are profitable under the status quo".
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The study also found that fishermen were in general in agreement on the status of
the fishery. They perceived the problem of declining stocks in their fishery as either
severe or extreme. Fishermen were also aware of the factors that cause their fishery to
be depleted_ High awareness of the resource exploitation problems, the factors
responsible for these problems and the potential benefit from cooperation might induce
fishermen in the area to work collectively to avoid their well-being been jeopardized.
When individual benefits exceed individual costs and summation technology applies,
the group is fully privileged and the public goods will be provided (Sandler, 1992; p.
44).
(b) Objective Two
The study found that small changes in institutions could change the incentive
structure facing individual fishermen. This is proved mathematically in Chapter Four to
demonstrate alternative institutional structure that may be used for mitigating the
potentially disastrous consequences of completely open access or unregulated common
property. Examples of communities that developed institutions for placing constraints
on individuals' exploitation of the resources, thereby avoiding some of the problems of
overexploitation of open access are legion, as suggested in the literature (see Baland and
Plateau, 1996 and Ostrom, 1990) and demonstrated by the findings of this study. The
resulting institutions to govern the resource involve neither wholly open access for
everyone to an unpriced resource nor the assignment of exclusive rights to a particular
group that then hires out the rights to appropriate the resource. In most of these
communities, access to the resources is restricted to members of a certain community
where systems for restricting individual use of the resource are imposed (Comes and
Sandler, 1996; p. 60).
In the present study, two institutional structures were compared, open access and a
regulated common property. While in the former, individuals' use of the resources is not
restrained (proportional-sharing rule), the latter regime adopts a system in which the
total output is shared among the members at the end of any day (equal sharing rule). It
was proved mathematically that the dominant strategy of individual fishermen under the
proportional-sharing rule is universal defection. However, modifying the sharing rule
changes the non-cooperative game into a game in which the dominant strategy of all
fishermen is to cooperate. Mathematically, it is proved that the equal shares rule can
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produce an outcome opposite to that characterized by Hardin (1968) as the tragedy of
the commons. The findings presented in Chapter Four demonstrate clearly that under
the equal-sharing rule an individual's decision to devote more fishing efforts forces the
negative externalities of his action back into his own incenti% e structure. In such a
situation he has to share the consequences of his excessive fishing effort with all other
fishermen. The structure of incentives is fundamentally altered by the adoption of this
sharing rule.
The empirical results indicated that there is a management institution that
governs the fishing activities of the fishermen in the study area. Fishermen in the area
inherited an indigenous management institution, which vas established hundreds of
years ago. The institution addresses the problems associated with their activities in
fishing and governs the use of the fishery. Many local accords were devised by the local
institution to address common problems faced by fishermen, of which many are still in
use. The local institutions provide the enforcement mechanism needed to regulate
fishermen's behaviour. Although the local institutions in current form seem to address
provision problems, there is some evidence that fishermen in the area have devised rules
to conserve important fisheries from depletion (appropriation problems).
The study indicates that the capabilities of the local institution have been
undermined as the result of the centralised approach to resource management by the
state. The results of the thesis suggests that the modernisation process that has been
taken place in the country during the last thirty years has tended to make collective
action at village level to manage the fishery increasingly difficult.
The new system of fisheries management made access to the fishery simple and
encouraged many non-fishermen to enter the fishery. This has transformed the fishery
from a common property to an open access. Communities' ability to exclude non-
fishermen was limited because legally they can no longer prevent those who hold a
fishing licence from fishing. The inability by the authorities to define resource user
boundaries fully, inhibited monitoring and enforcement of the local institution although
it was evident that some rules were still followed. Therefore, the entry of people from
outside the fishing village has eroded local collective arrangements and the dependence
of the local institution on social ostracism and moral norms to preclude certain activities
has been hampered.
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(c) Objective Three
The study findings strongly suggest that the majority of the traditional fishermen
in the study area are aware of the ongoing process of resource depletion and the extent
of damage done. The study also found that they are aware that their harvesting activities
are directly responsible for the degradation of their fishery, thus they have a correct idea
about their own responsibilities for the current status of the fishery. The results of
testing a number of hypotheses (hypothesis 3,4,5, and 6) concerning fishermen's
awareness of the resources exploitation problems showed that awareness of resources
exploitation problems has a significant influence on individual willingness to participate
in local collective action efforts.
Other important reasons which may account for collective action succes, are a
high economic dependence on the fishery and individual's social identity as fishermen.
The study found a significant positive relationship between fishermen's economic
dependence on the fishery and their individual decision to cooperate in managing their
fishery (hypothesis 1). Therefore, the chances of successful collective action would be
high in villages where income from fishing is a large share of the total household
incomes. However, Jodha reminds us that when people are subject to the pressure of
survival constraints and other needs they would use a high rate to discount future
income, especially when markets for use rights over the resources are highly imperfect
(Jodha, 1992; p. 62). Social identity, on the other hand, was found to influence
individual decisions in managing the commons (hypothesis 2). This strongly suggests
that in an open access situation, when people from outside the fishing village enter the
fishery they will not comply with the rules of the Senat Al-Bahar. This weakens the
function of the local institution and makes local collective arrangements to restrain the
take from the fishery difficult to achieve. The positive significant relationship between
fishermen's social identity and their willingness to cooperate indicates that those who
identify themselves more strongly as fishermen would cooperate more in the commons
than those who did not identify themselves strongly as fishermen. This is because
fishermen inherit fishing rules and fishing knowledge from their fathers and
grandfathers; thus, they tend to have strong awareness that their activities might harm
their fishery compared to newcomers.
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The study found that fishermen's profiles do not seem to have a significant
influence on fishermen's decision to participate in collective action apart from
education attainment, which emerged as causing a negative impact on fishermen's
willingness to cooperate (hypothesis 7). Furthermore, the study found that vessel
characteristics have no influence on fishermen's decisions to participate in collective
action (hypothesis 8). This finding was not surprising, as earlier results confirmed that
fishermen in the study area are using vessels of more or less similar characteristics.
Fishermen's cooperation appears to be influenced by individuals' risk aversion
(hypothesis 9). The findings suggest that situation of high risk and uncertainty plays a
crucial role in fishermen's decision to participate in collective action. The findings
indicate that there is a significant positive relationship between risk aversion and
attitude toward cooperation. However, the assumptions made regarding the relationship
between perception of risk and fishermen's willingness to cooperate in managing the
commons need to be explored further. Two indicators were used to measure fishermen's
risk aversion: debt to asset ratio and number of fishing gears types owned. Among the
two indicators used to operationalize perception of risk, one indicator (number of gear
types owned) supports the hypothesis, but the other one (debt/asset ratio) does not
support it (the hypothesis holds true for Suwaiq only). The results indicate that the
higher the D/A ratio (less risk averse) and the more the number of fishing gear types
owned (less risk averse), the lower the fishermen's willingness to cooperate'. In such
situations, a fisherman with a less risk averse attitude will not take the offer of a
cooperating game, as there is no guarantee that others will not defect and make him a
"sucker". It is anticipated that when productivity benefits from collective action are
considered certain, more risk-averse fishermen are likely to expend greater conservation
effort in order to avoid future losses in the fishery productivity and revenue
(Kalaitzandonakes and Monson, 1994 and Robison and Barry, 1987; cited from
Femandez-Comejo et al., 1994).
A linear regression model was built to predict fishermen's attitude toward
cooperation. The results of the model indicated fishermen's awareness of the resources
exploitation problems appears to be the best predictor of fishermen's attitude toward
cooperation followed by perception of risk. Economic dependence on fishing came in
As they have high investment in the fishery, they try to reduce their business risk by avoiding a
cooperative strategy.
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the third place, followed by social identity. The results of the regression model indicate
that these four variables were statistically significant in explaining variation in the
dependent variable "willingness to cooperate". The four variables alone explained 24
percent of the variation in the dependent variable.
(d) Objective Four
As indicated above, the study found that there are a number of factors that can
be used to predict the success or failure of collective action. The findings of this study
strongly suggested that group size does not have any significant influence on individual
willingness to participate in local collective action (hypothesis 10).
The conditions for a privileged group may depend on the technology of
publicness and its relationship to the underling game structure (Sandler, 1992). When
individual's benefits exceed individual costs and summation technology applies, the
group is fully privileged and the public goods will be provided. In this case the number
of players would have no effect whatsoever on whether the good is provided; group size
is irrelevant (Sandler, 1992; p. 40). If provision costs are shared among group members
regardless of contributors, then individual cost will fall with group size. When
individuals' costs fall with overall group size, then the fall in individuals' fraction of the
group gain may be offset by the decline in cost, hence ensuring that the group is
privileged. But sharing the provision costs among group members depends largely on
institution rules. Sandler (1992) states that the requirement for a privileged group to
form is more dependent on the underlying game structure, which, in turns depends on
tastes, cost and the technology of publicness, rather than the number of players
involved. The changing institutional forms challenges the influential predictions that
only state or market solutions can allocate and protect common resource (Kurien, 1995).
The present study also challenges the assumption that those who are caught in a
"commons dilemma" would rarely invest time and money in the design and supply of
institutions to conserve it.
Therefore, the finding of this study rule out the direct effect of group size on the
success or failure of collective action which is consistent with the findings of Baland
and Platteau (1996); Chamberlin (1974); Comes and Sandler (1996); Salim (1996);
Sandler (1992) and Wade (1988).
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The study considers further the relationship between group heterogeneity and the
success of collective action. Three indicators of group heterogeneity were included in
hypothesis testing (ethnical divisions; differences in the nature of interests various
individuals may have in a particular collective action and income inequality). The study
does not test the effect of the first source of heterogeneity because the study groups are
culturally homogenous and thus ethnic and cultural differences were not included as an
independent variable. The study findings indicated that while the second sources of
heterogeneity (difference in objectives and interests) are considered as causing a strong
obstruction to collective action (hypothesis 11), the same cannot be said about the
difference in the distribution of income (hypothesis 12). More inequality does not
necessarily lead to more efficient use of natural resources; thus, Olson's (1965)
exploitation hypothesis was ruled out.
Game theory analysis of the decision choice of individual fishermen when
facing a common dilemma has made clear that enforcement of the agreed-upon rules
can be carried out effectively by the users themselves. The findings of this study
strongly suggest that fishermen in South Al-Batinah have initiated collective action to
overcome some of the problems they are facing in their fishery. It was clearly
demonstrated throughout this thesis that modelling the fishermen's behaviour in the
study area using the Prisoners' Dilemma game seems unrealistic as revealed by previous
theoretical and empirical studies, as well as the findings of this study, as this game does
not account for the variability and complexity of resource use conditions.
To illustrate cases of successful collective action in the study area, many
provisional and appropriation problems were conceptualised using game theory. The
results of the analysis of the two fishermen game strongly suggests that in most of these
cases fishermen have no dominant strategy, but there were two Nash equilibria in pure
strategy in which one fishermen cooperates while the other defects. The payoff structure
(similar to that of a Chicken game) depicts that each fisherman prefers the other to
cooperate while he defects. At the same time, both avoid universal defection (the worst
payoff) in which one is willing to contribute if he believes that his opponent will not
Therefore, both maximize their benefit by coordinating their actions. To maximize their
benefits and to avoid the worst outcome, fishermen were seen to depend heavily on the
rules devised by the local institution (Senat Al-Bahar). Rules such as "first entrant into
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the fishing spot has the right to fish", the "distance rule" and many others are usually
used to coordinate fishermen's actions to solve commons dilemmas.
Modelling the overall level of cooperation suggests that fishermen's behaviour in
the study area is best represented by an assurance game in which there is no dominant
strategy, but there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria in which no one contributes or
all contribute. In this situation alternative outcomes depend largely on optimistic
expectations about mutual behaviour of all fishermen in the group. The study found that
what makes fishermen hold optimistic expectations about the behaviour of others is the
presence of a local management institution.
Broader conclusions regarding individual cooperation in the commons may be
drawn here. As suggested in the literature and demonstrated by the findings of this
study, individuals using a common resource are faced by various "assurance" and
"chicken" problems. In both the PD game and the Assurance game, the preferred
outcome is mutual cooperation. Whereas the predicted outcome of the former is
defection, however, the latter suggests the possibility that the preferred outcome (i.e.,
cooperation) will occur, because individuals' decisions in the commons are influenced
by a complex set of factors, rather than strictly materialistic self-interest. The analysis
presented in this study examined several of those factors for their influence on
individual behaviour.
11.4 Theoretical Implications
As no previous attempt has been made to assess the collective choice of
fishermen in Oman this study will be the first to appear on this type. An understanding
of the factors influencing fishermen's decisions to provide a collective good will
certainly foster the required preconditions to achieve a sustainable management of fish
resources in the county.
The findings of this study rule out the direct effect of group size on the success
or failure of collective action. This was confirmed by comparing the fishermen's mean
level of cooperation in the three towns included in this study. Thus Olson's (1965)
assumption of the relationship between the provision levels and group size was not
supported. The study further ruled out the direct effect of income inequality on the
efficient use of natural resources, thus Olson's (1965) exploitation hypothesis was not
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supported. The study further suggests that the success of collective action is very
complex, involving a host of other factors. The most significant conclusion of this study
is the importance of the institutional considerations in anticipating future participation
in collective action. The presence of a local management institution to coordinate the
fishermen activities in the study area is the key factor for the success of collective
action. Game theory analysis of the decision choice of individual fishermen when facing
a common dilemma has made clear that enforcement of the agreed-upon rules can be
carried out effectively by the users themselves. They study shows that the presence of
proper institutional rules changes the payoff structure of the game from that of the
Prisoners' Dilemma to a payoff structure similar to the Privileged, Assurance or a
Chicken game.
The results strongly suggest that awareness of resources exploitation problems
and the potential benefits from cooperation have a significant influence on individual
willingness to participate in local collective action efforts. Economic and social
considerations are also important in predicting the success of collective action. Factors
such as economic dependence on the fishery and perception of risk were found to
dominate the decision about participation in collective action. The results further
indicate that social factors such as individual identity as a fisherman was also found to
influence fishermen's decision to participate in local collective efforts. Personal profile
and characteristics were found to have no significant influence on fishermen's attitudes
and decisions.
The traditional conventions and informal social sanctions relating to the use of
fish resources have been replaced by unenforceable legal and administrative measures.
This has marginalized the fishermen's initiatives to coordinate their usage pattern and to
exclude outsiders from entering their communities. It was clearly demonstrated
throughout this thesis that modelling the fishermen's behaviour in the study area using
the Prisoners' Dilemma game seems unrealistic as revealed by previous theoretical and
empirical studies and proved by the findings of this study. The results therefore
challenge the influential predictions that only state or market solutions can protect
common resources. Government attempts to regulate fishermen's activities proved
ineffective. Furthermore, the findings of this study have made clear that enforcement of
the agreed-upon rules can be carried out effectively by the users themselves. This does
not mean that government support to local management should be ruled out.
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Historically these local management institutions in Oman are backed up by the legal
systems. Some form of co-management should be implemented where the
responsibilities to regulate the fishery are shared between the state and the users.
Therefore, fishermen's involvement in the management of fish resources must be
considered in the Ministry's plans to manage the fishery effectively.
During his visit to the country to carry out the field work to collect the data for
this study (Jamiary to April 1998), the researcher had several meetings with officials in
the Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery Resources, including the Minister His
Excellency Dr. Ahmed Al-Rawahi. The researcher explained the benefits of a collective
action approach toward fisheries management, which received positive responses from
many staff in the Ministry, including the Minister himself. Some official staff in the
Ministry to whom the researcher spoke during his recent visit to Oman (April 1999),
indicated that the Ministry is proposing a study to establish a Fisheries Management
Council in each town. The council will include local fishermen, sheikhs (heads of tribe
in each village) and some government officials in each town. The council will be
involved in the management of the coastal fish resources. The traditional conventions
and informal social sanctions relating to the use of fish resources (Senat Al-Bahar) will
be supported. The researcher believes that his efforts in this regard have borne fruit even
before the findings of his study have been made available to the Ministry's staff
Therefore, the implications of the findings of this study for the management of the
Omani coastal fisheries are significant. Presenting these findings to the Ministry's
officials will trigger their attitude toward a co-management approach for the
management of the coastal fish resources in the country.
11.5 Management Implications
As illustrated above, the findings of this research give support for more
involvement of fishermen in the management of their fishery. Certainly these findings
demonstrate the need for a change in previous Government policies regarding the form
of resource regulation. The Government is advised to show a quicker and stronger
determination to reverse its previous policy (nationalization of the coastal fish
resources) by making a radical shift towards fishermen-based fisheries management.
Changq of legislation can be carried out by a Royal Decree to give local communities
greater responsibilities to manage their fish resources. Special district committees of
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fishermen (Fisheries Management Council in each town) representing different fishing
villages should be established to make the rules of the fishery (e.g., allowable fishing
times, which gear is allowed on which fishing grounds, etc.). In addition a public
enforcement agency should be established to assure that the rules crafted by fishermen
are being obeyed.
The following suggestions can serve as the bases for the nature of relationship
between the Government and the fishermen in the form of a co-management regime:
(a) The Government can process crucial information on coastal fisheries and inform the
fishermen of external effects they may produce as well as providing technical
assistance to the fishermen by disseminating new practices aimed at ensuring
preservation and optimal exploitation of the fishery (e.g., advising fishermen to
use more selective fishing gears). This will help fishermen to assess the changes
that have taken place as a result of their activities, and what remedial action need
to be taken. The Government can also provide a legal framework by which local
communities can get legally enforceable recognition of their identity and rights.
The government can also improve the efficiency of local management groups by
promoting competition among local management organization by forecasting
information on best practices to manage the fish resource.
(b) Fishermen on the other hand can be involved in a number of issues in a co-
management regime concerning the use of their resources. Users groups can
inform the govenunent of any local ecological changes like a decline in the catch
of a particular fish species. Because they are well informed about their local
conditions, fishing grounds and the fishery overall, they can be responsible to
craft fishing rules and adjust them over time as required by local conditions.
Fishermen can also be responsible for local conflict-resolution mechanisms to
solve interpersonal disputes cheaply and effectively on the spot as well as
conflicts arises between communities on fishing.
Of course, the extent to which socio-professional fishermen's organizations can
undertake these functions is constrained by the weakness of local communities. The
stronger the communities in one or several of the above functions, the more the
responsibilities the Government should hand to them. For example, communities which
possess strong determination to initiate collective action should perform many of the
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above functions. Therefore, the present study and similar studies are of paramount
importance and a prerequisite before deciding on what form of fisheries regulation
should be practiced and/or which users groups should be given some functions
concerning the management of local fisheries.
11.6 Limitations of the Study
The primary limitations of this research can be summarized in the following
points:
(a) The scope of this study is confined to fishermen of South Al-Batinah coast.
However, the methodology adopted could be applied to cover all fishermen along
the coastline to see if differences are likely to occur among different regions.
Similar study could be carried out in a fishery of another country, especially the
Arabian Gulf countries.
(b) Like any other survey research, this research may be limited by the fact that the
questions may have been interpreted by the respondents differently than intended,
and answers to some questions may have influenced answers to others.
(c) The findings of this study depend largely on cross-sectional data which reflect the
socioeconomic conditions as well as collective decisions of those included in the
sample at the time of the survey. Institutions are always changing; thus, follow up
investigations would enable comparison of institutional performance over time.
11.7 Significance of the Study
This study and the formulation of its aim and objectives transcend the restricted
population of fishermen in South Al-Batinah, and this has implications for the whole
fisheries of Oman. As no previous attempt has been made to assess the collective choice
of fishermen in Oman this study will be the first to appear on this type. An
understanding of the factors influencing fishermens' collective decision to provide a
collective good will certainly allow policymakers to foster the required preconditions to
achieve a sustainable management of fish resources in the country. It is intended that a
longer term outcome of the study will be the development of a feasible model for the
management of the coastal fish resources in Oman. The Government has been exerting
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efforts to diversify the economy by increasing the contributions of the fisheries sector.
This study aims to contribute to these efforts by raising issues that might enhance the
productivity of fish resources in Oman, thus increasing their contributions to the
national economy.
11.8 Directions for Further Research
The implications for further research apply to theoretical development and the
methodology used for testing the emerging propositions. The study, therefore suggests
the following avenues for future research:
(a) Assumptions regarding the relationship between individuals' social identity as
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate in managing the commons need to be
explored further. Among the three indicators used to operationalize respondents'
social identity, two indicators (years fishing and principal work) supported the
hypothesis, but the other one (family involvement) did not support it. The
contradictory results of testing the social identity hypothesis (hypothesis 2) for the
different indicators of social identity suggest the need for considering alternative
operationalizations of social identity for their relevance to cooperation in the
management of fish resources. The same procedure can be applied to the
assumption regarding the relationship between perception of risk and fishermen's
willingness to cooperate. The contradictory results of testing the risk aversion
hypothesis (hypothesis 9) suggest the need for considering alternative
operationalizations of risk aversion for its relevance to cooperation in the
management of fish resources.
(b) This study can serve as the basis for additional research in Al-Batinah coast.
Another field visit would enable comparison of the fishermen's socio-economic
conditions and their collective decisions over time. Other fisheries in Oman should
be studied using the same framework developed in this study in order to determine
if the proposed framework is applicable elsewhere, and to determine whether the
results of this research can be extended to other countries with similar cultural and
socioeconomic infrastructure such as the Arabian Gulf Countries as well as other
geographical areas such as Africa, South East Asia and Latin America.
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Appendix 1
The University of Hull
Institute of Food Health Quality
Questionnaire for vessel owners on:
Social and economic factors influencing collective action in a
traditional fishery of South Al-Batinah, Oman
Dear fisherman,
My name is flamed Al-Oufi, an assistant lecturer at Sultan Qaboos University,
Oman, and I am currently pursuing my studies at the University of Hull, England, under
the supervision of Dr. Andrew Palfreman, a senior lecturer in fisheries economics. I am
carrying out a questionnaire survey to collect data about the traditional fisheries sector
which will be used for a Ph.D thesis. My topic concerns the factors that may influence
the collective activities in coastal communities. I am interviewing fishermen in this
village and will be grateful if you can participate in this interview.
You were selected randomly from the 1995 boat census carried out by the Ministry
of Agriculture and Fisheries.
The contents of this questionnaire are absolutely confidential and only be used for
the purpose of this research. Information identifying you will not be disclosed under any
circumstances. Your co-operation in this survey is very important for the success of this
study. Under no circumstances will your name be linked to the data of this work or any
related work.
Thank you very much for your time and co-operation.
Hamed Said Al-Oufi (Assistant Lecturer)
Sultan Qaboos University
College of Agriculture
Department of Fisheries Science and Technology
Al-Khod, P.O.Box 34, CN 134. OMAN
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to2. Time: from	
3. Town 	
4. Date of interview
5. Census No.
Village 	
Appendix 1
(Continued)
A. General information
1. Serial No.
B. Fishing assets
Bl. Fishing vessel/s owned
Item Vessel I Vessel II Vessel III
1.Length (ft)
2. Year acquired
3. Cost of acquisition
4. Method of acquisition
1. own finance
2. loan (source) 
B2.En ne
- 
Item Engine I Engine II Engine III
1. HP
2. Year acquired
3. Cost of acquisition
4. Method of acquisition
1. own finance
2. loan (source) 
B3. Fishing Gears
-
Item Gear I Gear II Gear ILI Gear IV Gear V
1. Type of gear
2. No. of units
3. Year acquired
4. Fish species
5. Depth (fin)
6. Sale per trip
7. Season
8. Cost of acquisition
9. Method of acquisition
1. own finance
, 2. loan (source) 
291
Appendix 1
(Continued)
B4. Fishing Accessories and Other Assets Owned
Item Name of accessories and other assets
Farm House Net hauler
No. owned 
C. Fishing activities and fish marketing:
C5. Number of crew 	
C6. How many days per month do you fish on average? 	
C7. When do you normally not fish in a month? (explain) 	
C8. And why? 	
C9. Where do you sell your catch? (State the auction name and commission charged)
C10 How much are your fuel and lubrication costs per trip? OR 	
C11. How much are your other costs (food, ice, etc.) per trip? OR	
C12. How do you share the catch? Boat	  %, Crew
	 %, Owner 	 %
D. Fish resources current status
D13. Do you think the fishery of your community is declining?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
D14. How would you describe the problem of declining fishery here- No problem,
Moderate, Severe, or Extreme?
No problem	 1	 Severe 	 3
	
Moderate 	 2	 Extreme 	 4
D15. Have you noticed a decline in the quantity of some species in your catch
compared with the past?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
D15.1. List those species 	
D16. Have you noticed that a species has disappeared completely from your catch?
D17. What makes fishery resources decline? (Explain)
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No 	 3
III MI
NI
IN
III
OM NI
III MII
NI
III
MI
NI
A	 I	 D
(3)	 (2)	 (1)
1.1
CD
CI
CI
Appendix 1
(Continued)
D18. As far as you know, do you think overfishing in this area could be stopped?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
D18.1 If "Yes", how should it be done?
D18.2. Have you personally done anything to get the community to take action to
reduce overfishing in this area?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure
	 2
D18.3 If "Yes", what have you done?
	
Instruction for section E, F and G
The following statements are regarding your perception towards resources status,
factors that may cause resource to decline, and the consequences of resource
depletion. Please use the scales below to indicate to what extent you agree or
disagree with the following statements. The choice is whether you (1) Disagree
(D), (2) are Indifferent (I), or (3) Agree (A) with the statement.
E. Perception of resources status
A	 I
(3)	 (2)
E19	 Your fish catch per trip declines III III
E20	 Your target species per trip decline III III
E21	 The large fish are difficult to find or catch El III
E22	 We need to spend longer hours looking for fish
then we used to CI MI
E23	 The percentage of trash fish in your daily catch
has increased. NI MI
F. Overfishing:
F24 Fish resources decline if too many vessels are
operating in the same area
F25 Fish resources decline if all vessel are large in
size
F26 Fish resources decline if all vessels use high
horse-powered engines
F27 Fish resources decline if all vessels employ a
large number of nets
F28 Fish resources decline if fishermen use
destructive gear
F29 Fish resources decline if fishermen increase
their fishing time per trip
NI
NI
IN
NI
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(2)	 (1)
IN IN
MI M NI
NI M Ell
MI MI NI
MI MI Ell
Appendix 1
(Continued)
G. The consequence of overfishing:
A
(3)
I
(2)
D
(1)
G30 Your fishing area becomes further away from
your village
MI M IM
G31 Your fishing hours become longer MI MI MI
G32 Your fuel consumption increases II NI Ell
G33 Many fishing areas are barren CI M NI
G34 You have to use more fishing gears to catch fish El MII MI
G35 Your income from fishing declines IM M IN
Instruction for section II:
The following statements are regarding your perception towards externalities.
Please use the scale below to indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with
the following statements. The choice is whether you (1) Disagree (D), (2) are
Indifferent (I), or (3) Agree (A) with the statement.
H. Externalities in coastal fisheries
1136 You may face some difficulty in fishing if too
many vessels operate in a small area
1137 Net entanglement problems often occurs if too
many vessels operate in the same area
1138 You cannot fish in the area where many
colleagues are fishing
H39 Less catch is expected if you operate in the area
which has just been fished by many colleagues
H40 Conflicts among fishermen at sea are rising
I. Collective activities in fishing community:
141 Is it necessary for all fishermen, including you, to work together to prevent
resource depletion?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure
	
2	 No 	 3
142. Do you go fishing in a group?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
142.1. Why or why not ? (explain)	
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(Continued)
143. Do you always help your group members?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
	
143.1. If 143 is yes, in what way? (Explain) 	
144. Do you recognize all fishermen in your village?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
145. Do you have any artificial reefs?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
145.1. Why or why not? (Explain)	
145.2. Did some of your colleagues help you in the construction of the reefs?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
146. What is the method you adopt to avoid the net entanglement
problem?	
J. Factors that may influence collective activities:
1. Group size
J47. How many fishermen operate in the same fishing grounds where you operate?
	 People
348. Are they from your village?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
J49. Do you meet with them after the fishing trip?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
J49.1 If
	 Yes,	 where	 do	 you	 meet?
J49.2 Why
	 do	 you	 meet?
J49.3 How many of you meet regularly? 	
J50. Do you discuss fishing matters?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
2. Fishing technology constraints: 
J51. How could you improve your catch rate?
Enlarge your vessel size 	 1
Increase your engine horse-power
	
2
Use a large number of nets 	 3
Increase fishing time per trip 	 4
Other (Explain)
	
	 5
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(Continued)
J52. Have you heard about the rule that bands the use of drift gill net in areas less
than 30 fathoms depth?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure
	
2	 No 	 3
J53. Do you think this rule will reduce conflicts between fishermen?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
J53.1 Why or why not?
	
J54. Did all fishermen or some of them obey this rule in this village?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
J55. Are you willing to inform the authority about fishermen who violate this rule?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
J56. Are there fishermen use encircling gears in this village?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
J56.1 What are the consequences of this action? 	
J56.2 Are you against the use of this gear in your fishery?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
J56.3 Have you and your colleagues done anything to stop this? 	
3 Institutional factors: 
J57. Do you agree that anybody who does not have a fishing licence should be banned
from fishing?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
J58. Do you agree that breakers of fisheries laws should be penalized
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
J59. Do you think that the quality of the fish resource will improve if current number of
fishing vessels is reduced?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
J60. Have some of you united to resolve conflicts in fishing?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
	J60.1 If "J60" is Yes:	 (a) Explain the conflicts 	
(b) How it was resolved	
J61. Are there rules by which each one knows how he should fish?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
J62	 If "J61" is Yes:
1)How you did	 learn of these?	
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(Continued)
2)Have anyone in your village been penalized because of rules
breaking? (Please explain) 	
J63. Do you think that fishermen from other villages are a threat to the fishery?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
J64. Do you agree that fishermen from other villages should not fish on your fishing
ground?
(Explain)
	
J65. Do you think it will be possible for you and your colleagues to limit other village's
fishermen from fishing here?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2
	
No 	 3
Instruction for section 4: 
The following statements are concern your perception towards the benefits of
collective conservation activities. Please use the scales below to indicate to what
extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. The choice is
whether you (1) Disagree (D), (2) are Indifferent (I), or (3) Agree (A) with the
statement
4. Benefits from Collective Conservation Activities
A	 I
(3)	 (2)	 (1)
J66	 If resources are abundant, you do not require
longer fishing hours to catch the same amount
J67	 If resources are abundant, you require less
fuel to catch the same amount of fish
J68	 If resources are abundant, there will be less
conflicts among fishermen at sea
J69	 Your fishing income will be higher if the
quality of fish resources improves
5. Economic dependence on fishing
J70. Your age at 1st Feb. 1998. 	 years
J71. How many people living together with you?
	
J72. How many years of school did you complete? 	 years
J73. How many people depend on your fishing activities? 	
J74. How many people in your house have a permanent job?
	
J75. The average monthly household expenditure: (OR) 	
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J76. The average monthly household income
Income (OR)
Fishing Other work
1. Respondent
2. Others	 person's kin
a)
b)
c)
d)
Total income 
6. Social identity
J77. How many years have you been a fishermen?	 years
J78 Why do you fish?	
J79. Are there others in your family who have a fisheries related job?
Yes ( )
Kin relation Yes No
1.Father 1 0
2. Sons 1 0
3.Brothers 1 0
4. Uncles 1 0
5. Cousins 1 0
No ( )
J80. Do you have any other occupation beside fishing?
Total score:
Work
	
Time allocated
Fishing
	
Farming 	
Government or private sector 	
Other
J80.1. Why do you do this other work?
	
J80.2. (if doesn't have other work), Would it be easy for you to get another job?
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2
	
No 	 3
K. Attitude towards investment
K81. Are you considering another investment in fishing in the future?
YES NO
New boat 1 2
New motor 1 2
New gear 1 2 I
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K82. If any item in K81 is "Yes" which of the followings will be your source of
finance?
Own-saving 	 1
Borrowed from commercial bank 	 2
Both from own-saving and loan 	 3
Government subsidies/low interest loans 	 4
K83. How	 much is	 your dept at present? 	 (RO)
L. Clubs
L84. What	 are	 the	 major	 problems	 of input	 and	 services
	
procurement?	
L85. Are you in favor of developing fisheries cooperatives in your community to
provide input and service supply.
	
Yes 	 I	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
L86. Are you willing to join the cooperatives if you can get fishing gears and other
fishing inputs at lower prices?
	
Yes 	 1	 Not sure 	 2	 No 	 3
L87. Do you agree that non-member should not sell their catch through the
cooperative?
Yes 	 1
	
Not sure 	  2
	
No 	 3
M. Attitude towards the willingness to cooperate
Did you in the past year Score one unit for each "yes"
Item Yes No
M88 Returned under-sized fish into the sea when caught in your
net
1 0
M89 Set your nets at a distance from other fishermen gears 1 0
M90 Inform on colleagues who break the fishing rules 1 0
M91 Attend workshops arranged by the Ministry of Agriculture
and Fisheries
1 0
M92 Renew your fishing licence and boat licence 1 0
M93 Speak to the head of the tribe about the problem of your
fishery
1 0
M94 Discuss fishing problems frequently with more than one
fisherman
1 0
M95 Participate in a group to resolve conflicts in fishing 1 0
M96 Persuade others to follow fishing rules 1 0
M97 Visit the Governor office to complain about other fishermen
activities in fishing
1 0
M98 Oppose catching Sardine with encircling gears 1 0
M99 Own artificial reefs (number of reefs
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Appendix 3
The Semi-structured Interview
Name: 	
Age: 	
Address 	
Occupation: 	
Experience in the fisheries sector:
	
1. Could you describe the condition of the fishery resources in your area?
2. Describe the technological progress of the fishery that has taken place
during the last 30 years?
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3. Can you talk about the factors that cause the fishery to decline?
4. What is your suggestion to improve the status of the fishery?
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5. Describe the traditional customs or laws that coordinate the activities of
fishermen at sea?
- Do people follow them at present?
- Do you think they can be enforced and how?
6. What is the rule of the religion to shape fishermen's behavior at sea?
7. Are there any form of collective activities taking place in your village?
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The interview process
Pictures show the researcher filling up the questionnaire schedule
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Picture show the researcher interviewing the chief of Senat Al-Bahar  in Barka.
Picture show the researcher interviewing the chief of Senat Al-Bahar  in Al-
Masn'a
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Appendix (5a)
Content Validity
Dear respondent
The following scales are used in a questionnaire which will be administered to boat
skippers in a traditional fishery in Oman. The main objective of the questionnaire is to
identify factors that influence collective choice in a coastal fishery.
I need your help to determine the Content Validity of the scales below. You are
asked here to give your opinion regarding each item and the scale appropriateness and their
relevance to the issue of the scale. Also you are asked to list any area that are pertinent to
the issue measured in the scale but not covered in the items.
Instruction for section A, B and C:
The following statements are concerning fishermen's perception towards status of
current fish resources, fishermen's perception of overfishing and the consequence of
overfishing. Please use the scale below to rate each item for appropriateness and
relevance to the issue measured by each scale. You can list issues that are pertinent to
the issue of the scale but not covered in the items. Please circle one number for each
,line.
A. Status of current fish resources
Statement EA A M FA NA
1. Your fish catch per trip declines 5 4 3 2 1
2. Your target species per trip decline 5 4 3 2 1
3. The large fish are difficult to find or catch 5 4 3 2 1
4. We need to spend longer hours looking for fish then we
used to.
5 4 3 2 1
5. The percentage of trash fish in your daily catch has
increased. 
5 4 3 2 1
(EA) Extremely Appropriate	 (A) Appropriate	 (M) Moderate
(FA) Fairly Appropriate 	 (NA) Not at all Appropriate
Comments:
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(EA) Extremely Appropriate	 (A) Appropriate
(FA) Fairly Appropriate 	 (NA) Not at all Appropriate
(M) Moderate
Appendix (5a)
(Continued)
B. Overfishing:
Statement EA A M FA NA
1. Fish resources decline if too many vessels are operating in
the same area
5 4 3 2 1
2. Fish resources are limited due to small area 5 4 3 2 1
3. Fish resources decline Wall vessel are large in size 5 4 3 2 1
4.	 Fish resources	 decline if all vessels use high horse-
powered engines
5 4 3 2 1
5. Fish resources decline Wall vessels employ a large number
of nets
5 4 3 2 1
6. Fish resources decline if fishermen increase their fishing
time per trip
5 4 3 2 1
7. Fish resources decline if fishermen increase their fishing
days per month
5 4 3 2 1
8. Fish resources decline due to pollution 5 4 3 2 1
9. Fish resources decline due to weather 5 4 3 2 1
Comments:
C. The consequence of overfishing:
Statement EA A M FA NA
1. Your catch contains a high proportion of trash fish 5 4 3 2 1
2. Your fishing area becomes further away from your village 5 4 3 2 1
3. Your fishing hours become longer 5 4 3 2 1
4. Your fuel consumption increases 5 4 3 2 1
5. Many fishing areas are barren 5 4 3 2 1
6. You have to use more fishing gears to catch fish 5 4 3 2 1
7. Your income declines 5 4 3 2 1
I
8. It is in God's hand how much fish remain in the sea 5 4 3 2 1
(EA) Extremely Appropriate 	 (A) Appropriate	 (M) Moderate
(FA) Fairly Appropriate	 (NA) Not at all Appropriate
Comments:
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D. Benefits from collective conservation activities
The following statements are concerning benefits from collective conservation
activities. Please use the scale below to rate each item for appropriateness and relevance
to the issue of the benefits from collective conservation activities. You can list issues
that are pertinent to benefits from collective conservation activities but not covered in
the items. Please circle one number for each line
Statement EA A M FA NA
1. You do not used to fish for long to catch a paying trip. 5 4 3 2 1
2. If fish resources are abundant, you require less fuel to catch
the same amount of fish
5 4 3 2 1
3. If fish resources are abundant, there will be less conflicts
among fishermen at sea	 -
5 4 3 2 1
4. Your fishing income will be higher if the abundance of fish
resources increases 
5 4 3 2 1
(EA) Extremely Appropriate	 (A) Appropriate	 (M) Moderate
(FA) Fairly Appropriate	 (NA) Not at all Appropriate
Comments:
E. Externalities in Coastal Fisheries
The following statements are concerning externalities in coastal fisheries. Please use
the scale below to rate each item for appropriateness and relevance to the issue of
externalities in coastal fisheries. Also you are asked to list issues that are pertinent to
externalities in coastal fisheries but not covered in the items. Please circle one
number for each line
Statement EA A M FA NA
1.	 You may face some difficulty in fishing if too many
vessels operate in a small area
5 4 3 2 1
2. Net	 entanglement problems often occur if too many
vessels operate in the same area
5 4 3 2 1
3. You cannot fish in the area where a colleague is fishing 5 4 3 2 1
4. You cannot fish in the area where many colleagues are
fishing
5 4 3 2 1
5. Less catch is expected if you operate in the area which has
just been fished by many colleagues
5 4 3 2 1
6. Less catch is expected if you operate in the area which has
just been fished by a colleague
5 4 3 2 1
7. Conflicts among fishermen at sea are rising 5 4 3 2 1
(EA) Extremely Appropriate 	 (A) Appropriate	 (M) Moderate
(FA) Fairly Appropriate 	 (NA) Not at all Appropriate
Comments:
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Instruction for section G:
The following statements are measuring fishermen's willingness to cooperate to
manage their fish resources. Please use the scale below to indicate the appropriateness
of the statements listed below. Also you are asked to list issues that are pertinent to
,cooperation but not covered in the items. Please circle one number for each line 
G. Willin ness to coo erate
Item EA A M FA NA
1. You returned under-sized fish into the sea when caught in
your net
5 4 3 2 1
2. Set your nets at a distance from other fishermen gears 5 4 3 2 1
3. Inform on colleague who break the fishing rules 5 4 3 2 1
4.	 Attend	 workshops	 arranged	 by the Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries
5 4 3 2 1
5. Renew your fishing licence and boat licence 5 4 3 2 1
6. Speak to the head of the tribe about the problem of your
fishery
5 4 3 2 1
7. Discuss fishing problems frequently with more than one
fisherman
5 4 3 2 1
8. Participate in a group to resolve conflicts in fishing 5 4 3 2 1
9. Persuades others to follow fishing rules 5 4 3 2 1
10. Participated in reef construction in your village 5 4 3 2 1
11. Share important information 5 4 3 2 1
12.	 Share information about	 fish concentration on the
grounds
5 4 3 2 1
13. Tell your colleague about new technical developments 5 4 3 2 1
14. Share information about low cost sources of supply 5 4 3 2 1
(EA) Extremely Appropriate 	 (A) Appropriate	 (M) Moderate
(FA) Fairly Appropriate 	 (NA) Not at all Appropriate
Comments:
Thank you for your cooperation
Hamed Said Al-Oufi (Assistant Lecturer)
Sultan Qaboos University
College of Agriculture
Department of Fisheries Science and Technology
Al-Khod, P.O.BOX 34, CN 134, Oman
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Content Validity of the Scales
Specialists Responses Analysis
Table (1) Status of current fish resources (N = 11)
Mean.'Statement EA A M FA NA Total
F F F F F F
1. Your fish catch per trip declines 8 2 0 1 0 50 4.55
2. Your target species per trip decline 5 5 1 0 0 48 4.36
3. The large fish are difficult to find or
catch
7 2 2 0 0 49 4.45
4. We need to spend longer hours looking
for fish then we used to.
8 3 0 0 0 52 4.73
5. The percentage of trash fish in your
daily catch has increased. 
4 5 1 0 1 44 4.0
(EA) Extremely Appropriate (A) Appropriate	 (M) Moderate
(FA) Fairly Appropriate 	 (NA) Not at all Appropriate (F) Frequency
Table 2 The causes of overfishin 	 = 11
„
Statement EA A M FA NA Total Mean
F F F F F F
1.	 Fish resources	 decline if too many
vessels are operating in the same area
8 0 1 2 0 47 4.27
2. Fish resources are limited due to small
area
2 3 1 4 1 34 3.09
3. Fish resources decline if all vessel are
large in size
3 5 2 1 0 43 3.90
4. Fish resources decline if all vessels use
high horse-powered engines
4 2 5 0 0 43 3.90
5.	 Fish resources decline if all vessels
employ a large number of nets
8 2 1 0 0 51 4.64
6.	 Fish	 resources decline if fishermen
increase their fishing time per tip
5 5 1 0 0 48 4.36
7.	 Fish resources decline if fishermen
increase their fishing days per month
5 2 3 1 0 44 4.0
8. Fish resources decline due to pollution 2 1 1 6 1 30 2.72
9. Fish resources decline due to weather 1 1 1 5 3 25 2.27
10.	 Fish resources decline if fishermen
use encircling gear 
4 5 3 0 0 49 4.45
(EA) Extremely appropriate 	 (A) Appropriate	 (M) Moderate
(FA) Fairly appropriate	 (NA) Not at all appropriate
(F) Frequency
1 Specialists answers for each item were measured on a scale of five, (EA (5)), (A (4)), (M (3)), (FA (2)),
and (NA (1)). Number of responses in each category is multiplied by the value attached to that category.
Then the scores are aggregated in the total column. The mean is calculated by dividing the total score for
each item by the number of specialists (11).
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(EA) Extremely appropriate	 (A) Appropriate
(FA) Fairly appropriate
(M) Moderate
(F) Frequency(NA) Not at all appropriate
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Table (3) The consequence of overfishing (N = 11)
Statement EA A M FA NA Total Mean
F F F F F F
1. Your catch contains a high proportion
of trash fish
3 6 1 0 1 43 3.91
2. Your fishing area becomes further
away from your village
7 2 2 0 0 49 4.45
3. Your fishing hours become longer 9 1 1 0 0 52 4.73
4. Your fuel consumption increases 7 2 2 0	 " 0 49 4.45
5. Many fishing areas are barren 7 2 1 0 1 47 4.27
6. You have to use more fishing gears to
catch fish
4 4 3 0 0 45 4.09
7. Your income declines 8 1 0 2 0 48 4.36
8. It is in God's hand how much fish
remain in the sea 
1 3 2 1 4 29 2.64
(EA) Extremely appropriate 	 (A) Appropriate	 (M) Moderate
(FA) Fairly appropriate	 (NA) Not at all appropriate	 (F) Frequency
Table (4). Externalities in coastal fisheries (N = 11)
Statement EA A M FA NA Total Mean
F F F F F F
1. You may face some difficulty in
fishing if too many vessels operate in
a small area
3 5 3 0 0 44 4
2. Net entanglement problems often occur
if too many vessels operate in the
same area
6 3 2 0 0 48 4.36
3. You cannot fish in the area where a
colleague is fishing
3 3 2 2 1 38 3.45
4. You cannot fish in the area where
many colleagues are fishing
3 5 3 0 0 44 4
5. Less catch is expected if you operate in
the area which has just been fished by
many colleagues
5 4 1 1 0 46 4.18
6. Less catch is expected if you operate in
the area which has just been fished by
a colleague
4 1 4 1 1 39 3.55
7. Conflicts among fishermen at sea are
rising 
4 2 3 1 1 40 3.64
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(EA) Extremely appropriate 	 (A) Appropriate
(FA) Fairly appropriate
(m) Moderate
(F) Frequency(NA) Not at all appropriate
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Table (5) Willingness to cooperation (N = 11)
Item EA A M FA NA Total Mean
F F F F F F
1. You returned under-sized fish into the
sea when caught in your net
6 3 2 0 0 48 4.36
2. Set your nets at a distance from other
fishermen gears
6 3 2 0 0 48 4.36
3. Inform on colleague who break the
fishing rules
4 5 1 0 1 44 4.0
4. Attend workshops arranged by the
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
4 6 0 0 1 45 4.09
5. Renew your fishing licence and boat
licence
4 4 3 0 0 45 4.09
6. Speak to the head of the tribe about the
problem of your fishery
4 6 0 0 1 45 4.09
7. Discuss fishing problems frequently
with more than one fisherman
4 5 2 0 0 46 4.18
8. Participate in a group to resolve
conflicts in fishing
6 5 0 0 0 50 4.55
9. Persuades others to follow fishing rules 3 4 2 2 0 41 3.73
10. Participated in reef construction in
your village
5 2 2 2 0 43 3.91
11. Share important information 5 2 2 2 0 43 3.91
12. Share information about fish
concentration on the grounds
3 3 4 1 0 41 3.73
13.Tell your colleague about new
technical developments
3 6 1 1 0 44 4.0
14. Share information about low cost
sources of supply
4 2 3 1 1 40 3.6
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Appendix 6 (A)
THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL
INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES INSTITUTE
HULL HU6 7RX • UNITED KINGDOM
TELEPHONE 01-L S2 466421/346311 • FACSIMILE 01482 470129/466205
TELEX 9312134723 HUG
The Vice Chancellor
Sultan Qaboos University
SULTANATE OF OMAN
•
•
14 January 1998
4*.
.1=•n•• ,
f •
Our Ref DAP\MF\Chan
•	 •
•	 .11‘.,..11
••. •
Dear Vice-Chancellor
Mr Al-oufi. H. is currently a full-time student at this University. conducting research studies
leadin g
 to the degree of PhD. His progress has been very satisfactory to date and has been
reviewed in the reports submitted to the Cultural Division of the Oman Embassy in London.
Having completed a review of previous research and formulated a methodology for the
empirical part of his work, he is returning E0 Oman at the end of January to conduct a surrey
of fishermen.
Mr Al-oufi needs adess to information on the fisheries currently held in the Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries. I very much hope that you will be able to facilitate Mr Al-oun's
access to the Ministry for the purpose of his research.
Yours sincerely
/	 z •
.	 1
I 1 '
__u n../,
Dr D A Palfreman
Ceiniour e•-titrer
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Appendix 7
Reliability Analysis
A. Perception of resource status
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)
1. PERCEP1 e19, catch per trip decline
2. PERCEP2 e20 target species decline
3. PERCEP3 e21, large fish diff. to catch
4. PERCEP4 e22, spend longer hours at sea
5. PERCEP5 e23, trash fish high in catch
N of
Statistics for	 Mean Variance	 Std Dev Variables
SCALE
	 6.4227	 4.6183	 2.1490
Item-total Statistics
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Alpha
if Item if Item Total if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Deleted
PERCEP1 5.3196 3.3999 .6486 .6917
PERCEP2 5.3144 3.3359 .6854 .6811
PERCEP3 5.1804 3.0916 .5273 .7120
PERCEP4 5.2320 3.0185 .6343 .6748
PERCEP5 4.6443 2.8314 .3658 .8204
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases = 194.0	 N of Items = 5
Alpha = 0.7568
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(Continued)
B. The causes of overfishing
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE GuAnD4
1. OVER1	 f24, too many vessels
2. OVER2	 f25, large vessel
3. OVER3	 f26, high HP
4. OVER4	 f27, large no of nets
5. OVER5	 f28, destructive gear
6. OVER6	 f29, increase fishing time per trip
N of
Statistics for	 Mean Variance	 Std Dev Variables
SCALE
	
9.7216	 10.0983	 3.1778	 6
Item-total Statistics
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Alpha
if Item if Item Total if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Deleted
OVER1 8.3402 7.3655 .5143 .7180
aVER2 7.7320 6.3112 .6049 .6910
OVER3 7.3918 7.1514 .5345 .7122
OVER4 8.4845 8.0231 .4680 .7320
CVER5 8.4485 8.4248 .3090 .7655
OVER6 8.2113 6.8411 .5667 .7026
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases =	 194.0	 N of Items = 6
Alpha =	 .7575
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(Continued)
C. The consequences of overfishing
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (MAMA)
1. CONSE1 g30, fishing area far from village
2. C0NSE2 g31, fishing hours become longer
3. CONSE3 g32, fuel consumption increased
4. CONSE4 g33, fishing area barren
5. CONSE5 g34, use more fishing gears
6. CONSE6 g35, income decline
N of
Statistics for	 Mean Variance	 Std Dev Variables
SCALE	 6.9330	 4.4877	 2.1184	 6
Item-total Statistics
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Alpha
if Item if Item Total if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Deleted
CONSE1 5.6340 2.6270 .6036 .7483
CONSE2 5.6753 2.9769 .4983 .7734
CONSE3 5.8557 3.5231 .5754 .7531
CONSE4 5.7577 2.9721
.6772 .7180
CONSE5 5.8660 3.6607
.5498 .7616
CONSE6 5.8763 3.7359
.5145 .7684
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases =	 194.0	 N of Items = 6
Alpha =	 .7869
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(Continued)
D. Externalities in coastal fisheries
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)
1. EXRT1 h36, face some difficl. in fishing
2. EXRT2 h37, net entanglement prob.
3. EXRT3 h38, can't fish in area where
4. EXRT4 h39, less catch expected
5. EXRT5 h40, conflicts rising
N of
Statistics for	 Mean Variance	 Std Dev Variables
SCALE	 6.1856	 5.1364	 2.2664	 5
Item-total Statistics
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Alpha
if Item if Item Total if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Deleted
EXRT1 4.7990 2.8972 .6115 .7113
EXRT2 4.8454 2.7946 .7259 .6576
EXRT3 5.0722 3.9015 .5975 .7289
EXRT4 5.0773 3.9888 .5292 .7442
EXRT5 4.9485 3.7901 .3757 .7869
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases =	 194.0	 N of Items = 5
Alpha =	 .7723
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(Continued)
E. Benefits from collective conservation activities
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALMA)
1. BENEFIT1
	
j66, do not require longer fishing hr
2. BENEFIT2	 j67, less fuel to catch the same amount
3. BENEFIT3	 j68, less conflicts
4. BENEFIT4	 j69, fishing income higher
N of
Statistics for	 Mean Variance	 Std Dev Variables
SCALE	 4.5515	 1.0776	 1.0381	 4
Item-total Statistics
Scale	 Scale	 Corrected
Mean	 Variance	 Item-	 Alpha
if Item	 if Item	 Total	 if Item
Deleted
	 Deleted	 Correlation	 Deleted
BENEFIT1	 3.3402
	 .5676	 .2031	 .1532
BENEFIT2	 3.3196
	 .5295
	 .2224	 .1182
BENEFIT3
	 3.5103	 .9973	 .0405	 .3230
BENEFIT4	 3.4845
	 .9039	 .1369	 .2570
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases =	 194.0	 N of Items = 4
Alpha =	 .2903
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(Continued)
F. Fishermen's willingness to cooperate
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE WA4U0
1. COP1 n88. returned undersized fish
2. COP2 n89, set gear at distace
3. COP3 n90, inform on rule broker
4. COP4 n94, attend workshop
5. COP5 n92, renew fishing licence
6. COP6 n93, speak to the head of the trip
7. COP7 n94, discuss fishing prob.
8. COP8 n95,	 participate in a group to resolve
9. COP9 n96, persuade others to follow fishing r
10. COPA10 n97, visit the governer office
11. COPAll n98, oppose catching sardine with encirc
12. COPAl2 own artificail reefs
N of
Statistics for	 Mean Variance
	 Std Dev Variables
SCALE	 7.6546	 7.7609	 2.7858	 12
Item-total Statistics
Scale
Mean
if Item
Deleted
Scale
Variance
if Item
Deleted
Corrected
Item-
Total
Correlation
Alpha
if Item
Deleted
COP1 6.7423 6.8659 .5484 .7402
COP2 6.7371 6.9305 .5195 .7429
COP3 7.1907 6.1862 .5326 .7309
COP4 7.2474 6.8918 .2422 .7675
COPS 6.9536 7.2258 .1315 .7780
COP6 6.9794 6.0418 .6497 .7166
COP7 6.8093 6.6318 .5344 .7360
COP8 7.1907 6.3108 ,4778 .7382
COP9 7.0103 6.4868 .4269 .7447
COPA10 7.3041 6.3518 .4868 .7372
COPAll 6.8454 6.4610 .5706 .7305
COPAl2 7.1907 7.541.) -.0119 .7973
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases = 194.0	 N of Items = 12
Alpha = .7640
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